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THE REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS IN BRITISH GOVERNMENT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

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Harvard University

Out-of-date ideas—if they can only manage to survive long enough—are often put to new and surprising uses. A case in point is British Toryism. This pre-capitalist, pre-individualist, pre-liberal creed, one might think, ought surely to have died out during the 19th century. Yet not only has it survived into the era of socialism, it can also claim credit for having helped build the Welfare State. And today British socialists and Tories—both collectivists in a degree—often have more in common than either have with their fellow Liberals. Old traditions of strong government, paternalism and the organic society have made easier the modern re-assertion of state power.

New policies usually produce new kinds of politics. For every major concept of public policy, Schattschneider has observed, there has been a different theory of political organization.[1] Over a period of decades, British collectivism has created not only a new pattern of policy, but also a new structure of power, especially in the realm of political parties and interest groups. Along with a collectivist theory of policy has arisen a collectivist theory of representation. And the latter, like the former, is today supported in interesting and subtle ways by attitudes and ideas deriving from a distant past. The purpose of this article is to look at the historical background of certain of these attitudes—especially those concerning the role of interest groups in politics.

Over the past two hundred years in Britain, the representation of interests has taken several forms. Each of the principal forms has been associated with a cluster of ideas and sentiments toward government and society in general and toward representation in particular. Such a cluster we may call a theory providing we understand by "theory" not necessarily the product of a political philosopher, but rather an operative ideal of people in politics. The main theories appear to be four: the Old Whig, the Liberal, the Radical and the Collectivist. Older than any of these is one which will be referred to only briefly and which may be called the Old Tory theory of representation.

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[1] Sigmund Neumann (ed.), *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago, 1955), p. 195.

I. THE OLD WHIG THEORY OF REPRESENTATION

While not without rivals at the beginning or at the end of the period, the Old Whig theory was dominant in the eighteenth century. Under the growing challenge of Liberal and Radical theories, it was given explicit and elaborate form as the orthodox defense of the unreformed House of Commons. In spite of the defeat of 1832, it persisted through the nineteenth century and survives today in important respects as a part of the political culture of Britain.

Although the men who used it most in the nineteenth century called themselves Tories, the theory, as Gibbons pointed out, was derived from the conservative Whigs of the previous century, among whom the most articulate was Burke.[2] That it was championed by Burke, however, does not mean that the theory had any great antiquity; and in what ways it was original, as well as those in which it was traditional, may be better understood if we look briefly at a still earlier view. This, the Old Tory theory, prevailed in the 16th century and may perhaps be attributed in succeeding generations to what Keith Feiling has called the "first Tory Party."

That aspect of the Old Tory theory which contrasts with the Old Whig is, naturally, the role it gave to the monarch. In any of these theories of representation, some answer is given to the question: How is the community as a whole to be represented? Who or what is to represent the national interest, in contrast with the special interests of the various groups composing the nation? According to the Old Tory theory, this role belonged above all to the Sovereign, who, as De Grazia has pointed out, was held to be not a mere personal overlord, but the representative head of the corporate community of the realm.[3] In practice this meant that the initiative and decisive influence in questions of public policy were the Crown's preserve, entrenched in its prerogative. As the Lord Keeper warned the Commons at the opening of the Parliament of 1571: they were to "meddle with no matters of state, but such as should be proponed unto them."[4]

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[2] P. A. Gibbons, *Ideas of Political Representation in Parliament, 1651–1832* (Oxford, 1914), p. 36.

[3] Alfred De Grazia, *Public and Republic: Political Representation in America* (New York, 1951), p. 17. I wish to express the great debt which this paper owes to De Grazia's book, especially to his discussion of American ideas.

[4] J. E. Neale, *Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1559–1581* (London, 1953), p. 189.

From such a point of view, the role of the Member of Parliament was what it had been in medieval theory, still in this respect alive in the 16th century. M.P.s were delegates or attorneys for their constituencies, and their principal function, for which they were given "full and sufficient" power, was to bind their constituencies to make good the grants of supply to H.M. And in practice, they were preoccupied with local and special interests. Vast numbers of private bills were promoted by boroughs, crafts, companies and individuals, often in a context of intensive lobbying—as, for example, by the City of London which from the fifteenth century had maintained a handsomely paid agent to look after its interests in Parliament. When in the latter part of Elizabeth's reign, the Commons increasingly took the initiative in matters of public policy, meddling with such questions as the religious settlement, foreign affairs, monopolies, and the succession, the conflicts of the 17th century and the decline of the Old Tory theory of representation were foreshadowed.

In contrast with Tudor theory and practice, this role of representing the community as a whole was given by the Old Whig view primarily not to the Sovereign, but to Parliament. Not until much later was the king in theory or practice completely excluded from politics, but the whole emphasis was changed and a new responsibility created for M.P.s, individually and collectively. Now the members for Bristol, in Burke's famous words,[5] were not only "members for a rich commercial city," but also for the "nation, which, however, is itself but part of a great empire, extended by our virtue and fortune to the farthest limits of the East and of the West." Hence, Parliament was not "a *congress* of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates." It was rather "a *deliberative* assembly of *one* nation, with *one* interest, that of the whole—where not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole." We are so accustomed to thinking of this as a conservative view stated by Burke in reaction to the Radical movement of the 70's and 80's that it does no harm to recall that there was a still older view in light of which Burke's idea was subversive. Algernon Sidney, one of the first to state this new role of the M.P., died at the hands of the conservatives of his day.

The parliamentarism of the Old Whig theory consisted first in this notion of the M.P. as the representative of the whole community, as well as of its component interests. He performed this function in Parliament with his fellows by deliberation on the great questions of state. That is the second element in Old Whig parliamentarism—deliberation. It is, so to speak, a "thought" theory, not a "will" theory, of how the general good is arrived at. As Burke said to his constituents: "If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination." While a member ought to give "great weight" to the wishes of his constituents, he ought never to sacrifice to them "his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience." It followed that what was desired as a member was not the typical or the popular man, but rather the man of wisdom and ability. Rotten boroughs and "influence," therefore, were defended because they could provide seats for those who might not please the ordinary elector, but who had high qualities of mind and character. Lord John Russell himself frequently acknowledged the strength of this argument and gave it as his reason for the toleration shown to a number of rotten boroughs by the Act of 1832.

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[5] In his election speech on November 3, 1774. *The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke* (Boston, 1901), Vol. 2, pp. 89–98.

Parliamentarism ruled out "authoritative instructions" and "mandates" from the electorate. It also ruled out associations formed outside Parliament for the purpose of determining what Parliament ought to do and for pressing these decisions on it as coming from a higher authority. The Yorkshire Association of 1779-80, which in the minds of some of its supporters would command Parliament as "the principal to the delegate,"[6] was regarded as an "anti-parliament."[7] "The people of England collectively," replied Lord North to the demands of the Association, "could only be heard (through) their representatives in Parliament."[8] For similar reasons the House of Commons refused even to receive a petition from the Stamp Act Congress in 1766. A major development in the politics of the 19th century was the immense growth of such associations formed for the purpose of putting pressure on Parliament. Through them public opinion acquired a new and flexible system of channels of political expression.

But if interests were forbidden the use of this device to obtain a voice in government, that does not mean that the Old Whig theory would exclude them from representation. On the contrary, their representation in Parliament was as legitimate as it had ever been in Tudor or medieval times, and indeed, if we follow Burke, even more necessary. For as he described it, the process of deliberation was not performed in isolation. One of its principal starting points was the array of all the "wide-spread interests" of nation and empire which in Parliament "must be considered—must be compared—must be reconciled, if possible." Groups interested in influencing legislation were inhibited from forming voluntary associations to put pressure on Parliament and were obliged to proceed through what the Porritts have called "official outlets." This meant that petitions and other expressions of public opinion outside Parliament were normally expected to come from such bodies as the municipal corporations, the universities, deans and chapters of cathedrals, magistrates in petty sessions and grand juries at quarter sessions and assizes.[9] But so long as interested groups proceeded through such legitimate and restricted channels, they were given a generous role in government. Access to these channels was crucial.

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[6] H. Butterfield, *George III, Lord North and The People, 1779–80* (London, 1949), p. 192.

[7] Richard Pares, *King George III and the Politicians* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 52–53.

[8] Butterfield, p. 341.

The Old Whig view thus involved a definition not only of the mode of representation, but also of the nature of the interests which were considered legitimate. As compared with Liberal and Radical ideas, it conceived of representation as being not of individuals, but rather of corporate bodies, although not in the strict legal sense of the term. The legitimate interests were not shifting groups of individuals who happened to share similar opinions and wishes, as was the case with the great pressure groups, formed as voluntary associations in the 19th century. They were more like the "fixed interests" of modern pluralist theory. Burke attacked the philosophy of natural rights because, among other things, it proposed "personal representation" and failed to recognize "corporate personality,"[10] and for many years one of the charges against parliamentary reformers was that they championed "individual representation" which, in addition to its suggestion of universal suffrage, also implied equal electoral districts in the place of the ancient, unified communities of the old system.

The legitimate interests, in this sense "fixed" and "corporate," were of two broad types, local and functional, although normally in representation one type easily passed over into the other. There were first the local communities united by ancient ties of interest which M.P.'s might and ought to promote in Parliament. Then—of greater importance to us—there were the broad social groupings not confined to a particular place—the various "estates," "ranks," "orders" and—to use the term most commonly employed—"interests," of which the nation and empire were composed. Not individuals but such functional groupings were the basic units of representation along with the local communities. Hence, virtual representation was possible: the M.P. from Bristol, for example, virtually represented not only that city, but also all other places which did not have actual representation in Parliament, but which, as out-ports and centers of shipping and commerce, had common interests with Bristol.

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[9] Edward and Annie Porritt, *The Unreformed House of Commons: Parliamentary Representation before 1832* (Cambridge, 1903), Vol. I, p. 270. "Cockburn, in describing public opinion in the last twenty years of the eighteenth century states that it was 'recognized only when expressed through what were acknowledged to be its legitimate organs,' which meant its formal or official outlets," *ibid.*, p. 270.

[10] Speech in the House of Commons on the state of the representation, 7 May 1782 *Writings and Speeches*, Vol. 7, pp. 92–3.

Present in Burke's general view of society as well as his idea of representation and no doubt going back to Tudor and medieval times, this notion of functional representation was a principal basis of the defense of the unreformed House of Commons. The existing system brought into Parliament not only the men of wisdom and ability needed for deliberation, but also representatives of all the great functional interests. Variety of franchise was defended against uniformity because it enabled a variety of interests to be represented. Rotten boroughs were justified because they opened a parliamentary career to men of the various professional interests. Along with parliamentarism, *the functional representation of interests in the House of Commons is one of the two main poles around which clustered the sentiments and ideas of the Old Whig theory and is that element of the theory which is the strongest and most interesting survival today.*

While for the purposes of exposition Burke's statement of the Old Whig theory has been made central, the leading traits of the theory can be traced through the sixty years of debate over parliamentary reform and achieve a certain definitive form in the great speech of Sir Robert Harry Inglis in reply to Lord John Russell's motion introducing the first reform bill on March 1, 1831. All the essentials are there. Members of Parliament, he said, are not deputies and are not bound by "the cries of a majority of the people" to decide in favor of any change. They represent not a particular place, but the whole empire and should follow the will of their constituents only if it coincides with their "own deliberate sense of right." At the same time, the House is

> the most complete representation of the interests of the people which was ever assembled in any age or country. It is the only constituent body that ever existed, which comprehends within itself, those who can urge the wants and defend the claims of the landed, the commercial, the professional classes of the country; those who are bound to uphold the prerogatives of the Crown, the privileges of the nobility, the interests of the lower classes, . . . the rights of the distant dependencies, of the East Indies, of the West Indies, of the colonies, of the great corporations.

How unnecessary and dangerous to alter a system which provides such wide and balanced representation, which "admits all classes, lets in all interests, and invites all talents"![11]

Was there a distinctive Old Whig theory of party? This is a difficult question and in finding an answer Burke is a poor guide. His definition of party in the broad ideological sense—"a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed"—is neither a good description of the actual parliamentary groups of the time nor a reflection of a generally accepted view of right action. It is inevitable, we may argue with Burke, that men will differ and that, differing, they will organize; hence, once it is granted that Parliament is to determine state policy, party is bound to arise. But the age did not draw this conclusion, or at least did so very reluctantly.[12] A "formed opposition" to Government was commonly and with some sincerity decried—although continually practiced—and the ideal of unity under the Crown flourished in spite of the facts.

Yet if we again make comparison with the Old Tory view something distinctive may be seen. Within the Tudor system the pursuit of power by the right people and the approved methods was permitted, as was the effort to satisfy personal or group interests, so long as they did not concern basic matters of state. Faction, we might say, was legitimate, and familiar examples are provided by Essex, Leicester, Burghley and their clients and their clients' clients at Court and in the country. Party, in the Burkean sense, however, was not only deplorable; it was intolerable. For it meant the usurpation of prerogative to which, as the rising Puritan party in the Commons learned, a Tudor Sovereign could only reply with repression. In contrast the 18th century, in politics as in religion, would tolerate organized dissent, although it deplored it and hoped for unity. To this considerable extent, the Old Whig theory meant that at least a beginning had been made in the legitimizing of party.

II. OLD WHIG PRACTICE OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION

In 1947 the Committee of Privileges of the House of Commons was considering the question whether it was a breach of privilege for a member and any body of persons outside his constituency to enter into an agreement by which the member should pursue a prescribed line in Parliament in return for a salary. In the course of taking testimony Earl Winterton, then the "Father of the House," observed that the question had never been decided. He went on to remark that, nevertheless, "this situation has existed for a very long time. It must have existed in the 18th century when Members' seats were purchased for them?" "That is so, undoubtedly," replied Sir Gilbert Campion, the Clerk of the House.[13]

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[11] *Parl. Deb.*, 3d ser., Vol. II, Cols. 1090ff.

[12] See, for example, Hume's ambiguous attitude toward party in his *Essays, moral, political and literary* (World's Classics edn., London, n.d.), Part I, Essay 9 and Part II, Essay 14.

If we are looking for continuities in the history of the interested M.P., one of the most significant aspects of 18th century politics is the relationship between patron and nominee. This relationship provided a principal theme of parliamentary reformers. In presenting the petition of the Society of the Friends of the People in 1793, Lord Grey stressed as his principal objection the "system of private patronage which is so repugnant to the spirit of free representation."[14] Historians as well as reformers have minutely examined the facts, the most elaborate analysis being provided by Namier, who determined that in 1760 out of 489 English M.P.s, 192 had been returned by patrons, along with 32 others returned by Government influence.[15] This relationship normally involved on the part of the patron the payment of election expenses, as well as the exercise of other kinds of influence, and on the part of the M.P., a very considerable degree of dependence. "If he does not obey the instructions he receives," said Fox, "he is not to be considered a man of honour and a gentleman."[16] Confirming this, the Porritts say that the code governing the relations of patron and member required the member to resign if he parted company from his patron in his voting in Parliament. No less a man than the younger Pitt, for instance, upon being returned from one of Sir James Lowther's pocket boroughs in 1780, wrote of his relations with his patron that "no kind of condition was mentioned but that if ever our lines of conduct should be opposite, I should give him the opportunity of choosing another member."[17] Even when Pitt was a leading member of the House, he reported to Lowther his refusal of an offer from the King to form a Government and promised to explain further his motives.[18]

While this relationship, born of an aristocratic society, had its unique traits, the fact of importance to us is that *the House of Commons since that time seems never to have been without members bearing some such relation to outside persons or bodies.* As Gash has shown, aristocratic patronage flourished, although with declining strength, in and beyond the mid-Victorian era.[19] As aristocracy declined, new forms of patronage arose in the latter part of the 19th century. The form with which we are best acquainted today is provided by the trade union M.P. who, having secured appointment to the union's panel of candidates and adoption by a constituency party, has his election expenses largely paid by the union and often receives in addition a salary for services in Parliament, where he sits in a "representative capacity" for the union.[20] What degree of dependence will in fact be tolerated, the House has not made entirely clear. It has refused to condemn such arrangements, yet it has said that they must not infringe "the complete independence and freedom of action" of members in Parliament.[21]

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[13] *Report of the Committee of Privileges;* H.C. 118, 1946–47; minutes of evidence, p. 7.

[14] *Parliamentary History,* Vol. xxx, Col. 793.

[15] L. B. Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (London, 1929), Vol. I, p. 182.

[16] Quoted in Porritt, Vol. I, p. 311.

[17] R. S. Ferguson, *Cumberland and Westmoreland M.P.s from the Restoration to the Reform Bill of 1867* (London, 1871), pp. 173–74.

[18] *Hist. MSS Comm.;* 13th Rept.; Appx. Pt. VII; Lonsdale MSS, 27 Feb. 1783.

What use was made of "sponsored" M.P.s in Old Whig practice? How far did they act to promote the economic interests of their patrons, as they do today? From the historians we have learned in abundant detail how they were employed to further their patrons' interests in office, patronage and emoluments. The basic structure of the aristocratic factions of the time consisted of little clusters of nominees, grouped around their patrons, who formed the complex alliances which provided ministers and their opponents with a considerable part of their followings. Patronage of many varieties was the cement which held patrons in these alliances and which in turn often provided the patrons themselves with the means of maintaining their influence over elections.

Historians have not yet examined in much detail, however, the role of the sponsored M.P. in relation to the economic interests of his patron. This would especially require detailed inquiry into the processes of private bill legislation, a field which is almost entirely unexplored. But since that inquiry cannot usefully be separated from a broader inquiry into the ways in which interested M.P.s, whether sponsored or not, sought to represent the great functional interests of the society, it is in this larger context that we shall look at the problem. While much research needs to be done, one can safely say that in general Old Whig practice fitted closely with the Old Whig theory of representation.

The 18th century, unlike the Victorian era, was not an age of memorable Acts of Parliament. At mid-century, parliamentary activity probably reached its lowest ebb, yet, when one thinks of Government programs even in the quiet times of later generations, it is striking to find that at the opening of Parliament in 1753 the King's Speech, after requesting supply, had nothing further to recommend to the attention of the assembled Houses except the increase in the "horrid Crimes of Robbery and Murder."[22] The session which followed saw the enactment of some 69 bills. While 35 were classed as "Private Acts" and 34 as "Publick Acts,"[23] nearly every one, by modern standards, would be classed as private and most of them were introduced by unofficial members. This does not mean that they were insignificant. Although few great strides in reform were taken during this century, countless small steps in legislation carried the country a long distance in social and economic development. As Pares has remarked,

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[19] Norman Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel* (London, 1953), *passim*.

[20] Replying to a Conservative who asked why an M.P. who was an official of the miners' union should not "declare his interest" in pending legislation as would, *e.g.*, a director of a mining company, a Labour member said that the distinction was that the miners' official sat in "a representative capacity." 348 *H.C. Deb.* 1720ff (16 June, 1939).

[21] See the debate on the report from the Committee of Privileges mentioned above; 440 *H.C. Deb.* 284–386 (15 July, 1947).

> most of this legislation was private, local and facultative, setting up local agencies, such as turnpike, paving, enclosure, or improvement commissioners where such things appeared to be desired by the preponderant local interests. . . . Even legislation which was ostensibly national, imposing customs duties or regulating overseas trade, often had local implications and members of parliament handled it as agents of local interests.[24]

A few examples taken from private bill legislation will show what the Old Whig practice was in the concrete and will suggest the general tactics of interest politics in the period.

The criterion of the subject-matter of private bills was far from precise in the 18th century. In general, we may presume, they were those bills "affecting the interests of individuals or localities and not of a general public character."[25] Procedure in private bills contrasted sharply with the semi-judicial character given it in the 19th century,[26] ample opportunity being given for the intervention of interested M.P.s, indeed, as Pares observes, the power of decision being largely given to them. In contrast with public bills then and now, private bills began with a petition from the interested party alleging a state of affairs which needed legislative remedy and praying that leave be granted to bring in a bill for the purpose. In the normal course a member from the locality to which the petition related would present it to the House, after which it would be referred to a committee.[27] While a member could not present a bill for which he himself had petitioned, he could, as we shall see, present a petition and guide the course of a bill which intimately concerned his personal interests.

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[22] *Journals of the House of Commons,* Vol. xxvi (1753–4), 15 November, 1753.

[23] *Statutes at Large,* Vol. 7 (London, 1786).

[24] Pares, p. 3.

[25] The words are those of Clifford who implies that they stated the criterion in the 18th century—when also, as he notes, some local bills were included among public bills by being explicitly declared to be public. Frederick Clifford, *A History of Private Bill Legislation* (London, 1885), Vol. I, p. 267. I have not yet found a contemporary 18th century definition of the scope of private bills. The best contemporary account of procedure, *The Liverpool Tractate* (ed. C. Strateman, New York, 1937) does not take up the question.

[26] This summary of private bill procedure is based principally upon O. Cyprian Williams, *The Historical Development of Private Bill Procedure and Standing Orders in the House of Commons* (London, HMSO, 1948), Vol. 1.

The committee on the petition was chosen on the principle that those were best qualified to serve who had "some personal, local or professional knowledge of the matter, and who represented interests likely to be affected."[28] After the chairman of the committee had reported to the House and it had decided to give leave for the introduction of the bill, members were appointed to prepare and present the bill, which after a second reading was committed to a committee chosen on the same principle of interest representation. Counsel for and against might be heard in committee or, in some circumstances, at the bar of the House. Report was by the chairman—who it appears was normally the member who had introduced the bill—and after passing through further stages, the bill went to the Lords.

Gradual, yet revolutionary in their effect, the enclosure acts are the clearest example of profound social development brought about by private legislation. From 1719 to 1845 some 4,100 acts were passed, the peak of activity being reached around the turn of the century. Except for a few eccentric poets and divines and an occasional petitioner before the House, opposition was negligible. Of the 5,034 members who sat in the House of Commons from 1734 to 1832, fully three-quarters had their principal economic interest in land.[29] In these Parliaments the landed interest was dominant and no one questioned its right to dominate.

While the passage of the enclosure acts does not provide examples of the conflicts of interests in the parliamentary arena, it can be used to illustrate the role of the interested M.P. The painstaking work of W. E. Tate, for instance, "brings out quite clearly," as he says, "the connection which actually existed between the landowning gentry and the Enclosure movement."[30] His elaborate data for Nottinghamshire show that the main burden of preparing, presenting and reporting the bills fell to the knights of the shire from that county, and their role in reporting implies that they very probably also acted as chairmen of the committees on the bills. For example, Lord Edward Charles Cavendish Bentinck, second son of the second Duke of Portland, a great magnate in the county, presented or reported (or both) some 44 enclosure bills while he was M.P. from Nottinghamshire from 1775 to 1796.

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[27] A petition for a bill to enclose, however, was not sent to a committee on the petition, but led directly to the introduction of the bill.

[28] Williams, p. 30.

[29] Gerritt P. Judd IV, *Members of Parliament, 1734–1832* (New Haven, 1955).

[30] W. E. Tate, *Parliamentary Land Enclosures in the County of Nottingham during the 18th and 19th centuries* (Nottingham, 1935); Thoroton Society Record Series, V, p. 137.

In the light of the reforms of procedure in the 19th century, it is worthwhile to try to see just how closely a member might be linked with the interests being favored by the bill with which he was concerned. Tate's data permit some inferences as to what was and was not permitted. Personal interest did set some limit on the part played by the member. He would not, apparently, present or prepare a bill concerning a place of which he was lord of the manor. A son and heir, however, fairly often would prepare and present a bill for which his father had petitioned. A nominee might prepare a bill for which his patron had petitioned.[31] It also appears that a member connected with a petitioner by ties of family or patronage would commonly sit on the committee on the relevant bill, although he would rarely be the chairman of the committee and so charged with reporting it to the House. In all of this, as Tate remarks, the 18th century saw nothing striking, much less scandalous. It was indeed wholly in accord with the Old Whig theory of interest representation.

The virtual absence of opposition makes the enclosure bills exceptional. In the sphere of public legislation, an outstanding example of a conflict of interests was the struggle over Walpole's excise scheme of 1733 which was bitterly and successfully opposed by trading interests in a contest employing floods of petitions, numerous deputations to Westminster and an extensive war of pamphlets.[32] Even schemes for turnpike roads sometimes involved a contest, as, for example, when towns differed over the proposed route and rival petitions for and against a pending scheme were received by the House. Proposals for river navigation improvement, which formed an important part of private bill legislation from the 17th century, often met with hostility from land carriers who would be threatened with competition, from towns which would lose trade, or from local producers who feared the influx of competing goods, and sometimes gave rise to long and fierce parliamentary struggles carried on by petitions and counter-petitions and by lobbying at Westminster and in the counties. For twenty-one years at the beginning of the century, for example, opposing interests successfully resisted the enactment of the scheme to improve the River Weaver.[33]

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[31] For example: in 1773 the Rt. Hon. J. Shelley helped prepare a bill for which the second Duke of Newcastle had petitioned. Shelley had been returned for Newark in 1768 by the Duke, then the 9th Earl of Lincoln, of whom Shelley was a boon companion. This information based on Tate, p. 49; Namier, *Structure*, p. 269, and *Debrett's*.

[32] E. R. Turner, "The Excise Scheme of 1733," *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, Vol. 42 (Jan., 1927), pp. 34–57. Turner's appendix lists some 700 pamphlets issued during the struggle.

[33] T. S. Willan, *River Navigation in England, 1600–1750* (Oxford, 1936), pp. 34–6.

For the sake of illustration we may look briefly at the passage of two canal acts in 1762 and 1766, respectively, which set off the canal boom of the late 18th century.[34] The first of these, the Longford Bridge scheme, which provided for a canal to cheapen transportation between Manchester and Liverpool, was promoted by the Duke of Bridgewater and executed by James Brindley, the untutored genius of the age of canals. Its passage illustrates how sponsored M.P.s might be used to promote their patrons' interests and the way in which a private bill might become involved in the general political contests of the time.

The City of Liverpool, being interested in cheaper transportation, of course, sided with the Duke in the parliamentary struggle, lending assistance through petitions and especially through its two members. More important, however, was the support which the Duke received from his political connections. Although not himself taking an active part in politics, he was associated through his brother-in-law, the second Earl Gower, with one of the powerful aristocratic factions. This faction, sometimes known as the "Bloomsbury gang," was an alliance of the Duke of Bedford, Lord Gower and Lord Weymouth and included their nominees, relations and other followers in the House of Commons. From the mid-forties, it had supported various Whig Ministries and shared in high office and in 1761 formed one of the pillars of the Government of the Duke of Newcastle. Through this alliance the Longford Bridge scheme enjoyed the support not only of the Bedford-Gower group in the House, but also of Newcastle.

Opposing the bill were a few groups of traders, certain gentry through or near whose land the canal would pass and, especially, an existing—and lucrative—statutory undertaking, the Mersey and Irewell Navigation Company which had a monopoly on river transportation between Manchester and Liverpool. General politics also entered in on this side when Lord Strange, a son of the Earl of Derby, a great landowner in Lancashire, took up the cause of the Mersey and Irewell Company and mustered certain Tories against the bill and took part in the contest against it in the House.

The role of nominees can be briefly suggested. Richard Rigby, M.P. for the Duke of Bedford's pocket borough of Tavistock and manager of the Bedford-Gower group in the Commons, was chairman of the committee on the petition, reported to the House for the committee, served on the committee of three to prepare the bill, and reported for the committee on the bill. Alderman Marsh Dickinson, who sat for the Duke of Bridgewater's pocket borough of Brackley, was one of the three members appointed to prepare the bill and also presented the bill to the House. Among the tellers on the Duke's side in various divisions, in addition to Rigby and Dickinson, were Robert Henley-Ongley, M.P. for Bedford, and a nominee of the Duke of Bedford; Lord John Cavendish and Welbore Ellis, members of the Newcastle group; Sir Ellis Cunliffe and Sir William Meredith, M.P.s for Liverpool.

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[34] The account of the passage of these two acts is based on the *Journals* of the House of Commons and the House of Lords; Clifford's *History;* Samuel Smiles, *Lives of the Great Engineers* (London, 1867), Vol. I; J. C. Wedgwood, *Parliamentary History of Staffordshire* (London, 1922), Vol. II, Part II; J. Philips, *A General History of Inland Navigation* (London, 1792); and Namier's *Structure of Politics* and *England in the Age of the American Revolution* (London, 1930), which have been particularly useful in identifying nominees and patrons.

The passage of the bill took some four months from the presentation of the petition in November, 1761, to the granting of the Royal Assent in March, 1762, the major struggle taking place not in committee, but in the House of Commons after the bill was reported during the last two weeks of February. Numerous petitions for and against were received, counsel were heard at the bar of the House and several days were spent in debate marked by closely contested divisions. On three occasions during this time, the Duke sent out letters—a total of 700—to friends of the measure, explaining it and whipping up support. After a final division of 133–114, the bill was sent to the Lords where, after report by the committee on the bill—on which the Duke of Bridgewater and Lord Gower sat—it was passed without amendment.

A similar pattern of tactics and opposing forces can be traced in the passage of the act of 1766 which authorized a canal between the Trent and the Mersey rivers, linking Hull and Liverpool by water and passing through the potteries of Staffordshire. From 1755 interest in the project had been shown by various parties, among which were the City of Liverpool, Lord Gower, who was a magnate of immense wealth in Staffordshire, Josiah Wedgwood of the potteries, and other landowners, traders and manufacturers of the region. Several meetings in 1765 culminated in a gathering in Staffordshire at the end of December, over which Lord Gower, the Lord Lieutenant, presided. Among those present were the M.P.s for the county, William Bagot, an independent "Tory" squire, and George Harry, Lord Grey, a nominee of Lord Gower's and eldest son of the Earl of Stamford; the M.P.s for Lichfield, Hugo Meynell, another Gower nominee, and Thomas Anson, sitting by right of his own family influence and a close friend of Josiah Wedgwood; the M.P.s for Gower's pocket borough of Newcastle-under-Lyme, Thomas Gilbert and Sir L. Dundas. Gilbert, a barrister, was land agent for Lord Gower and the manager of his parliamentary interest as well as a promoter of the canal scheme. At this meeting the engineer of the Duke of Bridgewater, James Brindley, who had made the survey for the canal, explained the scheme and it was decided to open a subscription for

£101,000 and to apply to Parliament for an act to authorize the canal.

Proceedings in Parliament ran from mid-January to mid-May, 1766, and were accompanied by the usual petitioning for and against, lobbying by parties concerned, argument by opposing counsel, and promotion of their own and their patrons' interests by members of the House. Opposition came mainly from two river navigation commissions threatened by competition from the proposed line of transportation and from a number of Cheshire gentry whose lands would be affected by the canal. The principal part in guiding the bill through the House was taken by one of the promoters of the scheme, William Bagot, who sat on the committee on the petition, helped prepare the bill, presented it to the House, sat on the committee on the bill and took the bill to the House of Lords. Thomas Gilbert, also a promoter of the scheme, sat on the committee on the petition, helped prepare the bill, and after serving, probably as chairman, on the committee on the bill, reported it to the House. Robert Wood, a nominee of the Duke of Bridgewater, sat on the committee on the petition and Sir L. Dundas on the committees on the petition and on the bill. In the House of Lords, Lord Gower himself reported for the committee on the bill.

These cases will serve to illustrate the pattern of interest politics in the Old Whig period. More could be said about the activity of commercial centers in promoting or opposing legislation, both private and public, related to their interests. Isaac Gascoyne, M.P. for Liverpool, 1796–1831, for example, is said to have promoted some 200 bills at the instigation of his constituents. No general sketch would be complete without examination of the long-continued, influential and complex political activities of the East India Company. Its power resting less upon its bloc of M.P.s than upon its immense financial importance, it not only penetrated Parliament, but was itself penetrated by political factions struggling to control its board of directors.[35] Nor should the discussion of interests be confined solely to those which are economic: the "Dissenting interest," for instance, from time to time played an important role in legislation and policy-making. Moreover, the interplay between interests and government on the executive as well as the legislative plane needs to be examined and may produce important parallels with the quasi-corporatism of the present time.[36]

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[35] See especially Lucy S. Sutherland, *The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics* (Oxford, 1952), and also C. H. Philips, *The East India Company, 1784–1834* (Manchester, 1940).

[36] See, for instance, what appears to have been the successful lobbying of the Treasury Board by Sir James Lowther to have an exception made in his favor regarding the duty on coals. *The Jenkinson Papers, 1760–1766,* ed. Ninetta S. Jucker (London, 1949), pp. 34–36.

Still, it is clear that while the politics of the 18th century was not the scene of a conflict between disciplined parties unified around contending programs, neither was it merely the struggle of aristocratic factions concerned solely with the pursuit of power and of patronage. We must also recognize the fact—to which historians of the period have paid insufficient attention—*that groups with social and economic aims continually used government to promote their interests and that this was fully legitimized by the norms of Old Whig political culture.*

One caution is imperative. To stress the importance of interest politics in the period is not to say that policy resulted from a "balance of interests," if the aims of such interests are to be taken as their immediate economic self-interest. The landed interest was dominant in the economy and in the polity, but this does not mean that the claims of commerce were neglected. On the contrary, in the mind of the active political community of the time, according to Namier, commerce was "the dominant factor" in the existence of Great Britain. The ideology of mercantilism had as great a hold upon the age as *laissez-faire* came to have on the nineteenth century and with similar power shaped men's thoughts about what their interests were and how they might be best promoted.

III. THE LIBERAL THEORY OF REPRESENTATION

What has been called the Old Whig theory did not die in 1832. One reason was that—as often happens with political theories—it was used by both sides in the struggle over parliamentary reform. While virtually all the opponents of reform accepted it, some reformers also argued from its premises. In their view, the Reform bill, far from being an innovation, simply adapted the existing system to the changed circumstances of the country, giving to the new manufacturing interests their rightful share in representation along with the other interests of society. This, for instance, was the line taken by Melbourne and Palmerston in 1831. From the Old Whig theory descended Disraeli's argument for the representation of a "variety of interests" with which he supported his "fancy franchises" proposal in 1859,[37] and which was adopted by the "philosophic Liberals" such as Bagehot.[38] In the Victorian era, however, "class" rather than "interest" came more and more to be the term used to refer to the social units deserving representation and in the languid contest over the reform of 1867 the Old Whig theory was advocated and attacked as the "balance of classes" argument.[39] This point of view could hardly be stretched to cover the reform of 1885, but we find Randolph Churchill, for instance, resisting majority rule in defense of a variety of representation of interests and classes.[40] Nor did the arrival of democracy exclude the Old Whig view from public debate over representation. In 1947 L. S. Amery, for example, called for "a new and far-reaching Reform Act" based on the concept of functional representation which, as he said, has "its own independent history in this country."[41] Or, to take the views of a "new Conservative," more than a trace of the Old Whig notion appears in David Eccles' speech of January, 1948, in which he described his "conception of a balanced society with a purpose . . . in which the greatest number and variety of legitimate interests are all welcome and all have an assured place" and urged that Conservatives "deliberately encourage such groups and associations and make maximum use of them to carry out government policy."[42]

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[37] 152 *H.C. Deb.* 966ff. (28 Feb. 1859).

[38] Walter Bagehot, *Essays on Parliamentary Reform* (London, 1883), p. 63.

[39] *Essays on Reform,* n.a. (London, 1867), "The Balance of Classes," by A. V. Dicey.

The importance of such surviving attitudes today becomes clearer when we contrast them with other views which arose in the 19th century. Better known as sources of argument for parliamentary reform are the Liberal and Radical theories which need to be distinguished not only from the Old Whig theory, but also from one another. The latter distinction is particularly important for the study of American politics, in which both the Old Whig and the Collectivist theories have been weak or non-existent, while the two principal—and contending—theories of representation are derived respectively from the Liberal and Radical views.

Each individual politician cannot always be associated with a single theory. Lord John Russell, for instance, argued from the premises of both the Old Whig and the Liberal theories—as was natural for one who aspired to lead the Liberal-Whig party of the early part of the Victorian era. More consistent voices of the Liberal view would be, in Britain, Macaulay and, in the United States, Madison. Like the Old Whigs, the Liberals were committed to parliamentarism. The member of the legislature is not a delegate sent merely to reflect the will of the people; he is a representative charged with deliberation on the common good. So Madison treats representation in the 10th Federalist. It is not a device adopted in view of the impossibility of assembling all the people, but an instrument by which the public views may be refined "by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country."[43] Thus the force of faction and partial interests may be broken and a representation of the national interest achieved.

Unlike the Old Whigs, however, the Liberals, although not democrats, assumed that representation was of individuals rather than corporate bodies, "interests" or classes. In harmony with the individualism of their economic outlook, they also thought of representation as based upon rational, independent, individual persons. From this follows, for instance, the notion of equal electoral districts, which in Britain gradually was expressed in various schemes for redistribution until finally in 1885 the ancient communities of shire and borough ceased almost entirely to be the basis of representation.

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[40] 285 *H.C. Deb.* 173-8 (28 Feb. 1884).

[41] Amery, *Thoughts on the Constitution* (London, 1947), p. 63.

[42] *Conservatism: 1945-1950* (Cons. Political Centre: London, 1950), pp. 87-89.

[43] *The Federalist*, No. 10.

How shall we interpret the stress placed on property by Liberals in both Britain and the United States? Sometimes, it is true, the advocate of the property qualification argues from the assumption that the main end of government is the preservation of property.[44] Yet more often the property qualification is defended because it is the best rough index of capacity and good will in the individual. Blackstone, who, in his ideas on representation, as Gibbons notes, is far ahead of his time, wrote that while every man who is supposed a free agent ought to be in some measure his own governor, "the true reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property, of voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own."[45] Similarly, on the field of political debate, Russell argued in 1822 that that change in the state of the people which necessitated a change in the representation consisted not only in an increase in wealth, but also in a great improvement in knowledge, which he illustrated by noting the vast growth in the numbers of books and newspapers being sold.[46] So also other reformers such as Macaulay argued, against the democrats, that it is not by numbers, but by "property and intelligence" that the country should be ruled.[47]

But what of the reformers' emphasis upon "the middle class" and its right to representation? Is this not in the vein of Old Whig thinking? Sometimes the use of class is Old Whig as when, for instance, Inglis speaks of the many classes and interests of the empire. But in the mouths of the reformers it has a different meaning. For one thing they are less likely to consider society as consisting of so many ranks as did the Old Whigs. They speak rather of the "higher, the middling and the lower classes" only. And what is more important, they see the middle class not as just one among many component parts of society, but as peculiarly representative of the whole of it, suffering neither from the compulsions of poverty nor the temptations of great riches. To them the members of the middle class are, as Brougham said, the "genuine depositaries of sober, rational, intelligent and honest English feeling."[48] Or as Ruggiero has said, speaking of the Liberal middle class in Europe as a whole at this time, they regarded themselves as "the general class." Hence, it is right and safe that this class should have the largest voice in government and that in the boroughs the variety of franchise of the old system which gave representation to many kinds of property and many interests should be abolished in favor of a single uniform ten pound franchise based upon property in general.

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[44] For example, Flood in his famous speech of 4 March 1790 (*Parl. Hist.*, Vol. 28, Cols. 452ff); and in America, Gouverneur Morris.

[45] Sir William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1771–2), Vol. I, p. 171.

[46] *Parl. Deb.*, new series, Vol. 7, Cols. 51–141 (25 April 1822).

[47] 2 *H.C. Deb.* 1190ff. (1 March 1831).

In their parliamentarism and individualism, the Liberals of Britain and America were agreed. They were a good deal alike also in their attitudes toward interests and party, although special traditions and circumstances in each country alter accent and emphasis. Deriving from their individualism, the Liberals' fear of interests is in Britain noticeable and in America pronounced. While in Britain hostility to the corporatist society of the past did not reach the extremes in thought or action which were reached in France, nevertheless, Liberals there, as Gibbons observed, were cool to the representation of interests in contrast with the Old Whigs.[49] In America, of course, the fear of special interests in politics was given classic expression by Madison. The diversity of the faculties of men as well as the fallibility of their reason sets up insuperable obstacles to "a uniformity of interests." From this diversity of interests proceeds "faction," whose malign effects, it is hoped, will be offset by the device of representation and the wide extent of the Republic.[50] Even if interests will inevitably force their way into government, they remain under suspicion. Madison's atomistic bias distinguishes him sharply from the Old Whig. Individuals, not interests or classes, are the basic units of the polity and there is no question of an advocacy of virtual representation. Moreover, we may suggest, the way in which interests themselves are conceived changes in the Liberal period; they cease to be thought of as the "fixed interests" of the Old Whig or Old Tory view and become the shifting alignments of a developing, Smithian economy.

What did the Liberals think of party? In the case of Madison and the Federalists their hostility is emphatic: party and faction are interchangeable terms and the bane of free governments. They disliked party in theory, and in practice Hamilton himself could not get the Federalists to organize. The view of the British Liberals, however, is more complex. Both individualism and parliamentarism agree poorly with the idea of party government and we do not expect to find advocates of rigid party discipline or great extra-parliamentary organization among Macaulay and his friends. Certainly on the latter point—extra-parliamentary organization—the Liberal point of view was restrained; even after mid-century, as Ostrogorski notes, leading men in the Liberal party organization denounced the very registration associations which they directed,[51] and it was only Radical initiative which led to the founding of the National Liberal Foundation in 1877. In general, the period between the first and second Reform Acts was "the golden age of the private M.P."[52]

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[48] Quoted in A. V. Dicey, *Law and Opinion in England in the 19th Century* (London, 1905), p. 186.

[49] Gibbons, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

[50] *The Federalist*, No. 10.

> The highest respect, as Macaulay correctly stated, was reserved for the independent politician, in the sense not of one who was outside party, but one who was in party solely because of his conscientious opinion and perhaps traditional association. . . . All members and all candidates claimed to be independent in their opinions and votes because it was the contemporary ideal of what a politician should be, however far removed from reality that ideal was.[53]

The ideal member, like the ideal constitutent, was the independent, rational man. His "conscientious opinion," however, might lead him to agree and vote with others. So to act in concert, as Lord John Russell observed, was in accord with Burke's precept and constituted no sacrifice of conscience. Party so conceived, not only did not violate independence, but also positively enhanced it by attaching individuals to "steady and lasting principles," thus protecting them against the seductions of money and patronage.[54] And while one of the functions of party was to embody the various opinions of the nation, this did not make of M.P.s mere delegates; on the contrary, a great merit of party, according to Russell, was that it made possible the passage of laws which had not yet caught popular favor. A further stage in the legitimizing of party has been reached. Party in the Burkean sense is not only tolerable, but desirable—providing it respects the independence of the member.

IV. THE RADICAL THEORY OF REPRESENTATION

Not long ago, when Harry Truman, reaching for a cliché, declared that the task of his party was to take the government out of the hands of "the special interests" and return it to "the people," he was using the central symbols of the Radical tradition in both America and Britain. In that tradition, "the people" means not just a set of variously endowed and related persons: it means rather a body of individuals bound together and guided forward by a unified and authoritative will. In spite of apparent diversity, this unity of will and direction is there, forming the ultimate and only sovereign in the polity—supreme, morally infallible, even sacred. For that reason, those corrupting influences which divide the community, creating special and partial goals in conflict with the ultimate unity, are supremely reprehensible. They are the "special interests." Towards them the Radical is not simply suspicious, as is the Liberal; he is positively hostile. He would not only not listen to them or consult with them, but would indeed drive them out of political life. For they are not data from which thought begins to proceed toward the common good, but selfish promptings which seek continually to breach the unified will of the people. "The interests are always awake," Gladstone once said during his last and democratic phase, "while the country often slumbers and sleeps."

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[51] Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (New York, 1902), Vol. I, pp. 156–8.

[52] Pares, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

[53] Gash, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

[54] *Essay on the History of the English Government and Constitution* (London, 1823), ch. xvii.

How is this unified will of the people to be spoken? In practice, by the majority. And some Radicals may say that the majority, as such, has a right to do as it pleases, regardless of the will of the rest. Yet there is a more appealing and perhaps commoner Radical view which gives the right to rule to the majority, not because its will alone is a sufficient claim, but because it is the one will in the community which can be trusted to speak the will of all. The majority, as John Bright said in Britain and John Taylor of Caroline in America, is the only body which has no interest opposed to that of the whole. It is therefore through the will of the majority that the people carry on their war against the special interests and for the national interest.

These ideas leave little place for parliamentarism. Jefferson, defining a republic, called it "a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority" and said that although this could not be fully achieved beyond narrow limits of space and population, the ideal by which forms of government were to be measured was the degree of "direct action of the citizens."[55] Very different was his view from the Federalist notion of government based on a limited suffrage and refining the public views "by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens." Naturally, the result of deliberation, as conceived by British and American Liberals, would bear some relation to the crude, initial views of the electors, just as in the Old Whig view virtual representation had at some point a basis in actual representation. Yet the contrast of Liberal and Old Whig parliamentarism with Radical direct democracy is fundamental. For the latter, as directly as possible, the will of the majority should decide the major questions of policy.[56]

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[55] Quoted in De Grazia, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

The Radical approach works a great change in attitudes toward parties and pressure groups. Not that Radical theory is more tolerant than Liberal: indeed, given the Radical belief in the unity—at least the potential unity—of the people, rival partisanship can only seem wicked —a conclusion John Taylor of Caroline did not hesitate to draw.[57] Readier to acknowledge the inevitability of diversity and the utility of opposition, Liberalism is a more likely source of the legitimacy of our systems of competing parties. But to the Radical view we owe immense encouragement of associations outside the legislature. For if the essential direction of government is to come from outside, it is proper that the directing forces should arrange to give expression to their sovereign wishes. Such an idea lay behind the Yorkshire Association of 1779–80, and in both Britain and the United States, although at different times, it was the Radicals who took the initiative in setting up the vast organizations of political parties outside the legislatures.

Yet far as Liberal and Radical theories take us toward legitimizing party, we have still not yet reached a theory of party government. From this viewpoint the flaw in Radicalism, as in Liberalism, is its strong individualist bias. The people are a mass, an entity, and, ideally, act as one. Yet they achieve that unity of action by a series of individual acts of mind stimulated by common discussion. From the Liberals, the Radicals differ in believing that property is not a necessary qualification for the franchise. Yet for them also the ultimate unit is not class, estate, rank or interest, but the independent, rational man. Presumably by discussion the ultimate atoms will be led to unity. At any rate they have their right to speak out and to differ. Clearly upon such a premise a robust party discipline can hardly be founded. And in American history, the Radical, although the founder of party, is at the same time its great destroyer. Forever disillusioned with the actual tones in which party speaks, he seeks to eliminate interference by bosses, corruption and special interests and to tune in the authentic voice of the people by regulating party processes, by setting up a direct primary, by instituting the initiative and referendum. Only the Collectivist theory will provide us with a complete kit necessary for constructing our model of party government.

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[56] For a good example of this view in Britain in 1884, see H. H. Fowler's speech on Feb. 28th; 285 *H.C. Deb.* 167–172. De Grazia, who holds that the Radical theory is the "most indigenous to American life and buried most deeply in the American spirit," has traced its course through the Jacksonian, Populist and Progressive periods. In Britain representative spokesmen would be the early John Bright, the early Joseph Chamberlain, Charles Dilke and Lloyd George. Yet for a complete survey one would need to go back to the Levellers of the 17th century.

[57] "Truth is a thing, not of divisibility into conflicting parts, but of unity. Hence, both sides cannot be right." *A Definition of Parties* (Philadelphia, 1794).

V. LIBERAL AND RADICAL PRACTICE IN BRITAIN

In 19th century British politics probably the most striking change from the 18th century was the rise of public opinion.[58] This notion is easier to handle if we use the plural—public opinions—for then we are more likely to focus attention upon the vast proliferation of voluntary associations formed for political purposes. After the Society for Supporting the Bill of Rights (1769), the Yorkshire Association (1779), the London Corresponding Society (1791) and the Society of the Friends of the People (1792), outstanding examples were Wilberforce's Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, the Political Unions of the 1830's, O'Connell's Catholic Association, the London Workingman's Association and Chartism, the Anti-Corn Law League (1839), the Short Time Committees for the Ten Hours bill in the 1830's, the Liberation Society (1853), the National Reform League (1865), and the National Education League (1869).[59] Although for many years inhibited by Old Whig norms and indeed forcibly constrained by the anti-Jacobin laws on political associations, countless organizations such as these grew and spread.

Much of the old hierarchic, corporatist discipline remained: aristocracy, country gentry, the Church, Inns of Court, universities and so on. But alongside it and, so to speak, up through it, the new structure pushed its way, providing new and flexible channels for expressing and for forming public views. These associations were legitimized by both Liberal and Radical values, especially the latter, and in the course of the century one can discern a Radicalization of political organization, culminating in the creation of the massive extra-parliamentary political party.

What is the character of these new associations? There are differences from both the Old Whig and modern Collectivist types. As compared with the latter, they were not based on vocation and did not have important functions apart from political agitation; nor did they have the permanent and bureaucratic character of these modern bodies. The contrast with the Old Whig type is dual: the 19th century organizations, on the one hand, did not belong to the existing system of established, corporate bodies, yet, on the other hand, neither were they transitory and occasional. The 18th century, of course, permitted meetings for political purposes, such as petitioning, although under certain limitations. But once such a meeting had agreed upon its petition, its members dispersed. A major feature of the new associations, however, was that they remained on, or at any rate attempted to remain on, until their legislative goals had been achieved. Yet they were not bodies established by law or ancient custom, but, as certain opponents of the Yorkshire Association had charged, merely "self-created assemblies."[60]

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[58] See Pares' discussion in relation to the role of the monarchy, *op. cit.*, ch. 6.

[59] For a survey on the Radical side, see Simon Maccoby, *English Radicalism, 1762–1914* (London, 1935–55), 5 vols.

Thinking in terms of American experience, one can say that—very broadly—they resemble pressure groups of the classic type illustrated by the Anti-Saloon League. They were not party organizations, although usually, but not always, they found more friends among Whigs and Liberals than among Tories. Most had only a single, legislative purpose, such as the abolition of the slave trade or the repeal of the corn laws and, once this purpose had been accomplished, the association would very probably disband. In this trait, one may justifiably see the individualism, Liberal or Radical, which inspired them. They conceived themselves to be formed and united by a meeting of individual minds. This—a common opinion individually arrived at—was what joined them, not tradition, personal loyalty, class, estate, vocation or some such bond. Hence, there was no reason to expect that once they had achieved the desired reform, they would have further common interests.

The individualism of Liberals and Radicals was often deflected by other factors, especially in Britain where it was confronted by the facts and norms of a deeply entrenched class system. Chartism was highly class conscious and the Corn Law repealers wished intensely to win for their class its proper place in society against the warlike and wasteful aristocracy. Yet the propaganda of these Liberal and Radical associations had a reformist tone that was distinctive. They saw themselves as champions of a new kind of society—as indeed they were—and laid great stress on their work for the common good and not merely for a single interest or class. The Corn Law repealers thought of their struggle as a great battle for freedom and peace against monopoly and war. As compared with the language of wool-growers or sugar-importers of the 18th century or a trade union or trade association in the 20th, a certain moral exaggeration, not to say self-righteousness, surrounded their demands. "While they," *i.e.*, the contributors to the Anti-Corn Law League, "abstained from the claim of being actuated by unmixed benevolence," wrote the historian of the League, who was also a leader of it, "I have seen the tears run down the cheeks of many a manly countenance, when the great employer spoke of the wretched condition of hundreds and thousands who looked to him for employment when none was to be had."[61]

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[60] Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 250. President Washington stigmatized the Democratic Societies of the 1790's with the same term, "self-created." E. P. Link, *Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790–1800* (New York, 1942), p. 30.

About forms of organization and tactics, a few general points can be risked. The model exemplified by the Yorkshire Association was followed in whole or part by a number of other associations. There were three elements: what we might call primary assemblies at the base; then committees of correspondence linking the various local units; and at the top an assembly of deputies to speak for the whole. H. J. Ford traces back the organization of American parties to the corresponding committees of the days of the Sons of Liberty and the Stamp Act Congress. Presumably of American origin, the committee of correspondence was particularly useful in Britain in the face of the laws which forbade the federation of political bodies. It was used not only by the Yorkshire Association and the London Corresponding Society and similar bodies during the period of the French Revolution, but also by Wilberforce in his agitation against the slave trade, by Attwood's Political Union and by the London Workingmen's Association and its counterparts throughout the country. Later associations seem to show growing centralization. The Anti-Corn Law League was an alliance of a number of local associations, direction being put in the hands of the executive committee of the Manchester association and its staff. At some point in the constitutional development of 19th century pressure groups, a central assembly comes to choose and supervise the directing body, as appears to have been the case with the National Reform League founded in 1865.

As in the 18th century, the tactics of the 19th century reformist pressure groups included petitioning and intensive lobbying of M.P.s and ministers. Petitioning indeed grew in quantity, reaching its peak in the years 1868–72, after which it fell off, declining to negligible proportions in the 20th century. Yet the petitioning of the 19th century took on a new character as compared with that of the 18th and in the case of the great mass petitions, such as those of the Chartists and Corn Law Repealers, merged with the new techniques for appealing to and "educating" an active political public many times larger than it had been in the 18th century. "All you want," Cobden told the League in 1842, "is to have the opportunity of disseminating those stores of information which are now lying bound up in Parliamentary returns or the productions of writers on this question; all you want is, that this information be disseminated, in order to insure the success of the question at the next meeting of the Parliament."[62] Inspired by this article of the Liberal and Radical faiths, the League performed prodigies of propaganda, distributing, for instance, in the year just referred to, some nine million tracts and publications and in general making of itself "a peripatetic university." Yet, as Jordan has observed,[63] the League was more than a propaganda body; it also came to the point of organizing deliberate intervention in elections to procure the return of free trade candidates. The contrast with the tactics of Wilberforce is interesting: in appealing to "the justice and humanity of the nation," he distributed tracts and sent out lecturers on tour through the provinces. But he opposed the holding of a great public meeting in London, disavowed a "systematic agitation" and did not intrude the slave trade question into parliamentary elections.[64] Francis Place, likewise, did not resort to electoral intervention in bringing pressure to bear for the repeal of the Combination Acts.[65] In the course of later years, however, there seems to be an increasing tendency for pressure groups to resort to this tactic.

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[61] Archibald Prentice, *History of the Anti-Corn Law League*, 2 Vols. (London, 1853), pp. 94–95.

From Wilberforce's abolition societies to the National Education League, there is a course of development in form of organization and in tactics which has yet to be traced. Very broadly, the line seems to be from Liberal to Radical models—away from parliamentarism and toward direct democracy.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this process of Radicalization is its relation to party. These reformist pressure groups of the Victorian era were strong, at a time when party, as a source of policy, was weak. Although, as Gash has observed, party control over politics was greatly strengthened after 1832, the national effectiveness of the two great parliamentary parties was severely limited. Patronage had declined as a means of holding together majorities and the later devices of party government had not yet been developed. As a result, the political structure gave "too little power to the executive, too much to the private member; too much to interest and too little to principle."[66] At mid-century, some thought that parliamentary government itself had come to an end and in 1859 Lord Derby, then prime minister, while not ready to concede so gloomy a conclusion, declared with regard to a two-party system in which leaders exercised an undisputed and uncontrolled power over their followers, commanding their votes and exercising a species of parliamentary discipline, that "those days are gone, and are not likely to return."[67]

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[62] Prentice, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 393.

[63] Henry D. Jordan, "The Political Methods of the Anti-Corn Law League," *Pol. Sci. Qu.*, Vol. 42 (March, 1927).

[64] Robert I. and Samuel Wilberforce, *The Life of William Wilberforce*, 5 vols. (London, 1839), Vol. I, p. 299; and *passim*.

[65] Graham Wallas, *The Life of Francis Place* (London, 1919).

[66] Gash, *op. cit.*, xviii–xxi.

Whatever the causes, this condition was not out of harmony with the Liberal ideal of the independent voter and the independent member of parliament. Its consequence was to give ample opportunity to the great reformist pressure groups of the time. In 1838, for instance, Melbourne's reply to the initial agitation for repeal of the corn laws, that the Government would not take a decided part until it was certain that a majority of the people wanted a change, was treated by the repealers as an invitation to set in motion the Anti-Corn Law League. And in general, as has often been observed,[68] the pressure groups of the time, rather than Governments, were the sources of new ideas in policy.

Yet the process of Radicalization of political methods, which in its first phases enhanced pressure group activity, in the course of time worked to restrict it. For the culmination of that process was the foundation in the 1870's of massive extra-parliamentary party organizations constructed to emphasize program and to enforce discipline on M.P.s. The sustenance offered the followers of the Birmingham Caucus and the National Liberal Federation was the pure milk of Radical democracy.[69] According to William Harris, the Federation would enable the people themselves, rather than parliamentary leaders, to decide what questions should be agitated and when the agitation should begin. Moreover, it would save the waste of having separate organizations such as an Education League, a Reform Union, or a Liberation Society, by providing one body which would speak on any question that might arise with all the authority of the voice of the nation.[70]

The immediate connection between Radical pressure groups and the formation of such extra-parliamentary party organizations was provided by the National Education League, which led directly to the founding of the National Liberal Federation, and the techniques which had been worked out in pressure group activity were carried over to the new Liberal Party by political managers such as T. N. Roberts, who had supervised the electoral registration department of the League and who became the chief agent of the Liberal Party. But now, as Harris had advocated, initiative in program came more and more to be exercised by the party organization. In the passage of the first and second reform acts, for example, agitation had come very largely from associations outside parliament, such as the Political Unions of the 1830's and the National Reform League of the 1860's. In the case of the act of 1885, however, the movement was launched in 1883 by the National Liberal Federation and the work of spreading propaganda and organizing meetings to forward, or oppose, the scheme was mainly by the parties through their extra-parliamentary organs.[71]

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[67] 153 *H.C. Deb.* 1268.

[68] *E.g.*, by Jordan and Maccoby.

[69] See, for example, Ostrogorski, Vol. I, pp. 161–2.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

From this period and on into the present century, *the reformist pressure group has declined in importance*—perhaps the last robust example was the League of Nations Union—*and the parties with their growing research and publicity departments have become more and more the centers from which new ideas are propagated among the voters.* Such a development was essential to filling out the model of party government. Yet Radicalism, although the father of mass parties, provides an inadequate base for party government. Certain final and indispensable traits were derived from the Collectivist theory of representation. But before turning to that theory, we need to trace another development in interest politics which also leads into the rise of collectivism. This is the history of the interested M.P. in the 19th century.

The Liberal mind, precisely because of its stress upon independence, meant that in fact M.P.s with strong outside economic interests would survive. For if a member was to be barred from receiving not only subventions from party or patron but also a salary from the executive, it was imperative that he be well-to-do on his own account. "It is because I have made a fortune, and am independent, that I come here to ask for your suffrages to send me to Parliament," said George Hudson, the Railway King, to the voters when he first stood for Parliament in 1845;[72] but, as his subsequent actions in Westminster showed, he meant anything but independence of his vast railway interests. And, moreover, just as Old Whig attitudes persisted, so also did many of the old interests and their representatives. Up to the middle of the century, for example, a phalanx of some 150 landed gentry formed the hard core of protectionists in the Tory Party. They did not know how to use the new instrument of the voluntary association, as was shown by their impotent efforts to organize agricultural protection societies to combat corn law repeal. But they could and did exploit their parliamentary power in the Old Whig way.[73]

While the interested M.P. remained, however, the role permitted him in legislation was substantially revised and in what may be fairly called a Liberal spirit. We have seen how tolerantly the Old Whig viewed the use of parliamentary power to favor group and personal interests, especially in the field of private bill legislation. From early in the 19th century, procedure in this field was gradually reformed, the general direction being toward assimilating it to a quasi-judicial model. The principal reform was the elimination of members with local interests from private bill committees. Under the existing system of appointing committees, every opposed private bill became a battlefield for interested parties, and the Select Committee on Private Bill Procedure of 1825 recognized the difficulties which arose from the presence on committees of members whose constituents were locally interested in the results, and of members who had themselves an individual interest in the subject of bills. It was willing to go no farther, however, than to reflect that "abstractedly considered, that mode would undoubtedly be most desirable which should assimilate committees, by a limitation of numbers and an exclusion of all bias from interest, to the form and character of juries."[74] Through the following twenty years, such a reform was resisted on the grounds—typically Old Whig—that the local knowledge possessed by members was valuable and that it was wrong to abolish their right and duty to represent their constituencies in committee as well as in the House. At last, in 1844, the House, impelled by Gladstone, resolved to send all railway bills to committees whose members were obliged to sign a declaration of non-interest, both local and personal, and eleven years later the same procedure was adopted for all private bill committees.[75]

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[71] Maccoby, *English Radicalism, 1853–1886*, pp. 275–284.

[72] Richard S. Lambert, *The Railway King, 1800–1871* (London, 1934), p. 152.

[73] See Bright's comments on the trouble they caused Disraeli, *e.g.*, over the malt tax; 513 *H.C. Deb.* 778 (21 March 1859).

Efforts to eliminate personal interest from procedure were more complex, less successful and perhaps less important. In 1811 Speaker Abbott said that it was a rule established some two hundred years before, and even then spoken of as an ancient practice, that "a personal interest in a question disqualified a member from voting."[76] Yet, as we have seen, during the 18th century, this rule had not prevented members from taking a very active part in promoting bills in which they were intimately interested. In the field of public legislation, the rule was so narrowly interpreted as to be virtually meaningless and in the history of the House there has been only one instance when votes of members were disallowed on this ground.[77] In the field of private legislation, during the 19th century some change was made. Not only were personally interested members banned from sitting on private bill committees, as we have seen, but also they were forbidden to vote in the House on relevant private bills. Again, however, the rule was very narrowly interpreted and in the 19th century did not, for instance, prevent directors and shareholders of a company from guiding through the House a bill concerning their company or from voting on the bill in the House.[78]

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[74] *Parliamentary Papers*, 1825; Reports from Committees, Vol. II, Report from the Select Committee on the Constitution of Committees on Private Bills.

[75] O. Cyprian Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[76] *Parl. Deb.*, Vol. XX (May–June 1811), Col. 1012.

[77] Report from the Select Committee on Members of Parliament (Personal Interest). H.C. 274. *Parl. Papers*, 1896. Appendix.

In spite of Liberal reforms, ample opportunity, therefore, was left the interested M.P. Sponsorship and patronage continued although on a declining scale, and, as analyses, such as those of Jennings and J. A. Thomas have shown, the property ties of members, as in the past, reflected the changing structure of the economy. What use did interested M.P.s make of their parliamentary opportunities? It is not contended here, we hardly need say, that British policy, then or now, can be explained as a mere resultant of the economic interests of members of Parliament and without regard for party or ideological commitment. Railway politics illustrates the interplay of such influences, and provides as well an example of the activity of the interested M.P. in the Victorian era.

It was generally recognized that certain members represented the railways in the House of Commons and, while there were protests against the parliamentary strength of the companies, there were, to this writer's knowledge, none against the fact of their being represented. In addition to shareholders—who Gladstone in 1844 thought constituted a majority of the House—there were many directors. Of the 815 M.P.s who sat from 1841–47, some 145 were railway directors;[79] in 1867 the number was 179;[80] in 1885 it was 90.[81] Considerably smaller than these figures suggest, the hard core of railway M.P.s busied themselves with both private and public legislation. A private bill was needed to authorize a new line and also to make major changes thereafter. As a result railway bills poured through Parliament, some 4,000 being sanctioned in the half century after 1830. Sometimes, especially in the early days, the initial bill involved prolonged and bitter conflict with existing interests, such as turnpike trusts and canal companies, and the pattern of politics was essentially that of the struggles over the canal acts of 1762 and 1766. Such, for instance, was the case with the struggle over the Liver-

[78] *Ibid.*

[79] W. O. Aydelotte, "The House of Commons in the 1840's," *History*, Vol. 39, pp. 249–62 (Oct. 1945).

[80] Bernard Cracroft, *Essays, political and miscellaneous* (London, 1868), Vol. I, "The Analysis of the House of Commons, or Indirect Representation in the year 1867."

[81] Philip Williams, "Public Opinion and the Railway Rates Question in 1886," *English Historical Review*, Vol. 67 (Jan. 1952), No. cclxii.

pool and Manchester Railway from 1824 to 1826 which involved parliamentary expenses of £80,000, mostly for "canvassing," *i.e.*, lobbying.[82] Once the railway age had been launched, however, the principal contests were between opposing projects, in which the growing amalgamations were often pitted against one another. A classic example was the bitter parliamentary fight between George Hudson and Edward Denison, also an M.P., over the latter's scheme for a London-to-York line, which was finally enacted at a cost to all parties of £523,000 for legal controversy, lobbying and wirepulling.[83]

In the field of public legislation, however, the railway M.P.s were likely to act together, as they did, for instance, when resisting Gladstone's proposals of 1844.[84] These proposals, intended to provide some comprehensive guidance for railway policy which otherwise was left to the countless *ad hoc* decisions of private bill committees, would have given the state a direct control, including effective power of revising rates. Although recognizing that the railways had "perhaps the strongest interest in regard to direct influence upon the votes" of M.P.s, Gladstone, then President of the Board of Trade, took a high line against the companies in the second reading debate. The usual deputations and lobbying went on, however, and very probably through Peel,[85] the bill was drastically amended as desired by the companies. The point of interest is that the strength of the companies proceeded not just from the brute number of railway M.P.s in the House, but also from the fact that members generally, including the prime minister, did not believe in state intervention. For the same reasons, similar efforts to frame and enforce a comprehensive policy in later years also failed.

By 1888, when the act providing the first effective regulation of rates was passed,[86] two important and interrelated changes had taken place. On the one hand, there had begun that general shift of opinion away from *laissez-faire* which led Dicey to date the beginning of Collectivism from 1870. Railways in particular were regarded as exceptions to the usual rules of orthodox economics; as potential or actual monopolies they might be regulated by the state. And when the bill was being contested in the House in 1886, the press as a whole showed little sympathy with the complaints of the companies.

The second change was the rise of pressure groups of a new kind which opposed the railways' claims and favored the bill. Already in the early seventies concern over railway monopoly had been shown by the trading community which expressed itself by means of petitions from various chambers of commerce; and in the mid-eighties there was formed a formidable opposition, based on organizations of traders, manufacturers and agriculturists. The Associated Chambers of Commerce, founded only a few years before, strongly supported the bill. So also did the Central Chambers of Agriculture, the Association of Municipal Corporations and the recently formed Railway and Canal Traders' Association which brought together some 26 trade and manufacturing associations such as the Mining Association of Great Britain and the British Iron Trades Association. Like the railways, many of these bodies had their interested M.P.s, and the committee consisting of their representatives and formed to coordinate their parliamentary action included fifteen peers and forty-five members of the House of Commons. In terms of interested M.P.s, the two sides were about evenly matched, forty-five on the side of the railway customers and an equal number constituting the hard core of railway members. The opinion of the House, however, was so overwhelmingly against the railways, that they did not even challenge a division when the bill had its second reading in 1886. While for various extraneous reasons, the measure was not enacted until two years later, the contest showed that the railways, once dominant in these matters, now, as Philip Williams has concluded, could only win brief victories "in the dark."

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[82] George S. Veitch, *The Struggle for the Liverpool and Manchester Railway* (Liverpool, 1930).

[83] Lambert, *op. cit.*, 185.

[84] This account is based mainly on Edward Cleveland-Stevens, *English Railways: their Development and their Relation to the State* (London, 1915).

[85] Gustav Cohn, *Englische Eisenbahnpolitik.* 2 Bd. (Leipzig, 1874), Bd. I, 164.

[86] Philip Williams, *op. cit.*, gives a brilliant analysis of this episode.

The bill was not an item of party policy. Governments, whether Liberal or Conservative, exerted little influence on the outcome, their effort being to find a position midway between the traders and the railways. If in this sense the struggle was mainly one of pressure politics, it was pressure politics waged with very different weapons from those used by the railways in the 1840's or by the reform associations of the previous generation. *The rise of nation-wide associations of manufacturers and traders was introducing a new element into the politics of the country.* The essence of this change was the formation of bodies with a vocational basis and their affiliation as national organizations, the principal examples being trade unions and trade associations. The latter were growing up in the last quarter of the century, in reaction partly to the growth of trade unions and partly to the price-fall that began in the mid-seventies.[87] Behind both developments lay large changes in the British economy at home and in its relations to the international economy. By the nineties British managers had made their first large-scale experiments with industrial combination. *On the plane of economic development*

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[87] Sir John Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain*, Vol. II, p. 155.

as well as of public policy and political organization the foundations of Collectivism were being laid.

VI. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVIST REPRESENTATION

In the sphere of politics, the Englishman's faculty for not being too clear about the theories on which he is acting has had, on the whole, only happy results. We do not mean that he does not act on theories, but rather that they may be mixed. The Labour Party, for instance, at certain times speaks as the party of the working class and at other times makes a typically Radical appeal to "the people"—a transition less easily accomplished by the more doctrinaire socialists of the Continent. In general, the prevailing theories of representation in Britain today, as well as the patterns of political action, inherit much from the Radical and Liberal, not to mention the more distant, past. Yet among these operative ideals we can identify a cluster of sentiments and ideas which is distinctively different from those we have so far considered and which may be called the Collectivist theory of representation.

Very broadly, the major theme of this theory is party government; the minor theme, functional representation. It is more commonly expressed by spokesmen and members of the Labour Party. But it is also fairly widely held by Conservatives and, generally, behind much newspaper comment and political conversation its principal assumptions can be traced.

Like the Radical, the collectivist rejects the parliamentarism of the Old Whig and the Liberal. Parliament has an important role in ventilating grievances and focussing public attention on the large issues. But it is not the place for deliberating and deciding policy—certainly not major policy—for that would be usurping the role of the electorate. *But the collectivist is not a direct democrat.* Between the electorate and Government he interposes the party, attributing to it far more authority than does the Radical. This fundamental difference springs from the fact that unlike the Radical the collectivist, in political as well as economic theory, rejects individualism. For him the basic units of representation are not primarily individuals, but social groups: primarily classes, but also the sub-groups which underlie the great vocational associations of the modern economy.

When the National Liberal Federation was founded, its purpose was to enhance the representation of "the people." When the Labour Representation Committee was set up, its task was to ensure that "the working class" was represented. To base a party upon class and vocation is very different from basing it upon the natural consensus of free wills which the Radical conceived to be the foundation of his organizations.

It gives to party greater authority and consequently greater unity and tighter discipline. Once you accept this theory, for instance, you face no problem of looking about for other like-minded individuals: your political community is unmistakably defined by all those who share your class status. And as it becomes easy to identify your party, so also it becomes correspondingly hard to break with it. For this presents itself not as the simple task of dissociating yourself from certain other free individuals who, in your opinion, have mistaken the common good; it is rather to break with your class, an objective social fact. Moreover, the class upon which the party is based, although unified, is not undifferentiated—as are "the people"—but consists of sub-groups such as trade unions. Again party authority is strengthened. It is doubly difficult for the working man to deny that his union's party represents his interest when he sees the union doing precisely that in its daily relations with employers.

Conceivably one could hold a class theory of party and yet because of the multiplicity of classes accept a multiplicity of parties. This blow at party government is avoided by the socialist idea that there are only two classes, the working and the owning, and that, therefore, there is only one issue before the electorate, socialism or capitalism.[88]

A full-fledged theory of party government can now be derived. That government should be by a party to which individual M.P.s are bound by powerful ties of discipline is fully legitimized. Deriving from a comprehensive social philosophy formally adopted by such an authoritative party, program now can—and must—make an emphatic claim to coherence. From the premises of collectivism it follows that the voter cannot find himself liking parts of each party's program. His preference for one party's policy in one field will be linked with his preference for that party's policies in other fields. Hence, the choice presented to him is meaningful in two senses: it is a choice between two coherent and distinctive programs and social points of view; moreover, the victorious party is sure to be able to carry out the program to which it is pledged.

A program so based on class interest, expressed in a coherent social philosophy, will not be, as was said of the Newcastle Programme of the Liberals, "a rag-bag of miscellaneous demands." This is most fortunate. For the aim of a collectivist party is to carry out massive state intervention, which in turn requires consistency and coherence in policy and administration.[89] Not all party systems are up to this requirement and sometimes the forces of democracy do not accord with the needs of government. But in the model of party government derived from Collectivist theory, the demands of democratic representation produce precisely the kind of party and program required by the functional needs of policy.

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[88] See, for example, Harold J. Laski, *Parliamentary Government in England* (New York, 1938), pp. 58–59.

[89] Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 60; Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, rev. edn. (New York, 1949), pp. 227, 545.

Democracy is interpreted to mean, primarily, periodic contests between the two parties, to one of which authority to rule is given by majority approval. But the voters are not left without guidance. Party programs rule out the opportunity of merely local representation by giving the voter only a choice between two national programs. They make sure that the voter, in Rousseau's phrase, asks himself "the right question." Thus the old problem of whether the M.P. should represent his constituency or the nation is given a new solution. The function of representing the national interest, once attributed to the Sovereign, and later to Parliament, is now performed through party. Party—to echo Herman Finer's phrase—is indeed "king."[90]

While an "imperative mandate" from the local constituency is thus excluded, another kind of mandate—so to speak, a collective mandate—takes its place. Some may argue, as the Tories have often done when resisting reforms, that a Government cannot embark on major changes unless these have been explicitly pledged in its election propaganda. To this others may object that any item in the known program of a party is sufficiently mandated by the party's victory in an election. In either case the position of the M.P. is not that of a representative in the Old Whig or Liberal sense, but that of a delegate, although not a local delegate. A certain program, defining a view of the common good, has won; hence, the function of the M.P. is to see that this program is carried out. Real thought about policy does not go on in Parliament but in the party—and no doubt also to some extent among the electorate when it decides between parties. It follows that stringent party discipline in the name of program is justified and required. "Representative government"—again to quote Herman Finer—"is Party Government."[91]

What role can be given to the representation of interests by such a theory of party government? Here we touch on an interesting problem in the political culture of contemporary Britain. At least two possibilities are open. One would give interest groups, whether or not formally organized, representation in and through party. So, for instance, trade unions are represented on the various bodies of the Labour Party and, much less explicitly, trade associations, as S. E. Finer has shown, are

[90] Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

[91] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

closely connected with the Conservative Party.[92] But the collectivist would hold that in each party the political claims of such sub-groups are unified by the interest of the class to which they belong and by the comprehensive social philosophy reflecting that interest. Secondly, associations based on interest groups have a function in administration. For instance, they possess information which ministers and civil servants will need in carrying out policy. But that function will be advisory in the strict sense of the word, since policy has already been determined by party and electorate. In both cases, the conditions of party government severely restrict the activities of interests.

But here we come to the problem, for so restricted a role accords poorly with what actually happens—and also with other operative ideals concerning the legitimate role of interests in government. It is not the purpose of this paper to present the factual pattern of interest representation in Britain today.[93] Summarily, we may note that the new collectivist type of pressure group exercises a profound influence on policy. Unlike the reformist pressure groups of the Victorian era, the new type, in most cases, is explicitly based upon vocation and lasting common economic interest. Economic interest was often a bond of the Victorian reformers, also, but it was less likely to be avowed or even perceived by the members of an association who thought of themselves as united rather by the free, rational judgment of individual men of good will. From this difference in social basis—and in the group's perception of its social basis—flow most of the other differences. In structure, the vocational pressure group is more likely to be strongly articulated and to possess a substantial bureaucracy, while the Victorian groups were much less tightly organized and depended very considerably upon voluntary workers.[94] As for objectives, the Victorian groups usually had a single

[92] "The Political Power of Private Capital," *Sociological Review;* New series; Vol. 3, No. 2 and Vol. 4, No. 1 (December, 1955 and July, 1956).

[93] See W. J. M. Mackenzie, "Pressure Groups in British Government," *Brit. Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 6, pp. 133–48 (June, 1955); "Pressure Groups: The 'Conceptual Framework'," Vol. 3, pp. 247–55 (Oct., 1955); S. E. Finer, "The Federation of British Industries," *Political Studies*, Vol. 4, pp. 61–84; "The Political Power of Private Capital," *loc. cit.;* S. H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (March, 1956), pp. 1–23; John H. Millett, "British Interest Group Tactics: A Case Study," *Pol. Sci. Qu.*, (March, 1957); "The Role of an Interest Group Leader in the House of Commons," *Western Pol. Qu.* (December, 1956); Allen Potter, "The Equal Pay Campaign Committee: A Case-Study of a Pressure Group," *Political Studies*, Vol. 5, pp. 49–64, (Feb., 1957).

[94] Of the Anti-Corn Law League, for instance, Prentice wrote, "never, perhaps, had there been any association where so large a portion of the labour to be performed was without other remuneration than the consciousness of discharging a duty." Prentice, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 189.

legislative purpose, while the collectivist groups of today develop over a period of time, a number of objectives, fairly closely related to their view of the economic interests of their members. A broader, reformist element may enter in, as when trade unions adopted socialism and trade associations came to favor a system of imperial preference.

In the sphere of tactics, the modern vocational, like the Victorian reformist, pressure group will sometimes try to influence public opinion and votes by propaganda. The anti-nationalization campaign of recent years is an example. But the parties have so far taken over doctrinal combat that this is now a much less important function of pressure groups. The interested M.P. continues to flourish, sometimes, as of old, maintaining a connection with an outside interest through a directorship or the ownership of property, but also sometimes, as in the case of trade union M.P.s, serving as the parliamentary representative of a vocational pressure group.[95] Perhaps the principal channel of influence, however, is provided by the vast and elaborate development of administrative pluralism. Vocational pressure groups do not merely advise; they are regularly brought into the heart of the policy-making process. This is not a new development. In 1920 the Webbs could write—possibly with some exaggeration—that "the real government of Great Britain is nowadays carried on not in the House of Commons at all, nor even in the Cabinet, but in private conferences between Ministers with their principal officials and the representatives of persons specially affected by any proposed legislation or by any action on the part of the administration"—and they make clear that the bodies having such access are not mere private individuals, but groups and "powerful outside interests."[96]

Direct contact between outside interests and the executive very probably has a continuous history at least from the 18th century. Professor H. L. Beales has remarked, for instance, that in the 19th century before the reform of the civil service insurance companies regularly secured the appointment of their representatives to positions in certain departments of state. A complete sketch of interest representation in British government would need to follow through this important, though obscure, line of development. Administrative pluralism has grown in recent years, we may note, as state intervention has increased and is closely connected with the consequent expansion of delegated legislation. Indeed, since many of the functions formerly performed through private bill legislation are now performed under delegated powers,[97] one may well be able to trace the transfer of the play of interests which we have seen clustering around private bill legislation in the 18th and 19th centuries to the formal bodies and informal contacts involved in the exercise of delegated powers.

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[95] In the Parliament of 1951, for example, 170 M.P.s were company directors and 98 trade union officials. J. F. S. Ross, *Elections and Electors* (London, 1955), p. 442.

[96] S. and B. Webb, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (London, 1920), p. 69.

Interests have so large a role, for one reason, because the conditions of party government are far from being established in modern Britain. Are there really only two classes in Britain, each with a unified interest? Or are there not rather several classes, some of which are united on certain policies and divided on others? Perhaps it will be argued that the notion of two fundamental classes is not an essential of the theory of party government. Granting that and looking at the programs of the two main parties, can it be honestly said that each party, or either party, has a coherent social philosophy? The parties through their powerful organizations undoubtedly do a great deal to impose policies upon their memberships and upon the electorate. Broad tendencies also unite each party, although within each the tendencies dividing one segment from another are hardly less profound than those uniting them. But to be united on broad tendencies is very different from having a coherent social philosophy and leaves ample opportunity for the typical democratic process of balance and compromise among interests. Like the electorate, each party is a coalition of groups with interests and values which compel recognition in program-making. And similarly when a party is in power, its ministers and Cabinet, concerned with successful administration, party unity and victory at the next election, adjust and shape policy in response to the claims of interest groups.

Alien as this process may be to the strict theory of party government, it finds strong support in British political culture. As Amery has said, the theory of functional representation has "its own independent history" in Britain. In the form of explicit theoretical constructions, collectivism itself has made powerful contributions—for example, in guild socialism and the doctrine of workers' control of industry. Harmonizing with modern ideals are attitudes and practices which legitimize a generous role of interests in government and which have descended, with changing guise in different periods, from a distant past. In modern collectivist dress, the Old Whig and the Old Tory are still very much alive.

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[97] T. E. May, *Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament*, 15th edn. (London, 1950), p. 853.

PROLEGOMENA TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MIDDLE EAST GOVERNMENTS

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Only the cold war has overshadowed the second most striking political phenomenon of the post World War II scene. The demise of imperial power over vast Asian and Middle Eastern territories and the rise of new independent states is in part the result of the transfer of power from Europe to the United States and the Soviet Union, and in part a distinct phenomenon. The politics of these new states have an increasing interest, partly because of their possible subversion to Communist allegiance, and partly because of the desire to assess the possibilities of successfully transplanting democracy. Emphasis on the danger of subversion intensifies interest in the political processes in these non-western countries; but the context of these politics, *i.e.*, that which may be subverted, is the primary concern of the discipline of comparative government.

Political scientists have been among the last to extend the area of their research to non-western countries. They have been preceded by travelling diarists, students of comparative religion, archaeologists, historians, and latterly, anthropologists. From these sources much material, though of varied and uneven quality, exists to start with. A few political histories, fewer studies of various aspects of non-western politics, and still fewer studies of the contitutional development of these areas supplement these resources. Materials are scantiest for the Middle East.

I

The attempt to extend the study of comparative government to the Middle East needs little excuse either from the point of view of the strategic interest in this region or, simply, of its attractiveness to the individual scholar; but it does pose certain problems. The first of these is the justification for the selection and definition of a geographical area to limit the field of inquiry. Theoretically, the concepts of an academic discipline should be universally applicable. Against this sort of objection we must appeal to those elements of religious, ecological, and anthropological similarity which tend to give unity to the area.[1] Against the argument that all former colonial territories might make a better subject of comparison, one might answer that western imperialism only briefly, and often indirectly, touched the Middle East, and that Ottoman imperialism had a far greater influence.[2] A more positive argument, however, is that the Middle East is the only former colonial region which offers a vigorous ideologi-

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[1] R. Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 6 (Winter, 1952), pp. 1–21.

[2] Even this influence was not uniform; see H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London, 1950), Vol. 1, Part I, p. 20.

cal alternative to nationalism.[3] Elsewhere religion tends to reinforce nationalism. The opposition of fundamentalist[4] and traditional[5] Islam to nationalism gives a distinctive character to potential alterations or transformations of existing political institutions, whether they are traditional or borrowed from the west.

A second problem in the extension of the study of comparative government to the Middle East is the lack of developed data. Here one must balance the danger of prejudicing future research by premature generalizations against the risk of wasting much valuable effort in aimless pursuits. To be fruitful, the gathering of data must be based on some sort of preliminary hypotheses. So we must posit some hypotheses while remaining ready to discard them for new ones. This essay purposes both to discard and to posit anew.

To be discarded at the outset, as a basis of comparison, is the notion of stability. Aside from its vagueness, it is an inappropriate starting point because it is an effect and not a cause. Nor are existing institutions a sufficiently firm foundation for our study. They are often abruptly changed, and their functioning is frequently, if temporarily, interrupted. We cannot base our study on the differentiation between "modern" and traditional states either, for those that are modern have been traditional, and none that is traditional was ever modern. The comparative study of governments of the Middle East might better be based on the assumption that all of the states of the area are "tending" toward the modern; that the economic development which nearly all of them are experiencing, albeit often uncertainly, reinforces this tendency; and that the nation-state is the modern "type" rather than the democratic state. On these assumptions our study ought to be aimed at assessing the possibility of the creation of nation-states in the Middle East; and where the obstacles to that seem too great, at discovering the possible alternatives that might arise.

Institutional diversity and instability in the Middle East deprive us of the usual criteria of comparison. Even if we successfully describe the institutional constellation of the Middle East at any moment, we can be sure that it will not outlast a season or two. Even the classification of states as traditional, transitional, and modern is risky when we realize that a handful of really determined men might have moved the Yemen from the first category to the second,[6] or that Riza Shah's acceptance of the throne of Iran did not move Iran from the second to the first.[7] We must, therefore, supplement the study of existing institutions by probing into the changing social basis of the political order, and by attempting to construct model state-forms in which these institutions may eventually become fixed. Here argument must cease and exposition begin.

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[3] The Middle East has been, and remains, an ambiguous term. For the purposes of this essay the applicability of the comparative method is the only limitation. Islam as a political ideology therefore provides a preliminary criterion of limitation. If this looseness is unacceptable, the "American" Near East plus the "British" Middle East may be substituted. These two usages include all the countries from Libya to Pakistan. While the State of Israel lies within these geographic limits, the comparability of its political institutions with those of its neighbors is at least enough in doubt to warrant its exclusion from the present discussion.

[4] By fundamentalism is meant a reforming movement emanating from the romanticization of early Islam, but insisting upon strict adherence to Islamic law. Another variety of fundamentalism is the Wahhabi and related Sanusi types, which are of earlier origin and were mostly directed against mystic and primitivistic accretions to Islam.

[5] *I.e.*, that of the "ulama," representing the whole of the accumulated legal and social tradition of Islam and stressing the related function of the ulama as a religious institution. The ulama "know" the law, hence are clergy.

II

The changing concept of legitimacy in the Middle East appears to provide the most fruitful approach to the contemporary study of comparative government in that region. It calls attention to the institutional instability of the area, and at the same time implies that newer and more stable forms of the state may be emerging. It also stresses the role of ideology in establishing and fixing institutional arrangements. Insofar as these arrangements can be scientifically related to certain economic and social prerequisites, the latter are crucial to our study.

The most superficial observation of Middle Eastern governments will reveal the absence of any common concept of legitimacy. Existing concepts vary all the way from that associated with the modern democratic state, with its constitution, parliament, and contractual accoutrements, to the medieval Imamate, with its traditional, prescriptive order, and its theocratic implications. Turkey lies at one end of the scale, and at the other possibly the Yemen. Turkey enjoys a two-party system, has a constitution providing for representative government, is a secular state, and has even adopted the latin script. Above all, Turkey is a nation-state. Both Ottoman imperialism and Pan-Islam have been rejected, while, since the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, a complete national historical myth has been elaborated and diffused through an expanding educational system.[8] The Yemen, on the other hand, retains a constitutional arrangement which is a thousand years old. The Imam Ahmad is the final court of appeal in both civil (decree) law and religious (shar'i) law. Though a Shi'i Imamate, this Zaidi state was so early established that its head is not accorded the later messianic aspects of divine guidance and personal infallibility. The Imam is elected by the dignitaries of the state because he is the most qualified of the descendants of 'Ali, the most able in interpreting the sacred law, and the most courageous in defending the state from external aggression.

Between these two extremes are many variations. Libya, for example, is a constitutional monarchy; but the king, himself, is the leader of the Sanusi brotherhood. Since the Sanusi have "arrived"—so to speak—they are no longer a reforming force. The dominant tendency is to run the government along the lines of a medieval sultanate. Iraq is also a constitutional monarchy, but there the dominant tendency is to rule through the outstanding political leaders of the parliament. The Lebanon is a republic, whose president is always a Christian and whose prime minister always a Sunni Muslim. Members of the Lebanese parliament are elected from confessional (communal) constituencies, reflecting, in a way, the traditional Ottoman millet system. Syria is also a republic, but Islam is established and the President must be a Muslim.[9] The Syrians, themselves, are not sure whether they seek to build a new nation of their own, to integrate all the original members of the Arab League into a single nation-state, or to develop a new Islamic-Arab state form. Their constitution reflects most of these conflicting ideas. Pakistan, though its inclusion in this discussion is questionable, is a democratic-republican-Islamic State. Its institutions are definitely comparable to those of the west, but its constitution has established the relationship between Islamic polity and the maintenance of the sacred law. The constitution of Iran provided for the establishment of a board of mujtahids[10] to pass upon the repugnancy of Majlis[11] legislation to the shari'a.[12]

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[6] See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey* (London, 2d ed., 1954), p. 104.

[7] For a short period Iran was without a Shah, and throughout 1924–5 Riza was undecided whether to become President or Shah of Iran.

[8] D. Rustow, *Politics and Westernization in the Near East*, Center of International Studies (Princeton, 1956), p. 14.

As for political ideologies, theories of representative government and the rule of law exist side by side with those of the "pious sultan"[13] and the traditional dichotomy of qanun[14] and shari'a. Except for the incorrigible traditionalists, represented by the unregenerate "ulama" and the ruling élites of peripheral states,[15] nearly all accept the dogmas of representative government. Where parliamentarism has been tried and found wanting, it has been supplanted, for the time being, at least, by plebiscitary democracy. Most educated Muslims have reconciled democracy and Islam through the romantic device of identifying the Prophet's shura[16] with representative government. Secularism is associated with extremist nationalism or communism, though both are often camouflaged behind a rhetorical façade which rejects the shari'a as casuistry and finds in Islam only certain vague general principles of the brotherhood of believers, or the state's responsibility for social welfare.[17] Fundamentalists, while accepting the notion of representative government, reject democracy. For them it is not the will of the people that counts, but the will of God as revealed to His Prophet and correctly interpreted by wise and pious men learned in religious science.

The wide diversity of political institutions in this region is a phenomenon with a time as well as a space dimension. Diversity is found not only as between various countries, but also, over time, within the same country. This institutional change is not characterized by any regularity and so might better be known as instability, rather than development. It is often rapid, sometimes violent, and consists of alternations between parliamentary rule and military, nationalist or popular revolutions, without visible progress toward actual democracy or legitimacy.

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[9] *Constitution of the Republic of Syria* (September 5, 1950), Preamble and Chapter I, Article 3, (1) and (2).

[10] Shi'ite legists competent to interpret the law of Islam.

[11] The Iranian parliament.

[12] Islamic Law.

[13] See H. A. R. Gibb, "Some Considerations of the Sunni Theory of the Caliphate," *Archives d'Histoire du Droit Orientale*, Tome III (Wetteren, 1948), p. 405.

[14] Civil decree without religious sanction.

[15] *I.e.*, peripheral to the historical Islamic empire: Afghanistan, the Yemen, Morocco, even Arabia.

[16] A council of notables, with floating membership.

[17] W. Z. Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (New York, 1956), p. 167.

The changes which have occurred in Turkey seem to be regular enough in the progress of that state from empire to nation. On the other hand the reforms of Ataturk were certainly rapidly introduced. The *coups* of 1908 and 1909 were not without violence, nor has it been absent from the enforcement of later reforms. These *coups* were repeated by Ataturk, and some of the illiberal tactics of his party are now being renewed by the incumbent Democratic Party.[18] Iraq and Syria both have suffered from chronic *coups d'état* on the part of the military, but authority, if not power, has always returned to the politicians in parliament. In both cases the military have remained disunited, and they have failed to win wide popular support. In Jordan, violence has attended the devolution of some power from the king to the Assembly. Egypt has undergone a series of constitutional changes, the last of which resulted from the *coup* within a *coup* of Nasir against Nagib. Parties have been abolished, but a return to parliamentarism has been promised. Indeed part of the reason for Nagib's ouster was his desire to precipitate the return to parliamentarism before the rest of the military were ready for it. The Sudan and Libya have suddenly attained independence with all the paraphernalia of representative government. While the future of parliamentarism in both of these states remains somewhat obscure, it seems fair to surmise that Libya will have to go through a number of "repeat performances" before parliamentarism is well established. The Yemen came within an ace of experiencing a "liberal" revolution, while the Lebanon seems to have barely missed having a *coup* of its own. Iran had its revolution early in the twentieth century, followed by reaction, occupation, a *coup*, renewed constitutionalism, a period of nationalist *étatisme*, occupation again, an attempt to oust the Shah, and finally a royalist *coup*. Afghanistan had a small taste of liberal reform, followed by reaction. Pakistan has overcome a severe threat to its parliamentary regime, in which the military played a minor role. Saudi Arabia alone has experienced neither striking political change, nor the imminent threat of it. Syria's latest military *coup* is still enigmatic.

No clear pattern of democratic or constitutional development emerges from these facts. During the past fifty years or so populations have increased, industrial production has increased, agricultural land area has increased, the number of modern schools has increased, and communications have been greatly improved. But none of these changes has been of such magnitude, except possibly in Turkey, as to have provided a new socio-economic basis for a stable political system. During this period, nevertheless, nearly all the states of the Middle East have received written constitutions providing for representative government. Perhaps most significant is the fact that, while traditional institutions have sometimes persisted alongside modern ones, and while representative government has often been suspended, there is a definitely discernible trend to return to parliamentarism. On the other hand, the position of the traditional "sultan" in Jordan, Iraq, and Libya, and of the Shah of Iran has been fundamentally altered. The only successful popular dictatorship in the Middle East before Nasir was that of Ataturk, and he laid the foundation of Turkish nationalism.

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[18] *E.g.*, suppression of opposition newspapers.

The tendency toward according a lasting legitimacy to a parliament is clear; but that need not imply the derivation of legitimacy from the ideal of democracy or even democratic-nationalism. Parliaments have been imported from the outside, and nothing else has been devised to supplant them. But parliaments have not been popular or democratic or efficient; nor is it agreed whether parliaments are to represent the nation, the various confessions, economic interests, or whether they are simply to institutionalize a learned élite. For the present it seems that membership in parliament is not looked upon as a representative function, but rather as the privilege of a select group of notables. The legitimacy accorded a parliament of this nature may only be temporary. Either the basis of these parliaments must change, or a new institutional form may be expected to take their place.

All these institutional details, and changes in them, need to be put into some kind of conceptual framework. In order to understand change, certain points of reference must be fixed. These points, if they are to apply to all parts of the region, become less accurate as we approach the present; and they become alternatives when we extend them into the future.

III

The political institutions of the Middle East are less important for what they are, than for what they were, and what they will be. At present they are simply changing, and the final issue is very much in doubt. We may be sure of one thing, and that is the continuing influence of earlier regional experience. Medieval institutions can accordingly form our first point of reference. The Middle East has not turned its back on Islam, and does not seem likely to do so.[19] Imperialism has produced the new intellectual pursuit of the competitive comparison of cultures. The world-wide ideological conflict has intensified the search for a middle way. Islam itself continues in vigorous proselytization, and with some success. Western historians have already infected Muslims with a fascination for their own glorious past, and the efforts of Muslim historians have been encouraged by the growing demand for new national historical myths. Even the traditional Islamic religious institution has shown vigor, and not a little political wisdom and restraint. Only Turkey has pursued a policy of vigorous secularization, and that, too, seems to have been more superficial than has been commonly assumed; and it has recently been somewhat relaxed.[20]

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[19] This view differs from that of Laqueur, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[20] See B. Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey," *International Affairs*, Vol. 28 (January, 1952), pp. 38–48; L. V. Thomas, "Recent Developments in Turkish Islam," *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 6 (Winter, 1952), pp. 22–40; and E. Marmorstein, "Religious Opposition to Nationalism in the Middle East," *International Affairs*, Vol. 28 (July, 1952), pp. 344–349.

The development of vigorous fundamentalist movements with obvious political intentions has encouraged the existing political élites to cooperate more and more with the ulama, who, themselves, have been undergoing a reform for some two centuries or so.

Our knowledge of past political and legal institutions in the Middle East is fairly good, and improving all the time. The Islamic legal, political, and administrative tradition was built upon that of the ancient Near Eastern empire, but much of its history is that of a struggle to "Islamicize" inherited institutions and traditions. At the height of the Abbasid Caliphate in the ninth century it may be said that a successful compromise had been achieved, but this cultural-political equilibrium was upset during the decline of the Caliphate and in the aftermath of the Mongol invasions. Islam as a religion won out, but as an explanation of civil polity it underwent changes of such magnitude that it is possible to say that the ancient Iranian tradition reasserted itself. On the other hand, it is important to note that this old tradition reappeared without the ancient unity of empire. The political forces which now asserted themselves were those of the Satraps; the empire was only partially reestablished by the Ottomans, with the notable exclusion of heterodox Iran. The unity imposed by the Ottomans did not lead to the re-emergence of the classical Islamic doctrine.

> They accepted the traditional and recognized division of mankind into a variety of social orders: "men of the sword," "men of the pen," merchants, artisans, cultivators, *dimmis*, slaves. To each order were assigned its functions, and regulations were drawn up to ensure the proper carrying out of those functions, and that none should interfere with or infringe the functions or rights of others.[21]

In many cases the government did not deal directly with the individual members of these orders, but only with their appointed representatives. Rights and privileges, for most political purposes, were enjoyed only by virtue of the civil or religious status derived from such membership. This was the doctrine of ancient Iran, and so far was it successful, that even the ulama were incorporated and made part of this alien quasi-feudal system.

Out of the hegemony of the Satraps there developed three more or less stable empires, the Ottoman, the Safavid, and the Mughal. The imperial systems of each were similar; and they were all fairly efficient within the limitations of contemporary administrative techniques. The revival of the classical Islamic doctrine of the Caliphate coincides with the decline of each of these three imperial institutions. This decline spans both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; it was characterized only at the end by the encroachment of western power, and it was accompanied throughout by efforts at religious reform by the ulama. Finally, the Ottoman claim to the universal Caliphate was based on the literary discoveries of western scholars, the improvement of communications between the various parts of the Islamic world, the misinterpretation of the Caliphate as parallel to the Papacy, and the usefulness of this doctrine in the struggle of Abdul Hamid II to maintain his empire.

The result of this development has been the unwarranted belief that Islamic legal and political thought has remained stagnant at the point achieved about one thousand years ago. The fact of the revival has been mistaken for unbroken continuity, and the legitimate basis of earlier imperial government remains an enigma. Thus we find the Islamic world, while yet on the threshold of the modern period, questioning the legitimacy of its government, striving to purify its religion, and threatened with a renewal of the hegemony of the Satraps. The development of the modern Muslim state has been viewed by many Muslims as a step backward.

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[21] Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

In sum, the elements to be stressed in this sketch of historical influences are the contrast between the idea of a universal empire and the actual breakup into satrapies; the re-emergence of this same problem in modern dress in modern times; the submergence of the theory of the "pious sultan" which might have legitimized Islamic nation-states; the institutional and traditional-theoretical roots of contemporary fundamentalism; and the fact that the revival of classical (Caliphate) theory has obscured the function and political interest of the ulama. The Islamic theory of the empires denies that feudalism existed in them; feudalism is therefore "alien." But improving historical knowledge makes it plain that the practice of the Islamic empires approximated feudalism, with the important exceptions of the roles of cities and the ulama. The theory has survived and the feudalistic practices have been attacked both by western innovations and by the religious revival. Muslim "modernists" would reject all Islamic influences, while fundamentalists would go back to an ideal imperial system that never actually existed.

The second point of reference is the impact of western influences upon the changing political systems of the Islamic east. This impact was particularly severe because it fell upon three empires in decline. From these special circumstances a kind of double reaction may be discerned: the first, and most obvious, is the relative ease with which western methods might be borrowed because of the increasing failure of traditional ways. The second type of reaction came from those who, knowingly or not, were destroying the old system in the hope of reforming it. They looked upon the western encroachment as a new trial of piety. Inevitably there developed many intermediate positions, maintained principally by the new and transformed classes produced by the changes of the last century or so.

For our purposes, the impact of the west took three major institutional forms: the new division of labor within the military; government concern with economic development and financial stability; and the anonymity of government itself. The net effect of these influences has been to enhance the importance, while transforming the function, of the military and administrative classes. New industrial and commercial classes have developed, and the old corporative groupings have begun to break down. Finally, the old imperial governmental forms have been demolished.

Of course, there are parts of the Middle East where this process has not yet taken place, but it is hard to believe that even the remote fastnesses of tradition can withstand the onslaught of twentieth century forms. Even Afghanistan has accepted foreign technical and financial aid towards agricultural development; and its government has in recent years embarked upon a program of fostering Pakhtun nationalism both in the schools and among the tribes along Pakistan's north-west frontier. The Yemen was threatened with modernization through the efforts of emigrés who have been little affected in their sentiments by the restoration of the Imamate. The king of the Libyan Federation has suffered foreign air-bases to be constructed on its soil, and the Libyan people, living next to Egypt and Tunisia, cannot be expected to ignore the trumpeting of Middle Eastern nationalism. It seems inevitable that all must tread the same path of transformation, at least in some approximation of these three western influences.

The acceptance of western military organization, including the citizen army, and of western administrative organization, including the merit system, and of western industrial organization, including state capitalism, does not commit the Middle East on the central question of the nature of legitimate government. Many of the changes involved in the acceptance of these ideas and institutions were accomplished by the traditional sultans, others were imposed by external pressure, and some were the work of the military and administrative élites themselves. The principle of the anonymity of the state, and of its adjunct the rule of law in the form of logical, positive codes, has not yet been fully accepted. The military and civil services seem to favor such a change, but the industrial and commercial élites are at least ambivalent. To the urban lower classes this kind of government is incomprehensible, and devoid of that element of human charity which is often the only positive aspect of Middle Eastern government. The peasant has already suffered grievous loss by the application of western ideas of contract to his agricultural borrowing.

The third point of reference is that, without settling the question of legitimacy, western governmental institutions have been established throughout most of the Middle East. The reasons and historical circumstances behind each incident vary, but generally speaking parliaments have come into being to limit a sultan or to begin the process of the devolution of western imperial power. It is a matter of more than passing significance that parliamentary institutions, already accepted in the west, were simply transferred wholly grown to the Middle East. They were, and remain, an artificial legalism, and a continuing temptation to go outside the law. The two bases for the establishment of parliaments imply two not necessarily coordinate theories of legitimacy. The first of these is that associated with the idea of democracy institutionalized and modified in a representative assembly. The second is associated with the somewhat vaguer idea of national self-determination.

The total effect of the western impact, including the recent decline in western imperialism, has been to leave a residue of parliamentary institutions on the debris of traditional sultanates. These institutions, though welcome to the officials in most cases, are without any strong and stable social basis. With some interruption, these institutions have been maintained *faute de mieux*, but they are certainly shaky. Nationalism, while continuing to be expressed in these parliaments, often finds it difficult to work with them; while the parliaments themselves have been notably unable, and often unwilling, to extend the scope of democratic government.

Since no important theories of legitimacy have received general acceptance since the breakdown of the sultanates, idealistic attempts "to get things done" without parliaments have had to rely upon charismatic leadership. Such leadership can as well be adapted to an integral nationalism as to a plebiscitary democracy, but it is also, and perhaps ideally, suited to the government of a theocratic state. Less successful leaders than Ataturk have discredited military dictatorship as much as parliamentarism, so the stage may be set for trying a kind of theocratic dictatorship.

Those ulama who have continued in their reforming tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are as suspicious of nationalism as they are of lay religious fundamentalism. However, the secularist tendencies of some nationalists have at times tended to drive the ulama toward the fundamentalists. The ulama are fairly immune to the democratic charms of parliaments, and they tend, like Plato, to put more faith in the abilities of a cooperative autocrat.

The fourth point of reference is the fact of economic development and change. It is important here in a special sense. We are concerned with how much, but also with how little. We are concerned with how fast, but also with how long and how frequent the interruptions may be.

In only a few Middle Eastern countries has economic development been so little as to have had no substantial effect on the distribution of social and political power. Again in only a few of them has the peculiar concentration of economic power in the hands of the sultan been maintained. In all the rest far-reaching economic change has occurred involving restrictions on production, currency controls, state-capitalism, the diffusion of a money economy, and great outlays on public capital projects.

We still have much to learn about the political effects of economic change, in the Middle East as elsewhere, and especially when the question concerns the speed and sustained character of economic development in its relation to the development of democracy. There are, however, two things we can say that are relevant here. The first is that economic development will proceed in the Middle East; and the second is that this economic development will result in broadening the basis of politics in the region.

The most persistent form in which economic development takes place in the Middle East is the provision of the public capital prerequisites for development. A railroad, a bridge, a dam, a telegraph line will all outlast the temporary domestic upheaval or foreign boycott which dries up the flow of foreign capital and sends the factory worker back to the village. Sometimes these public capital projects are more closely tied to military projects, and then their effect upon communication and "social mobilization" is even more pronounced. This kind of development has already begun and so long as international communications remain at their present level, and so long as some states are considerably more developed than others, it will continue.

At some point in the future the economic development of various Middle

Eastern countries may reach the point where a vigorous democratic nationalism may be reasonably expected to emerge. But there may be many obstacles to overcome; and it is possible that the political form of these states may become fixed long before that time. What possible forms may they take?

The fifth point of reference is the future form of the "typical" Middle Eastern state. We have already intimated that there are only two important genera which are competing for legitimization. The first is the nation-state, and the second may be called the Islamic-State.[22] Both terms are already in use in the Middle East, and sometimes in reference to the same state. Turkey even now may be considered a nation-state, while Pakistan calls itself an Islamic-State. Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, Morocco, and Afghanistan resemble the medieval Islamic-State of the "pious sultan." For our purposes neither of these terms can be referred to an actual state. Both are ideal constructs against which to judge political development. Middle Eastern states will tend toward one extreme or the other. The development of intermediate forms will be greatly hampered (*a*) by the force of the pent-up reaction against existing traditional sultanates, (*b*) by the lack of a mediator in the form of a legitimate political institution with legalized procedures in countries of erratic economic and political development, or (*c*) by the previous settlement of the issue. In Turkey, which seems to enjoy a firmly established form of government which may mediate between these two positions, economic development is most likely to continue to diffuse secularism and strengthen nationalism. Only Pakistan has provided in its constitution for a means whereby the Islamic-State may come into being; but Pakistan is a very special case.

IV

Once we have established two alternative lines of development, and have eliminated for all academic purposes intermediate forms, we are no longer required to use them both. It will be sufficient if we take only one form for our fifth point of reference, understanding throughout that all obstacles to the progress of a Middle Eastern state in this direction will turn it toward the other pole.

Of the two it seems that our choice must fall upon the nation-state, for a number of reasons. First, the nation-state is most familiar to us. Second, the nation-state is the most widely accepted form in the world today, and so compels the use of its justifications in all international relations. Third, the forces of nationalism are in the ascendant throughout most of the Middle East. The Islamic-State is a tantalizing concept, for it exists nowhere, except possibly in Pakistan where the issue has not yet been fully resolved, and where it has failed of the ungrudging support of the religious classes. Only in Egypt has there been a powerful organization working for the establishment of an Islamic-State; but the Muslim Brotherhood has been crushed, at least for the time being. The Wahhabi and Sanusi movements in Saudi Arabia and Libya, respectively, belong to an earlier reform of traditional Islam. Both these movements fail to recognize the modernization of the state apparatus, but emphasize instead the religious views and performance of the Head of the state. Both movements have lost much of their vigor and social sense as a result of their comparative success, so that King Saud's government resembles a traditional sultanate, while that of King Idris would be similar but for the inconvenience of a legislative assembly imposed by the United Nations.

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[22] Communist influences, though growing in the Middle East, seem most likely to manifest themselves within the framework of the nation-state. It may be assumed that the United States will actively resist the subversion of any of the "Northern Tier" states bordering on the USSR, *i.e.*, those most likely to imitate communist forms in such an eventuality.

The type of Islamic-State which may arise as a real alternative to nationalism remains largely undefined, but some of its features can be specified. Such a state will declare the sovereignty of God as the foundation of the legitimacy of its government. The sovereignty of God is not merely nominal, for God has revealed His will through His Prophet. The law of the state will be based upon the qur'an (Koran) and the traditions of the Prophet, but it will reject the later consensi of the legal schools. The Head of the state will have the power of interpreting the sacred law in applying it to new situations. It is possible that legislation on some points by an assembly will be permitted. The Head of state and assembly will be elected, but there will be only one party, or perhaps none at all. Candidates will not canvass for election, but they will be elected on the basis of their knowledge of the law, their piety, their respectability, and their *modern* knowledge. The composition of the assembly may reflect economic interests, but probably not geographical areas. The law will be a respecter of persons in regard to religious differences. Only Muslims will be able to hold policy-making positions, but non-Muslims will be permitted to live in accordance with their own personal status law. Private property will be safeguarded, but exceptionally large accumulations of wealth will be prohibited. Women will be excluded from public life, and secluded in the home whenever possible. The major domestic duty of the government will be to foster the good and suppress evil in encouraging the growth of a truly Muslim society.

As may be judged from this sketch, the romantic-fundamentalist groups agitating for the establishment of such a state are presently or potentially "power-aspiration" groups. Groups of this kind have had considerable appeal among the lower middle classes which are made up both of those less successful in the westernized sector of Muslim society and those whose intermediate position in the traditional social structure has been undermined by recent change. Before these groups can hope for success, they must win to their support either a much larger segment of the administrative and military élites, or many more individuals who have been frustrated by the inability of the existing political structure to satisfy their aspirations. The latter situation can only arise when the social basis of political life is considerably broadened. It is the narrow basis of political life in Saudi Arabia and Libya which makes all the difference between the political qualities of the old and new fundamentalism.

In the absence of any concrete example of the Islamic-State, and with only a highly theoretical statement of its law and but a vague notion of its political organization, it cannot serve efficiently as an ideal construct. Moreover, it does not grow out of the contemporary social and economic phenomena which have elsewhere produced the familiar form of the nation-state. Looked at in terms of the aspirations of most of the ruling élites of the Middle East, the Islamic-State could only come into being after the failure of the current effort to build nation-states. It seems, therefore, preferable to posit the nation-state as the model construct toward which the Middle East is moving.

The establishment of nation-states throughout the Middle East entails the final breakdown of the medieval corporations and the de-emphasis of the heretofore all-important religious distinctions. Wherever traditional institutions obtain, the newly rising middle classes will have to transform or overthrow them. The privileges and obligations of citizenship will have to be much more widespread. The obligation of the government in terms of popular health, welfare, and education, and in the creation of economic opportunity, will have to be fulfilled in more than mere declaratory fashion. Communication must improve to the point where the individual's horizon spreads beyond his immediate community, and appropriate national myths will have to be evolved to keep the individual's allegiance within the territorial bounds of the nation-state. The nation-state must also have sufficient power, and its leaders sufficient skill, to maintain its independence under all foreseeable circumstances short of a third world war.

Given certain prerequisites, all these things may be achieved in an orderly political environment capable of adjusting to and controlling a sustained economic development of an appropriate magnitude. The absence of optimum political and economic conditions, which we know to exist, will hamper and possibly permit the perversion of the development of nation-states. But even under optimum conditions certain difficulties may appear which cannot be overcome. These difficulties arise primarily from the manner in which the contemporary Middle East is politically demarcated.

Paradoxical though it may be, the primary legal and political sphere of the nation-state is territorial. Language, history, and religion may be the stuff of nationalism, but the nation-state remains heir to the territorial sovereignty of the monarchical states of pre-modern Europe. The territorial divisions of the Middle East were devised by European powers to meet their own needs and aspirations. Boundaries do not coincide with the areas of strongest potential national feeling in many cases, and yet they mark the limits of governmental effort toward the creation of nation-states. Arbitrary territorial divisions have not always hampered the development of nation-states elsewhere, when they were not evolved in a period of conscious nationalism. But arbitrary territorial divisions have created states which must be economically and militarily dependent on their neighbors.

The population-land ratio will also have much to do with the successful creation of nation-states in the Middle East. Economic development may be severely disturbed by either too low or too high a ratio. Underpopulation may make the maintenance of external security difficult, while the maldistribution of population and the existence of large tribal groups hinders social integration. Religious minorities, whether heterodox Muslims or non-Muslims, and linguistic minorities are other obvious obstacles to the creation of nation-states.

The unequal distribution of natural resources in the area will tend to encourage more rapid development in some, and may be an insurmountable obstacle to development in other states. The more advanced state may then attract the loyalties and cooperation of its neighbor's citizens.[23] Wide stretches of desert throughout the area will remain a barrier to rapid and efficient transport and communication. Territorial nationalism will have to compete with Pan-Islam and Pan-Arabism, which survive in the area under the confused guise of nationalist ideologies. Finally, there is always the possibility that intra-area conflict or external subversion may bring the effort to establish nation-states within the territorial states of the Middle East to an untimely end.

V

The preceding observations enable us now to make a preliminary classification of the countries of the Middle East into three groupings in terms of their satisfaction of the prerequisites of the nation-state. The first grouping, comprising Turkey, Egypt, and Iran, comes very close to satisfying the conditions. The second grouping comprising the states of the Fertile Crescent, is furthest away from fulfilling these conditions. The third grouping, comprising Saudi Arabia, Libya, the Yemen, and possibly Afghanistan, still retains elements of an earlier legitimacy.

The population of Turkey is largely homogeneous, with the Kurds forming the only significant minority. The Kurdish "problem" has been largely eliminated by a twofold process of repression and assimilation; and since both Turks and Kurds are Sunnis, there has been no religious extension of political issues between them. For the present Turkey is somewhat underpopulated, but the trend is toward rapid growth. At the same time, with the support of American foreign aid programs, the improvement of communications and the provision of state capital for economic development has been steady over the last decade. In the thirty-five years since Ataturk's victory over the Greeks, nationalism has spread throughout the educational system, which has been modernized and expanded. The alphabet reform speeded the spread of literacy, which, in turn, has been fed by a new nationalist literary movement. A new national myth has been created by skipping back over the Islamic period to the legendary reports concerning the Turks of Central Asia. The dominant political élite has its roots in the westernized official classes of the Ottoman Empire, but they have found in the Turkish nation an adequate compensation for the loss of a reactionary Sultan and an unmanageable empire.

Egypt is also a country of homogeneous population. The Copts number barely 5 percent of the population, and are Arabic speaking too. There are only a few and unimportant nomadic tribes in Egypt. The country is predominantly agricultural, and the overwhelming majority of the population is concentrated along the Nile. Among the consequences of this concentration are ease of communication and the necessity, realized by all, of centralized control. Egypt is, however, limited in agricultural resources, and suffers from a very adverse arable land-population ratio. The national myth of Egypt has been based upon the glories of the Pharaonic civilization quite as much as upon Arabic symbols. Even under Islam, Egypt long enjoyed an independent administration, and its ties to the Ottoman empire were loose to the point of insubordination. Given a stable political order and the skill and finances to overcome its population problem, there is little doubt that Egypt can emerge in the recognizable form of a western nation-state. Even if no transitional political system can persist, but if economic development proceeds, one might expect the same results. On the other hand, if economic development continues erratic, and if political decision-making remains haphazard or adventurous, the Muslim Brotherhood may yet arise more powerful than before.

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[23] See K. W. Deutsch, *The Political Community at the International Level,* Doubleday Short Studies (New York, 1954), p. 44.

Iran suffers from maldistribution of population, poor internal communications, and the decentralizing effects of large and powerful tribal groups. On the other hand, Iran is most favorably endowed for development as a nation-state. It has a large territory and a growing population, tremendous resources of petroleum and adequate resources of other minerals. The ideological, historical, and literary bases of Iranian nationalism are stronger than those of many a European state. Iran is a Shi'i state, and yet is ruled by a Shah who calls himself *Pahlavi*, referring to the rulers of ancient Parthia. Modern Iran has been an independent, unified empire for over four centuries. Like Turkey, it has a unique national language, and one which can boast of an exceptional poetic achievement crowned by a national epic which may be heard from the lips of many an illiterate Iranian. Had the government of Iran the will and the ability to invest the proceeds of its petroleum sales properly, it could most probably effect the social integration lacking in that country. The problem of Iran is, however, much greater than that of either Turkey or Egypt when seen from the standpoint of existing linguistic and racial homogeneity. On the other hand, the tribal and linguistic minorities may be swept up in a new vigorous nationalism, since there are few external attractions for them. The only seriously competing nationalism is that of Soviet Azerbaijan, but here the USSR overplayed its hand in 1946, and this is not forgotten nor forgiven. In any case, once economic development gets under way the peasant classes should become far more important than the tribes.

In the Fertile Crescent, the Lebanon is an Arab state, but not a nation-state. The precarious balance of Christians and Muslims in the population is institutionalized in the division of political offices and in the distribution of parliamentary constituencies. Though the Lebanese standard of living is higher than that of Syria, its economic position is precarious also. Its major sources of income are from the transit trade, the tourist trade, foreign receipts from emigrants, and an overworked agriculture. Its attempt to boast an historical connection with ancient Phoenicia is belied by the dominance of Arabic sentiment and the rigidity of confessional politics. The historical basis of its separate existence is French intervention on behalf of the Christians of the Levant. There is little likelihood that the Lebanon will ever become either a nation-state or an Islamic-State; but there is the danger that it may be incorporated in a Greater Syria.

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was created in 1922 by the British government for reasons of British policy. Until recently it was ruled as a traditional sultanate, but with the annexation of Cis-Jordan the Kingdom acquired a new majority. This new majority was far more advanced than the sparse population of Trans-Jordan, and also politically frustrated. The only nationalism popular in Jordan is Pan-Arabism. Jordan, itself, has been economically sustained by subventions from the British government which it has lately sought to replace by similar grants from Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Evidently this arrangement has not worked out very well, and now Jordan seems likely to become a client of the United States. The patronage of the greatest world power is bound to prolong the existence of even this most artificial of states, but sheer power does not suffice for every purpose. Recent events indicate that Jordanian independence cannot withstand the growth of nationalism within its own borders.

Syria and Iraq are alike in many ways. They are separated in the south by the Syrian desert, and they are joined in the north by the potentially rich agricultural area of the upper Euphrates. Both are underpopulated. Both have powerful nationalist and Pan-Arab movements. Both have important minority problems, but in both the Sunni Muslims are politically dominant. They share the problem of settling nomadic tribesmen, but Iraq's share is greater. Iraq has great resources of petroleum, and presently invests 70 percent of its royalties in a respectable economic development plan. Syria accommodates two Iraq petroleum pipelines at a considerable income. Both Syria and Iraq can look forward to a substantial expansion of their agricultural land area.

Iraq is ruled by a constitutional monarchy which has weathered over half a dozen *coups*. Syria is a republic when it is not ruled by a military dictator. To the extent that their national myths differ, Syria emphasizes the Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus, and Iraq emphasizes the Abbasid Caliphate, but the distinction is not crucial. The greatest obstacle to unity is the existence of two sets of political, military, and administrative élites. The unity of the Fertile Crescent is also opposed by both Egypt and Saudi Arabia for reasons of their own. In Syria, the ideal of Arab unity is enshrined in the 1950 constitution; and Iraqi statesmen pay similar homage to the Pan-Arabic aspiration.

Should the two states combine in the near future, it is obvious that Iraq, because of its resources, somewhat stabler politics, and powerful western support, would be dominant. If the two were united, a stable Sunni electoral majority would be created, the income from Iraqi petroleum could be shared and development thus equalized, the problem of trans-desert communications and the settlement of the tribes could be jointly dealt with, and the military security of both would be enhanced. Should they remain divided, it is difficult to imagine the ideological basis for separation, and even more difficult to conceive of a widely accepted legitimacy being granted these governments. At present neither Iraq nor Syria can claim complete nationalism. Possibly because of the prevalence of heterodoxy, neither country has a powerful fundamentalist movement, so that the prospect of the creation of an Islamic-State in the Fertile Crescent seems remote. The governments of Syria and Iraq may stumble for a long time before losing their opportunity of creating an Arab nation-state in the Fertile Crescent.

In the third grouping of states, still dominated by traditional political forces, one can only speculate as to the timing and source of political change. In Saudi Arabia one looks to the growing group of westernized administrators not belonging to the royal house, and to the employees of the Arabian-American Oil Company; in Libya one looks, perhaps, to the federal parliament; in the Yemen one looks to the Yemeni emigrants; in Afghanistan one looks to a handful of military and administrative officials. It is possible, if unlikely, however, that political change will come about peacefully in these countries; if so, they may avoid the growth of nationalism and hit upon some intermediate form. In all likelihood, developments in other parts of the Middle East will be so far advanced by the time these traditional governments are weakened that the nation-state will be the only logical solution.

Finally, a word about Pakistan, which is the only state claiming the title "Islamic." The present constitution of Pakistan enjoins the National Assembly to codify Islamic Law, and prohibits the Assembly from enacting any law repugnant to the qur'an and sunna. But the constitution seems to leave these matters to the final discretion of the legislators themselves, so that the Assembly may have as much of an effect on Islam as Islam may have on Pakistan. As a concrete application of the modern doctrine of the constitutive character of the consensus of *all* Muslims (not merely those specially qualified), this type of provision may be acceptable even in a national constitution.

VI

In summary, while the potential development of Islamic-States or the possible elaboration of political forces committed to that model as a goal has been taken as a basis for demarcating the Middle East as an area to which the discipline of comparative government may be applied, these potentialities do not seem sufficient to justify an undifferentiated application to all parts of the area. Existing political institutions have been considered too weak a staff upon which to lean, while the changing concept of legitimacy has been stressed. The political process is crucial to the dynamics of the changes going on, but it has been deemed theoretically subordinate to the central problem of comparative government. The possibility of the success of Communism in the Middle East, outside of the framework of nationalism, has been ignored as unlikely in the foreseeable future, and the persistence of parliamentary institutions has been dealt with briefly.

Limited spheres of disciplinary application have been delineated on the basis of an argument from the impact of historical and economic forces upon diverse ideological, territorial, and institutional complexes. This argument turns on five points of reference: medieval institutions; the impact of western influences; the establishment of western institutions; economic development; and the future form of the Middle Eastern state. Finally, it is suggested that reasonable comparisons and the most valid estimates of similarity of development can be made regarding the following groups of states: 1) Turkey, Egypt, and Iran; 2) the Fertile Crescent countries; 3) those states whose political institutions are dominated by systems of traditional authority, especially Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, Libya, and Afghanistan. Morocco and the Sudan may fit into the second group. Pakistan offers special difficulties because of its geography and lengthier imperial experience, as do Tunisia and Algeria because of the presence of a large French minority in each of them. The presence of politically powerful fundamentalist groups and organizations of the traditional ulama in Indonesia may permit limited comparisons on the ideological level, but not much more.

PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY IN FRANCE

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In controlling nationalized industries parliament plays the role of the traditional lion under the throne. It lies quietly most of the time but can rise suddenly and wrathfully to smite offenders. It has little day-to-day influence, the major decisions being made by the managers of the industries, or by the government; but occasionally its importance is capital. This conclusion emerges from a study of the methods used by parliament to control the nationalized industries. Since these industries are fundamental to the French economy, in reality this is a study of the ways and means by which parliament controls major segments of the national economy—in every industrial state a controversial and highly significant issue.[1]

Theoretically parliament is the fountainhead of controls over the nationalized industries. It creates them by statute; it votes their budgets; it approves the activities of the responsible ministers; and its creates organizations for supervising the industries. In reality, parliament usually only ratifies actions recommended by the government, as one would expect in a parliamentary system. The government, in turn, is usually recommending actions which high civil servants in the ministries or administrators in the nationalized industries have recommended. Our concern here, however, is with the actions which parliament initiates, or with those in which major changes are made in the government's proposals, so that we can see how the elected representatives actually make use of their potentially enormous powers and responsibilities. So significant is the role of parliament, in fact, that the nationalized enterprises have appointed contact men who can, so to speak, lobby in the corridors of parliament for the industries.[2]

The statutes creating the broad operating structure were written by the immediate post-war governments, many of them being ratified by the first Constituent Assembly in 1945–1946. Partly these statutes were punitive measures against collaborators—most notably the nationalization of the Renault automobile works—but much more they were the result of a doctrinal enthusiasm for "returning to the nation," in the words of the National Council of the

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[1] For general background, see: Einaudi, Byé and Rossi, *Nationalization in France and Italy* (Ithaca, 1955); *Le fonctionnement des entreprises nationalisées en France* (Paris: Dalloz, 1956). (This is a collection of papers delivered at the 3d *colloque* of the Faculties of Law, at Grenoble, June 9 to 11, 1955.) Jean Rivero, "*Le fonctionnement des entreprises nationalisées* (*Réflexions sur le 3e colloque des Facultés de Droit*)." *Droit Social*, Vol. 18 (November, 1955), pp. 533–538. In reply, "*A propos du contrôle des entreprises nationalisées.*" *Droit Social*, Vol. 19 (February, 1956), pp. 65–68. Bernard Chenot, *Les entreprises nationalisées* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956).

[2] Lionel de Tinguy du Pouët, "*Les entreprises nationales et le parlement,*" *Revue Politique des Idées et des Institutions*, Vol. 44 (October 30, 1955), pp. 481–495.

Resistance, the major monopolized productive forces of the country.[3] The majority of the members of parliament, ranging in political coloration from ardent supporters of General de Gaulle to the Communists, shared this enthusiasm.

By these statutes, parliament created a number of relatively independent organizations, most of them controlled by an administrative council rather like a board of directors. Following the pattern advocated by the *Confédération Générale du Travail* since 1918, the councils were tri-partite, consisting of members representing the workers, the consumers, and the state. Technical leadership was usually vested in a general manager appointed by the appropriate minister on nomination of the administrative council.

In the original statutes no machinery was set up to provide for direct parliamentary supervision of the industries. This lack was soon recognized and remedied. In the ensuing ten years, four major devices were developed to control the nationalized industries. The first was the creation of sub-committees of the finance committees of each chamber, to gather information and make it available to parliament. The second was the modifying of the statutes and decrees by which the original framework was created. The third was the creation of extra-parliamentary supervisory bodies, the most important of which was the Commission for Verification of the Accounts of the Public Enterprises. And the fourth was the influencing of the operation of the industries through parliamentary control over their budgets.

I

Sub-committees of the finance committees, specifically empowered to "follow and assess the management of the nationalized enterprises," were among the earliest parliamentary efforts to establish an institutionalized control. The primary objective of these sub-committees was to gather information. Obviously if parliament lacked data its actions could easily fall wide of the mark.

The sub-committees were created almost on the spur of the moment, in a short article tacked on to the finance law of March 21, 1947.[4] The addition of this article indicates the shift in the attitude of many members of parliament away from their earlier enthusiasm for nationalization, which took place not long after a highly controversial and momentarily successful effort by the Communist party to gain control over the nationalized coal industry. The Minister of Industrial Production, a Communist, appointed fellow enthusiasts to the administrative council of *Charbonnages de France* to represent not only the workers but also the consumers. The government rather than parliament destroyed this Communist attempt to dominate the industry by issuing a series of decrees providing in more detail for the choosing of the tripartite interest group representatives. But parliament's reactions can be seen in the controls which it began to devise.

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[3] For a discussion of the background and course of nationalization, see "*Les nationalisations en France et en Grande Bretagne,*" in *Notes documentaires et études,* no. 983 (Paris: Présidence du conseil, Service de la documentation, 1948).

[4] Article 70, law no. 47–520. *Journal Officiel* (*Lois et Décrets*), March 25, 1947, p. 2774. (Hereafter, *J.O.* (*L*).)

The first suggestion was that the nationalized enterprises[5] present annually to parliament a more extensive balance sheet than already required by law, with the addition of an elaborate profit and loss statement. The emphasis on profit as the measure of success of the operation of the nationalized industries also represented a considerable change of attitude. In the original acts, the motivation of the enterprise was supposed to be "the general public interest." Now, in the eys of some deputies, it was to be profit.[6] In supporting this idea, some were striking at the whole idea of nationalization, emphasizing that there were more losses than profits under nationalization. Others were more concerned with bringing these enterprises more directly under the control of parliament.

The idea that there should be an extended statement of accounts led a finance committee member, M. Jean-Marie Louvel (M.R.P.), to suggest that a number of parliamentary sub-committees be created to watch over the activities of the nationalized enterprises. The model was the sub-committee of national defense, which had existed for many years, and had helped to bridge the gap between the armed forces and parliament.[7] As the law was finally approved, each chamber was to create a number of sub-committees, one for each category of nationalized enterprise, each to consist of twelve members, half from the respective finance committees, and the other half, equally divided, from the committees of industrial production and of economic affairs. As soon as the finance committee began to name members it was evident that there would hardly be enough deputies on the committee to go around; so parliament speedily approved the proposal of M. Gilles Gozard (Socialist) and others that there should be but one large sub-committee in each house.[8] The number of members was increased from twelve to sixteen. In 1953, because of increased committee activity, four more members were added from the finance committee, three from the committee on means of communication and tourist affairs, and one from the committee on the merchant marine. The finance committee members still constitute one-half of the twenty-four members of the sub-committee.[9] The other half of

[5] The author was M. Maurice Villette, a member of the finance committee, belonging to the Rally of the Left Republicans (R.G.R.). His suggestion was extended by an amendment from the floor of the Assembly, proposed by M. Jacques Bardoux, belonging to a group allied with the Popular Republican Movement (M.R.P.). *J.O., Parl. Deb., N.A.*, Dec. 21, 1946, pp. 206 ff; February 8, 1947, pp. 251–254. *J.O., Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexe 363 (1947).

[6] Rivero, *loc. cit.*, and Bernard Chenot, "*Les paradoxes de l'entreprise publique,*" in *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. 5 (Oct.–Dec., 1955), pp. 725–735.

[7] de Tinguy, *loc. cit.*, pp. 486–487.

[8] *J.O., Parl. Deb., N.A.*, June 6, 1947, p. 1918; *C. of R.*, June 20, 1947, p. 781. *Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexes 1293 and 1313 (1947). *Parl. Doc., C. of R.*, Annexe 333 (1947). Law no. 47–1213, *J.O.* (*L*), July 4, 1947, pp. 6215–6216.

[9] Law of Dec. 31, 1953, article 28, *J.O.* (*L*), Jan. 5, 1954, p. 131. *J.O., Parl. Deb., N.A.*, Dec. 14, 1953, p. 6747; Dec. 31, 1953, p. 7277; *Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexe 7270 (1953); *Parl. Deb., C. of R.*, Dec. 31, 1953, p. 2848; *Parl. Doc., C. of R.*, Annexe 692 (1953).

the sub-committee has representatives from each of the major subject-matter committees concerned with nationalized enterprises. Whereas the parent committees are built on rigidly partisan lines, in the sub-committees partisan coloration is less important than interest in the subject.

The number of enterprises potentially supervised by the sub-committees is enormous. In additon to the major enterprises, by the law of July 18, 1949, the sub-committees were empowered to examine any enterprise in which the state participated to the extent of more than 30 percent of its capital.[10] The basic purpose of this law was to obtain annually a definitive list of enterprises in which the state participated. Sub-committee control was added as an afterthought.

The major function of the sub-committee is making information available to the finance committee and to the legislature. One of the thorniest problems of the sub-committee itself has been to pry information out of the government or the enterprise. Time and again government or industry people have refused to answer questions put by the sub-committee, or to give evidence before it. This is the classic situation of the clash of the legislature and the executive. The government seems to fear too close a sub-committee control. An effort was made by the Council of the Republic in 1953[11] to extend the information-gathering powers of the sub-committees, but the National Assembly objected.

The same issue was raised by the government, and momentarily settled much to the disadvantage of the sub-committees in a decision of the *Conseil d'Etat* of May 18, 1954.[12] Narrowly interpreting the investigatory power of the sub-committees under the statute of March 21, 1947, it ruled that although the primary purpose of the sub-committees was to make information available to parliament, their powers did not extend to technical matters, and must be confined to the past, and not the future. They could investigate the activities of the enterprises to the extent of receiving and verifying the accuracy of economic and financial reports. The enterprises could refuse to divulge necessarily or legitimately secret material—such as, for example, the sales strategy of the Renault organization. The enterprises could also withhold information concerning national defense, the legitimate interests of third parties, and professional and manufacturing secrets. Within their limited competence, however, the sub-committees could not only ask appropriate ministers for information, but could also request the director of the enterprise, but no other servants of the organization, to furnish evidence. Preferably, according to the *Conseil d'Etat*, the sub-committees should send their requests for information by way of the minister, but because the enterprise and not the minister was being investigated, requests might go directly to the director. He, however, could ask the minister to intervene if the requests were of doubtful legality.

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[10] Law no. 49-958, *J.O. (L)*, July 20, 1949, p. 7086–7087. *J.O.*, *Parl. Deb.*, *N.A.*, Feb. 11, 1949, pp. 466–472; July 3, 1949, pp. 4113–4114; *Parl. Doc.*, *N.A.*, Annexes 6059, 6335 (1949); *Parl. Deb.*, *C. of R.*, May 20, 1949, pp. 1184 ff.; *Parl. Doc.*, *C. of R.*, Annexes 116, 345, and 388 (1949).

[11] See above, note 10.

[12] For comments as well as the text of the decision, see G. Vedel, "*Le contrôle par les commissions parlementaires de la gestion des entreprises industrielles nationalisées et des sociétés d'économie mixte*," *Droit Social*, Vol. 18 (March, 1955), pp. 137–145.

The continuing difficulty of gathering information, coupled with a desire to regularize many of the practices of the preceding seven years led, in April, 1955, to the enactment of a law substantially enlarging the powers of the sub-committees.[13] The original text was prepared by the president of the sub-committee of the National Assembly, expanded considerably by his opposite number in the Council of the Republic, and discussed with ministers and representatives of the Commission for Verification.[14]

According to the new law, the fundamental objective of the sub-committees was not only to gather technical information dealing with the present management of the nationalized enterprises and their subsidiaries, but also with their past or their future. This explicitly nullified parts of the restrictive decision of the *Conseil d'Etat.* The investigatory powers of the sub-committees were more precisely defined. Now the president of the sub-committee and its general and special *rapporteurs* were given "the most extended investigatory power."

Additional information was made available to the sub-committees by allowing them to receive the special as well as the general reports of the Commission for Verification. A permanent liaison was established between the sub-committees and this commission—a liaison which operates with some effectiveness. Furthermore, the sub-committees were empowered to ask the commission to make special studies for them. High civil servants could be and have been loaned to the sub-committees to help gather and systematize the information.

To make sub-committee reports more useful, it was provided that they should be presented at the time that the budgets of the appropriate ministry were under discussion. And to tie the sub-committee's work more closely to that of its parent finance committee, its chairman must come from the finance committee. Also the president of the finance committee and its *rapporteur-général* could participate in the work of the sub-committee when the budgets relating to the particular nationalized enterprises were under discussion.

It is difficult to assess directly the value of the sub-committees' work in contributing to parliament's control of the nationalized enterprises. In the first few years, even though annual reports were required, few were inserted in the *Journal Officiel.* The presidents of the sub-committees considered that it was important to make haste slowly and to solidify gradually the powers of the committees. Also, to a degree, the character of the reports drafted as well as the activities of the committees have depended upon the personalities of their presidents. With rare exceptions, the reports were concerned with specific problems or industries, and were normally drafted at the request of the finance committees.[15]

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[13] Law of April 3, 1955, Article 23. No. 55-366; *J.O.* (*L*), April 6, 1955, pp. 3415 ff.

[14] *J.O., Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexe 10002 (1955), pp. 215–216; *Parl. Doc., C. of R.* Annexe 187 (1955), pp. 424–425; *Parl. Deb., C. of R.*, March 31, 1955, pp. 1206–1211.

[15] See, for example, *Bulletin des Commissions* (*Assemblée Nationale*), no. 117 (May 10, 1955), pp. 2692–2693.

The general reports have been so few that generalizations cannot be usefully made about them. There have been three in the National Assembly and two in the Council of the Republic in ten years. The first general report in the National Assembly[16] pointed out how busy the new sub-committee had been and planned to be, but contained little of substance on the nationalized enterprises. The second general report described the way in which the sub-committee had operated during the previous two years. Each member had been assigned as commissioner-investigator to a particular industry, and ministers had been requested to grant appropriate powers, although not all of them did so. Various ministers and civil servants had been called before the commission, as well as representatives of the nationalized enterprises. The sub-committee recommended that it be made into a full-fledged committee—which has not been done. It also asked that it be given a place to work, and a professional staff—requests which have both been honored. It described only briefly its substantive conclusions about the industries.[17] The third one was issued in 1957, and was planned by the president of the sub-committee to be a forerunner of many more like it. He undertook to state generally the place of the committee in the parliamentary system, and to synthesize the many different reports on the individual nationalized industries.[18]

The first of the general reports of the Council of the Republic concentrated on specific abuses reported in a few enterprises, such as the building of miners' houses by *Charbonnages de France* without putting the contracts out for enough bids, and the sale of domestic appliances by *Electricité de France*, in competition with private business.[19] The second general report was a more or less neutral survey of the major industries, but did point out—as the industries have themselves, with anxiety[20]—the growing deficits caused in large part by the economic policy of the government. For example, in the Paris underground railroad, while the costs of personnel, electricity, and other supplies have mounted sharply, the government did not allow the fares to rise, so that in 1955 one-fourth of the operating cost of the *Métro* was deficit. American experience with the post office suggests that this sort of issue is not peculiar to France. A related situation existed in *Charbonnages de France*.[21] It is unlikely, however, that reports of the sub-committees will lead to major changes in these policies. They make the information available, but economic decisions of such sweeping importance are fought out at the highest levels of the government and with the full parliament.

The special reports, much more numerous, have been generally made at the request of the respective finance committees, and deal with the most varied subjects. No thread ties them together, unless it is that the press, or members of parliament, or constituents had been particularly suspicious or annoyed by certain activities of the agencies investigated.

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[16] *J.O., Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexe 6774 (1949).

[17] *Ibid.*, Annexe 13050 (1951).

[18] *J.O., Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexe 4703 (1957).

[19] *J.O., Parl. Doc., C. of R.*, Annexe 286 (1953).

[20] See, for example, *Charbonnages de France, Rapport de Gestion, Exercice 1955* (Paris: Charbonnages de France, 1956), pp. 107–108.

[21] *J.O., Parl. Doc., C. of R.*, Annexe 200 (1956).

In the National Assembly, the sub-committee has reported on the financial and managerial difficulties of a nationalized aircraft motor construction company, (S.N.E.C.M.A.),[22] on the coal shortage in 1950–51 and the activities of *Charbonnages de France*,[23] on the *Métro*,[24] on *Agence Havas*—a news agency,[25] on *Electricité de France*,[26] and on the nationalized railways.[27] There are two spectacular reports on S.O.F.I.R.A.D.,[28] a holding company for managing the radio stations in Tangiers, Andorra, the Saar and Monte Carlo. These read like modern suspense novels of high intrigue and resulted in corrective action being taken shortly by the government.

The Council of the Republic sub-committee has reported on the building, and later the disastrous crash, of a French passenger plane of which much was expected;[29] on *Charbonnages de France*;[30] on a project for raising the salaries of civil servants to meet those paid in the nationalized enterprises;[31] and on the "post-exchange" run for the benefit of the railroaders.[32]

In many ways the work of the sub-committees is useful. Members are interlocked with other standard committees. Time and again the people who have been active in sub-committee work take the lead in parliamentary action connected with the nationalized industries, either at budget time, or when statutes are to be made or amended. In general the sub-committees are working toward a solution of the difficult problem of making parliamentary control of the nationalized enterprises effective against the sometimes conflicting interests of the government and the technicians in the industries themselves. The committees hope to supervise the budgets of the nationalized enterprises through the finance committee in the same way that the finance committee itself supervises the administrative budget of the state.

II

Another major means of parliamentary control is by statutory action modifying the laws and decrees by which the original framework was set up. This method has been piecemeal, for although repeated requests have been made for a general statute which would deal with all of the nationalized industries, none has been passed.[33] This inaction may be desirable. The industries are so varied in function that perforce their structures are bound to vary considerably.[34]

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[22] *J.O., Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexe 4629 (1948).

[23] *Ibid.*, Annexe 12876 (1951).

[24] *Ibid.*, Annexe 9064 (1954).

[25] *Ibid.*, Annexe 8084 (1954).

[26] *Ibid.*, Annexe 10942 (1955).

[27] *Ibid.*, Annexe 7085 (1953).

[28] *Ibid.*, Annexes 10357 and 11759 (1955).

[29] *J.O., Parl. Doc., C. of R.*, Annexes 149 and 762 (1950).

[30] *Ibid.*, Annexe 110 (1953).

[31] *Ibid.*, Annexe 454 (1956).

[32] *Ibid.*, Annexe 684 (1956).

[33] See, for example, the report of the *Conseil Economique*, November, 1947, in *J.O.*,

Perhaps the most dramatic piecemeal statutory action of parliament resulted in the law of April 3, 1955,[35] in which governmental attempts to take more power over the nationalized industries were vigorously blocked.

The background involves nearly the whole field of regulation of the nationalized enterprises, and reveals the interplay of various forces deeply concerned with the issue. In the spring and summer of 1953 the René Mayer government, of predominantly center-rightist flavor, hurriedly published a series of decrees which, among others, made far-reaching changes in the super-structure of the nationalized enterprises. The author was M. Jean-Marie Louvel, then Minister of Industry and Energy, who like M. Mayer himself had headed the sub-committee for nationalized enterprises.[36]

The decrees were part of a drastic program for dealing with the severe budgetary crisis. M. Mayer tried to reduce the deficit of some 804 billion francs partly through economies in the management of nationalized enterprises. His government tumbled shortly thereafter when the National Assembly refused it decree power to make further sweeping economic changes. In the resulting famous crisis, it took five weeks to produce another working combination, headed by M. Joseph Laniel.

The decrees in connection with the nationalized enterprises were carefully studied by parliament. After much consideration, only one of the major reforms was left untouched: the one in which the administrative councils of several of the major industries were cut from around twenty members to twelve. M. Mayer argued that the councils had been so large that managers had largely avoided bringing their problems to them because decisive action was so hard to obtain. One can imagine also that managers might by-pass their councils to avoid the controls which such contacts might bring forth. While preserving the appearance of the tripartite membership formula, the decrees reduced the consumers' representatives from four to two, adding two persons having special financial or professional competence.[37] This change had been recommended several times by the Commission for Verification on the ground that the administrative councils should contain members having specialized knowledge, and it objected to the alliance of consumers and workers against the state. The Socialists, however, charged that this change allowed capitalists to infiltrate the structure of the nationalized enterprises—perhaps this was a prelude to denationalization.

Parliament overturned the second series of decrees.[38] These had removed much of the autonomy of the enterprises by subjecting the day-to-day activi-

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Parl. Doc., *N.A.*, Annexe 2670, pp. 2443–2445. Also, *ibid.*, Annexe 6027 (1948). A general statute was required by the law of April 3, 1955, but has not been pushed forward.

[34] This point is forcefully made in the *Rapport Annuel de Gestion du Président-Directeur-Général* (Paris: Régie Nationale des Usines Renault, 1949), pp. 38–39.

[35] No. 55-360, *J.O.* (*L*), April 5, 1955, pp. 3378 ff.

[36] *J.O.*, *Parl. Deb.*, *N.A.*, Mar. 12, 1954, p. 810.

[37] Decrees no. 53-416 to 420, May 11, 1953, *J.O.* (*L*), May 12, 1953, pp. 4432 ff.

[38] Decrees no. 53–412 to 415, *J.O.* (*L*), May 12, 1953, pp. 4329 ff.

ties of the managers to veto by government agents. Specifically, two ministerial representatives gained this power, one of them having technical and the other financial competence. The first was a commissioner chosen by the Minister of Industry and Energy, who became an ex-officio member of the administrative councils of *Electricité de France*, *Gaz de France*, *Charbonnages de France*, and *Houillères de Bassin*. He could suspend, within three days, any action of the management which he considered contrary to "the general interest." He must immediately report his action to the minister, and if no action were taken in eight days, the suspension stood. The second person given suspensory powers was chief of the governmental control missions for economic and financial affairs. These missions had been provided for by a decree of August 12, 1950,[39] one for EDF and GDF, one for CDF and HDB, and a third for Air France, *Messageries Maritimes* and the *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique*. In practice most of these control commissions had not operated, but the decrees of May 11 revived them. The chief of each control mission was required to submit reports to the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance on the economic and financial management of the enterprises. He also became an ex-officio member of the administrative councils, and could suspend the decisions of the management within a three day period. His request was transmitted via the government commissioner having technical competence. The suspensive action must be reported immediately to the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finances and to the Minister of Industry and Energy; should these take no action within twenty days, the veto stood.

Parliament struck down both of these control devices. From many benches it was said that the industries had been turned into direct agencies of the state, that they had lost their autonomy—as undoubtedly they had. Whereas formerly government controls had mostly been *a posteriori*, and defensible, now the detailed control was *a priori*. The ultimate responsibility for running the industry on a day-to-day basis had been transferred from the manager to the government.

A degree of *a priori* control already existed. Many major decisions were already subject to governmental approval, such as those concerning the production program, the investment policy, the personnel policy, and the future budgetary requests of the industry. But once these decisions had been made, the management was left to act as it saw fit. Otherwise the management could hardly be expected to work effectively.

Parliament explicitly abrogated the decrees giving these *a priori* powers to the government commissioners. It left intact those changing the size of the administrative councils, and ordered the government to publish within a month a decree codifying the various controls over the nationalized enterprises, and within six months to submit a project for a general law on the enterprises.

The control structure after parliamentary action had been completed is as follows: Budgets, profit and loss statements, distribution of profits, and financial undertakings or extensions of credit must receive prior ministerial approval.[40] Wages and salaries cannot be changed until the appropriate minister has asked the advice of an interministerial committee dealing with wages and salaries. With respect to ministerial supervision, in each enterprise there is either a chief with a control mission or a controller of the state representing the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs.[41] The chief or the controller is an ex-officio member of various administrative organizations within the industry. He is concerned with economic and financial affairs, and makes recommendations in an annual report submitted to the minister. He may submit his views on detailed proposals and decisions of the enterprises when these are transmitted to the minister.

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[39] No. 50-968, *J.O.* (*L*), August 13, 1950, pp. 8632 ff.

By these piecemeal statutory actions, parliament has profoundly influenced the operation of the nationalized enterprises. In the major case it restored to the enterprises the autonomy which the government had taken away.

III

The most important example of the third method of parliamentary control over the operation of the nationalized enterprises—by creating non-parliamentary, statutory agencies—is the Commission for Verification of the Accounts of the Public Enterprises. While the inspiration for the commission was primarily governmental, the parliamentary sub-committee for nationalized enterprises played a role in creating it. The Commission for Verification was to be but one part of the planned but uncompleted general statute for nationalized enterprises. A committee of experts attached to the office of the President of the Council devised the idea of the commission, and the bill was introduced under the sponsorship of the Robert Schuman government by M. René Mayer, the Minister of Finance.[42] The proposal had already been submitted to the sub-committees for nationalized enterprises before being brought to the floor.[43] M. Mayer, as he shepherded the project through the National Assembly, pointed out that as former president of the sub-committee he would not soon forget the problems the sub-committee faced.[44]

The fundamental purpose of the Commission for Verification was the establishing and supervising of standardized financial accounting. But the commission also was given—and has fully exercised—power to make recommendations on commercial and financial management, future as well as past.

Whereas the original government proposal extended the commission's control to enterprises in which the state held more than two-thirds of the capital, under the finance committee bill as revised by the sub-committee, this control was extended to enterprises in which the state held one-half or more of the capital. The sole change made in the project on the floor of the Assembly was to empower the commission to deal with commercial management rather than financial, with the implication that this was less inclusive.[45] M. Mayer somewhat grudgingly accepted the idea that an accounting organization should confine most of its attention to finances rather than to broader questions of economics. In practice the commission has ranged widely over the economic as well as the financial position of the enterprises.[46]

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[40] Decree of August 9, 1953, no. 53-707, *J.O.* (*L*), August 10, 1953, p. 7051.

[41] Decree of May 26, 1955, no. 55-733, *J.O.* (*L*), June 1, 1955, p. 5547.

[42] *J.O., Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexe 2937 (1947), and first report of the Commission for Verification, *J.O., Annexe Administrative*, August 21, 1949, p. 370.

[43] *J.O., Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexe 2944 (1947).

[44] *J.O., Parl. Deb., N.A.*, Dec. 31, 1947, p. 6614.

The commission's reports have been extensive and a number of their recommendations have been put into effect, usually by the government rather than by parliament, but often with the acquiescence of parliament.

IV

Parliament markedly influences the conduct of the nationalized enterprises at the time their budgets are approved. We have already seen that sub-committee reports are to be drafted so as to be presented at budget time (although often they have not been), and that the technical ministers are responsible—subject to parliamentary criticism—for supervising the budgets of the enterprises to the extent that state support is required.

Only a part of the budget is normally subjected to parliamentary scrutiny, although this part is vital: parliament must act on loans to the enterprises; it must approve capital advances by the government for new construction. In the post-war years when reconstruction and modernization became so important, government loans and grants became a major source of funds to the nationalized enterprises. Priorities are in part determined by the so-called Monnet plan authorities, in part by the Commission for Investments, an offshoot of the Monnet plan, and by the government; but parliament approves or disapproves the planned investments.

In addition, the government determines the prices to be charged by several of the major industries, of course subject to parliamentary criticism.[47] The major deficits, it has been pointed out many times, are due to rising costs, notably wages, easily subject to syndical pressure, and to a refusal of the government to raise the prices sufficiently for the service rendered or the goods furnished. The government also plays a role in fixing salaries. Clearly, then, the economic health of the industry often depends upon governmental action, subjected to vigorous parliamentary attack or support.

Under the old budgetary practices, most of which have been carried over into the new procedure to be used for the 1958 budget,[48] both the finance committees and the assemblies sometimes play independent roles with respect to the nationalized enterprises. The new procedure gives an even more decisive voice to the finance committee of the National Assembly and will probably enhance the role of its sub-committee for nationalized enterprises.

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[45] *Ibid.*, Dec. 31, 1947, p. 6612.

[46] By the law of January 6, 1948, articles 56–64 (no. 48-24, *J.O.* (*L*), January 7, 1948, pp. 191, 207) the commission is made up of distinguished administrators. Its president, a member of the chamber of the Court of Accounts, is chosen by decree on nomination of the Ministers of Finance and of Economic Affairs. Three other members are magistrates of the Court of Accounts; the roster is completed by two representatives from the Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs.

[47] For a list, see Monique Maillet-Chassagne, *Influence de la Nationalisation sur la Gestion des Entreprises Publiques* (Paris: Société d'Edition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1956), Chapter II.

The importance of government initiative should be stressed in considering the role of the finance committee, and of the parliament. The constitution of 1946 explicitly forbids members of parliament, during budgetary discussions, to increase the figures fixed by the government, although at other times they may bring in separate proposals concerning particular projects.[49] Also the rules of the National Assembly provide that any amendment which increases expenditures or reduces receipts will be referred to the finance committee without discussion. Members of parliament, therefore, if they wish to express themselves on the nationalized enterprises, can do so by moving that the budget be reduced, even though their real objective may be to drive the government to increase the expenditure. Their other weapon is to refuse to discuss a particular chapter until the government promises to take the action required—a sort of parliamentary sit-down strike.[50] Through these indirect devices, the members of parliament get a chance—and use it—to let the responsible ministers know what their wishes are.

A typical sample of this procedure, highlighting the role of the committees and of the parliament, is the discussion of the 1956 budget before the National Assembly.[51] The finance committee report which was the basis of the parliamentary discussion ran to 1368 pages.[52] Its very bulk shows how little attention most of the deputies could give to the budget as a whole. The nationalized enterprises are discussed under the sections devoted to the appropriate ministries, the references being scattered according to the sort of budgetary assistance required, and the rubric under which it falls. In a section on subsidies, for example, the committee discusses the amount of money which the government plans to allot to *Charbonnages de France* to cover the deficit brought on by the low fixed price of coal. Before making its recommendation, the finance committee grilled the Secretary of State for Industry and Commerce. It noted that the deficit of 30 billion francs could be covered by a 600 franc increase per ton of coal, but that this was not economically desirable. It noted that the Coal and Steel Community High Authority was about to study the relative coal subsidies among its various members; perhaps this would point the way in which the government might move. Among other items dealing with nationalized enterprises, the finance committee discussed: grants for hydroelectric projects for *Electricité de France;* a subsidy for raising the pay of journalists for *France-Presse;* and how to remedy the deficit in the nationalized railroads. The finance committee was so unimpressed by the government's scheme to coordinate rail and road transport as a means of reducing the deficit that it cut this section out entirely. After a long debate in the committee, it wrote at length about a subsidy for Air France. To force the government to be more precise in its plan for the creation of a new secretary generalship for civil aviation, the committee reduced that section by a million francs until the government should produce more information. It discussed, also, radio and television, and particularly the reforms which it was pleased to notice the government had introduced in S.O.F.I.R.A.D.[53] It dwelt at length on the plans of the *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique* for building a vessel of some 55,000 tons to replace the *Ile de France* and the *Liberté*. The price which the private builder had bid was so far above the international price that the finance committee cut this article out of the budget.

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[48] Georges Morange, "La réforme des institutions budgétaires françaises," in *Revue de Science Financière*, Vol. 4 (Oct.–Dec., 1956), pp. 644–659.

[49] Article 17, paragraph 1 and 2.

[50] For a general discussion of the procedure used before the reforms of 1956, and a brief comment on them, see Maurice Duverger, *Institutions financières* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1956), and Louis Trotabas, *Institutions financières* (Paris: Dalloz, 1956).

[51] This budget was technically a supplement to the credits granted by the laws of August 6, 1955 (nos. 55-1043 and 1044).

[52] *J.O., Parl. Doc., N.A.*, Annexe 1862 (1956).

This list of subjects clearly does not cover the whole range of day-to-day activities of the nationalized enterprises. Nevertheless, some important actions were recommended which profoundly influenced the conduct of the enterprise. For example, if the committee action on the new North Atlantic ship were to stand, the operation of the *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique* would be greatly affected.

Once the committee had finished its report, the National Assembly went to work on the budget. The formula is straightforward. Many deputies move amendments to reduce the grant by 1000 francs, to provide a basis for discussion, and to get more precise information or guarantees out of the responsible minister. Also, the *rapporteurs* of the various technical committees paralleling the ministries contribute their views on the operation of the industries. Very often the leading questioners are members of the finance committee and of its sub-committee for nationalized enterprises.

The *rapporteur* for advice of the commission of commerce and industry, for example, discusses the budgetary deficit of *Charbonnages de France*, pointing out that though the production record of the organization is excellent, the artificially low price of coal throws the enterprise into deficit. The Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry replies that the Coal and Steel Community has some influence on price, and that the government considers that this major economic decision needs some more thought.[54] A Communist deputy criticizes the government for not pushing safety procedures in the mines to the utmost degree. The minister replies that he will look into it, but that safety practices are carefully enforced. The *rapporteur* for advice of the commission of the press moves a reduction of 1,000 francs to show that the Parisian journalists working for *France-Presse* should receive an increase in salary which would cost 12 million francs. The responsible secretary of state replies that the budgeted increase is partly for this purpose, so the amendment is withdrawn. There is much discussion of the spectacular deficit of the *Régie Autonome des Transportes Parisiens.* It is running close to a billion francs a month. The sub-committee on nationalized enterprises has directed one deputy to raise this issue during the debate. The root of the deficit was the refusal of the government to raise fares. There is much discussion, too, of details of service of the nationalized railroads. For example, one deputy objects to the elimination of train service on the small feeder lines, saying that the minute saving this makes is not worth the loss of service to the people affected. There is much discussion about Air France. While the company furnishes satisfactory service, it is having financial difficulties because the government forces it to use some planes which it would not have ordered by itself, to subsidize the production of these planes. In connection with the construction of the *Caravelle,* a new French plane, a deputy from the south complains that draftsmen for the nationalized company that produces them are paid more in Paris than are comparable draftsmen in Toulouse. On the radio and television budget, S.O.F.I.R.A.D. is again mentioned and the responsible secretary of state explains that the government has improved the situation that had been criticized.

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[53] See above, note 18.

[54] *J.O., Parl. Deb., N.A.*, June 6, 1956, pp. 2372–2378.

Particularly illuminating is the discussion about the subsidy for building a replacement for the *Ile de France* and the *Liberté.* Several deputies attack the government. The government has been delaying construction for three years, they say. Meanwhile the French prestige on the North Atlantic run will fall should the ship not be built. At one stage the government had suggested the building of a smaller ship. In the view of several deputies, this would not replace the capacity of the two older ships, and the operating cost would be nearly as great as that of a larger ship, hence the profit would be unnecessarily reduced. The responsible secretary of state terminates the discussion by explaining at great length the position of the government. Because of the size of the ship, he says, the only French shipyard having facilities for building it is Penhoët. This the builders knew; they were driving a hard bargain. At one stage in the negotiations, the secretary of state had publicly suggested the building of a smaller ship so that it could be built in one of several yards, and put out for competitive bids. Incidentally, one deputy had even suggested the creation of a national shipbuilding company if the private builder should not come down in price. Finally, the secretary of state continued, after long negotiations the *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique* cut down on some of the refinements it had hoped to have, and the builders reduced their price to a limited degree, so that now a contract was ready with which both sides were satisfied. The upshot of the debate was that the National Assembly replaced this item in the budget, overturning the recommendation of the finance committee.

Through the course of this typical budgetary debate, it is clear that some of the activities of the nationalized enterprises have been powerfully influenced by parliament; some aspects of their management have been ventilated. The comments, though loosely tied to the technical subject under discussion, have ranged widely over the behavior of the companies, and the government ministers have been forced to give information, and sometimes to promise that criticized practices will be abandoned. Much of the ammunition used by the deputies has been furnished by the finance committee and by its sub-committee for nationalized enterprises.

While statutory action dealing with budgeting of nationalized enterprises is a most important means by which parliament influences these enterprises, it occasionally uses other standard devices. There have been interpellation debates which centered around the nationalized enterprises, such as that in June, 1947,[55] praising the workmen, and, among other things, inviting the government to submit a generalized statute on the nationalized enterprises. The major effect of the interpellation was a ventilation of grievances, and a presentation of viewpoints. The government did introduce a generalized nationalization statute, but did not push it.

Still another parliamentary device—available, but little used—is that of the parliamentary inquiry. This will perhaps be less used in the future because the sub-committees now have more extensive evidence-gaining powers than formerly. Occasionally, too, written and oral questions directed at the government have elicited some information.

In summary, parliament has developed in ten years a reasonably effective control mechanism for the nationalized enterprises. It establishes a compromise between contending forces, each seeking to make major decisions with as little interference as possible. The managers, seconded by their administrative councils, would naturally prefer to minimize governmental supervision. They defend autonomy as desirable, because they are masters of the technical and professional information which makes their decisions the appropriate ones. The government ministers and their departmental advisers have been sometimes anxious to subordinate the managers, making the enterprises mere branches of government departments. This, they consider, is the road to closer coordination of the economy, so much influenced by the activities of the nationalized enterprises. The parliament, ultimately responsible, starting with no special control machinery, has gradually filled this gap, most notably by setting up its sub-committees for nationalized enterprises. Their role is primarily informational—now enriched by the documentation furnished by the Commission for Verification. Yet they also coordinate, by synthesizing the viewpoints of the managers and the ministers, both of whom they interrogate.

The machinery is such that no major abuses can long continue without parliamentary notice. Major abuses, however, are probably less to be feared than the long range effect of ill considered day-to-day decisions. At least, institutions now exist for preventing the mistakes of the past from occurring again, and for reflecting on the effect of daily decisions. Parliamentary machinery is not perfect, and some nationalized industries are more effectively managed than others, but now parliament has an institutionalized means of ventilating the difficulties, and of making major or minor overhauls in the light of considerably more information than it formerly had.

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[55] *J.O., Parl. Deb., N.A.*, pp. 1903, 2087, 2282–2288 (1947).

BALANCE OF POWER, BIPOLARITY AND OTHER MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS[1]

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The postwar years have been a period of great interest in the theory of international politics. A contributor to this REVIEW[2] has surveyed the state of the study of that theory and indicated the alternatives open to it. Within the last year the Institute of War and Peace Studies of Columbia University has held a series of seminars on the subject in an effort to push forward research frontiers.

Interest in theory is no reflection upon the merits of scholarly endeavors that are not oriented primarily to theoretical considerations. But it does assume the independent importance of a theory of international politics. The present essay assumes the importance of theory in general, but is based upon a particular kind of theory, namely, systems theory.[3]

I

A number of theoretical considerations underlie this essay. One is that some pattern of repeatable or characteristic behavior does occur within the international system. Another is that this behavior falls into a pattern because the elements of the pattern are internally consistent and because they satisfy needs that are both international and national in scope. A third is that international patterns of behavior are related, in ways that can be specified, to the characteristics of the entities participating in international politics and to the role functions they perform there. A fourth is that international behavior can also be related to other factors such as military and economic capability, communication and information, technological change, demographic change, and additional factors well recognized by political scientists.

Just as it is possible to build alternative models of political systems, *e.g.*, democratic or totalitarian, and of family systems, *e.g.*, nuclear families, extended families or monogamous or polygamous families, so it is possible to build different models of international systems. The models can be given an empirical interpretation and the specific propositions of the models can be tested. In the last part of this paper, some specific tests will be suggested.

The aspiration to state testable propositions in the field of international politics is useful provided some degree of caution is observed concerning the kinds of propositions one proposes to test. For instance, can a theory of international politics yield a prediction of a specific event like the Hungarian revolution of

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[1] This article is based upon the first section of *System and Process in International Politics*, to be published in the fall of 1957 by John Wiley and Sons. In this version, definitions of precise technical terms used in the book have mostly been eliminated.

[2] Kenneth W. Thompson, "Toward a Theory of International Politics," this REVIEW, Vol. 49 (September 1955), pp. 733–746.

[3] The development of systems theory by W. Ross Ashby, *Design for a Brain* (New York, 1952), is a landmark in theoretical research.

October 1956? The answer probably must be negative. Yet why make such a demand of theory?

Two basic limitations upon prediction in the physical sciences are relevant to this problem. In the first place, the mathematics of complicated interaction problems has not been worked out. For instance, the physical scientist can make accurate predictions with respect to the two-body problem, rough guesses with respect to the three-body problem, and only very incomplete guesses concerning larger numbers of bodies. The scientist cannot predict the path of a single molecule of gas in a tank of gas.

In the second place, the predictions of the physical scientist are predictions concerning an isolated system. He does not predict that so much gas will be in the tank, that the temperature or pressure of the tank will not be changed by someone, or even that the tank will remain in the experimental room. He predicts what the characteristic behavior of the mass of gas molecules will be if stated conditions of temperature, pressure, etc., hold.

The engineer deals with systems in which many free variables enter. If he acts wisely—for instance, in designing aircraft—he works within certain constraints imposed by the laws of physics. But many aspects of exact design stem from experiments in wind tunnels or practical applications of past experiences rather than directly from the laws of physical science.

The theory of international politics normally cannot be expected to predict individual actions because the interaction problem is too complex and because there are too many free variables. It can be expected, however, to predict characteristic or modal behavior within a particular kind of international system. Moreover, the theory should be able to predict the conditions under which the system will remain stable, the conditions under which it will be transformed, and the kinds of transformations that may be expected to take place.

II

Six alternative models of international systems will be presented in this paper. These models do not exhaust the possibilities for international organization but they represent positions along a scale of political organization, with the unit veto system exhibiting the smallest degree of political integration and the hierarchical system the greatest. The six international systems are the "balance of power" system, the loose bipolar system, the tight bipolar system, the universal system, the hierarchical system, and the unit veto system.

In their present stage of development the models are tentative and may be less complex than the real phenomena to which they refer. Yet, if they have some degree of adequacy they may permit a more meaningful organization of existing knowledge and more productive organization of future research.

Only two of the models—the "balance of power" system and the loose bipolar system—have historical counterparts. Greater attention will be given to these in this paper. The other four are projections based upon requirements of internal consistency and of relationships to other political and economic factors. They function both to illustrate possible transformations of the loose bipolar system and as possible predictions of the theory when the transformations are explicitly linked to the conditions that will bring them into being.

The first system to be examined is the "balance of power" international system. Quotation marks are placed around the term to indicate its metaphoric quality.

The "balance of power" international system is an international social system which does not have as a component a political subsystem. The actors within the system are exclusively national actors, such as France, Germany, Italy, etc. Five national actors—as a minimum—must fall within the classification "essential national actor"[4] to enable the system to work.

The "balance of power" international system is characterized by the operation of the following essential rules, which correspond to the elements of the characteristic behavior of the system: (1) increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight; (2) fight rather than fail to increase capabilities; (3) stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor; (4) oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance within the system; (5) constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizational principles; and (6) permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to reenter the system as acceptable role partners, or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.

The first two rules of the "balance of power" international system reflect the fact that no political subsystem exists within the international social system. Therefore, essential national actors must rely upon themselves or upon their allies for protection. However, if they are weak, their allies may desert them. Therefore, an essential national actor must ultimately be capable of protecting its own national values.

The third essential rule illustrates the fact that expansion beyond certain limits would be inconsistent with nationality. It is not necessary to raise the question whether capabilities place limits on appetites or whether more basic national values are inconsistent with unlimited national expansion.

The fourth and fifth rules give recognition to the fact that a predominant coalition or national actor would constitute a threat to the interests of other national actors. Moreover, if a coalition were to become predominant, then the largest member of that coalition might also become predominant over the lesser members of its own coalition. For this reason members of a successful coalition may be alienated, although they may also be able to bargain for more from the threatened national actors.

The sixth rule states that membership in the system is dependent only upon behavior which corresponds with the essential rules or norms of the "balance of power" system. If the number of essential actors is reduced, the "balance of power" international system will become unstable. Therefore, maintaining the number of essential national actors above a critical lower bound is a necessary condition for the stability of the system. This is best done by returning to full membership in the system defeated actors or reformed deviant actors.

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[4] The term "essential actor" refers to "major power" as distinguished from "minor power."

Although any particular action or alignment may be the product of "accidents," *i.e.*, of the set of specific conditions producing the action or alignment, including such elements as chance meetings or personality factors, a high correlation between the pattern of national behavior and the essential rules of the international system would represent a confirmation of the predictions of the theory.

Just as any particular molecule of gas in a gas tank may travel in any direction, depending upon accidental bumpings with other molecules, particular actions of national actors may depend upon chance or random conjunctions. Yet, just as the general pattern of behavior of the gas may represent its adjustment to pressure and temperature conditions within the tank, the set of actions of national actors may correspond to the essential rules of the system when the other variables take the appropriate specific values.

Thus, by shifting the focus of analysis from the particular event to the type of event, the seemingly accidental events become part of a meaningful pattern. In this way, the historical loses its quality of uniqueness and is translated into the universal language of science.

The number of essential rules cannot be reduced. The failure of any rule to operate will result in the failure of at least one other rule. Moreover, at this level of abstraction, there does not seem to be any other rule that is interrelated with the specified set in this fashion.

Any essential rule of the system is in equilibrium[5] with the remaining rules of the set. This does not imply that particular rules can appear only in a particular international system. The first two rules, for instance, also apply to bloc leaders in the bipolar systems. However, they are necessary to each of the systems and, in their absence, other rules of the two systems will be transformed.

The rules of the system are interdependent. For instance, the failure to restore or to replace defeated essential national actors eventually will interfere with the formation of coalitions capable of constraining deviant national actors or potential predominant coalitions.

The equilibrium of the set of rules is not a continuous equilibrium but one that results from discrete actions over periods of time. Therefore, the possibility of some change operating to transform the system becomes great if sufficient time is allowed.

It is relatively easy to find historical examples illustrating the operation of these rules. The European states would have accepted Napoleon had he been willing to play according to the rules of the game.[6]

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[5] This kind of equilibrium is not mechanical like the equilibrium of a seesaw which reestablishes itself mechanically after a disturbance. Instead, it is a "steady state" or homeostatic equilibrium which maintains the stability of selected variables as the consequence of changes in other variables. For instance, the body maintains the temperature of blood in a "steady state" by perspiring in hot weather and by flushing the skin in cold weather. The international system is not simply stable but in Ashby's sense is ultrastable. That is, it acts selectively toward states of its internal variables and rejects those which lead to unstable states. See W. Ross Ashby, *op. cit.*, p. 99, for a precise treatment of the concept of ultrastability.

The restoration of the Bourbons permitted the application of rule three. Had such a restoration not been possible, the international system would immediately have become unstable. Readmission of France to the international system after restoration fulfilled rule six.

The European concert, so ably described by Mowat, illustrates rule one. The *entente cordiale* illustrates rule four and the history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rule two. Perhaps the best example of rule three, however, can be found in the diplomacy of Bismarck at Sadowa, although his motivation was more complex than the rule alone would indicate.

It is not the purpose of this essay to multiply historical illustrations. The reader can make his own survey to determine whether international behavior tended to correspond to these rules during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Apart from the equilibrium within the set of essential rules, there are two other kinds of equilibrium characteristic of the international system: the equilibrium between the set of essential rules and the other variables of the international system and the equilibrium between the international system and its environment or setting.

If the actors do not manifest the behavior indicated by the rules, the kind and number of actors will change. If the kind or number of actors changes, the behavior called for in the rules cannot be maintained.

In addition, the essential rules of the "balance of power" international system may remain in equilibrium for a number of values of the other variables of the system. Some changes in capabilities and information for instance may be compatible with the rules of the system, while others may not.

Indeed, if the value of one variable changes—for instance the capabilities of a given coalition—the system may not maintain itself unless the information of some of the actors changes correspondingly. Otherwise a necessary "counterbalancing" shift in alignment may not take place. Some shifts in the pattern of alliance may be compatible with the rules of the system and others may not.

If the rules of the "balance of power" international system are consistent with the actions of the national actors in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the system may well have appeared to be an absolute system to observers and the "balance of power" a rule of universal applicability. But since the described system is not consistent with the present bipolar international system, it is clear that the system operated only under fixed conditions. To account for the change from one system to the other, it is necessary to isolate the critical conditions for the maintenance of the "balance of power" system.

The changes in conditions that may make the "balance of power" international system unstable are: the existence of an essential national actor who does not play according to the rules of the game, such as one whose essential rules are oriented toward the establishment of some form of supranational political organization; failures of information which prevent a national actor from taking the required measures to protect its own international position; capability changes which become cumulative and which thus increase an initial disparity between the capabilities of essential national actors; conflicts between the prescriptions of different rules under some conditions; difficulties arising from the logistics of the "balancing" process, the small number of essential actors, or an inflexibility of the "balancing" mechanism.

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[6] It is nevertheless true that since Napoleon threatened the principle of dynastic legitimacy, the system would have been strained. The principle of legitimacy, for quite some time, reduced the suspicions which are natural to a "balance of power" system.

An important condition for stability concerns the number of essential national actors. If there are only three, and if they are relatively equal in capability, the probability that two would combine to eliminate the third is relatively great. It is possible that the third actor may not be eliminated and that, after defeat, it would participate in a new coalition with the weaker of the victorious powers. But clearly the probability of such an outcome—necessary to the stability of the system—rises if the number of essential actors is greater than three. Mistakes or failures in information can be tolerated more easily if the number of actors is greater. Therefore, only some numerical lower bound will give sufficient flexibility to the "balance of power" system to permit the required shifts in alliance as conditions change.

Coalitions with many members may regard loosely attached members with equanimity. The role of the non-member of the coalition also will be tolerated. When there are a large number of loosely attached actors or non-members of an alliance, any change of alliance or addition to an alliance, can be "counterbalanced" by the use of an appropriate reward or the cognition of danger to the national interest of some actor. There are many national actors to whom these bids may be made.

When, however, there are very few loosely attached or non-member actors, a change in or an addition to an alignment introduces considerable tension into the international system. Under these circumstances, it becomes difficult to make the necessary compensatory adjustments.

For the same reasons, coalition members will have more tolerance for the role of "balancer," *i.e.*, the actor who implements rule 4, if the international system has a large number of members and the alignments are fluid. Under these conditions, the "balancer" does not constitute a lethal threat to the coalition against which it "balances."

If, however, there are only a few essential actors, the very act of "balancing" may create a permanent "unbalance." In these circumstances the tolerance of the system for the "balancing" role will be slight and the "balance of power" system will become unstable.

Instability may result although the various national actors have no intention of overthrowing the "balance of power" system. The wars against Poland corresponded to the rule directing the various national actors to increase their capabilities. Since Poland was not an essential national actor, it did not violate the norms of the system to eliminate Poland as an actor. The Polish spoils were divided among the victorious essential national actors. Nevertheless, even this cooperation among the essential national actors had an "unbalancing" effect. Since the acquisitions of the victorious actors could not be equal—unless some exact method were found for weighting geographic, strategic, demographic, industrial, material factors, etc., and determining accurately how the values of these factors would be projected into the future—a differential factor making the system unstable could not easily be avoided.

Even the endeavor to defeat Napoleon and to restrict France to her historic limits had some effects of this kind. This effort, although conforming to rules four, five, and six, also aggrandized Russia and Prussia, and hence upset the internal equilibrium among the German actors. This episode may have triggered the process which later led to Prussian hegemony within Germany and to German hegemony within Europe. Thus, a dynamic process was set off for which shifts within alignments or coalitions were not able to compensate.

The logistical or environmental possibilities for "balancing" may be decisive in determining whether the "balancing" role within the "balance of power" international system will be filled effectively. For example, even had it so desired, the Soviet Union could not have "balanced" Nazi pressure against Czechoslovakia without territorial access to the zone of potential conflict. In addition, the intervening actors—Poland and Rumania—and possibly also Great Britain and France, regarded Soviet intervention as a threat to their national interests. Therefore, they refused to cooperate.

It is possible that a major factor accounting for British success in the "balancing" role in the nineteenth century lay in the fact that Great Britain was predominantly a naval power and had no territorial ambitions on the European continent. These facts increased the tolerance of other national actors for Britain's "balancing" role. As a preponderant maritime power, Great Britain could interfere with the shipping of other powers and could also transport its small armed forces to the zone of conflict. It could afford to maintain only a small army, because it was able to use its naval capabilities to dispel invading forces. Even so, Palmerston discovered occasions on which it was difficult to play the "balancing" role either because it was difficult to make effective use of Britain's limited manpower or because other powers displayed little tolerance for the role.

The "balance of power" system in its ideal form is a system in which any combination of actors within alliances is possible so long as no alliance gains a marked preponderance in capabilities. The system tends to be maintained by the fact that even should any nation desire to become predominant itself, it must, to protect its own interests, act to prevent any other nation from accomplishing such an objective. Like Adam Smith's "unseen hand" of competition, the international system is policed informally by self-interest, without the necessity of a political subsystem.

The rise of powerful deviant actors, inadequate counter-measures by non-deviant actors,[7] new international ideologies, and the growth of supranational organizations like the Communist bloc with its internationally organized political parties, sounded the death knell for the "balance of power" international system.

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[7] Britain and France violated rules 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 in the 1930's.

In its place, after an initial period of instability, the loose bipolar system appeared. This differs in many important respects from the "balance of power" system. Supranational actors participate within the international system. These supranational actors may be bloc actors like NATO or the Communist bloc or universal actors like the United Nations. Nearly all national actors belong to the universal actor organization and many—including most of the essential national actors—belong to one or the other of the bipolar blocs. Some national actors, however, may be non-members of bloc organizations.

In distinction to the "balance of power" international system, in which the rules applied uniformly to all national actors, the essential rules of the loose bipolar system distinguish, for instance, between the role functions of actors who are members of blocs and those who are not.

In the "balance of power" system, the role of the "balancer" was an integrating role because it prevented any alliance from becoming predominant. In the ideal form of the system, any national actor is qualified to fill that role. In the loose bipolar system, however, the integrating role is a mediatory role. The actor filling it does not join one side or the other, but mediates between the contending sides. Therefore, only non-bloc members or universal actor organizations can fill the integrative role in the loose bipolar system.

The functioning of the loose bipolar system depends upon the organizational characteristics of the supranational blocs.[8] If the two blocs are not hierarchically organized, the loose bipolar system tends to resemble the "balance of power" system, except that the shifting of alignments takes place around two fixed points. Such shifting is limited by the functional integration of facilities, since a shift may require the destruction of facilities and the reduction of the capabilities of the shifting national actor. Shifting in alignment tends also to be limited by geographic and other logistic considerations. Nevertheless, the bloc actors constitute relatively loose organizations and the international system itself develops a considerable flexibility.

If one bloc has some hierarchical organizational features and the other is not hierarchically organized, a number of consequences can be expected. The hierarchical or mixed hierarchical bloc will retain its membership, since functional integration will be so great that it would be difficult for satellite members to withdraw or to form viable national entities if they did.[9] The relative permanence of membership in the bloc constitutes a threat to non-members. Therefore, such a bloc is unlikely to attract new members except as a consequence of military absorption or political conquest by a native political party which already had associate membership in the bloc through the medium of an international party organization. The irreversible characteristics of membership in such a bloc constitute a threat to all other national actors, whether associated in a bloc or not.

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[8] Extensional definitions would identify NATO as relatively non-hierarchical and the Communist bloc as mixed hierarchical. If the Communist bloc were to be so integrated that national boundaries and organizational forms were eliminated, it would become fully hierarchical.

[9] In this connection, it is noteworthy that the Yugoslavs were able to resist the drastic Soviet demands for economic integration. Tito's withdrawal would have been much more difficult—and perhaps impossible—had this not been the case.

The non-hierarchical bloc has a looser hold over its members but is more likely to enter into cooperative pacts of one kind or another with non-bloc members. The pressure emanating from the hierarchically organized bloc, however, is likely to force the non-hierarchically organized bloc to integrate its bloc activities more closely and to extend them to other functional areas, or alternatively to weaken and undermine the bloc.

If both blocs subscribe to hierarchical integrating rules, their memberships become rigid and only uncommitted states can, by choosing an alignment, change the existing line-up. Any action of this sort, however, would tend to reduce the flexibility of the international system by eliminating nations not included in blocs. Non-bloc member actors therefore would be more likely to support one or the other of the blocs on specific issues rather than to support either in general. If both blocs are hierarchically organized, their goals are similar—hierarchical world organization—and incompatible, since only one can succeed in leading such a world system.

With only two major groupings in the bipolar system, any rapid change in military capabilities tends to make this system unstable. For this reason, possession of a larger stockpile of atomic and thermonuclear weapons by both major blocs is a factor for stability within the system.

The rules of the loose bipolar system follow:

1) All blocs subscribing to hierarchical or mixed hierarchical integrating principles are to eliminate the rival bloc.

2) All blocs subscribing to hierarchical or mixed hierarchical integrating principles are to negotiate rather than to fight, to fight minor wars rather than major wars, and to fight major wars—under given risk and cost factors—rather than to fail to eliminate the rival bloc.

3) All bloc actors are to increase their capabilities relative to those of the opposing bloc.

4) All bloc actors subscribing to non-hierarchical organizational principles are to negotiate rather than to fight, to increase capabilities, to fight minor wars rather than to fail to increase capabilities, but to refrain from initiating major wars for this purposes.

5) All bloc actors are to engage in major war rather than to permit the rival bloc to attain a position of preponderant strength.

6) All bloc members are to subordinate objectives of universal actors to the objectives of their bloc but to subordinate the objectives of the rival bloc to those of the universal actor.

7) All non-bloc member national actors are to coordinate their national objectives with those of the universal actor and to subordinate the objectives of bloc actors to those of the universal actor.

8) Bloc actors are to attempt to extend the membership of their bloc but to tolerate the non-member position of a given national actor if the alternative is to force that national actor to join the rival bloc or to support its objectives.

9) Non-bloc member national actors are to act to reduce the danger of war between the bloc actors.

10) Non-bloc members are to refuse to support the policies of one bloc actor as against the other except in their capacities as members of a universal actor.

11) Universal actors are to reduce the incompatibility between the blocs.

12) Universal actors are to mobilize non-bloc member national actors against cases of gross deviation, *e.g.*, resort to force by a bloc actor. This rule, unless counterbalanced by the other rules, would enable the universal actor to become the prototype of a universal international system.

Unlike the "balance of power" international system, there is a high degree of role differentiation in the loose bipolar system. If any of the roles is pursued to the exclusion of others, the system will be transformed. If one bloc actor eliminates another, the system may be transformed into a hierarchical system. If the universal actor performs its function too well, the system may be transformed into a universal international system. Other variations are possible.

The tight bipolar international system represents a modification of the loose bipolar system in which non-bloc member actors and universal actors either disappear entirely or cease to be significant. Unless both blocs are hierarchically organized, however, the system will tend toward instability.

There is no integrative or mediatory role in the tight bipolar system. Therefore there will tend to be a high degree of dysfunctional tension in the system. For this reason, the tight bipolar system will not be a highly stable or well integrated system.

The universal international system might develop as a consequence of the functioning of a universal actor organization in a loose bipolar system. The universal system, as distinguished from those international systems previously discussed, would have a political system as a subsystem of the international social system. However, it is possible that this political system would be of the confederated type, *i.e.*, that it would operate on territorial governments rather than directly on human individuals.

The universal international system would be an integrated and solidary system. Although informal political groupings might take place within the system, conflicts of interest would be settled according to the political rules of the system. Moreover, a body of political officials and administrators would exist whose primary loyalty would be to the international system itself rather than to any territorial subsystem of the international system.

Whether the universal international system is a stable system or not depends upon the extent to which it has direct access to resources and facilities and upon the ratio between its capabilities and the capabilities of the national actors who are members of the system.

The hierarchical international system may be democratic or authoritarian in form. If it evolves from a universal international system—perhaps because the satisfactions arising from the successful operation of such a universal international system lead to a desire for an even more integrated and solidary international system—it is likely to be a democratic system. If, on the other hand, the hierarchical system is imposed upon unwilling national actors by a victorious or powerful bloc, then the international system is likely to be authoritarian.

The hierarchical system is a political system. Within it, functional lines of organization are stronger than geographical lines. This highly integrated characteristic of the hierarchical international system makes for great stability. Functional cross-cutting makes it most difficult to organize successfully against the international system or to withdraw from it. Even if the constitution of the system were to permit such withdrawal, the integration of facilities over time would raise the costs of withdrawal too high.

The unit veto international system is one in which all actors possess such great capabilities that an aggressor—even if it succeeded eventually in destroying an actor—could be destroyed in return. Within this system, each actor relies upon itself exclusively for its own protection, rather than upon alliances.

The unit veto system is maintained by mutual threat. Therefore the dysfunctional tension within it is likely to be quite high. For this reason, actors may succumb to threats, *i.e.*, they may lose nerve, or they may launch an aggressive venture simply because they cannot stand the tension. As a consequence, the unit veto international system is not likely to have a high degree of stability.

III

History will still remain the laboratory for research, since controlled experiments, for the most part, are out of the question in the field of international politics. Yet, the normal modes of historical investigation are not adequate for the confirmation of a theory of international politics.

The mere statement of the alternative models of international systems necessitates the collection of information relevant to their validation, in particular, of information dealing with the patterns of national interactions. It is significant that the simple task of counting various kinds of interactions has never been seriously attempted in the literature, and that this information is essential to the description of the international system.

Some consequences of the theory which can be empirically tested are fairly obvious. For instance, the rules of the "balance of power" system specify a great fluidity in the formation of alliances and groupings with respect to particular issues. The analysis of national interactions during the "balance of power" period should test this consequence and should also permit a more detailed specification of the characteristics of the "balance of power" system.

If the theory is correct, there should be a difference between the "balance of power" and bipolar systems with respect to the frequencies of certain groupings. For instance, in the "balance of power" system, groupings will depend primarily upon the interests of nations in particular situations. Therefore, they will tend to break up as soon as the interests are satisfied or forestalled. New groupings should continue to depend upon particular interests. Therefore, there should be great variety in the groupings.

In the loose bipolar system, on the other hand, groupings will depend upon long range rather than particular interests. Therefore, some alignments will have an extremely high probability and others an extremely low probability. The study of interaction patterns in the two systems should serve both to test these propositions and to permit a closer comparison of the characteristics of the two systems.

To be more specific, the "balance of power" system postulates that any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations. Moreover, any particular alignment should not *a priori* predispose the same nations to align themselves with each other at the next opportunity. Was there, therefore, any period of the "balance of power" system during which the fluctuations in alignments did not shift as the theory predicts? If there were, some other factors must be located to account for the pattern of preferences.

It is also possible that the system of alignments became more rigid over time, *i.e.*, that any one alignment increased the probability that that alignment would recur in the future. If so, an element of instability would be found within the system. Of course, the frequency of interactions is not identical with the predisposition to interact. Other variables complicate the picture. Nevertheless, if it is true historically that the frequency of interactions changed in some systematic manner, this in itself would have great importance.

If some important patterns of behavior are discovered, an effort should then be made to discover whether they are linked to internal system characteristics, *e.g.*, increasing probability of repeating previous patterns of alignment, or whether they are linked to external factors, *e.g.*, technological change, or to some combination of the two.

Still additional consequences may be derived from the rules of the various international systems. Although the problems involved in testing these propositions may prove difficult, the problems nevertheless arise in the area of empirical theory and are brought to attention by abstract theoretical considerations.

THE *DEMOCRATIC DIGEST:* A CONTENT ANALYSIS[1]

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In August, 1953, the National Committee of the Democratic Party began publishing a new magazine, the *Democratic Digest.* This venture represents an attempt to create a "Democratic" viewpoint on political issues and personalities of national concern. It is an essentially new form of activity in the American party arena, for, though minor parties and one-issue political movements have often sponsored periodicals to further their causes, neither of the present major parties has previously done so on the national level.

The role of the national committees in the political process is still only vaguely defined. The national ticket is nominated by convention, and the Presidency is independent of, and ordinarily more powerful than, the national committee after election. The selection and campaign activities of Congressional candidates lie outside national committee control. Within these limits, any change in the scale or type of activity of the official national political organizations warrants careful study to determine its possible effects on the party system. The *Democratic Digest* marks such a change. In place of random speculation about the purposes and possible functions of a party magazine in the American system, a reliable content analysis of the early issues of this journal may provide a sounder basis for theory. An analysis of the manifest content of the magazine suggests certain conclusions as to the function not only of the *Digest,* but perhaps also of all national political party mass communication activity in our party system.

Since the major task of a political party in the United States is winning elections, the focal points of organization and activity historically have been at those levels of government where there are the most elections to be won, namely, the state and local levels. This study assumes that the *Democratic Digest* is symptomatic of change in this fundamental feature; that it represents an attempt to create an allegiance of rank-and-file members to some pattern of political preferences associated with the Democratic party on a national scale.

The universe of study was the first eighteen issues of the magazine, and the basic unit of analysis was the individual article. Four characteristics were isolated to form the code of instructions to guide the analyst. These were: (1) the news sources from which the *Digest* drew its reprinted or condensed articles; (2) the news sources quoted by the magazine in those articles that were prepared by its editorial staff; (3) the individuals who were quoted by the magazine; and (4) the political issues emphasized during the period of publication. Precise data on these four characteristics of the magazine could be produced,

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[1] I wish to thank Professor Joseph G. LaPalombara of Michigan State University, who directed the research upon which this paper is based, and the members of the Wayne State University Department of Political Science, whose comments on the manuscript were most helpful.

and these data promise to be useful in constructing a theory of national political party mass-communication policy.

I. ARTICLE TYPES IN THE *Democratic Digest*

Each of the first eighteen issues of the *Democratic Digest* is 112 pages long. The articles are divided into four basic types for the purpose of analysis. Articles under one-half page in length are not listed in the table of contents, were evidently intended to be filler material, and were not included in this analysis. The basic division of articles is between (1) articles attributed to a prior source, (2) articles not so attributed, (3) pictures and cartoons, and (4) the standard lead article. This last, titled "The Talk of the Nation," appeared as the first article of every issue and was apparently modeled after the *New Yorker* feature, "The Talk of the Town."

A magazine labelling itself as a "Digest" might be expected to consist entirely of articles reprinted or condensed from other publications. This is not true of the *Democratic Digest*. As Table I shows, more than half the articles of the first eighteen months are reprints or condensations, but more than half the letterpress pages of the magazine are devoted to articles that originated with the magazine itself.

TABLE I. ARTICLE TYPES OF THE *Democratic Digest*, FREQUENCY AND LENGTH

	Original Articles	Reprinted Articles
Total Number of Articles	200	337
Mean Frequency per Issue	11.1	18.7
Total Pages	760*	608*
Mean Length	3.8	1.8
Modal Length	5	1

* Lengths were coded to the nearest one-half page.

An interesting quantitative difference between articles originating with the *Democratic Digest* and those that are reprinted from prior sources is the extreme difference in modal length. The most frequent length of an article originating with the magazine was five times the usual length of articles attributed to a prior source. This discrepancy would be even greater if "The Talk of the Nation" were included as an original article, for that feature was usually seven pages long.

The magazine emphasized its own articles at the expense of reprints in other ways, such as prominence of position in the magazine. For example, the first and second articles always originated with the magazine, the third did so in thirteen of the eighteen issues, and the fourth in nine

II. THE SOURCES OF THE *Democratic Digest*

We can also see a distinct difference between the leading sources of reprinted articles and those publications most frequently quoted in the original articles of the *Digest*. Leading reprint sources are those nineteen of the 106 sources which accounted for more than half of the reprinted articles. Leading quote sources are those nine of the ninety-three different newspapers that accounted for more than half of the 442 quotes. Leading magazine quote sources were the five magazines that accounted for sixty percent of the ninety-eight magazine quotes (see Table II).

TABLE II. LEADING REPRINT AND QUOTE SOURCES OF THE *Democratic Digest*

Reprint Sources		Newspaper Quote-Sources		Magazine Quote-Sources	
Dayton Daily News	19	New York Times	97	Time	20
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	12	Washington Post and Times-Herald	58	Life	14
New York Times	11	Washington Star	22	Fortune	11
Milwaukee Journal	10	Wall Street Journal	17	Business Week	7
New York Herald-Tribune	9	St. Louis Post-Dispatch	15	New Republic	7
Christian Science Monitor	9	New York Herald-Tribune	13		
Reporter	8	Christian Science Monitor	12		
Baltimore Sun	8	New York Post	11		
Washington Daily News	8	Washington Daily News	10		
Kansas City Star	8				
Newark Evening News	7				
Arkansas Gazette	7				
Charlotte News	7				
Washington Star	7				
Washington Post and Times-Herald	7				
Atlanta Constitution	5				
Berkshire Eagle	5				
Greensboro Daily News	5				
Overset	5				
Totals	157		255		59
Totals for entire magazine	337		442		93

Of the nineteen leading reprint sources, seventeen were newspapers, one was a magazine, and one (Overset) was unidentifiable. Furthermore, the list of leading reprint sources has a much more regional flavor than that of the leading quote sources. If we consider the Washington press as a special case, which seems justifiable in light of that city's peculiar political character, we find that none of the leading quote sources is a Southern newspaper, while five of the leading reprint sources are such papers. Only one of the leading quote sources is anything but an Eastern or Washington paper, while nine of the leading reprint sources come from other sections.

The publication sources of the *Democratic Digest* are as interesting for what they exclude, as for what they include. No labor periodical is a leading source, either of articles or quotes, and journals of political opinion like the *Nation* and the *New Republic* are seldom used.

The cartoons printed in the *Democratic Digest* are drawn from a much more compact collection of sources than the letterpress articles, which may only mean that good cartoonists are scarce, and syndicated. Of the 418 cartoons contained in the first eighteen issues, more than half came from ten publications. Table III displays the extent of this concentration:

TABLE III. LEADING CARTOON SOURCES

Source	Frequency
Washington Post and Times-Herald	44
Original	37
Des Moines Register	31
Nashville Tennessean	27
Sacramento Bee	27
St. Louis Post Dispatch	20
Greensboro Daily News	20
Atlanta Constitution	16
Louisville Courier-Journal	14
NEA Syndicate	12
Total	248

No newspaper that is both a leading article source and a leading cartoon source provided more articles than cartoons, a further reflection of the concentrated nature of the cartoon source category. It seems highly probable that the overwhelmingly Republican political sympathies of American newspaper and magazine publishers explain at least part of the *Digest's* concentration on regional papers as article and cartoon sources. Democratic papers are rare enough to require the *Digest* editors to use some of restricted circulation if they are to use any at all. There is also the possibility that the editors are consciously attempting to attain a regional balance of sources. It seems likely that the *Democratic Digest* draws different editorial conclusions from those of some periodicals it quotes on the matters discussed. Otherwise, the editors would probably use article-length reproduction in order to take advantage of the "authority" of the quote sources.

Individuals Quoted in the DEMOCRATIC DIGEST. The universe of individuals quoted by the *Digest* displays some interesting characteristics, for the magazine pays much more attention to Republicans than to Democrats. One hundred thirty-seven Republicans were quoted 725 times, while seventy-nine Democrats rated only 219 quotes; and if we consider only those members of both parties outside Congress, Eisenhower, Dulles, Benson, Nixon, Brownell, and Herbert Hoover were each quoted more frequently than Adlai Stevenson.

TABLE IV. LEADING INDIVIDUALS QUOTED, BY PARTY AND FREQUENCY

Republicans		Democrats	
Eisenhower	187	Gore	46
McCarthy	56	Stevenson	22
Dulles	55	Barkley	15
Benson	33	Truman	9
Nixon	28	Mitchell	9
Brownell	28	Douglas	6
Hoover	24	Humphrey	6

Organizations and the DEMOCRATIC DIGEST. Organized groups are also quoted by the magazine and the pattern of emphasis is similar to that of individuals (see Table V).

TABLE V. ORGANIZATION QUOTE SOURCES, BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION AND FREQUENCY

Type of Organization	Frequency
Republican	15
Business	8
Non-partisan organizations	26
Non-partisan Government Committees	3
Unions	5
Farm	1
Veteran	1
Polling organizations	3
Democratic	3
Total	65

III. ISSUES AND THE *Democratic Digest*

To measure the stress on political issues in the *Democratic Digest* during its first eighteen months of publication, articles are classified as political or non-political in the following analysis. Any article that discussed or proposed any sort of governmental activity or that discussed or proposed any actions by political parties or other organizations which might be assumed to affect governmental activity, (e.g., campaign techniques, local political party organizations) was coded as political. Since several different issues might be discussed within the body of any one article there is no relation between the number of articles and the number of political issue references.

Every time such a political issue was discussed the analysis also required that the party stands on these issues be noted if either or both of the two major parties were specifically mentioned as taking a stand. Table VI compares original articles with those reprinted by the magazine on the basis of their political character.

TABLE VI. THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF ORIGINAL AND REPRINTED ARTICLES

	Original Articles	Reprinted Articles
Political issue references	242	239
Non-Political references	47	180
Total number of articles	200	337
Total references	289	419
Frequency of issue references for political articles	1.58	1.52

The reprinted articles in the *Democratic Digest* were much less likely to be political, even under the broad definitions adopted as the criteria for this study.

The party stands associated with the discussion of political issues in the *Democratic Digest* show the same pattern of emphasis that appeared in the analysis of individuals quoted by the magazine. Republican stands on specific political issues were mentioned far more frequently than Democratic ones. This held true in all article-types and in the cartoons of the magazine as well.

TABLE VII. PARTY STANDS ON ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN ARTICLES AND CARTOONS, BY FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE OF ALL ISSUE REFERENCES

Material	Frequency of Party Stands		Percentage* of All Issue References	
	Repub.	Dem.	Repub.	Dem.
Articles	413	71	86	15
Cartoons	323	32	77	8
All Issue References			82	11
Total	736	103		

* These percentages will not sum, since they are based on the total number of issue references. Some issues are linked with both parties, some with neither.

This content analysis of the first eighteen issues of the *Democratic Digest* highlights two major characteristics of the magazine. First, the overwhelming emphasis in the political discussions of the magazine is upon the activities, programs, and personalities of the Republican party. Second, the magazine is hardly a digest, since most of its pages are devoted to articles that originated with its editorial staff.

IV. ARGUMENT

Some possible explanations for this pattern of activity can now be ventured. Studies in voting behavior suggest that most voters in the United States are pretty firmly committed to one or the other of the two major parties. A firm commitment to a particular party is frequently associated with interest and activity in political affairs. We may therefore assume that the communicative activities of any political party are likely to be directed chiefly towards those who are already sympathetic towards it: the previously committed individual pre-selects his sources of information in such a way as to make conversion unlikely.[2] Since the *Democratic Digest* is sold through the activities of local party organizations, it is reasonable to assume also that this general finding holds for this particular case.

It seems ironic that the self-directedness of political party mass communication should be coupled with an overwhelming attention to the activities of the opposing party. The loose ideological structure of the American party system is probably responsible for this pattern. Each party contains almost as much variation on political issues within its ranks as exists between the two organizations. Ideological orientation consequently is a shaky base for building party identification and encouraging the commitment of the rank and file to the support of national party activities.

It is possible that the ultimate goal of the *Democratic Digest* is to create a Democratic position on political issues, but the existing framework of political opinion in the United States precludes emphasizing this aspect of its activities at present. The safest standard around which to rally support for the Democratic party as a national organization is the mutual preference which all Democrats have for seeing Democrats in political office. To be a Democrat implies being anti-Republican. In fact, that is almost all it necessarily implies. This being the case, the safe and sure focus of communicative activities of the national party is cheerfully lambasting or lampooning Republicans.

The research here reported leads to a theory of national political party mass communication policy based on these four assumptions: (1) national political party mass communication policy is self-directed; (2) this policy is oriented toward the activity of the opposition party; (3) the purpose of such a policy is to create an identity for the party and strengthen rank and file commitment to that identity; and (4) lack of a clear ideological division between the parties makes it impolitic to create such an identity on the basis of specific policies.

Three hypotheses can be drawn from these statements and tested in future research: (1) national political party mass communication policy will emphasize the statements and actions of members of the opposition; (2) any concentration on specific issues will be framed in terms of attacking or ridiculing the proposals of the opposing party; and (3) the mass communication policy of the national party will be sensitive to the mass communication policy of its opposition. That is to say, the Democrats must know what the Republicans are saying, about whom it is being said, and what sources of authority are being used. The mass communication policies of both national parties will reflect this knowledge. This may, of course, only mean that the fraternity of professional publicity people talk chiefly to each other.

While these generalizations should apply to the mass communication policies of both national parties, insofar as such policies exist, it is not surprising that they are more strongly reflected in the behavior of the Democratic National Committee than in the Republican. The Republican preference of most newspapers and magazines certainly provides a stimulus for a national organ of the Democratic party. The party holding the Presidency also, of course, possesses a position which focuses policy formation and publicity in a manner which the "outs" cannot match.

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[2] P. F. Lazarsfeld and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1948), 2d ed., p. 124.

The national platforms, the public statements of personalities identified with the national organization of the two major parties, the publications of the national parties and the campaign materials used during presidential elections are the major sources of national party communication. Of these sources the least useful are the national platforms, which represent a highest common factor of policy orientation among state organizations. The most valuable material lies in the speeches of national candidates and publications of the national organizations during a presidential campaign. The *Democratic Digest* gives us a continuing flow of communicative behavior around which future research into this aspect of politics can be framed.

NEGRO REGISTRATION IN LOUISIANA

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The 1944 action of the Supreme Court voiding the white primary ended the last effective legal block to Negro voter registration in the South. After that, resort to legal steps to block Negro registration was either outlawed by the courts or else could only be a delaying device. In the state of Louisiana, however, the decision in *Smith* v. *Allwright* did not result in Negro registration comparable to white registration. In 1956, twelve years later, 30 percent of the potential Negro voting population was registered, compared to 73 percent of the whites. This study is an investigation of some factors in that discrepancy, and in particular, of the differences in registration between Catholic and Protestant areas.

An important characteristic of Negro registration in Louisiana is the extreme range of variation to be found among the several parishes. Table I shows 17 parishes with fewer than 20 percent of the eligible Negroes registered, and 11 parishes with 70 percent or more of the potential Negro vote registered. Therefore, the statewide "average" percentage of Negro registration[1] has little meaning without more detailed interpretation.

TABLE I. LOUISIANA PARISHES BY PERCENTAGE OF NEGROES 21 AND OVER REGISTERED, 1956

Registration Percentage	Number of Parishes
0– 9	7
10– 19	10
20– 29	9
30– 39	6
40– 49	5
50– 59	13
60– 69	3
70– 79	6
80– 89	3
90–100	2

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[1] Current estimates on population figures were obtained as follows: (1) The estimated total population of each parish for 1956 was obtained from *Sales Management Annual Survey of Buying Power*, May 10, 1956. (2) It was assumed that the 1950 ratio of Negroes to the total population in each parish would remain constant. (3) It was assumed that the 1950 ratio of Negroes 21 and over to the total Negro population in each parish would remain constant. (4) Thus by taking percentages of the 1956 total population estimate as derived from the 1950 census, a 1956 estimate was obtained for the potential Negro vote in each parish.

Among the factors responsible for these differences is the religio-cultural variable. Louisiana offers a unique opportunity to study the influence of this variable on the registration aspect of race relations. Catholicism is dominant in southern Louisiana and Protestantism in northern Louisiana. The two regions are very nearly separate worlds. Other variables enter, but this one is the focus of this paper.

The material for this study was gathered from Census Reports and from specialized and local sources on the cultural characteristics of Louisiana. Sixteen parishes were visited throughout the state, chosen to represent different degrees of Negro registration, different socio-economic areas, and different religio-cultural areas. Interviews were conducted with state and parish officials and local political leaders, both white and Negro.[2]

I. THE RELIGIO-CULTURAL VARIABLE

Every Louisianian is aware of the religious complications of his state's politics. It has usually been thought, though experience provides exceptions, that only Protestants can be elected to state-wide offices or as congressmen from the north Louisiana districts; and only Catholics can be elected to major offices in south Louisiana. The Catholicism of Louisiana is predominantly French, and it is said that a French name is worth 50,000 votes in south Louisiana in a state-wide election.

Roughly the southern 25 parishes form French Catholic Louisiana while the remaining parishes in the north are predominantly Protestant and Anglo-Saxon. The French parishes remain French-Catholic because of their assimilation of extraneous cultural elements entering the area.

As Table II indicates, Negro registration, in percentages of potential eligibles, is more than twice as great in Louisiana's French-Catholic parishes as in its non-French parishes. In only two of the 25 French-Catholic parishes are less than 20 percent of the eligible Negroes registered, whereas in 13 of the 39 non-French parishes less than 20 percent of the potential Negro vote is registered. In seven of the French-Catholic parishes Negro registration is 70 percent or more, while only four of the non-French-Catholic parishes equal or exceed the 70 percent mark. Yet no significant differences exist between the two groups of parishes with respect to Negro-White population balance or to urbanism.

The reasons for the different reaction of French and non-French population groups to Negro registration seem, in large part, to be due to fundamentally different attitudes of each culture toward the Negro. Both Negro and white leaders agree that social attitudes toward the Negro differ in the two cultures.

Some objective evidence of this difference is to be found in these facts: (1) at political meetings in southern Louisiana crowds are often racially mixed, even at indoor meetings, whereas in northern Louisiana such crowds are always segregated; (2) the Citizens' Council organizations have comparatively little sup-

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[2] The authors wish to acknowledge the aid of the Southern Regional Council in support of this project. The Louisiana project was part of a Southern-wide survey of Negro registration and voting sponsored by the Council.

TABLE II. NEGRO REGISTRATION BY RELIGIO-CULTURAL SECTIONS OF LOUISIANA, 1956

	French-Catholic Parishes[1]	Non-French Parishes[2]
Number of Negroes registered	70,488	90,922
Potential Negro vote	138,000	390,000
Percentage of Negroes registered	51	23
Mean of parishes—percentage of Negroes in total population	32	38
Mean of parishes—percentage of urbanism	30	26
Mean of parishes—percentage of Catholics among all religions[3]	83	12

[1] French parishes: Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Avoyelles, Calcasieu, Cameron, Evangeline, Iberis, Iberville, Jefferson, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, LaFourches, Plaquemines, Pointe Coupee, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary, Terrebonne, Vermilion, West Baton Rouge. Definition of French parishes taken from T. Lynn Smith and Homer L. Hitt, *The People of Louisiana* (Baton Rouge, 1952), p. 143.

[2] Predominantly Anglo-Saxon Protestant.

[3] From 1926 *Census of Religious Bodies*, the most reliable source available. It is recognized that the figures contain a bias because of the difference between Catholic and Protestant practice in counting children as members of the church. However, the purpose of the figures is to show differences in degree of Catholicism.

port in French-Catholic Louisiana, while in northern Louisiana, as a Madison Council official put it, "Here the Citizens' Councils are the prominent people"; (3) racially hybrid communities occur more frequently in south Louisiana than in north Louisiana.[3]

It should be emphasized that the people of French-Catholic Louisiana are not in favor of integration. Yet they do evidence, people and leaders alike, a permissive attitude toward Negro participation in political affairs that is generally lacking in the northern parishes.[4] These permissive attitudes seem to stem in large part from the social and religious practices of the Catholic Church. The Church looks upon segregation as a sin, and Archbishop Rummel of New Orleans has led the clergy in an all-out doctrinal attack on the practice. Catholic clergy cite the "catholic" character of the Church as the reason for its advanced stand on racial issues and emphasize the fact that the Protestant churches are national in origin and tend to be exclusive in character, whereas the Catholic Church is more universal in both its background and orientation. Many Catholics also point to the effect of the Church on the Negro as a reason for the high percent of Negro registration in Catholic parishes. According to this argument, the Catholic Negro enjoys religious and ethical training which is identical with that received by the white community, and from a well-educated priest. Therefore, the Catholic Negro's value system more nearly approaches that of the white community than does that of the Protestant-Negro, and, accordingly, he is more readily accepted by the greater community.

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[3] See Alvin L. Bertrand, *The Many Louisianas*, Bulletin #46, Louisiana State University, Agricultural Experiment Station, June, 1955, p. 21.

[4] The more "permissive" attitude of the French-Catholic parishes may be demonstrated additionally by comparison of its record on race relations with the northern parishes on such matters as rates of lynching, 1900–1941; and the number of racially integrated state colleges. It was also confirmed in interviews with both Negroes and whites from the two areas.

Since the Catholic Church attempts to build a Catholic culture wherever it exists by providing educational, recreational, and fraternal organizations for its members, the influence of the Church as a social institution is great. It appears to be the principal, in many areas the only, unsegregated social institution in Louisiana. In the French parishes where Catholicism has been the major formative factor in the culture for many years, it has been, Catholics say, important in producing the permissive attitudes of the people toward the political and social activities of the Negro.

In north Louisiana, on the other hand, one finds little or no objective evidence that the dominant Protestant religion has aided in the creation of tolerant attitudes toward Negro political activity. Negro leaders in these areas rarely cited white Protestant ministers as friends of the Negro, and seldom referred to a Protestant church as an ameliorative factor in the easing of racial tensions. Although most Protestant national organizations are opposed to racial prejudice and segregation, their position has not effected many changes in the attitudes of local congregations. Protestant churches, in contrast to the authoritative control by the Catholic hierarchy, are dominated by local congregations, and Protestant ministers, though often mindful of national pronouncements on segregation, must remain passive on such matters so as not to offend their flocks.

Although the mean percent of Negro registration is low in north Louisiana, there are parishes with large Negro registration. As Table III shows, this usually occurs where Negroes are not an important part of the population, that is, where there are few Negroes, little economic tenancy, and no heritage of a plantation society.

TABLE III. RELATION BETWEEN PERCENTAGE OF TENANCY, PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO POPULATION, AND PERCENTAGE OF NEGROES REGISTERED IN FRENCH AND NON-FRENCH PARISHES OF LOUISIANA, 1956

Percentage of Tenancy	Number of Parishes		Mean Percentage of Negro Population		Mean Percentage of Negroes Registered	
	French	Non-French	French	Non-French	French	Non-French
50 and over	6	11	34	52	65	11
40–49	0	4	—	43	—	23
30–39	7	6	33	39	48	25
20–29	5	6	23	36	67	36
10–19	7	9	34	25	43	53
0– 9	0	3	—	19	—	59

When the parishes of northern Louisiana are grouped into areas, this correspondence of a high rate of tenancy and concentration of Negro population to a low Negro registration becomes clearly evident and significant. In the North-Central cut-over pine section where the percentage of Negroes in the total population (mean of parishes, 24 percent) and prevalence of tenancy (17 percent) is relatively low, there is a great deal of Negro registration (55 percent). In this area, there has been little fear of the Negro as a political force, and the society tends to be pluralistic.[5]

The Mississippi Delta area, in northeast Louisiana, is the section with the highest rate of tenancy (60 percent), the greatest proportion of Negroes (51 percent), and the lowest Negro registration (11 percent) in the state. It remains a plantation society. There are plantation owners in Tensas and Madison parishes who take pride in the resemblance between the plantations of 1856 and 1956, in terms of the physical appearance of the Negro and his cabin, and of the social and economic relationships between Negro and white.

The survival of this kind of society depends upon excluding the Negro from all political and economic power. Outsiders are assured that the Negro happily accepts the existing power structure, and strenuous efforts are made to demonstrate the mutual advantages which accrue from it.

Thus in non-French Louisiana, Negro registration varies with the number of Negroes present and the nature of the economy. In a plantation economy, a tight power structure exists which makes it possible to exclude Negroes from the polls. In addition the numerical strength of Negroes in such communities arouses real or imagined fears of possible Negro rule if he should obtain the ballot.

As Table III indicates, the economic structure of many of the French-Catholic parishes differs from that of the northern portion of the state. In French-Catholic Louisiana the Negro is not typically in a tenant-master relationship to the white community. Rather, his position is that of a free wage-earner. The reason is that much of southern Louisiana is engaged in the production of cane sugar, which does not lend itself to the tenant system of farming.

The free wage-earner is more remote from his master than is the tenant farmer, and thus (at least in prosperous times) enjoys greater social and economic freedom. Therefore, the difference in the economies of the two regions undoubtedly exercises an important conditioning effect on Negro registration.

However, even in those French-Catholic parishes where a plantation economy does exist the percent of Negro registration tends to be considerably above that of the northern plantation parishes. In three French-Catholic parishes (St. Landry, Pointe Coupee, and West Baton Rouge) both the percentage of Negro population and the percentage of tenancy is 45 or more. The percentage of Negro registration exceeds 20 in all three parishes and reaches a level of 87 in St. Landry. This highlights the importance of the French-Catholic religio-culture in producing a permissive attitude toward Negro registration.

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[5] It should be noted, however, that resistance to Negro registration is stiffening in North-Central Louisiana. Efforts to purge Negroes from the rolls are being vigorously pressed by Citizens Council groups in the section. For a detailed statement of the procedures being used there, see the letter from Assistant Attorney General Olney to Senator Douglas, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 103 (August 1, 1957), pp. 12156–7 (daily ed.); New York *Times*, August 4, 1957, which, however, misplaced the parishes cited as in the southern part of the state.

II. THE EFFECT OF NEGRO-WHITE POPULATION BALANCE

Perhaps the most widely accepted belief concerning Negro registration in the South is that the amount will vary inversely to the proportion of Negroes in the local population. According to this theory, areas with large Negro populations, (1) were most passionately attached to the cause of the Confederacy, and (2) because of the greater number of Negroes have more reason to fear Negro voting. The theory concludes that the centers of Negro population will be the last to extend the suffrage to the Negro.

Table IV shows that there is certainly no uniform correlation between the proportion of parish population Negro and the proportion of Negroes registered. However, at the extreme ends of the scale, the relationship is significant. The four Louisiana parishes with no Negro registration—Tensas, Madison, West Feliciana, and East Carroll, neighboring parishes in the Mississippi Delta area—are the only parishes with over 60 percent Negro population. In the parishes with less than 29 percent Negro population there is a significant increase in the percentage of Negro registration. However, in ten parishes with a majority of Negro population (50 to 59 percent) the mean percentage of Negroes registered (37 percent) slightly exceeds that for the two intervals with fewer Negroes (40 to 49 percent and 30 to 39 percent).

Table IV also shows that the presence or absence of large numbers of Negroes has a similar effect on Negro registration in French and non-French parishes. However, as the table indicates, the range of variation tends to be much nar-

TABLE IV. RELATION BETWEEN NEGROES IN TOTAL POPULATION AND NEGRO REGISTRATION IN PARISHES OF LOUISIANA, 1956

Percentage of Negroes in Total Population	Number of Parishes			Mean Percentage of Negroes Registered		
	Total	French	Non-French	Total	French	Non-French
60 and over	4	—	4	0	—	0
50–59	10	4	6	37	44	33
40–49	8	3	5	33	57	19
30–39	19	6	13	32	47	25
20–29	12	6	6	52	51	53
10–19	10	5	5	62	65	59
0– 9	1	1	—	94	94	—

rower in the French than in the non-French parishes. Of course, the degree of economic tenancy is another variable present in this figure, a factor which has already been discussed.

In conclusion, it can be definitely stated that, in Louisiana, the simple fact of the presence of a high proportion of Negroes and a tradition of a plantation economy (such as in St. Landry parish) does not necessarily militate against the registration of Negroes in sizeable numbers, especially where a French-Catholic culture predominates.

III. THE EFFECT OF URBANISM

Contrary to the widely held belief that Negro registration in the South is concentrated in urban areas, Table V indicates that no clear relationship exists in Louisiana between the degree of urbanism and the extent of Negro registration.

TABLE V. RELATION BETWEEN URBANISM AND WHITE AND NEGRO REGISTRATION, FOR STATE AND BY RELIGIO-CULTURAL SECTIONS, LOUISIANA, 1956

Percentage of Urbanism	Number of Parishes			Mean Percentage Registered of Potential Vote					
				Negro			White		
	Total	Fr.	Non-Fr.	Total	Fr.	Non-Fr.	Total	Fr.	Non-Fr.
70 and over	5	2	3	29	43	20	64	70	60
50–69	4	3	1	45	48	35	75	78	69
40–49	8	2	6	27	67	13	78	79	77
30–39	10	3	7	46	54	42	84	84	84
20–29	14	8	6	49	61	33	90	91	88
10–19	6	3	3	28	43	13	88	89	87
0– 9	17	4	13	43	53	40	92	93	90

The reason, in all probability, for the stereotype about urbanism and Negro registration is that those few Negroes who were registered to vote prior to 1944 resided in the large urban centers. In addition, the first increases in Negro registration after 1944 largely occurred in urban areas. The urban areas of the state contain the largest concentration of professional and business Negroes, equipped to provide leadership toward registration; and the cities provide, one might imagine, an environment of political competition better suited to encourage Negro political participation.

As Table V indicates, however, Negro registration in Louisiana is, if anything, lower in the large urban centers than in the more rural portions of the state. The table also shows that an identical though more pronounced pattern obtains for white registration too. Taking the religio-cultural areas of the state separately, the same relationship between urbanism and registration exists in both regions as in the state as a whole, but with both Negro and white registration in the French parishes tending to be either equal to or higher than registration in the non-French parishes.

Negro registration tends to be lower in the urban than the rural areas for a variety of reasons. Many an urban Negro is rootless, and tends to feel little identification with his community or his fellow Negroes; his leadership often works at cross purposes, and is particular rather than general. In addition, local interest in registration and voting tends to be more intense in Louisiana's rural areas, where the election of a sheriff is an important event, than in the urban areas. All of these factors tend, also, to operate on the level of white registration.

Even though the urban centers do not provide favorable environments for securing a high proportion of Negro registration, the "pilot" role of activities in urban centers toward launching Negro registration is important. In all parishes studied the registration of Negroes was initiated by business and professional Negroes residing in the major urban center of the parish. In the event resistance to Negro registration made it necessary to resort to legal and politcial action, the city provided the resources and locus for suits against the registrar, for requests to the F.B.I. to investigate reluctant registrars, and for bargains which might be negotiated with court-house politicians.

IV. THE POLITICAL FACTOR

The first concern of every politician is to be elected and reelected to office Therefore, the existence in any community of a reservoir of untapped voters tends to act as a magnet on politicians in search of votes. The Negro vote in Louisiana, however, was not exploitable until the Supreme Court declared the white primary laws unconstitutional. After 1944, Louisiana politicians could legally pursue the Negro vote.

In all the Louisiana parishes except those with the very largest cities, political power and interest center in the courthouse of the parish seat. The dominant political figure in the courthouse is the sheriff, whose election occasions the most interest and largest voter turnout in the parish. Where Negro registration has occurred in large numbers, the sheriff has almost invariably been friendly to the idea.

The process by which this political variable helps bring Negroes to the polls works generally as follows. Community attitudes must, first of all, be permissive with respect to Negro registration. If the white community is strongly and unalterably opposed to Negro voting, the sheriff or other politician will rarely venture to seek the Negro vote. Instead, as in the Mississippi parishes with no registration, the sheriff will help keep the Negroes away from the polls. This is true because the politician fears the reaction of his townspeople to Negro registration and because he, too, generally shares the dominant attitude.

Secondly, the sheriff, by the very nature of his office, is subject to manifold temptations relating to law enforcement, particularly, in Louisiana, to the classic "payoff" to permit gambling. When a sheriff permits gambling, he is charged with corruption of his office by the good government, middle-class voters of his community. In this event the sheriff is compelled to turn to lower socio-economic groups or to marginal groups in the community for support.

After Negro leaders have initiated the movement for registration and thus demonstrated their group's potential voter strength, the sheriff or other official can then use to his own profit the power of his office to prevent interference with registration, or else later encourage registration drives and voter turnout campaigns. In many parishes the Negro vote has become a "balance of power" factor.

Finally, the reward of the Negro for his vote is respect from the politicians and attendance at Negro political meetings, cessation of police brutality, and promises made and often kept regarding such matters as street improvements and better school facilities. It is ironical that this advance may thus result from an alliance of shady white and underdog Negro elements against the more "respectable" white segment of the community.

The political factor is also important as an inhibiting influence. For example, in the two French parishes (Terrebonne and Plaquemines) with a rate of Negro registration below 20 percent, the local sheriff has been instrumental in keeping the Negroes from the polls. In these cases, the sheriff is unalterably opposed to Negro voting, primarily out of fear that it will cost him the election, and, consequently, he uses the power of his office to prevent registration. In all probability, a different sheriff could permit Negro registration without suffering a serious reaction from the white community.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This paper is concerned with the problem of differences in the political behavior of the South toward the Negro. These differences have been studied, here, through an analysis of Negro registration for voting in Louisiana. Negro registration is basically related to Southern politics not only because it is the fundamental step for the Negro toward the power of the ballot box but also because it appears to be vitally related to the willingness or unwillingness of specific societies to allow the Negro an equal place in the community. The evidence indicates that Southern attitudes and practices toward the Negro are in large part a function of the culture in which the relationships occur.[6] Our inquiry here is whether religio-cultural variables in the South, long celebrated as the "Bible-belt" of the nation, are related to Negro-white political relationships insofar as these can be defined by practices and attitudes toward Negro registration.

The findings of this study emphasize the importance of religio-cultural factors in defining white attitudes and practices toward Negro registration. In the southern French-Catholic parishes the percentage of Negroes registered is more than twice as great as in the northern Anglo-Saxon Protestant parishes. Socio-economic factors, urbanism and Negro-white population balance, account for some of the difference. Yet where non-religious cultural factors are held constant, as in cotton plantation areas with large Negro populations, the religio-cultural variable emerges as a clearly influential factor in Negro registration.

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[6] See, for example, V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York, 1949); and Hugh Douglas Price, *Negro and Southern Politics, A Chapter of Florida History* (New York, 1957).

First-hand observations in the parishes of Louisiana support the statistical evidence that Negro registration is related to the type of religio-cultural area involved. Permissive attitudes toward Negro registration in French-Catholic parishes seem expressive of the basic value that the Negro is spiritually equal in a Catholic society. Such a view of man's relation to man, a scheme of elementary justice implicit in a Catholic society, some Catholics maintain, is sustained by traditional Catholic theology and actively promoted by the Church in Louisiana. There is little evidence in the Protestant parishes of cultural values assigning the Negro a spiritually equal place in the community or of activity by the church itself toward these values.

Dr. Frank Tannenbaum has written a brilliant exposition of the comparative treatment of the Negro in North and South America, maintaining that differences are in large part a function of the respective Protestant and Catholic cultures.[7] Curiously, the religio-cultural analysis has been largely neglected in race-relations analysis of the United States, even though the role of the Protestant ethic, for instance in economic behavior and intellectual development, has been well stated.

It is not the intention of the authors to urge religious determinism in this paper but to maintain that, on the evidence, the politics of Negro registration in Louisiana can be understood only by consideration of religio-cultural variables with other relevant factors. In consequence we suggest that religio-cultural analysis may be useful in understanding the whole of Southern politics. Excepting Maryland, possibly, the type of analysis employed here would not be possible in other Southern states due to the lack of distinctive religio-cultural areas. Some attention could be given, however, to the general problem of the Protestant ethic in the South and its involvement with political behavior.

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[7] *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (New York, 1947).

THE DILEMMAS OF FREEDOM[1]

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During the Civil War, which was a war for freedom in a truer sense than most of the wars which have been so called, Abraham Lincoln laid bare the essentials of the dilemma which has baffled the philosophic understanding of freedom and which has made it appear that there was always something left to be desired in its political realization. On April 18, 1864, Lincoln gave a brief and unpretentious address to the crowd assembled at the Sanitary Fair in Baltimore.

"The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty," he said,

> and the American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for liberty; but in using the same *word* we do not all mean the same *thing*. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and the product of other men's labor. Here are two, not only different, but incompatable things, called by the same name—liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and incompatable names—liberty and tyranny.
>
> The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd as a *liberator*, while the wolf denounces him for the same act as the destroyer of liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly the sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word liberty; and precisely the same difference prevails today among us human creatures, even in the North, and all professing to love liberty. Hence we behold the processes by which thousands are daily passing from under the yoke of bondage, hailed by some as the advance of liberty, and bewailed by others as the destruction of all liberty.

I

Political freedom, then, has two different and incompatible meanings according to whether we think of the holder or the subject of political power. Freedom for the holder of political power signifies the opportunity to exercise political domination; freedom for the subject means the absence of such domination. Not only are these two conceptions of freedom mutually exclusive in logic, but they are also incapable of co-existing in fact within any particular sphere of action. One can only be realized at the expense of the other, and the more there is of the one the less there is bound to be of the other.

The concept of freedom is contradictory as seen from the vantage point of the political master and his subject. It is also ambivalent in that most members of society are not simply one or the other, master or subject, but both at the same time. B is the master of C in one respect and also the subject of A in another, and C, in turn, is the master of D in a third, and so on. Most men play multiple roles with regard to political power, subjecting some to it and being subjected to it by others. When they claim freedom for themselves, what do they mean: their freedom to dominate others or their freedom from domination by others? Perhaps they mean one, perhaps they mean the other, perhaps they mean both. This ambivalence makes inevitably for continuous confusion, manifesting itself typically in ideologies which rationalize and justify the freedom to dominate in terms of the freedom from domination.

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[1] This paper was first presented at the Conference on the Essentials of Freedom, held at Kenyon College in April, 1957.

It follows that universal and absolute freedom is a contradiction in terms. In the political realm, the freedom of one is always paid for by the lack of freedom of somebody else. The political master can have his freedom only at the price of the freedom of those who are subject to him; the latter can be free only if the master is made to sacrifice his freedom as a master.

What applies to the freedom to exercise political power also reveals itself in the profession and application of the political truth which justifies and informs the exercise of political power. He who believes that he has a monopoly of truth in matters political is free to propound his truth, which to him appears to be all the truth there is, and to act upon it, only if the non-believers are not free to oppose their "truths" to his; for freedom for error to corrupt thought and action is incompatible with the freedom of "the" truth to prevail. On the other hand, the freedom of the many to compete in the market place for acceptance of their different truths requires the abrogation of the freedom of the one to impose his conception of truth upon all.

In any given society not everyone can be as free as everyone else. Every society must, explicitly or implicitly, decide for itself who shall have what freedom. The kind of freedom a particular society is able to realize in a particular period of its history, then, depends upon the kind of political order under which it lives. The nature of that particular order, in turn, is determined by the fundamental values with which that society identifies itself and which it attempts to realize through the medium of politics. In one word, the kind of liberty a society enjoys is determined by the kind of political justice it seeks. Liberty cannot be defined without justice, and it can only be realized by a particular political order informed by a particular sense of justice.

II

All attempts at realizing freedom have throughout history derived from one of two incompatible conceptions of justice: one, minoritarian; the other, equalitarian.

The minoritarian concept of justice assumes that only some minority, somehow determined by birth, supernatural charisma, wealth, or qualifications of achievement, is capable of finding and understanding the truth about matters political and of acting successfully on it. The majority, not so endowed, is subject to the will of the minority, both for its own sake and for the sake of the whole commonwealth. From Plato and Aristotle to the modern justifications of aristocratic and totalitarian government, the denial of political freedom for the majority has derived from a conception of political justice which limits to a minority the ability and, hence, the right to enjoy political freedom.

This conception determines not only the overall character of political society but also the specific nature of its institutions. It claims for these institutions the attribute of freedom, if not in good faith, at least in good logic. To what Lincoln experienced in the controversies over slavery we can add our experiences with totalitarian arguments.

Communist theory claims that the government monopoly of information and control over the mass media of communication means freedom of the press and the only freedom of the press there is, while what we call freedom of the press is but a sham. The absurdity of the argument does not lie in the claim itself but in the underlying assumption of the government monopoly of political truth, from which the claim follows with logical necessity. For since we have all the political truth there is, so the Communist argument runs, how can we allow freedom of expression to those who refuse to recognize the political truth and, hence, are by definition enemies of the truth, that is, criminals, saboteurs, or foreign agents? And what you in the West call freedom of the press is nothing but the license to sow confusion by propounding error as truth.

The decisive argument against the Communist idea of freedom and against all political philosophies reserving political freedom to a minority, however defined, must come to terms with the philosophic assumption from which those political philosophies derive. That argument is two-pronged.

It opposes the monistic assumption of a monopoly of political truth vested in a minority with the pluralistic assumption that while no member of society has a monopoly of political truth and can even be certain what action political truth requires in a given situation, all members of society as rational beings have access to a measure of political truth, however dimly seen. From this equalitarian political ontology and anthropology evolves an equalitarian conception of political justice which postulates equality of political rights and equal treatment of equal situations. Since no conception of political truth nor any political philosophy and program of action derived from it is necessarily and demonstrably superior to any other, they must all have an equal chance to prevail, but none of them must be given an *a priori* chance to prevail once and for all. The mechanism through which this chance materializes is the periodic majority vote which decides the issue temporarily either through popular elections or through the enactments of legislative assemblies.

Equalitarianism, then, attacks the minoritarian conception of political justice on the ground that no minority can be politically so wise in comparison with the majority as to possess a monopoly of political wisdom. No minority can be trusted with absolute power on the assumption that it possesses absolute wisdom. When Cromwell appeals to the representatives of the Church of Scotland, "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, to think it possible you may be mistaken," he expresses in the religious sphere the equalitarian mood.

Yet equalitarianism not only refuses to accept the explicit minoritarian claim of infallibility, but it also rejects its implicit claim to incorruptibility. Here is the other prong of the equalitarian argument. The minoritarian claim to a monopoly of political freedom derives from the overt assumption of a monopoly of political wisdom, and of necessity implies a corresponding monopoly of political goodness. For the minoritarian claim can be defended by the minority and accepted by the majority only on the assumption that the minority will not abuse its superior power. The nature of man, as it reveals itself to introspection and through the evidence of history, militates against the correctness of that assumption. The inevitable corruptiveness of power is the political manifestation of the inevitability of sin. Equalitarianism endeavors to limit the opportunities for the abuse of power by limiting the political freedom of the holders of power. Western constitutionalism is an elaborate set of devices to subject the political freedom of the holders of political power to institutional limitations and legal controls.

III

The decisive safeguard against the abuse of political power is the institution of periodic popular elections. The very fact that political power is subject to recall and can be taken for granted only for limited periods of time limits the duration of political power with mechanical sharpness. But it also limits the freedom with which political power can be used as long as it lasts. For since the holders of political power have a natural tendency to keep themselves in power by getting themselves reelected, they must use their political freedom with a view to winning the ever impending elections. Thus the preferences of the electorate, real or fancied, are an ever present limitation on the freedom of the holders of political power to use that power as they would like to. The absolute ruler is free to govern as he sees fit, subject only to the limits of physical nature. The freedom of constitutional government is hemmed in not only by institutional devices and, insofar as it is democratic, by the mechanical limits of popular elections, but also by the political dynamics of the democratic process. It is this contrast between the complete freedom of the absolute ruler to exercise the authority of government at his discretion and the limits within which constitutional government must operate, which Theodore Roosevelt had in mind when he expressed the wish to be for twenty-four hours President, Congress, and Supreme Court at the same time.

The democratic processes, in order to be able to delimit the freedom of the rulers to govern, must themselves be free to bring the will of the majority to bear upon the personnel and policies of the government. The freedom of the governed to control and replace the rulers and the limitations upon the rulers' freedom to govern are the two sides of the same coin, the latter being a function of the former. Without that freedom of the governed, democracy loses its substance; for it no longer provides the people with the freedom of choosing rulers and, through them, policies. A democracy which loses that freedom can only survive as the occasional plebiscitarian approval of the personnel and the policies of the government. This is the totalitarian type of democracy.

One would misunderstand the nature of democracy and of totalitarianism as well as their relationship were one to suggest that totalitarian elections are necessarily and always a sham and that they never reflect the true will of the people. They may well reflect that will, as elections in Nazi Germany and

Fascist Italy undoubtedly have, expressing a consensus between the popular will and the government. Here lies the decisive difference between traditional autocracy and modern totalitarianism. Autocracy imposes its will upon an indifferent or hostile people; totalitarianism aims at, and may succeed in, governing with the consent of the governed.

However, what sets totalitarianism apart from genuine democracy is the manner in which the government attains the consent of the governed. Totalitarianism creates that consent through the monopolistic manipulation of the mass media of communication; the consent of the people does not set limits to the freedom of the government, but is a function of its unlimited freedom. In a genuine democracy, on the other hand, the consent of the governed is the temporary result of the free interplay of antagonistic forces, competing freely with each other for popular support. The government enters this contest essentially as an equal; whatever advantages it may have by virtue of prestige, influence, and information, may be offset by other factors and do not necessarily prejudice the principle of free competition. Thus a genuinely democratic government can never be certain whether it will survive the next election or be replaced by another which, in turn, must subject its personnel and policies to the popular judgment in still another election to come.

IV

Genuine democracy must forever guard against the temptation to transform itself into an imperfect type and then to degenerate into totalitarianism. While democracy requires that the will of the people limit the freedom of the government, it also requires that the freedom of the popular will be limited. A popular will not so limited becomes the tyranny of the majority which destroys the freedom of political competition and thus uses the powers of the government to prevent a new majority from forming and to entrench itself permanently in the seat of power. Only a small step separates the destruction of the freedom of competition, that is, imperfect democracy, from the destruction of competition itself, that is, totalitarianism.

The freedom of political competition essential to democracy can be impaired in two different ways. The people are being deprived of their freedom of choosing among alternative policies by choosing among different candidates for office if the different candidates for office are not identified with different policies, but compete for power as an end in itself, not as a means for a particular policy. The people may still be able to choose in terms of the personal qualities of the candidates, such as competence and trustworthiness; their choice has no meaning for the substance of the policies to be pursued. The people, if they do not vote for the person of a candidate as such, will then vote out of habit or not at all, and in the measure in which this happens democratic elections will have lost their ability to protect the freedom of the people by limiting the freedom of action of the government.

The other—and more insidious—threat to freedom of political competition stems from the tendency of all majorities to act upon the assumption that they are more than—at best—temporary approximations to political truth, that is, the repositories of all the political truth there is. They tend to think and act, as long as they last as majorities, as though their will provided the ultimate standard of thought and action and as though there were no higher law to limit their freedom. The majority, as long as it lasts, tends to become the absolute master, the tyrant, of the body politic, stifling in that body the vital spirit of questioning and initiative and evoking instead the submissiveness of conformity. Yet since there is no higher standard for thought and action than the will of the majority, in theory at least each successive majority may produce a new tyrant with a political truth of its own. One political orthodoxy may be succeeded by another, calling forth a new conformity, and the very relativism which is the philosophic mainspring of the supremacy of the majority will produce not only the tyranny of the majority but also a succession of tyrannies, all justified by the will of the majority.

While this is possible in theory it is, however, not likely to occur for any length of time in practice. For the majority, by making itself the supreme arbiter of matters political, must at least implicitly deny to the minority the right to make itself the majority of tomorrow. Since the majority of today tends to claim a monopoly of political truth, it must also tend to claim a monopoly of political power, freezing the existing distribution of power. In one word, the majority of today tends to transform itself into a permanent majority and, by the same token, to reduce the minority of today to a permanent one.

This development not only reduces the minority to a permanent one, but it also deprives it of its democratic reason to exist. That reason is its ability, equal in principle to that of the majority, to have access to political truth and act upon it; hence its claim to compete freely for becoming the majority tomorrow. The assumption that the majority has a monopoly of political truth destroys the minority's political function and gives the respect for its existence an anachronistic quality. Since its continuing existence implicitly challenges the majority's monopolistic claims, is a living reminder of alternative rulers and policies, and may, by virtue of these attributes, become a political nuisance to the majority, the minority cannot for long survive the destruction of its philosophic justification and political function. With its destruction, democracy itself comes to an end. The unlimited freedom, that is, the tyranny, of the rulers corresponds to the unlimited lack of freedom of the ruled.

Thus decadent democracy goes through three stages before it transforms itself into its opposite: totalitarian tyranny. It starts out by emptying itself of part of its substance: it destroys the freedom of choosing policies by choosing men. Then it substitutes for the spirit of free political competition, which derives from a pluralistic conception of political truth, the monistic assumption that only the majority possesses that truth. Then it subjects the minority to restrictions which put it at a decisive disadvantage in the competition for intellectual influence and political power, thus transforming the majority into a permanent one, existing side by side with a permanent minority. The process of degeneration is consummated with the majority becoming the sole legitimate political organization, which combines the claim to a monopoly of political truth with a monopoly of political power.

V

Against these tendencies toward self-destruction, inherent in the dynamics of democracy, the institutions and the spirit of liberalism stand guard. Liberalism has erected two kinds of safeguards: one in the realm of philosophic principle, the other in the sphere of political action.

Liberalism holds certain truths to be self-evident, which no majority has the right to abrogate and from which, in turn, the legitimacy of majority rule derives. These truths, however formulated in a particular historic epoch, can be subsumed under the proposition that the individual—his integrity, happiness, and self-development—is the ultimate point of reference for the political order and, as such, owes nothing to any secular order or human institution.

It is on this absolute and transcendent foundation that the philosophy of genuine democracy rests, and it is within this immutable framework that the processes of genuine democracy take place. The pluralism of these processes is subordinated to, and oriented towards, those absolute and transcendent truths. It is this subordination and orientation that distinguishes the pluralism of the genuine type of democracy from the relativism of its corrupted types. For in the latter the will of the majority is the ultimate point of reference of the political order and the ultimate test of what is for the time being politically true. Whatever group gains the support of the majority for its point of view gains thereby also the attributes of political truth, and the content of political truth changes with every change in the majority. Out of this relativism which makes political truth a function of political power develops, as we have seen, first the tyranny, and then the totalitarianism, of the majority, unlimited as it is by an absolute, transcendent conception of political truth. Thus the relativism of majority rule, denying the existence of absolute, transcendent truth independent of the majority will, tends toward the immanent absolutism of a tyrannical or totalitarian majority, while the pluralism of genuine democracy assumes as its corollary the existence of such truth limiting the will of the majority.

As a matter of philosophic principle, the political order is oriented toward the individual; the political order is the means to the individual's end. Yet as a matter of political fact, as we have seen, it is the very earmark of politics that men use other men as means to their ends. That this cannot be otherwise is one of the paradoxes of the politics of liberalism; for political reality disavows, and does so continuously and drastically, the postulates of liberal philosophy. Liberalism believes in the truth of man's freedom, but it finds man everywhere a slave. Thus it adds another paradox—more shocking than the first for being the result of liberalism's own efforts—by creating political institutions which limit the freedom of some in order to preserve the freedom of others. Constitutional guarantees of civil rights and their legislative and judicial implementation are the liberal defenses of freedom of political competition. While the will of the majority decides how these guarantees are to be implemented, the existence of the guarantees themselves is not subject to that will. Quite to the contrary, these guarantees set the conditions under which the will of the majority is to be formed and exercised. They establish the framework of democratic legitimacy for the rule of the majority.

Yet the very need for these safeguards limiting the freedom of the majority points up the dilemma that liberalism faces. If the majority could be trusted with its power, the liberal safeguards would be unnecessary. Since it cannot be so trusted, its freedom must be curtailed for the very sake of freedom. The dilemma which concerned Lincoln in the individual relations between the wolf and the lamb reappears in the collective relations between majority and minority. It manifests itself here typically in the concrete terms of the antinomy between individual rights and some collective good, such as general welfare, administrative efficiency, national security. The liberal concern for individual rights may stand in the way of the maximization of such collective goods, and the greater the need for the full realization of a collective good appears to be, the greater is the temptation to sacrifice individual rights for its sake. Is individual freedom more important than national security, without which there will be no freedom at all? What benefits does a man draw from the Bill of Rights if, in the absence of measures of general welfare, it guarantees him the right to sleep under bridges and sell apples in the street?

This dilemma lies outside the purview of liberal philosophy, which inclined to identify itself in the nineteenth century with the individualistic prong of the dilemma and shifted in the twentieth to the other, collectivist one. Thus the philosophy of liberalism can provide no intellectual tools with which to master this dilemma. The decline, in our time, of liberalism as theory and practice is the result.

VI

Liberalism conceived of the problem of freedom in terms of a simple juxtaposition between society and the state. It saw the sole threat to individual freedom in the state, conceived either as an aristocratic minority or a democratic majority. The liberal policy, then, had a two-fold aim: to erect a wall between the government and the people, behind which the citizens would be secure, and to confine the government behind that wall in as narrow a space as possible. The smaller the sphere of the state, the larger the sphere of individual freedom was bound to be.

The aspirations for power and the struggle for power, resulting from them, however, could not be so neatly confined; for these aspirations are not the exclusive property of any group, but common to all men, ruler and ruled, oligarchs and democrats. The autonomous forces of society, left to themselves, engendered new accumulations of power, as dangerous to the freedom of the individual as the power of the government had ever been. And while liberalism had assumed that the weakness of the government assured the freedom of the individual, it now became obvious that it also assured the unhindered growth of private power, destructive of individual freedom. Against these concentrations of private power, which derived primarily from economic controls, the state was called back from the corner in which it had been confined to do battle. The state, which had just been relegated to the inconspicuous and relatively innocuous role of a night watchman by a society fearful of its power, was now restored to power as the protector of individual rights. Thus the modern state bears a Janus head: one face that of a monster lusting for power over the individual, the other with the benevolent mien of the individual's defender against his fellows' infringements of his freedom.

The struggle for freedom in the modern state has thus become a three-cornered fight, and the old dilemma reappears in a new and intricate configuration. A new feudalism of giant concentrations of economic power in the form of corporations and labor unions vies with the old tyranny of the state for limiting the freedom of the individual, subjecting ever new spheres of formerly free individual action to ever more stringent restrictions. That new feudalism calls into being the "new despotism" of the administrative state, which, for the sake of individual freedom, superimposes its restrictions upon those of the concentrations of economic power. From the latter's vantage point, this is but the old tyranny in modern garb. Yet the mass of individual citizens welcomes the administrative state as the champion of freedom.

It is the measure of the inadequacy of the simple juxtapositions of nineteenth-century liberal philosophy and of the inner contradictions and ambivalences of freedom, as it actually operates in the modern state, that both sides have a point. The administrative state can become a new despot to some and a new liberator to others, as majority rule can be both the nearest approximation to freedom in a mass society and a many-headed and, hence, unassailable destroyer of freedom.

The problem thus posed cannot be solved by any simple formula which endeavors to restore the juxtaposition of society and state from which the philosophy of nineteenth-century liberalism evolved. Rather the solution of the problem must start from the terms in which it poses itself in the twentieth century. As such, it demands an answer to the question as to how the state can be made strong enough to limit the freedom of concentrations of private power in order to protect the freedom of the many without becoming so strong as to be able to destroy the freedom of all.

A fruitful approach to this dilemma is suggested by the principles, underlying the constitutional devices, institutional arrangements, and political dynamics of the American system of government, by which *The Federalist* successfully tried to combine, in the simple relations between society as a whole and the state, a strong government with a pluralistic society. The same combination, in the complex conditions of the contemporary three-cornered contest, must rest upon the same foundation of the intricate interplay of multiple systems of checks and balances. These systems, if they work perfectly, limit on all levels of social interaction, private and governmental, the freedom of all for the sake of everybody's freedom. They do so in two different respects, through their internal structure and through their relations with each other. The classic analysis of these two functions is provided by Number 51 of *The Federalist*. As concerns the function of the internal structure of a particular system:

> This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power; where the constant aim is, to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner, as that each may be a check on the other; that the private interest of every individual, may be a sentinel over the public rights.

And for the relations among different systems:

> It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: The one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. . . . The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from, and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects. . . .

In the end, the freedom of the individual in the modern state is not the result of one specific constitutional device or institutional arrangement although such a device or arrangement may well make freedom more secure. Freedom rather reposes upon the social order as a whole, the distribution of concrete values to which society is committed. It is not enough for society to recognize the inalienable right of the lambs to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and to have on the statute books provisions against the activities of wolves detrimental to the lambs. The freedom of both the wolves and the lambs will in the end depend upon the values which society attributes, not in the abstract but in the carving out of concrete spheres of action, to the freedom of the wolves and the lambs. What is their due? How far can they be allowed to go? Since neither, and especially not the wolves, can be allowed to go as far as they would like and be able to go, society must intervene, deciding the value it wishes to put upon their respective capabilities and interests and assigning to each a sphere and mode of action. That intervention may take the form of an explicit decision settling the issue once and for all. More likely and more typically, it will result from the interplay of the totality of social forces, opposing, checking, supporting each other, as the case may be, in ever changing configurations, forming an intricate web of horizontal and vertical connections. It is upon that complex and shifting ground that freedom rests in the modern world.

COMMENT ON MORGENTHAU'S "DILEMMAS OF FREEDOM"

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Hans J. Morgenthau's "The Dilemmas of Freedom" is an extremely able, concise, and forthright treatment of a problem of grave importance, and a defense of a point of view which I deeply respect, but concerning which I have serious doubts. I suppose that the differences between us could be summarized in this way: Morgenthau suggests that the solutions to the dilemmas of freedom which he finds, are available and explicable largely in a kind of formalism. He follows, in that, the great tradition of the *Federalist,* which he quotes. I believe it is difficult today to understand these solutions in formal terms, and I believe the difficulty is enhanced by Morgenthau's own conception of what freedom is.

I

Morgenthau begins by quoting Lincoln's Sanitary Fair Speech, which seeks a definition of liberty and contrasts the wolf's definition with the sheep's. To Lincoln, the contrast between sheep and wolf is a contrast between different natures, the one innocent, the other predatory, as well as a contrast between powers. To Morgenthau, it seems to be wholly a contrast between different political situations and relative strengths. "Freedom for the holder of political power," he says, "signifies the opportunity to exercise political domination; freedom for the subject means the absence of such domination." Since Morgenthau introduces these statements into his comment on Lincoln's fable, I gather that he sees the holders of political power as the wolves, who have, like Lincoln's wolves, a different conception of liberty from that of the sheep. In Lincoln, on the contrary, the sheep, once liberated from the wolves are no longer subjects of the wolves but subject only to their liberator, the shepherd. If the wolf and the sheep have conflicting definitions of liberty, that meant, to Lincoln, that a new definition had to be sought. It means, to Morgenthau, that the definitions have to be reconciled. He does that, in effect, by identifying freedom and power, or, more specifically, by identifying the freedom of the subject as freedom, and the freedom of the powerholder as power. By this identification, Morgenthau changes Lincoln's fable. He makes sheep into potential wolves. As subjects aspire to become powerholders, sheep must aspire to become wolves. Whether in fact, they do, I cannot say. Politically, however, the denial of a difference in nature between the "free" and the "powerful" may well lead, as it apparently does for Morgenthau, to a certain neutrality between sheep and wolves, seeking to reconcile the freedom of one with another. No such neutrality is apparent in Lincoln's fable. I think that Morgenthau is led that way because his conception of freedom compels him to it. Though he does not follow Lincoln's plea and present the definition of freedom of which the world is badly in need, he certainly implies that freedom, alike for the powerholder and the subject, the wolf and the sheep, is permission and opportunity to do what one pleases. If that is so, and freedom and power are essentially the same thing, differing in degree, what is it that keeps us from following Nietzsche and preferring the wolves to the sheep?

It seems to me, however, that freedom is not at all freedom to do what one pleases, and that the subsumption of the freedom of subject and the freedom of powerholder under the single word "freedom" is open to grave objections. If there were not a very real difference between freedom and domination, between sheep and wolves, other than mere accident, it is doubtful whether a single soldier would have been ready to die for freedom. I do not think that the men of Bunker Hill or Gettysburg, the British of 1940 or the Hungarians of 1956, could have thought of their struggle for freedom merely as another form of the struggle for domination. Yet I agree with Morgenthau, who, with his relentless logic, sees that if freedom is identified with doing what one likes, freedom to dominate is as much doing what one likes as is freedom from domination. The difficulty lies not in the conclusion, which may well be inescapable, but in the initial premise.

It is true that this relation between freedom and pleasure is an inference of mine and not an explicit statement by Morgenthau. Political liberty can, of course, be seen in purely formal terms as legal permission and opportunity to affect or control policies. Apart, however, from serious practical objections to this view, it means ultimately that "the freedom of one is always paid for by the lack of freedom of somebody else" only if that freedom is freedom to do what one pleases. Even if freedom is "but choosing," in Milton's phrase, it need not follow that "choosing" is quite the same thing as doing what one pleases. One may choose the course that leads to perfection or excellence or justice, quite independently of whether that course is pleasant, and such a choice does not imply competition. The Declaration of Independence does not regard freedom as freedom to do what one pleases, but as freedom to secure one's unalienable rights, that is, the rights that are required for self-preservation. If political freedom rests on freedom for self-preservation and not for self-destruction, one man's freedom is not at all another man's slavery. If, as Morgenthau says, "liberty cannot be defined without justice," it follows that all definitions of liberty must presuppose some conception of the common good. The very idea of the common good presupposes an area where one's liberty is not in conflict with another's liberty. Anyone who has done as much as Hans Morgenthau has done to help us think in terms of the realities of foreign policy knows, better than I, that the freedom of the statesman or diplomat (in his own terms of formally permitted behavior) is often a safeguard of the freedom of citizens and of the free society itself. Or, we might take freedom in Montesquieu's sense, as freedom to do what the law permits, remembering that Montesquieu used the term "law" in an extended sense, as implying the necessary relations between things. Freedom then is freedom to understand, to use one's eyes to see and one's reason to apprehend, the relations between things, and to act according to what is permitted by a whole variety of external relations. To see what the relations of society permit, one must have the help of the law, making those relations as simple and clear as possible. Thus political freedom includes not only the freedom to participate in elections, but also the freedom to live in the world of the constitution once the elections are over. That gives one the feeling of security that goes with freedom, and that is common to powerholder and citizen alike.

Yet none of these conceptions of freedom satisfied Lincoln, who said that "the world has never had a good definition of liberty," and who was clearly familiar with the idea of freedom to do what is pleasant (which he mentions) or freedom to do what the law permits. I do not think that any formal conception can satisfy those who are aware that "the forms of a free, and the ends of an arbitrary government" are not "altogether incompatible."[1] I think that it should not satisfy Morgenthau, who is fully aware that "in the end" freedom is attributed to "society's values."

At this point I must confess a dilemma of my own. It would be highly presumptuous of me to suggest that I had the good definition of freedom which Lincoln says the world has never had, and which Morgenthau does not presume to offer. On the other hand, it would be purely destructive to criticize Morgenthau's conception or what I understand it to be, without turning to what I believe to be the signposts on the road to another conception, however hazy the goal itself may appear in my own mind. To do that, I want to begin with the common parlance.

What do we mean when we speak of a free man, a free soul, or a free spirit? Or what do we mean when we say that a man is a slave: to his passions, his past, his good health, or a machine? We do not generally mean that the free man can do as he pleases and the slave cannot. We mean that the slave cannot get along without these things, and the free man can, or can as nearly as is humanly possible. We do not speak of the free spirit as one who has money or leisure to contemplate his navel, read all the comic books, drown himself regularly in drink, or imagine himself the reincarnation of George Washington. The free man is not necessarily devoid of attachment to trivia, but he is not bound by them. We think of the man who shaves in cold water every day in case he has to, as seeking freedom, because of his knowledge that virtue is habitual. Yet we may see the man who shaves regularly with warm water, but turns to cold with indifference upon necessity, as closer to being a free spirit. We think of the free spirit as someone who is least dependent on externals or on passions. We think of the free spirit as the Platonic Socrates, who can drink or not with indifference, but who can be prevented from inquiring into the good only by his death. Or we may think of that same Socrates who returns from the battle of Potidea to inquire into the meaning of moderation.[2] The free spirit must have freedom to inquire into the highest things and to speak of them. The free spirit is the spirit that cannot be brain-washed because it holds to something above the most trying external circumstances. I think that what

[1] Burke, "Present Discontents," in *Works* (Boston, 1865), Vol. 1, p. 444.

[2] Symposium, 176 C, 4–7; Apology, 29 D, 2 ff.; Charmides, 153 A, 1 ff.

we really mean by freedom is what Plato meant, and it may, though it need not, coexist with fairly stringent controls. Without minimizing the important difference between the two teachings, I suppose that a Christian regards as a free spirit one who follows Augustine's admonition, "Love God and do as you please."[3] Freedom is freedom to do as one pleases only with a most important restriction, to a Christian the most important: the love of God. One who loves God will not please to do things that others may please to do. If that is true, freedom does not at all relate to doing what one pleases, for the free spirit is required not to be indifferent to the highest things, but only to things indifferent. That the question of what the highest things are is not a matter of whim or pleasure cannot be shown in full here. I think, however, that if we speak of a free spirit as one that is least dependent on externals, we must recognize habits and qualities that make the spirit independent.

I find confirmation of this from an unexpected source, William Sargant's recent discussion of "brain-washing." Sargant's own experiences in the physiology of conversion and his knowledge of the literature in the field lead him to the conclusion that the brave man who lashes out in bull-like anger against his tormentors has less chance of coming through than the one who, in his refusal to cooperate, "manages to concentrate mentally on some quite different problem."[4] While it is quite true, as Sargant points out, that one may concentrate, like Kim, on the multiplication tables, I suggest that he who knows the most about the most difficult things may have the most on which to concentrate, and classical political philosophy would, I believe, have characterized him as the free spirit.

I quite realize that there are few, if any, completely free men in this sense, and that when we speak of political freedom our demands must be somewhat less exacting. Nor can I offer any prescription for the best regime and the role of freedom in that regime and the kind of freedom desirable for us who are not free spirits. I must content myself with suggesting that, if Morgenthau thought of freedom in what I believe to be Platonic terms, and not in terms of formally permitted behavior or "power" to act politically, he could at least have moderated the dilemmas of which he speaks. I do not deny, of course, the differences in power between an absolute monarch and a constitutionally elected head. Leaving aside, however, the general and pervasive increase in power in modern society, I think that Morgenthau's picture of conflict is somewhat too simple.

II

I should like to explore Morgenthau's thesis first from the point of view of political principles and then from the point of view of specific political practices. Morgenthau sees two conceptions of justice, upon which concepts and practices of freedom depend, running through history: the "minoritarian" and the "equalitarian." In the case of the latter, which he clearly prefers, he sees two strains: the "pluralistic," which, while admitting the access of every man to some degree of political truth, affirms the subordination of the will of the majority, to certain "inalienable rights," and the "relativistic," which denies the "assumption" of these rights. For Morgenthau the safeguard of majority rule is, in principle, this "assumption." Insofar as this is purely descriptive, as I think it is not, I emphatically agree with Morgenthau, that a democracy buoyed by "self-evident truths" is more likely to show a spirit of freedom than a democracy which insists on the relative character of all beliefs. This preference does not show that these "self-evident truths" exist. Morgenthau's pluralism rests upon a conception of justice which makes the "truth" widely accessible to all, or some part of it as nearly accessible to one man as to another. It therefore opposes all "monopolistic assumptions" regarding the truth and all "minoritarian conceptions of justice" from Plato and Aristotle to modern totalitarianism.

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[3] "Dilige, et quod vis fac." For the citation (in Epistola Joh. Tractatus 7, Kap. 8), I am indebted to Rudolph Arbesmann, O.S.A.

[4] *Battle for the Mind* (London, 1957), p. 226. See also p. 38.

It seems to me that the statement that "all members of society as rational human beings have access to a measure of political truth, however dimly seen," is demonstrably false. Even if it really means that all those members who are in fact rational beings have such access, it does not constitute a refutation of all "minoritarian" claims. There are people who cannot learn the multiplication tables, and no one supposes that their right to err entitles them to teach arithmetic. There are people who believe that foreign policy can be decided by a vegetarian diet. There are people who voted for the second Roosevelt believing that he was the first. There are people who cannot pass the New York State Literary Test (not all of them because they are literate in another language). The politicians have been known to buy votes. And I recall a newspaper photograph of a man of over ninety who voted for the first time in 1952. His access was somewhat delayed. If, however, we follow Morgenthau and relate access to "rationality" (or, rather, to rationality in political things), is it not possible that some men have more access than others? What I think that Morgenthau means and what I heartily support is that it is difficult to find a conventional aristocracy which coincides in fact with a natural aristocracy. We have no royal road to political judgment, though some of my Burkean friends are still looking for one. But this is a practical difficulty, a difficulty which, presumably, will always confront society, for even if a natural aristocracy happens to coincide with a conventional one (and it was the god-given grace of this country that came close to happening at the time of the Founding Fathers), there is no guarantee of permanence. If one rests one's case for equality on the likelihood that farmers and carpenters are as good citizens as bankers and generals, or theologians and professors, that seems to me to make a good deal of sense. It is not, however, a *logos* of being and of man. Morgenthau's *logos* rests, on the contrary, on a dogmatic scepticism, for he adds that "no conception of political truth nor any political philosophy and program of action derived from it is necessarily and demonstrably superior to any other." One has to make a sharp distinction between philosophy and action, and I think that Morgenthau's failure to make that distinction has led to an antithesis between pluralism and monism which is essentially false. Historically speaking, it is not the teachings which have taken their bearings by the "quest for certainty" that have resulted in doctrinairism, but it is the teaching that the world is alien and incomprehensible that has led men to believe that certain political principles were positive and universal goals to which all action, regardless of the circumstance, might be directed. It is ironic, but it is true, that we have built utopian dreams out of dogmatic skepticism.

The point on which I think the ancients insisted is that it may be possible to know something of man's relation to the cosmos, and still not to know, in advance, and with certainty, whether Munich or Yalta was well-advised. While I doubt that one can *never* say that a particular program of action is superior to another, and necessarily so,[5] I admit that the risk is there, which is not necessarily the case with matters of principle. To say that "no conception of political truth . . . is necessarily and demonstrably superior to any other" is not only to deny that certain political principles can be known, for example, that Thrasymachus can be refuted, as I think that the idea that injustice can be rationally defended is refuted in the *Republic.* It is also to deny the possibility that any serious work in political philosophy to which a wise and thoughtful man has devoted twenty years can be shown to be superior to a slogan which a candidate finds it convenient, on a moment's reflection, to introduce into a campaign. To carry it even farther, the latest political effusions of the most gossipy inmates of the state prison are entitled to as much of a hearing (and a hearing without a judgment) as the writings of Spinoza, Mill, or Tocqueville. In other words, why argue? Or, why have political philosophy? If men can never transmute their wonder into knowledge but must rest content with mere opinions that are not demonstrably superior to those of cannibals, lunatics, and bankrobbers, why should anyone waste his time becoming a political philosopher? I do not pretend that any of these questions are easy, and grant that the fact that serious philosophers disagree as to the most important things, poses problems. Yet the self-evident truths that Morgenthau regards as essential to prevent democracy from degenerating into totalitarianism would never have been propounded if their proponents had agreed with Morgenthau that they were no more demonstrably true than any other opinions. The relativism which Morgenthau distrusts (and on that score we should strongly agree) has one advantage over his pluralism: relativism accepts its own chaos, and does not demand that its anarchy be modified by the orderliness of others.

If that is so, there must be a middle ground between the equal accessibility of political truth and what Morgenthau calls "the monopoly of truth." I doubt that any free spirit has ever asserted that he had a monopoly of truth. Certain things he might claim to know. For example, he might not find it sufficient to rest his opposition to the Communist claim to truth on the foundation that there could be no government monopoly. He might rest it not on formal rules but on the nature of man, showing that man is not a creature oriented primarily towards his economic well-being, but that his perfection depends on his independence of external goods. In so doing, he might describe a free society as one that fitted the idea of a free individual, a society that is least dependent on indifferent things. Granted that the existence of such a society would depend on many fortuitous factors: size, location, economic well-being, technology, military security, civil religion, and so on, it might not be meaningless to postulate it. Its postulation would demand, however, accepting the principle that freedom, in the usually accepted sense of the opportunity to choose, and to be left alone, much as it is loved by all good and thoughtful men, is only one good and cannot be seen independent of considerations of human perfection and excellence.

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[5] For example, in *Politics among Nations* (New York, 1954), p. 155, Morgenthau says, "The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or to overthrow the status quo leads of necessity to a configuration that is called balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it." If that is so, and Morgenthau makes a strong case for it, nations which recognize the real configuration, that of balance of power, are selecting a program of action that is "necessarily superior" to a program which supposes a different configuration, and which is therefore the "prey of illusions."

III

It must be granted that, while denying the necessary superiority of any political truth, Morgenthau apparently makes one exception. He asserts that the individual is "the point of reference for the political order." He adds that this individual owes nothing to any "secular order or human institutions." I think that it is obvious that every individual owes his understanding, to some extent, to the educational system or lack of it under which he was reared, and that he owes something to that. An uneducated man, for example, who tried to read *The Federalist* in his sixties, might find it hard sledding. Of course, in the sense that society ought to see to it that the human soul should obtain the best life which its nature permits, I agree with Morgenthau. If, however, his statement means that the "interests" of the individual take precedence over those of society, that means something that liberalism has always hesitated to grant and could hardly grant today.

The very fact that liberalism could hardly grant the precedence of the individual's interests at the moment when its own survival is in question further indicates the difficulty of conceiving the safeguards of freedom in formal terms. Without for a moment denying the importance of constitutional restrictions, periodic elections, and any other institutional protections of our liberty, it seems to me unrealistic to discuss these problems in terms of competition and the protection against the tyranny of the majority. Even in his final section, where Morgenthau is deeply concerned by the concentrations of economic power, and suggests new thinking about the traditional state-society dichotomy, he still sees the protection of the social order in terms of the Fifty-First *Federalist*, that is, in terms of size, conflicting interests, and the protection of minority rights. I seriously doubt that it is the tyranny of the majority that must chiefly confront us as the danger to freedom. How much of the liberal tradition rests on the argument of Spinoza, that the mind cannot be controlled as the tongue is controlled?[6] Who can read that celebrated passage today without doubt and a certain sadness? Are we so sure? Is it true that "Almighty God created the mind free?"[7] It seems that the freedom of the mind is something that Almighty God wanted us to attain, and to attain, if we may accept what Sargant tells us, less by striving or competition or any market place of ideas, than by a mixture of moral virtue, leisurely contemplation, and, unhappily, good luck. That a variety of forces in modern society, ranging from Communist brain-washers with ruthless aims and coercive powers, to public relations experts, advertising copywriters, psychiatrists, and psychological warriors, with their milder aims and their more moderate powers, are bound and determined that the minds of as many as they can get hold of, are not going to be free, Almighty God to the contrary notwithstanding, is a clear and simple fact, of primary importance, in its own way perhaps as important as the presence of periodic elections.

Certainly it is not necessary to prove that these forces exist, quite apart from whether they can do what they say they can do. The literature is abundant, and much of it is a long cry of disturbed protest, a protest built out of the fear that freedom does not seem to mean what it says in the law or even what the Supreme Court so bravely defends. Students of economic concentration testify to increasing appropriations for public relations or to the use of psychiatrists to promote mental health among employees.[8] Students of mass media deplore the "lowering of the level of healthy doubt" and the "failure to create safeguards against persuasion," or complain that fewer and fewer people speak to more and more,[9] and they apparently do not find the assurance that we do not have a government monopoly to be a sufficient safeguard. Students of electoral behavior have seen in the increasing costs of campaigning and in the rise of the new bossism of the public relations expert a developing irrationality, and a situation in which it becomes increasingly difficult for the ordinary voter to exercise his freedom in any way in which the word "freedom" makes any more sense than the choice of two brands of toothpaste—which Rosser Reeves is reported to have compared with the choice of names in a voting booth.[10]

That is not the tyranny of the majority, but quite a different locus of power. And some of the practitioners of the new power have, quite frankly, put the case not in terms of whether to control but of who should control. Norbert Wiener, for example, sees the new industrial revolution as a "two-edged sword." Yet he has no doubt that it will be used and will mean new power. He rests his hope on the "growing awareness" among business managers of its social consequences.[11] William Sargant believes that John Wesley used "brain-washing" and "changed the religious and social life of England for the better." These same methods, much improved, are being used by totalitarian countries for the worse. Yet Sargant, while fervently believing in the medical mission to "indurate" and "redirect" the human brain, grants that it is not for the medical profession to formulate "a new religious or political dispensation."[12] Yet who is to say whether business managers are becoming increasingly aware, or whether Wesley's changes were for the better? All I know is that, if the experts are right, and these are powers which are on the march and are not likely to be stopped, we had better rethink the problem of freedom, not in terms of formal permission to do what happens to give us pleasure, but in terms of who is to decide whether and how and by whom and for what purpose the techniques of the experts are to be used. If my brain is going to be washed in any case, I shall not like it very much, but I prefer that it should not be done by a technician who may or may not know what freedom is. If I have to be "forced to be free," I want to be sure, if I can, that the man who is doing the forcing understands the meaning of freedom.

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[6] Opening of Cap. XX of *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus:* "Si aeque facile esset animis, ac linguis imperare, tuto unusquisque regnaret et nullum imperium violentum foret," and the following passages.

[7] Jefferson, "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" in S. K. Padover, *The Complete Jefferson* (New York, 1943), p. 946.

[8] Alpheus T. Mason, "Business Organized as Power: the New Imperium in Imperio," in this REVIEW, Vol. 44 (June 1950), pp. 323 ff.; Andrew Hacker, "Is the 'New Freedom' Obsolete?," a paper read before a panel of the APSA meeting, September 1956 (mimeo).

[9] Gilbert Seldes, *The Great Audience* (New York, 1950), pp. 137–139. See the works of The Commission on Freedom of the Press, especially the report, *A Free and Responsible Press,* and W. E. Hocking, *Freedom of the Press* (both Chicago, 1947).

[10] See, among others, Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Professional Public Relations and Political Power* (Baltimore, 1956); Samuel Lubell, *The Revolt of the Moderates* (New York, 1956), Ch. 1, Sec. 2; articles in the *Reporter* by Gordon Cotler and by William Harlan Hale.

Degrees of coercion, of course, can be distinguished. The brain-washing practised in a police state obviously differs from the methods of persuasion adopted by the public relations counsel in a free society. Yet both are closer to each other than they are either to the freedom of Plato or to the freedom of the *Federalist*. Some public relations men, Stanley Kelley, Jr. points out, find politics "too dirty" and prefer to work in other fields.[13] The methods of persuasion repel even the experts. There are, to be sure, people who have resisted all these techniques. That fact does not, however, affect the fact that the techniques appear to be growing in precision, popularity, and pervasiveness. Whether the new powers are genuine or spurious, whether they can accomplish what their proponents claim, or whether there is vast presumption in those claims, one thing is clear: the power to change the habits and beliefs of men, and of society, whether to create new men, in Marx's sense, or simply to create new customers, is not an autonomous power, and the science which claims to teach it is not an autonomous science. It is the task of political science to formulate the questions of the aims and the legitimacy of scientific conversion, mass manipulation, and so on. These questions rest on other questions as to the nature of man and his political life. If they are not treated by political science, we run the great risk that they will be treated by technicians, and answered by default, that is by a body of men claiming these powers and exercising them according to human caprice.

[11] *The Human Use of Human Beings* (New York, 1950, 1954), p. 162.

[12] *Op. cit.*, pp. 102, 235–236.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 233.

In Lincoln's fable there is the shepherd, the third character, of whom little has been said. He is the "liberator" who tears the wolf from the sheep's throat. City dwellers today may evoke a different image from the metaphor, and object that he is ultimately no altruist, but only a benevolent despot: in his own time he too has designs on the sheep's carcass and fleece. But Lincoln was following an ancient tradition, suggested not only in the Twenty-third Psalm, but also in Plato, that the idea of the shepherd is the idea of divine care or the statesman's care.[14] He was, of course, fully aware that sheep are destined for use by men, and that the analogy is imperfect. In his fable the shepherd is seen as the guardian and liberator, not as the commercial grower of sheep for flesh, or wool—or as a purveyor to insomniacs for sedative computation. I do not expect to be a liberator, and I suppose that there will be few liberators. At the same time, liberators, like the Founding Fathers, have been, in the best sense, political scientists. It seems to me that it is the task of the political scientist to formulate and refine the citizen's concept of the common good. Perhaps he cannot prevent the real decisions as to freedom and power being left to the mercy of advertising agencies, secular evangelists and Pavlov with his dogs. He has the obligation, however, to try to prevent those decisions from being made by default. Otherwise, what has happened to his tradition, as a representative of the oldest and most fruitful of the social sciences? I do not say this to minimize in any sense the value of what Morgenthau has done. Yet I cannot look at the world of today and see freedom as something that can be defended simply in formal terms. In a sense the heritage of freedom is the heritage of political science, for it has never confined itself to formal considerations, but it has numbered among its teachers some of the freest spirits and some of the wisest of men.

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[14] *Republic,* 343 A ff; *Statesman,* 271 E 6–8, 275 B 1 ff. See also Francis Bacon in the case of the Post-Nati of Scotland, in *Works* (Spedding & Ellis, Boston, 1861), Vol. 15, p. 198. Bacon makes reference to a like parallel in Xenophon, which he does not cite.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY*

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Among political scientists, even among political theorists, there is a widespread conviction that political theory has entered upon a time of troubles. Few, however, regard it simply as a "dead dog," and political theorists continue, as they should, to administer critical self-analysis, and to define and defend their methodological and philosophical positions.[1] The basis for a unity of opposites is still a subject for dispute. This paper is offered, not as a solution, but as a statement of one conception of the role of political theory.

A time-honored technique of dialectic is to seek well-reasoned objections to the view one does not hold. A medicine often commended to the political scientists is a body of systematic, scientific theory akin to economic theory in approach and methodological sophistication. Accordingly, this article takes issue with that interpretation which conceives of political theory as, ideally, the master discipline whereby the science of politics is to be unified and systematized, and empirical investigation oriented and guided.[2] A few definite and carefully developed proposals for reconstruction along these lines, familar to political scientists, are G. E. G. Catlin's *The Science and Method of Politics*, Harold D. Lasswell's and Abraham Kaplan's *Power and Society*, and David Easton's *The Political System*.[3] These works can serve as an initial point of purchase for analysis and discussion.

Each of these programs for the reform of political science and political theory is built upon two theses that are critical for this discussion. One is the proposition that the attempt to dig out and refine the primary concepts and definitions of our discipline is a particularly rewarding occupation.[4] The other is a belief that putting the principles of politics together into a "conceptual framework" and articulating them closely—in short a "codification" of political science—is in principle or practice a useful approach to science or knowledge in politics.[5]

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[1] For some representative essays, see J. Roland Pennock, "Political Science and Political Philosophy," this REVIEW, Vol. 45 (December, 1951), p. 1081; also in this REVIEW, Andrew Hackers, "Capital and Carbuncles: The 'Great Books' Reappraised," Vol. 48 (September, 1954), p. 775, and Harry Eckstein (Rapporteur), "Political Theory and the Study of Politics: A Report of a Conference," Vol. 50 (June, 1956), p. 475; David Easton, "The Decline of Modern Political Theory," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 13 (February, 1951), p. 36; and William A. Glaser, "The Types and Uses of Political Theory," *Social Research*, Vol. 22 (Autumn, 1955), p. 275.

[2] See Harry Eckstein, *loc. cit.*, at p. 486.

[3] G. E. G. Catlin, *The Science and Method of Politics* (London, 1927); Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven, 1950); David Easton, *The Political System* (New York, 1953).

[4] Catlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 131–134; Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. xi; Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[5] Catlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 207–208, 215; Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. x; Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

The discussion which follows is directed (1) to a questioning of these propositions in the light of reflections upon the nature of political and related social sciences; and (2) to an attempted statement of the role of political theory.

I

The German philosophers, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, made a suggestive distinction between "nomothetic" and "idiographic" sciences. Nomothetic sciences, corresponding roughly to the physical sciences, search for abstract, universal laws. Idiographic sciences—exemplified by the more concrete cultural and historical disciplines—deal with unique, more or less extended temporal events, seeking to represent them fully and exhaustively rather than abstractly.[6] The two philosophers took a rather special view of history, and their conception of physical science is in many ways dated; but the bases they used in contrasting science and the cultural disciplines help to discriminate sharply the procedures of political science.

The natural sciences, in Kant's phrase, study objects only insofar as they are "determined according to natural law."[7] The physicist works only with unconditionally universal categories, eschewing all particularity or individuality.[8] He deliberately excludes all that is qualitative or that relates only to appearances, and ruthlessly exorcises all anthropomorphism. His goal is to attain the highest generality, to reduce all to mathematical system and symbolic representations, and to function with the smallest possible number of assumptions. Thus the saying, which has an odd quality if applied to social studies, that "science has to unify reality, not to understand it."[9]

Social, cultural and historical sciences—the "idiographic" sciences—destroy appearances, qualitative aspects, and particular spatial and temporal relations only in part, and in part preserve the specific and contextual properties of the individual phenomena regardless of what inferences or analyses or abstractions may be made.[10] Several more specific differences follow from this governing distinction.

In the first instance, the concrete content of an event or relationship is of more significance, in an idiographic science, than is the abstract, logical or scientific form. The student of politics is not greatly enlightened by learning that Freud's discoveries bear on politics. To know that psychology and history and economics are relevant, even to know how and why they are relevant, is not knowledge that can be converted immediately into a series of reliable deductive consequences. The matter for vital concern is the ramifications of some psychological or historical influence, the extent and complexity of its manifestations, its affective strength, its degree of integration into the political process, and how it distorts and modifies behavior. These are matters not of form or universal principle, but of specific and contextual expression.

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[6] Wilhelm Windelband, "Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft" (1894), in *Präludien—Aufsätze und Reden zur Einfurhung in die Philosophie*, Bd. II, (Tubingen, 1910), p. 145; Heinrich Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (Tubingen, 1910), pp. 38, 40.

[7] Rickert, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 40. See also, F. A. von Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (Glencoe, 1952), p. 18.

[9] Rickert, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[10] *Ibid.*, especially pp. 73, 76, 80–105. Also, A. L. Kroeber, *The Nature of Culture* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 66–70.

Secondly, the idiographic sciences often lack sharply defined criteria of confirmation or disconfirmation of hypotheses or explanations. These disciplines attempt to illuminate phenomena which do not fall neatly into the logician's or the physicist's universal categories, and must necessarily emphasize the particular qualitative shadings of individual configurations. In many instances, "proof" can be little more than an effort to establish a close or high degree of "fit," "congruence," or "conceptual integration" between the description, the event described, and a more or less wide range of other relevant conceptual findings.[11] Any reflective study of the legislative process would afford a good illustration of this thesis. Like the psychoanalyst, the historian or empirical political scientist, if he works upon any theme large enough to be of importance, never entirely proves his points. Yet we are neither at a loss to criticize the weaknesses of his proofs; nor do we feel, on the other hand, that he has not contributed to our knowledge.

Lastly, much of the knowledge sought by the idiographic sciences is not, to adopt John Wisdom's terms, "discovery by investigation," but "discovery by reflection."[12] Such discoveries are not "in the facts," but are the result of perspective, insight, and grasp. In political studies, a statement such as "The national parties are collections of state and local machines," is a homely example. They are the kind of discoveries reported in the literature of psychoanalysis, in the novel, or in the imaginative treatment of social themes. They are rooted in fact and matured opinion, and seek to summarize experience and insight and to tie knowledge and meaning together. Without them, to paraphrase a famous economist, we might possibly support our lives as political scientists, but we could scarcely be expected to enjoy them.

Although this contrast of nomothetic and idiographic sciences is extreme, it is useful to direct attention to certain aspects of political science. The many disciplines grouped together as political science do not fall neatly under one heading or the other. Only slight reflection is required to realize that politics is primarily an idiographic science. Perhaps a simple example of the relation between political science and related disciplines will illustrate. The political scientist has little use for the formalized or theoretical aspects of these disciplines—for economic theory, abstract learning theory, or highly conceptualized studies of group-behavior. He turns almost exclusively to those parts of other disciplines which cast their statements of findings in a contextual and relational mold—to psychoanalytic studies, to the more empirical, social and historical aspects of economics, to the sociologist's picturing of groups in a wide range of social situations—in short, to those related subjects that are concretely descriptive.

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[11] Kroeber, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–71; R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1946), pp. 243–246.

[12] John Wisdom, *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis* (Oxford, 1953), pp. 154, 260–261.

Moreover, the preceding discussion should help to clarify one point. Political science is not a "behavioral" science, concerned with general laws. The subject-matter of politics is basically the specific problem and particular institution: a constitution for post-war Germany, the present goals of Soviet foreign policy, the legislative process in Congress, or the reform of a city or state government. The political scientist may avail himself of the "laws" or descriptive regularities formulated by the behavioral scientist, but as a political scientist, his need is for *less* and not *more* general information. He is concerned to learn not how politics will illuminate human behavior, but the way in which depth psychology can aid in comprehending Nazism, or how problems of capital formation bear upon the politics of Southeast Asia, or what theories of class stratification contribute to the study of American voting behavior.

A generalized theory or "conceptual framework" of politics as a whole would give too distant and too different a view of the reality that the political scientist wants to study and reconstruct. The political scientist, assuming he could employ such an analytical system, would still face the task of searching for and re-assembling the concrete and qualitative details of his problem, and testing his solution, not by his abstract model, but in relation to the specific and contextual properties of his empirical materials. And if he also reported his findings in the language of such a "conceptual framework," the political scientist would find it necessary to attach an addendum, stating in descriptive and qualitative language what he really meant to say.

The Language of Politics. David Easton remarks that a science is "as strong as its concepts . . ."[13] This statement may be true of physical sciences; yet the attempt to exalt the status of political science in the hierarchy of sciences by assiduously recasting, polishing and sharpening its definitions and basic concepts is open to strong suspicion. Definitions function in radically different ways depending upon the purposes they serve and the nature of the disciplines within which they are employed. A passing glance at the different functions of definition in pure geometry, physics, ethics and law evokes considerable uneasiness at proposals for an authoritative terminology in a subject as diverse as political science.[14]

Two vital but unproven assumptions seem to be involved in most proposals for conceptual rigor and technical vocabulary in political science. Both assumptions comport ill with the idiographic properties of the discipline. The first unproved thesis is that effort devoted to more precise analytical and descriptive characterization of the abstracted elements of a political phenomenon yields proportionate revenue in reconstructing or understanding the situation as a whole. Secondly, the demand for terminology appears to turn also upon a belief that it is possible to have in advance an accurate and relatively conclusive knowledge of precisely what is to be characterized and with what specific conceptual instruments and preconceptions the task of characterization is to be approached.

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[13] Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[14] See, for example, Arthur Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy* (New York, 1949), pp. 100–107; Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (London, 1939), Abridged Edition, p. 235; G. C. Field, "The Place of Definition in Ethics," in W. S. Sellers and John Hospers, *Readings in Ethical Theory* (New York, 1952), pp. 95–96; Jonathan Cohen and H. L. A. Hart, "Symposium: Theory and Definition in Jurisprudence," *Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XXIX* (London, 1955), pp. 216 ff.

The first assumption is quite appropriate to a highly developed physical science. These sciences decompose reality into its elements, analyze these elements, and then reason deductively or by implication from the residual concepts. A necessary step in the procedure is precise analysis of the simplest phenomenon exhibiting the strategic factors involved in a specific problem.[15] And because the categories of natural science are universal and relations logical and mathematical, the procedure is extremely valuable.

But the results of applying any similar method to the social sciences are quite different, as the example of Pareto testifies. Perhaps the most illustrative case is the long and arid dispute of the psychologists over the nature, number and exact definition of "instincts," "drives" or "needs." Certainly, this exercise was not without importance. But many authors wrote quite intelligently and accurately about the more complex problems of psychology, even though these foundation concepts remained unclarified. Moreover, the dispute was not settled primarily by reflection upon or analysis of these terms, but by an accretion of information and reshaping of philosophy that ultimately implied new definitions. Even so, the precise logical and verbal properties, or even the empirical content of these new definitions, do not seem highly important or useful in discussing the concrete expression of these "residues" in a cultural context, or in the treatment of more complex problems of personality.

Heavy labors concentrated upon definition and conceptual clarification of a diffuse discipline such as political science seem to promise an even slighter yield. Analyzing the political into its elements still leaves the complex unity to be explained. Possibly the variables isolated would be numerous enough, and the descriptions of their functioning discursive and concrete enough to do justice to the richness and subtle diversity of political behavior. But this seems to be another way of saying that the way to learn more about politics is to learn more about politics.

The proposition that it is possible to have in advance a relatively accurate notion of what, specifically, about a phenomenon is to be described and how it is to be described is a notion also more appropriate to the physical than the social sciences. In physics, this condition is fulfilled because the exact *form* of the data required is already known. What is to be characterized and how it is to be characterized is determined. But in social sciences, as Durkheim notes,[16] discovering the nature of the problem itself is almost the whole of the task of solution. And the nature of the problem largely is just this matter of determining what, in a particular instance, needs to be described. In the study of politics, where problems are largely diffuse, concrete and unique, this requirement implies study of the individual problems and not the tools of a technical vocabulary.

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[15] F. S. C. Northrop, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York, 1947), p. 28.

[16] Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (Chicago, 1938).

There is also a compelling positive ground for avoiding, as far as possible, a highly technical vocabulary of politics. Political policy and moral judgment are inseparable; they are woven together both practically and conceptually. And the carefully chiseled and closely articulated terminology of the systematic reformer is often much worse than useless in weighing choices between policy alternatives or searching for the valuational premises of particular courses of action.

Ordinary language, "common sense" notions of events and behavior, and everyday, popular distinctions cannot be eradicated from the subject-matter of politics, any more than they can from that of ethics.[17] Certainly, rigor has its place. More, not less, analytical clarity and linguistic precision are needed in the often cavalier treatment of such notions as "natural," "equitable," "democratic," etc. But commonly held views and subjective conceptions of "rights" or "coercion" are essential data in piecing together the whole pattern of the ethical implications of political programs. Equally, prevalent anticipations, popular distinctions, and specific contexts are part and parcel of viable conceptions of "liberty" or "loyalty." In the same vein, "democracy" and "freedom" defy all attempts at final, authoritative definition and continue to gain supplementary meaning and richness from the theorist's attention to their habitual, undisciplined employment in everyday discussion and language. Insistence upon banishing ordinary language and distinctions by resolute adherence to scientific vocabulary, as moral philosophers have long insisted, can lead political scientists, first, to obscure and evade the crux of ethical disputes, and last, to rest in sterile conceptualism.[18]

The problem of doing justice to meaning and subtle implication is correspondingly magnified when a scientific or technical vocabulary is combined with the "conceptual framework." Discussion of and writing about politics are heavily infused with terms that have varying amounts of emotive content, such as "power," "responsibility," "legal," "consent," "authority," and "elite." Definitions expressed with such words are persuasive definitions, and propositions about such terms are often subtly and systematically misleading. Difficulties and dangers arising from systematic bias are illustrated by management studies, by the literature of administrative efficiency, or by approaches taken in the study of social control.[19] Casting the language of politics in the rigorous formulae of a given scientific framework may produce logical order; but it will also achieve disciplined and persistent perversity in the discussion of moral and democratic issues.

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[17] This same point has been effectively argued in respect to law. For example, the definitions of "intent," "causation," and "defamation" in law are necessarily merged and interwoven with ordinary language and "common sense" ideas of the subjects. See Glanville Williams, "Language and the Law," II and IV, *Law Quarterly Review*, Vol. 61, at pp. 181, 190, 191, 393, 394; and H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honore, "Causation in the Law: I—A Survey of Common-Sense Principles," *Law Quarterly Review*, Vol. 72, at pp. 60, 64.

[18] R. G. Collingwood supplies some support, on philosophical grounds, for the views here presented on this subject. He argues that the language of ethics—particularly when structured about such terms as "expedient," "pleasure," "happiness," "good," "just," "right"—has its own specific syntactical qualities of overlapping classes, contextual relation, and hierarchical ordering that defy any attempt to reduce the subject matter of ethics to neat or final categories and statements. See his *An Essay on Philosophical Method* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 33, 49, 86–89, 92–101.

The linguistic needs of political science are complex. Some terminology is technical, obviously, because it is borrowed from law, psychology, economics or related subjects. Furthermore, some of the concepts of political science are complex, puzzling in their use, or especially valuable in economizing thought or focussing or directing inquiry. These notions often require reform or analysis. Equally, however, political science makes extensive use of ordinary language and of the rich, flexible, and technically undisciplined vocabulary of literature to communicate information in a comprehensible form, and to characterize sharply qualitative differences, shades of meaning, and the elusive distinctions of reasoned philosophical views. The relations between these purposes of language are tangled and complicated, and very likely to be slighted by a systematic program for linguistic reform. A better approach, perhaps, is that of the lawyer, of allowing language and concepts to grow and be shaped piecemeal, in response to the emergent needs of a pluralistic subject matter.

The Codification of Political Science. Among proposals for the renovation of political science, the comprehensive "analytical" or "conceptual framework" has special attractions. Part of the allure of such an all-embracing program is that it offers hopes of scientific advances through a systematic and disciplined approach to the task of sharpening concepts and relating basic principles or hypotheses. Moreover, claims are made that such a method would suggest new and useful hypotheses, aid in the identification of political variables, and improve predictive theory.[20] This appeal for a methodological campaign needs to be critically examined both in relation to past experience in political inquiry, and by a consideration of crucial differences and similarities in other related disciplines where such techniques have been successful or unsuccessful.

Economic theory is the one social science that exhibits any high degree of scientific maturity. The growth of economic theory, also, has required and produced progressive systematization and increasing methodological rigor. However, the contrasts between scientific economics and political science are discouraging rather than promising. Economic theory is applicable primarily to static or short-term conditions.[21] It deals with one, qualitatively uniform,

[19] For an illustrative and compelling example of systematic bias, compare Lionel Trilling, "The Kinsey Report," in his *The Liberal Imagination* (New York, 1950), p. 216.

[20] Catlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–131; Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 318; Lasswell and Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. xxi–xxii. See also Morton A. Kaplan's article on models of international systems, published in this issue of the REVIEW, *ante*, p. 684.

[21] Frank H. Knight, *The Ethics of Competition* (London, 1935), pp. 141–4.

narrowly defined species of conduct. For economic theory, the end of activity is given, and the attitude toward that end determined by the assumption of rational behavior. With these special assumptions, the economic theorist can build a system of premises and theorems universally valid as to the form, not the content, of economic activity.[22] But the political scientist is more interested in the particular content of events and institutions than their universal or generalized form. The ends of political activity are not given, but diverse and continuously and rapidly changing. Assumptions of rational behavior toward a complex of ends or any given end are likely to be misleading and positively dangerous. The limited successes of the economic theorist in attempting to construct a theory of economic dynamics[23] should suggest the difficulties lying in the path of "analytical frameworks" when the logic of conceptions does not correspond closely to the "logic" of events.

The history of psychoanalysis, another case study instructive for the political scientist, affords an example in which increasing systematic rigor has not been the path of progress. To be sure, Freud's initial models have been altered by numerous elaborations and qualifications. But beyond a point at which the constituent concepts and their relations are still rather ill-defined and loosely articulated, disciplinary reform is not achieved by systematization and definition. Instead, analysts gain increased skill in using their concepts to explore and reconstruct. They need interpretive ability, cumulative insight, grasp and informed judgment rather than logic or method. Significantly, schools of psychoanalytic thought quarrel about their comprehensive models and about canons of application and construction more nearly in the fashion of legal theorists or philosophers than of scientists or logicians.[24] It seems likely that their laggard ways have reason, and that greater scientific purity, in the strict sense, is not sought because it would be at the expense of the usefulness of the discipline.

These examples argue strongly against any image of politics as a discipline possessed of a usable body of abstract deductive theory making possible scientific predictions of method and form. If a hypothetical "conceptual framework" for the political process can be at best a rather loose-jointed body of concepts and hypotheses, then prediction will remain at its present level of informed guesses based essentially on common-sense notions of behavior.[25] For the political scientist, unlike the physicist, will not have terms with fixed content, relations between concepts that are precise and stated, or rules of transformation permitting reliable inferences from one formal entity to another. To discover the significant and the exact relations of variables, the political scientist will still be forced to grope empirically. And reliable conclusions, or the control of error[26] will still depend upon assessment, confirming each step of the reasoning process empirically, and testing the result itself by the aid of concrete imagination or appeal to experience. In other words, the state of the discipline in the matter of prediction will stand much as before.

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[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 135–145.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 141–144.

[24] Clara Thompson, ***Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development*** (London, 1952). Karl Marx is also an instance of the manner in which conceptual rigor can lead away from intellectual light. In passages where Marx uses his materialistic interpretations of history as "levers for construction," his depicting of history or analysis of contemporary events is lifeless and unconvincing. Only where he or Engels employed their philosophy of history more tolerantly and more loosely, using concepts to probe and illuminate rather than to shape materials to an analytical model, does the interpretive power of Marx's insights become evident. The example is imperfect, however, because Marx also committed the error of reductivism—reducing a complex issue to a logically simpler level, as, for example, by explaining a psychological phenomenon in the language and concepts of biology; in short, a form of over-simplification, which accounts for part of his difficulties.

The claim most commonly made is that such a "conceptual framework" will aid in research—in exposing pseudo-problems, in revealing areas of ignorance, in directing inquiry, and in suggesting hypotheses worthy of further investigation. Certainly, some of these claims should be conceded. A codification of the principles of politics will expose some pseudo-problems. Whether it will generate more than it exposes is another question. Similarly, a systematic summation of knowledge reveals areas of ignorance. But the reasons why, specifically in the study of political science, an elaborate "conceptual framework" should be more effective than a careful inventory of ignorance remain to be explained.

Perhaps the codification of political science would suggest hypotheses valuable for further research; but the logical grounds for supposing this to be so are not readily apparent. What must be proven, if the methodologist's position is to be accepted, is that the use of such a "conceptual framework" to search for more inclusive and more abstract formulae embracing sets of related hypotheses turns up not only logical and conceptual problems, but problems with significant empirical content as well. In physics, by virtue of a close unity of empirical content, mathematical reasoning and physical intitution, significant empirical problems are discovered in such a fashion. In political science, the ascent through successive levels of abstraction would seem most likely to remove the investigator to an altitude at which the clues he is seeking merge into the surrounding landscape. In disciplines such as psychoanalysis, political science or anthropology, a startling or anomalous fact becomes a strategic datum for the particular scientist not by virtue of its logical and conceptual relation to a comprehensive system of the particular science, but because of his immersion in and theoretic sensitivity to the particular subject on which he is working.[27] A wide competence in a particular subject will always be of value in suggesting hypotheses. But conceptual systematization does not automatically generate hypotheses unless there is an integral relation between this operation and the problems that the inquirer is striving to formulate.

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[25] See Knight, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–126, for a discussion of the role of common-sense in prediction.

[26] C. I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, 1938) includes in the Appendix an interesting example of the fallibility of deductive reasoning when the relation of abstract concepts is vague.

[27] R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 1949), p. 99.

The limited successes achieved by the use of conceptual constructs in political science are of a variety that should warn against any ambitious methodological schema. The application of group theory to party politics, the decision-making approach to administration, the concept of power to international relations, and analyses of individual judicial attitudes and of the evolution of legal doctrine to the courts, have been valuable in differing degrees. But this experience argues for a piece-meal attack. These methodological tools vary greatly in approach and supposition. They have no common denominator, suggesting some inclusive, general formula. Nor are they, as "models," elaborate or sophisticated. Conceivably, the theorist might devote his attention to the construction and refinement of these more modest tools of inquiry. However, it should be obvious that the problems here are not those of detached conceptual refinement, but of application and improvement through use. These are tasks for the specialists in these fields.

Contemplation of the histories of physics, chemistry and economic theory is inspiring, but perhaps misleading. The wreckage of some of the monstrous symbolic mechanisms of the nineteenth century, such as the Hegelian dialectic, are equally lessons of history. European codifications of law in the same century are also instructive, especially when undertaken by jurists dominated by a passion for abstract logic. The imposition of deductive systems and a "mathematics of concepts" upon a vast field of diverse, complex, continually evolving separate problems did not produce order and clarity, but subterfuge, fictions, tortuous language, logical confusion and inept handling of individual cases.[28] Political science should not become, in Bentham's pungent language, "the art of being methodically ignorant of what everybody knows."

II

Since the political theorist cannot supply methodological canons for the guidance of scientific inquiry, there remains the task of describing what, except for the study of the history of political philosophy, the theorist can do. The preceding discussion suggests two conclusions. Political theory is largely a reflective and literary discipline, more akin to moral philosophy in its relation to ordinary living, than to economic theory or mathematical physics in their relations to economics or physics. The theorist warns and advises; he does not legislate. He pursues and articulates assumptions and implications, and commends models of the political life. Secondly, political theory does not have *a* task or *a* function. Its tasks are several. And the particular problems with which it is concerned are of greater significance than the matrix within which these problems are embedded. These problems are questions for the political theorist either because they call for reflective or philosophical judgment, or because there is confusion in such judgments about these matters.

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[28] Julius Stone, *The Province and Function of Law* (London, 1947), esp. Ch. VII, "Fallacies of Logical Form in Legal Reasoning."

One employment of political theory is that of analysis, with several approaches and several goals. Some topics require logical or philosophical analysis. For example, questions of the form, "What is sovereignty? the state? law?" have caused much perplexity. Whether such questions are merely "verbal," or whether they have a significant and not wholly obfuscating use in political discourse is a problem for the theorist.[29] Another issue for the logician, already discussed at some length by Prof. Weldon,[30] is the cognitive status of propositions about public policy or political values.

A second type of analysis is essentially linguistic in character. How judges, political sectarians, or ordinary people commonly and occasionally employ terms, and the distinctions they want to make, are a vital part of political discussion. The reasons for the meanings assigned to such terms as "freedom," "consent," "responsibility," "community," "democracy," are significant clues; and the exploration of these reasons is one of the primary ways of getting straight what one wants to say, and what sorts of propositions about such terms make sense.[31]

A more honorific occupation for political theory, partly analytical in character, might be termed philosophical critique. Such a critique can be of use both in practical or moral and in scientific concerns. One continuing task of the theorist is that of formulating philosophical judgments upon political practices and doctrines—unearthing their premises, tracing out their remoter implications, and presenting his reasoned criticism from the vantage point of moral philosophy, past experience, and present aspirations. Similarly, as a critic, rather than a creator of method, the theorist may help in untangling methodological confusion. Systematically misleading expressions,[32] equivocal terminology, mistaking the logically simple for constituent or cause, and disguised versions of reductivism or determinism are obvious and frequent examples of errors in treatises on method. Further, insights drawn from philosophy or the history of science can aid in forming tentative judgments of the conceptual foundations or philosophical consequences of a methodology.

But beyond these negative functions of criticism and clarification, something more positive is wanted of the theorist. Traditionally, political theory has claimed a series of special problems, such as those related to personal and civil liberties, loyalty and civil disobedience, equality, authority, and the appropriate grounds and limits of government intervention. The creative role of the political theorist depends largely upon what he can say about these matters.

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[29] As examples of a similar type of analysis in law, see H. L. A. Hart, "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" (Oxford, 1953); also, Jonathan Cohen and H. L. A. Hart, *loc. cit.*

[30] T. D. Weldon, *Vocabulary of Politics* (London, 1953).

[31] Examples of discussions concerned in part or entirely with linguistic analysis are John P. Plamenatz, *Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation* (Oxford, 1938); Michael Polanyi, *The Logic of Liberty* (London, 1951); J. Roland Pennock, "Responsiveness, Responsibility and Majority Rule," this REVIEW, Vol. 46 (September, 1952), p. 790.

[32] The term is Prof. Gilbert Ryle's: "Systematically Misleading Expressions," in Antony Flew, *Logic and Language* (Oxford, 1951).

Two subsidiary reasons explain in part the theorist's continuing preoccupation with these issues. To some extent, these topics are his through preemption. Political theory has been about them; and the theorist has reflected upon them. Consequently, he believes that he has something to contribute to their clarification. Secondly, the content of these problems changes constantly. Each generation must make up its mind about them. And the political theorist, in principle at least, contributes to the process of revision of evaluations and continuing decision.

A more significant reason for allotting these subjects to political theory results, to speak paradoxically, from their obscurity. They are questions of policy, but call for a decision on a route into uncharted regions. Moral values are involved, but there is disagreement upon what values shall guide us, and the values themselves are muddied and distorted by collective political action and diffusely and subtly meshed with social living. Furthermore, the problems of behavior shade off into darkness—the line at which legal rules break down or miscarry, the force of some image from the past, the power of hate, the amount of virtue that a nation can bear, the latent potentialities of political institutions. Therefore, it is idle to look for conclusive answers to the broader questions of political theory. What is wanted is the statement of a reasoned philosophical position, and informed judgment upon viable political options—in short, guidance in matters that despite their obscurity we must still decide.

The theorist, in his consideration of these traditional problems of political theory, can be likened to a reflective jurist reasoning about the merits of adopting a new line of precedent. Like the jurist, the political theorist strives for a practicable optimum, for a good and honest rule or principle that can survive and guide for future days. More than facts and logic is needed. The theorist's tasks call for intuition and judgment and wisdom to achieve creative solutions that strike a balance between interests, satisfy moral sentiments, and comport with a body of existing rules and institutional practices. Both the jurist and the theorist must reach conclusions about many questions of possible reactions and of human behavior, past and future. But the sign-posts that they have reach only part of the way. And they are searching not only for a safe answer but a good one. Beyond what personal experience and science can tell them, they both have use for and build upon the kind of insights, judgments and perspectives gained through literature, through philosophy, through reflection upon history.

The political theorist's mistake lies not in his concern with these issues, but in his failure to revise the list of topics and shift his approaches to them. Some problems should be allowed to expire; new ones should be added. Some traditional themes, such as political obligation, probably require only slight restatement. Others, such as pluralism, should be dissected into a group of separate questions. But a failing common to many discussions is their abstractness; they revolve about propositions so far removed from the political scene that they smack of scholasticism. Political science, law, economics, and the behavioral sciences are in continual evolution. They offer empirical foundations and raw materials for the problems of political theory. The methods and materials for answering the issues of political theory change as well as the issues themselves. Therefore, restatement is doubly necessary. And reconsideration is not treading the same ground, but continually creative.

Political theorists are commonly engaged in one remaining vocation. This occupation is the endeavor to present a systematic philosophy of politics: a comprehensive picture of political life that relates our living together in a common political entity with our private and general ends and our final aims.[33]

There seem to be two valid reasons why the writers of such treatises strive for systematic unity. First, to give a view of the whole so that interests, groups, institutions, aims, means, and policies are not viewed in isolation, but as parts of an interrelated and complex solution. Second, systematic unity is a mode of exposition and proof. Within such a framework, the significance, the validity, and the creative power of a theoretical perspective are set forth and tested.

A systematic political theory differs from a systematic treatment of political institutions primarily by greater emphasis upon the valuable in possible political goals, and upon the search for political ways and obstacles to broader and more ultimate moral purpose. If well done, a political philosophy has much in common with a thoughtful novel. The novel treats of quite possible characters and largely of ordinary and familiar events. But relationships of personalities, values and ideas cast shadows upon a far larger screen. Elements of scattered events are made to stand out, are ordered, and the whole set in a context so that the ordinary and familiar jars and provokes reflection. An intuition that before was dim and wavering is now clearer. An anomalous apprehension is articulated. Or the reverse is the case, and what was long believed now has an air of lunacy. The novelist carries his points by bringing his characters and his story fully to life. He shows us models of lives that are possible ones—lives like ours, and yet different from ours in a way that casts a thousand lights upon the life that we are leading, that enables us better to see why we behave as we do, and what we want to become.

Political theory, in its most constructive and ambitious endeavors, is literary in form. Some are perhaps disturbed by such a comparison and tempted to say, "Let Science be done, though perish the earth." Science has its role; but so has literature, and especially in aiding us to discover what we want to do. Like the novelist, the political theorist paints pictures in words of a political life that we might choose, or that we are now leading but do not fully comprehend. He records his reflections upon politics to help us to decide how we are to live. As Plato observed, that task is no mean one.

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[33] The most representative examples of a systematic philosophy of politics, as the concept is here discussed, are Ernest Barker's *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (Oxford, 1950), and Robert M. MacIver's *Web of Government* (New York, 1947).

THEORY AND THE STUDY OF POLITICS

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In the omnibus philosophy of an earlier day the pursuit of knowledge was the pursuit of science. Political science became a specialized discipline only very recently, and while it gained by its specialization it also suffered because of it. One of the nice tasks of modern political science is how to avoid the effects of descriptive detail as a substitute for theory and once again relate political phenomena to broader patterns of human activity, without losing the advantages, particularly in research, of the specialized knowledge and lore so laboriously acquired.

True, we cannot return to "omnibus philosophy." What is perhaps required is the reintroduction of problem-oriented empirical philosophy. This has gained considerable currency in other social science disciplines. The results have been most striking at those points in knowledge where in the past reliable information was weakest and the need for knowledge greatest. A few such areas are perhaps worth a brief mention here such as *concept-formation* with its dual aspects of basic perception and logic, *motivation* with its associated factors of objectives, expectations, and norms, and *organization*, including the basic supply of means and structures of choice thrown up in group activity and association. An enormous amount of research in the area of linguistics, logic, and indeed both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of knowledge has gone into the first. Widely differing approaches to the general area tolerate very little parochialism and social psychologists, logical positivists, mathematical logicians and others have pounded happily away at associated problems. The same thing can be said for the other two basic problem areas mentioned. A battery of approaches, rather than an array of disciplines, is brought to bear with cumulative and productive results. Social science literature is increasingly problem-clustered as a result, a healthy sign, and the selective reading of social scientists requires cutting through a variety of disciplines. If one is interested in bureaucracy, or certain aspects of organizational behavior his choice of literature will be necessarily very diverse. It may vary from articles on feed-backs and servo-mechanisms and communications nets, to the Weberian approaches to formal disinterested behavior in bureaucratic agencies.

A return to a more classical approach to scientific scholarship puts very different burdens upon students. What should they learn and emphasize? Weighed down by curricula which have emerged out of the era of specialization in political science, political scientists are unsure how much to stress detailed information which should be part of the intellectual apparatus of every student who plans to continue in the field, and the amount of "non-political science" material with which he should be familiar. If he is inadequately trained, a student may attempt a slow milk run through a diverse literature which turns sour before it can be consumed. Given the limited time available to a student there are difficult priorities: information versus theory, disciplinary theory versus general analytical theory; these are only a few of the problems which we face both in the teaching of our subject and in our own approach to research.

One approach to minimizing this difficulty for those who expect to be professional political scientists has been a revamping of the traditional curricula of post-graduate work to deal less with descriptive data and information (assuming the student has some background knowledge on which to build), and to present a broader training, first in the canons and criteria of scientific work generally, and secondly in the general principles of social behavior and organization.

The first emphasizes the setting up of a researchable problem and the legitimate ways of handling that problem in order that fruitful and reliable conclusions can be obtained. The latter stresses the generalizable potentialities of the problem and its conclusions so that the area in which the student does intensive and detailed work can be related to other problems and issues in the field. Such training emphasizes parsimony and clarity at the basic conceptual level so that succeeding efforts to find out facts do not result in a bewildering array of miscellaneous information which is sorted out in intuitive fashion, now wide of the mark, and now close to the mark.

There is of course nothing new in this method of approach to studies. Classical approaches to scholarship emphasize basic information early in education, with abstraction proceeding at the level of higher scholarship. Indeed, if higher education, particularly postgraduate work, means anything at all, it must deal with the manipulation of abstractions and generalizations in relation to problems posed. The art or science of analysis is the application of principles to fact.

The problem is aggravated for political science because a classical approach to science does not end specialization; it merely shifts the specialist function first to an appreciation of scientific technique, second to concept formation and organization, and third to technical information of a highly specific sort. Unfortunately in political science today the contrary tends to be true. Specialization simply means compartmentalization, with the result that we turn out better mechanics than we do creative scholars.

Students recognize this difficulty with political science more quickly than professors. They are "voting with their feet." The best students in the social sciences today often tend not to go into political science, but into those disciplines where a genuine body of research theory is emerging. It is already highly doubtful that undergraduate work in political science, particularly in some institutions where a heavy program in political science is possible, is in fact the best preparation for postgraduate work in the field. The same query can be raised in regard to the majority of postgraduate students preparing themselves to be professional political scientists. Presently constituted curricula tend to be theoretically parochial and laden with descriptive data without an adequate appreciation of the conceptual pegs on which to hang such data.

It can of course be argued, and with much justification, that prevailing undergraduate programs do not adequately prepare students with sufficient knowledge for the type of postgraduate program called for here. If this were true it would be rather an indictment of our entire university program. But such is not the case. Plenty of first class students come out of our universities, and postgraduate work at the Ph.D. level should cater only to first class students. Social analysis is technical stuff and there is no compromise with quality.

However, as soon as one raises queries pertaining to curriculum changes, vested interests, convictions, and indeed the cultural traditions of political science are set in motion. Questions about "education for what" vie with queries about the basic stuff of education itself. Styles and schools in professional education, each with their virtues and angry in defense, sometimes end by obfuscating real issues. Too often it is fashion which wins the day rather than a sober assessment of our needs and problems.

If the ferment which has been produced in some circles in political science is itself more than fashion, and there would be many who would deny that it is, then it is to the science of politics and the constitution of that science that we must address ourselves.

I

Curricula tend to reflect secular tendencies in a discipline, and rightly so if there is to be a stable body of knowledge out of which the field is constituted. The price paid for this is that curricula tend to remain too conservative and turn out people ill-equipped for present day needs. Perhaps it might be worth while to try to point out certain tendencies and trends in political science which have bearing on both the teaching and the needs of political scientists today.

Two "trends" have crystallized since the war. The first emphasizes science, its canons, and its applicability to political phenomena. The second, related to the first, is the return to fundamental theories about aspects of social behavior.

Both trends are incorporated in two general schools of thought recently grown up in political analysis. One "school," the institutionalist, is a result of dissatisfaction with the legal-historical approach to analysis in politics, and a recognition that "sociological" factors are significant in any kind of political analysis. Much of the work in this direction reveals itself in a search for the meaning of a set of organized groupings in society: the church, the state, the family, the economic system, etc. It avoids some of the pitfalls of simple pressure group analysis and tends to emphasize the ideological conventions which surround each of the institutions in contact with one another. Explanation, in part, consists of unravelling the ideological commitments of each of these institutions as they are joined together, in an effort to reveal the basic pattern or ground plan of social life and organization.

Another "school" has grown out of dissatisfaction with both the traditional legal-historical approach in political analysis, and the institutionalist approach. We can call this generally the behavioral approach, which deals with selected aspects of patterned behavior and includes three major features: 1) a formal institutional feature (or organizational feature), 2) a qualitative feature, and

3) an attributive feature. The formal institutional feature refers to the organization of membership structures of a given unit of analysis. The qualitative feature refers to the norms and values operative in action within a given unit, including standards of judgment and moral expressions. The attributive feature refers to the inferred functional qualities of patterns of action such as solidarity, economic allocation, etc.

These two "schools," as can be readily seen, have much in common, but their major differences appear in their approach to questions of science and method. This is not to say that the institutionalists would reject science. Not at all. To date they have probably contributed more along these lines than the behaviorists have. But, to the behaviorists, their standards vary somewhat, and the institutionalist's use of science tends to be *ad hoc* and imprecise.

Real controversy does exist between the institutionalist and behaviorist points of view. Both have been efforts to get beyond the immediate descriptive level of much of political science. In working towards similar objectives, the differences between them often mean more varied contributions, but unfortunately differences are taking on the proportions of doctrine rather than science. Indeed it is in debates between the institutionalists and the behaviorists over issues of science and political ethics (in which epithets of "scientism" or "moralist" are hurled) that many issues hardly relevant to the problems of developing political analysis get pushed to the forefront.

As is usual in such cases, the toughest protagonists of each point of view are rarely the best representatives of the actual work going on. Of more pertinent interest perhaps is the fact that people in other disciplines are becoming concerned with problems of politics, attacking them often from substantially different but no less important research needs. For instance, more and more attention to specialized instruments of social control is being paid by anthropologists and social psychologists. Suffering from a lack of knowledge of traditional political science, but often unencumbered by it, some of them are attacking political problems with a fresh eye. Many of their remarks are certainly not new. Yet they are closely tied in with immediate problems of the social world which give their statements a ready relevance sometimes lacking in political analysis. Often it is "the political system" which is regarded as the most crucial set of institutional structures for the integration and maintenance of a given society. It is looked upon as the most generalized structure for the performance of control functions and as an expression of generalized wants to be translated into legal and normative role prescriptions in all aspects of a given society. Approached systematically such a viewpoint demands broad knowledge and theoretical expertise if treatment is to be effective and meaningful.[1]

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[1] Examples of particular interest are L. A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy* (Cambridge, 1956), which deals with the development of a civil service system of chieftaincy in an important district in Uganda, and J. A. Barnes, *Politics in a Changing Society* (London, 1954), with its interesting thesis of the "snowball state," and which deals with another African group, the Fort Jameson Ngoni, as the subject for intensive empirical work.

II

If we grant that the theories of others are relevant to political scientists we immediately raise two important issues in our field, the relation of other disciplines to political science, and the consequence of "foreign" theory for the future of the field. This has both teaching and training implications and cuts to the heart of our tradition. We have, after all, a vested interest in our field. To argue that political science has not developed a vast body of theory in social analysis is to ignore much important work and thought. On the other hand, there are problems which are part and parcel of the very theories we inherit. There are blinders put upon us as well as insights given us. To fail to recognize this is really to be a victim of theory—the charge so often made against those interested in concept formation. Much of our theoretical work has been the illustration of relationships in a given empirical field on an *ad hoc* and intuitive basis. This is then used as the screen on which to view other problems. We may perhaps produce intellectual novelty, but rarely cumulative intellectual growth. In effect, our ideas and theories are modified in a historical sense. Individual insights modify other insights, but their scientific tenability if any has not been the subject of serious discussion, although moral tenability has more often been the basis for judging validity.

It is not that we do not have an epistemological position. We do, but it is very often submerged in a kind of political historicism, rather than a science of knowledge. Epistemology in politics often proceeds upon discovering the ideas of a historical period or society, and an examination of the forms or structures in which these ideas are expressed. There is enormous emphasis upon uniqueness, and heavy emphasis on ethics. Often the latter is called upon to answer the former. Each age, goes the argument, is unique, particularly since the world is in constant flux; but man is the common measure, the unchanging quantum, and his problems appear to be universal, therefore his moral problems stand out sharply.

Since a period or an epoch is considered as an expression of the men of the time, it can never be understood except through the intellectual and structural environment of the actual participant. Indeed in such a view, the most successful interpreter is the observer as participant. To participate vitally in the social processes of one's environment, it is held, is to come to grips with real problems until ethical constants become affirmed, and they become the means of judging validity.[2]

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[2] See for example, Mannheim, K., "On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung," in *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1952), or his *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1946), p. 7. Mannheim says, after discussing the factors which make for awareness of programmatical and ideological differences, "The most significant stage of this communication is reached when the forms of thought and experience, which had hitherto developed independently, enter into one and the same consciousness impelling the mind to discover the irreconcilability of the conflicting conceptions of the world."

For an interesting and differing view see Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 24–30.

This is not to say that "political historicism" dominates our field. However, very little else is a serious challenge to some version of that approach, because it has involved thoughtful and sincere efforts to wrestle with the problems of political analysis as both moral science and practical research. An initial utilitarian bias has impelled us to philosophical idealism, and from idealism to ideology and ethical judgments as substitutes for theory.

If we admit the need for scientific canons, we immediately raise a set of epistemological questions which are appropriate to science in general. Problems of experiment and control, of research design, and of operating assumptions become part and parcel of the training of political scientists. An emphasis on method is an emphasis on the rules of the game, and a description of how the rules can be put to work. Without such an effort neither the logic of science, nor science itself is of much use to us. The working assumptions we use should themselves be either defined as given, or else substantiated through the theoretical works of others. At least part of what can become operating assumptions for us would result from experiment in other fields.

If we are to examine the behavioral aspects of man as a political being, using the notion of behavior described above, we are at once forced to make certain assumptions about his nature and functioning. Either this is to be done arbitrarily, or else our conceptions of him must be abstracted from his range of activities in organized settings. In order to reveal the latter, across-the-board empirical research is the foundation for useful generalization.

That such research has been going on under conditions both controlled and freely structured has been testified by a large and growing investment of brains and capital in the study of human action on the one hand and comparative politics on the other. Recent tentative efforts along these lines attempt to bring together findings from diverse sets of experiments and literatures in order to maximize the level of empirical generalization.[3]

One common danger in queries of "fundamentals" is a tendency to focus on levels of human behavior in disciplinary terms rather than as units of analysis. The ranges of theory which might be necessary to deal satisfactorily with a problem can rarely be determined on disciplinary grounds, but rather by the units subject to analysis and the questions posed for research and findings. The types of units which the political scientist deals with continuously are extremely complex, combining both societal and specialized political variables which are irreducible.

Hence in viewing the work of other social scientists and their theoretical assumptions there is no injunction intended here about our own levels of specialized work, other than to note that we may have to bring in other ranges of explanatory concepts and premises than those we are accustomed to in our work, depending upon our problems for analysis, and the units of research.

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[3] See for example, Parsons, T., *et. al., Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1953). See also, Almond, G. H., "Comparative Political Systems," in Eulau, *et. al., Political Behavior* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1956).

This is not a plea for integration of concepts into a single "social science."[4]

While the political scientist certainly is engaged in examining selected aspects of social action and therefore depends upon the social sciences to provide aspects of the basic theory of such action, this does not mean that he should suddenly become political scientist *cum* psychologist or *cum* anything else. In that respect the sometimes plaintive question "but is this political science" is misleading. There is no doubt that the main focus for the political scientist is not action as a whole, but only certain aspects of action.

If one accepts this point of view, however, he assumes certain responsibilities. For a time at least, he may become an iconoclast. He may smash more idols than he can replace. He may even diminish his immediate research potentialities in favor of a long and difficult search over many fields of social analysis to learn how others view human action, what they regard as important about it, and possibly how such a search may rephrase the questions which a political scientist might be likely to ask. And he might hesitate before going through such a process, and might well ask, what is really in it for me?

Because this question is what some political scientists essentially are asking, what is incumbent upon them in order to find out? The first requirement is to attempt an over-view of some of the different ways those in other specialized fields attempt to categorize action data, both procedurally (in the emphasis upon experiment), and theoretically (in the emphasis upon statements applicable beyond immediate limits of experiment).

What contributions do they make in careful and controlled observation of human action as patterned behavior, in the kinds of generalizations drawn? Can they illuminate different aspects of questions which political scientists have concerned themselves with? Indeed the aspect of their work of most interest to us is that they may articulate much that has been implicit in political science, or rather crudely drawn in recent years, *e.g.*, such matters as unit change and response, the absorption limits of unit variations, the way in which group activity is sustained, etc., in such fashion that new bits of knowledge can be used to negate, advance, or rephrase questions. Political scientists constantly deal with the items mentioned. Efforts to discuss democracy, industrialization, cabinets and parliaments, voting and political parties, the spread of communism, how revolutions occur, threats to freedom and liberty, all deal with human motivations, activities in organized groupings, and a range of cultural and symbolic behavioral expressions about which those in other disciplines have important things to say.

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[4] See Mandelbaum, M., "Societal Facts," in *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, No. 4 (Dec. 1955), for a good discussion of this problem. Speaking of the problem of reductionism Mandelbaum says, "There can scarcely be any doubt that there is at present a considerable measure of disagreement among social scientists concerning the relations which obtain among their various disciplines. For example there is little agreement as to how the province of 'social psychology' is related to general psychology on the one hand or to sociology on the other. There is perhaps even less agreement as to how sociology and history are related, or whether, in fact history is itself a social science. Even the province of cultural anthropology which, in its earlier stages, seemed to be capable of clear definition, is now in a position extremely fluid. This type of fluidity in boundaries of the various social sciences, and the ease with which concepts employed in one discipline spread to other disciplines, has been quite generally regarded as a promising augury for the future of the social sciences. One notes the frequency with which 'integration' is held up as an important programmatic goal for social scientists. But such pleas for integration are ambiguous. On the one hand, they may merely signify a recognition of the fact that attempts to understand some concrete problems call for co-operation between persons trained to use the concepts and methods of different social sciences, or that workers in one discipline should be aware of the methods and results of those who work in other fields. On the other hand, what some who plead for 'integration' seem to demand is that the various disciplines should merge into one larger whole. On such a view the goal of integration would be the achievement of a state in which all persons who work in the field of social science would operate with the same set of concepts and would utilize the same methods of inquiry." The latter position is of course absurd if only because of the wide variety of research needs in the differing social sciences and because specialized theory is not easily transferred from one discipline to another.

Is the question for political scientists one of retaining or eliminating the field if he pays singular attention to these aspects of behavior? Certainly not. There is a wealth of accumulated wisdom and information which the discipline itself represents. Nevertheless, much of this wealth still needs to be sorted, tested, evaluated, and brought into better theoretical frames of analysis so that its content, its meaning, its true value, can be assayed. The difficulty which remains is one of grasping general propositions of social science without getting lost in ambiguities and conflicts within each of the social science disciplines themselves, and without losing sight of the problems which we are ourselves most concerned with. There is the problem of individual efficiency in ranging over the literature, and the problem of boundaries. They are problems that each man must answer for himself according to his needs, his interests and his rigor. Equally they are problems which seem more formidable at first glance than they really are.

Unless a question is made theoretically pertinent to a larger body of theory, a research enterprise remains at the levels of satisfying idle curiosity, or simple acceptance of disciplinary tradition. Usually of course some implicit notions of significance are built into the question raised .Whether the question is cabinet stability in France, or voting behavior in a rural American county, "significance" lies in much more than a more certain knowledge of the data pertinent to such questions. It lies in the abstraction of generalizable patterns about human propensities within certain types of institutional settings. "It is always the search for, and the exposition of, typical and recurring elements *within the unique course of the world* that is the subject of science."[5]

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[5] See Von Mises, Richard, *Positivism, A Study in Human Understanding* (Cambridge, 1951), p. 8. The extremely stimulating introduction of this work nicely covers some of the problems current in political science today when the issues of science, method, and technique are raised as a legitimate course for the political scientist to pursue. In the same work there is a very clearly written discussion of the language not only in interdisciplinary work, but as a barrier to logical analysis, and the need for specialized categories and concepts for technical purposes.

The only way in which questions can be phrased in terms of their maximum significance is to articulate the body of research theory to which the problem is relevant. If a problem is phrased concerning, say, the rise of the Falangist movement in Spain, for example, what ranges of theory do we typically provide? One political scientist might answer, "theories of revolution." Another might say that it involves "theories" of fascism, referring to doctrinal differences between different expressions of fascism. Another may "generalize" the material to "theories" of authoritarianism, while still another political scientist might argue that in truth the Falangist movement in Spain was the product of a peculiar and unique set of circumstances in history and the relative value of generalization is small, subject to all the ills of analogical thinking. This is scarcely an overstatement of the case. Not only do we have different things in mind when we deal with "theory," but we are concerned with phenomena as having "obvious" descriptive boundaries which are often reified by many observers as they begin to analyze their materials.

Much of what seems to be a maze of jargon in social science is a direct result of the effort to cut through so called common sense terms which, upon intensive probing, prove themselves to be of limited usefulness. Concepts of "class" and "ideology" or other terms characteristic of post-Marxian-type analyses, for example, while very productive in general sociological work, have had to be sharpened by categories having more immediate operational value, *e.g.*, status, role, factors of perception, normative structures in typologies of systems, etc. Indeed much of what remains the most sophisticated theory in political science today uses nineteenth century constructs of action developed by the Marxians, their commentators and glossators up until the end of the Second World War,[6] while others in other disciplines have gone far beyond this. Many of the most useful constructs in present day social science came from pushing on from the specific assumptions and models implicit in Marxian and post-Marxian hypotheses[7]—a task in which political science has been notably weak, Bentleyan pressure group analysis notwithstanding.

We are rapidly pushing beyond the sheer manipulation of common sense, except insofar as common sense is constantly being modified by the absorption and useful vulgarization of more rarefied knowledge. Common sense knowledge today is substantially different from the common sense knowledge of yesterday in many crucial ways. This is particularly noticeable in the physical science world and to a lesser extent in the world of "social engineering" where a kind of trickle-down theory of scientific capital applies in regard to such items as slum clearance, race relations, industrial efficiency of the working force, etc. This has been least true, however, in the world of politics where the "hero-villain" approach to analysis has not yet died out, and we are sometimes so concerned with establishing the superiority of one kind of system over another, that some of us have dubbed our "science," "the authoritative allocation of values" (to misquote Easton purposely).

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[6] See David Easton's general thesis that properly speaking there is no political theory today, *The Political System* (New York, 1953), *passim.*

[7] See Merton's paradigm of functional analysis and Marxian analysis in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1949), Chapter 1.

Interestingly enough, the development of modern political theory has been affected by those trained in Germany in the more classical omnibus pattern of philosophy and historical jurisprudence, the American parallels for which are found not in political science, but in sociology. In the British and American traditions of political science the Barkers and Laskis are far more brilliant commentators and publicists than theory builders.[8]

How do we phrase questions in a manner maximizing their scientific utility, and their cumulative value? To answer such a question one must first point up some of the things we see or have in mind when we ask a question. Second, we need to articulate "significance." Third, we must relate the question to other questions. Finally we need to develop useful research schemes in order to gather valid data.

III

It may well be asked whether or not the effect of "rephrasing" political science questions for their maximum theoretic implications is not simply a kind of reductionism, to return to a point raised earlier, *i.e.*, that political science is reducible to action or behavior generally, and action is reducible to physiological processes. With such reductionism little is left but the physiologist, and perhaps the psychologist. Certainly political science as we know it would disappear. Partly of course, this depends upon how we consider political science itself, the kind of boundaries we put upon it. Partly, too, in its most extreme form, the reductionist argument is misleading because the reductionism is phrased in terms of disciplines rather than theory. The matter is certainly not a question of political scientists becoming physiologists. Parsons clearly makes this distinction when discussing action theory:

> "actions, and the properties of aggregates and systems of action, are thus not properties of the organisms in the physiological sense, but are properties on the behavioral level of *relations between* one or more organisms and objects in the situation. The relation to objects which are not part of the organisms can *never* be omitted from an action-theory problem, whereas for a great many physiological problems it can be entirely omitted, though of course the physiological state of any organism is dependent on processes at the action level."[9]

"Reductionism," properly considered, represents the exhaustion of relevant factors of explanation at each analytical level of the phenomenon under consideration. Obviously processes of politics cannot be explained solely in terms of physiological theory. But equally, problems of politics insofar as they have crucial interaction processes as their foundation can rely on the data and findings of those studying other aspects of social interaction or behavior. This is not to say that theory regarding social interaction is sufficient to analyze political phenomena. It is to say that if political analysis is to reach a high state of theoretical sophistication it must have a specialized set of assumptions and theories which build on the more general.

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[8] For a good view of Barker's efforts at positive theory construction one need only look at his *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (London, 1953), where "out of his later years" he begins to deal in systematic analytical fashion with the materials he had previously worked in brilliant intuitive fashion. The volume is not only a failure as theory construction, but points up how far he has strayed from the tradition of Maitland, or for that matter, Gierke.

[9] Parsons, Talcott, "Some Highlights of the General Theory of Action," unpublished paper presented at the Northwestern University Conference on Analytic Systems, Spring, 1955, p. 3.

It is essential to draw up fundamental behavioral propositions which can tell us about interaction and learning processes which may appear in many specific or concrete groupings, like a Congress, an administrative agency, a labor union, etc. The groupings are identified by the problems one may wish to examine. The problem will help determine the range and degree of general theory to be used in examination, the choices to be made in this regard, and the specialized and further considerations which emerge from research findings about this problem.

In this connection much discussion can be simplified by examining models used in research and theory in a variety of disciplines. Behavioral models are of two general sorts. The first can be called a *nuclear* model containing predicating assumptions. As such it is a way of expressing theory in highly abstracted form since it sets up crucial patterns of interrelationships between variables. The second form of behavior model can be called the *experimental* model. Here the nuclear model or several nuclear models are brought together into a research design for purposes of identifying and relating new materials and for holding some factors constant and measuring changes in others. These can be of various kinds. For example, one type of experimental model, an equilibrium model, is being used in connection with several different kinds of disciplines, economics, psychology, etc., in which input-output analysis is being done. It must be pointed out that the two types of models discussed here are not concretely separable but rather deal with aspects of the same thing. The classic S-R model in psychology is both a nuclear model from a theoretical point of view and an experimental model from an operational point of view.

Not only can predominantly nuclear models and predominantly experimental models provide coherence and intelligibility in what have in political science been somewhat murky realms of intuitive speculation. They can as well organize more clearly the kinds of behavioral assumptions and implicit experimentation or hypothesizing that we are making all the time. No one studying politics today can ignore, for example, the communications aspects of pressure groups, legislative bodies, administrative units, etc., both as a guide to understanding how they achieve their work product, and their relation to authority or power, the making of law, etc. Yet if we have certain propositions tested under varying conditions which can be applied to the study of the communications aspect of such groupings, we will have a more fruitful base for analysis. If we know that a communication is more likely to occur between two persons if their orientations to the object of communication differ in some respect than if they do not, and if we also know that following communication between A and B in regard to X, A's knowledge and B's knowledge will have greater similarity, we can ask some pertinent questions about consensus, about political beliefs, and about the political activities of individuals in "political" groupings. If these propositions are true, for example, does it follow that the greater the difference in orientation toward an object of communication the greater the likelihood of communication? Does it also follow that with continuing communication, if there is greater similarity in the knowledge held by the communicators, communication in fact will fall off, other things being equal? Here we would run into the use of the nuclear model and its predicating assumptions. Could we say that the probabilities of communication of a given object vary jointly with the discrepancy in orientation among the potential communicators and with the strength of positive attraction among them? Indeed if our experimental model consisted of multiple ABX systems phrased in equilibrium terms, we might find that our research problem could deal with data derived from "summit" conferences, assuming for the moment that such data were available. The experimental model might take the form of multiple ABX systems set up in equilibrium terms. The nuclear model might be a form of the S–R model.

Experimental models are immediately useful in the development of methodologies of social science; they can provide a way in which order and control can be brought into the analysis of empirical political problems. If we assume, for example, that our S–R model as a nuclear model has relevance to basic factors in general behavior theory, particularly in learning, it is conceivable that it could form part of an operational model for the analysis of basic factors in political behavior. Certainly operational models for the analysis of groups which are involved in political processes could be developed. Insofar as government activity is small group or organizational activity, models which deal with variables crucial to any governmental activity, *e.g.*, problem solving variables, emotional and leadership variables, allow us to ask several kinds of questions. First, we can ask questions about political groupings as groupings, that is, the specific behavioral aspects of governmental organizations in terms of general small-group variables. Secondly, we can ask what are the special factors that arise in the nature of political tasks which governmental groups are created to handle. Out of the latter approach it is possible to build up a range of empirically verified propositions to add to the fund of knowledge about specialized political activities.

The utility of the various theoretical approaches in the building of systematic theory in political science is not that they substitute a more rarefied set of theories for those that we already have, but rather that they help to bring back to political science both respectability and purpose in the general attempts of social scientists to solve problems in the human sphere. Problems of government as such demand both general statements utilizing propositions pertaining to those characteristics of politics which arise from the fact that governmental structures are social organizations in which human personalities interact, have peculiar systems of roles which are institutionalized by members of a given society, and have special problems which give rise to statements unique to the "political" aspects of these structures. Where political scientists have most to offer and as yet have been relatively hesitant about coming forward, is in the analysis of authority (coordination and communication), the specialized attributes of a political system (the patterned power relationships in a social system), and related problems.

In putting forward this view, however, we do not disparage the discipline of political science as compared with other disciplines. The plea here is simply for more training of the political scientist in research theory. The specialists' knowledge he will get when dealing with a range of data and problems, *i.e.*, those pertinent to politics. Political scientists on the whole are not adequately equipped for behavioral studies partly because inherited course titles have become a substitute for analytical categories. A "typical" political science curriculum which has a variety of subject and areal *foci* tends to give a wealth of facts, but only the most primitive means for discussing those facts. It does not provide training in research theory and experimental design.

No one discipline or branch of science will provide complete answers to any of the problems to which political scientists have customarily addressed themselves. But, more and more, politics as a part of general behavior is becoming recognized, just as economists have more and more recognized the importance of non-economic factors in economics. The difference is that economists have a more manageable universe in which to work than do political scientists, and as well, have a series of currently useful systematic theories of their own on which to build, as on the whole we do not. This makes it all the more crucial that we organize our theoretical assets before we discard what we have, while not overlooking our theoretical liabilities. Indeed in many cases we have denied the place of what might be deemed the "scientific spirit" in favor of the pulpit and the sacrament. Surely we do not have to deny the one in order to accept the other.

If we attempt to absorb the scientific lore of other disciplines, will we simply become amateurs in other areas on which professional knowledge will be based? This issue has two sides. On the one hand we can ask whether we do not do this anyway, except that we are clumsy amateurs and not knowledgeable in the rules of the game. On the other hand we can be more than amateurs. This latter depends on knowing what general theory consists of, how to specialize conceptually both for the purpose of analysis and for organizing concepts. It does demand a difficult reading schedule. Too often perhaps it means that political scientists have to re-orient their thinking. This is difficult, but we are not making a plea here for pushing the field in an uncertain direction, rather merely for certain kinds of specialists to come forward in the field of politics who are willing to absorb a different kind of knowledge, and to put that knowledge to the tests which political scientists well know how to administer.

Aside from the value in theoretical development, research work, and cumulative results which are implicit in the use of behavioral theory in political science as we have used the term, one can perhaps put forward an assumption which helps reaffirm the significance of political science both as a moral and an experimental discipline. There has never yet been heard a definition of political science, or politics, or the place of political science or politics in the scheme of social affairs, which seemed to meet with general satisfaction. We feel vaguely dissatisfied with attempts to define away subtle areas of our discourse and knowledge. We often feel that the scope of our work is greater than any definition would allow, or that a definition gets us nowhere since we pay no attention to it anyway. Confusion in definitions helps to evade rather crucial issues in political science. While we may define politics by what it "does," the fact is that it intervenes in all major aspects of social life, and organization. The assumption offered here is that what sets off politics, and makes some people regard politics as both coterminous with society and coterminous with moral and ethical imperatives, is the assumption that government as a particular group of organizations and agencies at its most general level is responsible for seeing that at least the minimal conditions for the perpetuation of a society are in fact achieved. In analytical terms these conditions must be abstracted from a wide range of "sociological" and "psychological" phenomena which go on in any functioning society.

If this latter assumption is correct, then one is constantly, in political science, dealing with a discipline which has for theoretical boundaries any functioning system of which it is a part, and all theories relevant to how that system functions have possible relevance to an understanding of politics, depending upon the enquiry. Equally, if one of the major concerns of a functioning system is the empirical framework under which it will in fact function, then social improvement is political morality, and ethics cannot be banned from the sphere of the political scientists.

The political scientist can fall back on his lore and go through the motions to which he has become habituated through years of practice; or he can begin to reorganize the chaos which appears as soon as he begins to ask fundamental questions. We need rather more suitable frames of empirical theory, avoiding the pitfalls of omnibus knowledge on the one hand, and preaching on the other, without evading our responsibilities as citizens in a moral order and as social scientists.

IV

The first two trends of which we spoke represent enormous problem areas in political science today. And if the two "schools" which we have mentioned are to handle the tasks set for them, then we have several major priorities to establish in political science. It is easy enough to criticize but it is not so easy to formalize the canons of criticism into standards of meritorious work.[10]

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[10] One of the ways of doing this is of course to teach our students what some of the more basic criteria of science are, as we indicated earlier. The application of Mill's canons are by no means beneath our dignity or our art. Principles of logic are as much a part of the technique of the social sciences as they are of the physical sciences, and as such should be basic training for any political scientist worthy of his salt. In the days when politics

Any consciousness of the application of science immediately brings up the place, role, and definition of theory which is basic to any scientific enquiry. This, our second tendency, is looming large once again in the minds of those concerned with careful enquiry.

Theories are arbitrary *qua* theory unless they are related to sets of empirical data in which statements are put in the form of hypotheses with general rules for verification being carried out. A considerable amount of work in other disciplines has gone into the creation of hypotheses and the surrounding problems of significance. Political scientists have done this in a few areas, particularly voting behavior, where statistical verification is possible, but the accent on theory itself has been weak. The result has been little increase in a fund of general theoretical statements of even limited applicability. Another consequence has been a propensity to limit the scope of analysis to problems which help to accumulate narrow propositions of a rather *ad hoc* nature, difficult to fit together into a wider and more significant analytical scheme. This certainly has been one of the more valid criticisms of behavioral theory. Comparative analysis is even worse, generally speaking. Descriptive categories have been used for comparative purposes. Very few analytical categories are developed into a theoretical system—except on the intuitive level where the sins are at the other extreme, *i.e.*, in the lack of effective control and verification on an empirical basis.[11]

Much of what has been termed the study of political process turns out to be very difficult to work with as well. The "political process" defies careful pinning down. Its empirical usefulness is limited and it is not difficult to see why many of those who rather self-consciously work in the area of "political process" are simply using rather well known structural categories such as communications, elites, etc., based again on synthetic rather than analytical terms, and have not given us an advance in theory which was their promise some years ago. If one is going to study process he must study system, and this has not been done adequately.[12]

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was a small part of the large omnibus of social philosophy, mathematics and logic were as fundamental to humanist education as to the scientific, and the false dichotomy of modern times had not then yet been made. More than ever we need now to be familiar with those basic enquiries which make up scientific enquiry. Knowledge must be outspoken in its rules as well as in its information.

[11] See Macridis, R., *The Study of Comparative Government*, Doubleday Short Studies (New York, 1955), Chapter 2.

[12] It is interesting to note that others wrestling with similar epistemological problems come face to face with some of the same kinds of requirements in widely differing areas of social thought. A Danish linguist working towards systematic theory in an entirely different fashion voices a remark as applicable to our own science as to his when, speaking of theory, he says, "*A priori* it would seem to be a generally valid thesis that for every *process* there is a corresponding *system*, by which the process can be analyzed and described by means of a limited number of premises. It must be assumed that any process can be analyzed into a limited number of elements that constantly recur in various combinations. Then, on the basis of this analysis, it should be possible to order these elements into classes according to their possibilities of combination. And it should be further

Theory and method should be guides to action and not dogma. We need at the outset control methods and experiments out of which the attempts to produce useful statements have been made; statements which stimulate thought and work in many differing social science disciplines.

Our job as political scientists is perhaps the most complex of all the social sciences in some ways, dealing as we do with a special aspect of the totality of social activity and interpersonal behavior. All the more striking, therefore, is our need for approaching effective control of our material, and the development of theory through the application of scientific canons characteristic of all the disciplines. Insofar as our work deals with a specialized branch of human activity, we need to know some of the fundamentals of human behavior, "the political." The task for political science in that sense is a very heavy one because we become specialists who need to have a powerful armory of analytical tools partly derived by others as our work partakes of the general, and that developed by our own "specialists" as our work partakes of the particular.

We need then a greater clarification of the epistemological foundations of science. Too few political scientists get specific training in theory construction, work on science *qua* science, and at the same time keep contact with empirical problems which are manipulable by scientific means. We need, too, a greater appreciation of the difference between analytical theory and the mere creation of synthetic categories which simply add jargon rather than effective tools for greater understanding. We need a picture of other theories in social science relevant to our own basic assumptions as analysts of a segment of social behavior, which is impossible to obtain without an understanding of what theory is and how it works in relation to problems, and how it can be generalized to other areas.

The immediate responsibility of our profession to the future generation of political scientists who are coming to us for training makes these issues more than merely academic.[13]

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possible to set up a general and exhaustive calculus of the possible combinations. A history so established should rise above the level of mere primitive description to that of a systematic, exact, and generalizing science, in the theory of which all events (possible combinations of elements) are foreseen and the conditions for their realization established." He goes on to remark about the humanities, what is equally applicable to political science, "It seems incontestable that, so long as the humanities have not tested this thesis as a working hypothesis, they have neglected their most important task, that of seeking to establish the humanistic studies as a science." Hjelmslev, Louis, "Prolegomena to a Theory of Language," p. 5. Translated by Francis J. Whitfield, in *Supplement to International Journal of American Linguistics*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Indiana Univ. Publications in Anthropology and Linguistics, Memoir 7 (Jan. 1953).

[13] This paper was stimulated by the Conference on Analytical Systems held at Northwestern University in the Spring of 1955. My thanks are due to my colleagues at Northwestern for helpful criticism and stimulation. I wish particularly to acknowledge the help of Heinz Eulau, Antioch College, David Easton, The University of Chicago, Harold Sprout, Princeton University, and Richard C. Snyder and Roland Young of Northwestern University for reading and commenting on the manuscript. Their help is no token of their responsibility.

COMMENT ON SMITH AND APTER:
OR,
WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE GREAT ISSUES?

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> "I don't think it would have all got me quite so down if just once in a while—just *once* in a while—there was at least some polite little per*func*tory implication that knowledge *should* lead to *wisdom*, and that if it *doesn't*, it's just a disgusting waste of time. But there never is! You never even hear any *hints* dropped on a campus that wisdom is *supposed* to be the *goal* of knowledge. You hardly ever even hear the word 'wisdom' mentioned! Do you want to hear something funny? In almost four years of college—and this is the absolute *truth*—in almost four years of college, the only time I can remember ever even *hearing* the expression 'wise man' being used was in my freshman year, in Political Science! And you know how it was used? It was used in reference to some nice old poopy elder statesman who'd made a fortune in the stock market and then gone to Washington to be an advisor to President Roosevelt. *Hon*estly, now! Four years of college, almost! I'm not saying that happens to *ev*erybody, but I just get so *upset* when I think about it I could die!"—Comment by Miss Franny Glass in "Zooey," a story by J. D. Salinger in *The New Yorker*, May 4, 1957.

We do not know what college Miss Franny Glass is attending, or who teaches the freshman Political Science course, or the identity of the "nice old poopy elder statesman" (although we can guess). But her comment is well taken, and not merely in reference to political science, or the college curriculum at large. The relationship between "knowledge" and "wisdom" has become an issue at all levels of education, whether in the form of the learning-*vs.*-adjustment debate carried on in primary and secondary school circles, or in the form of the generalization-*vs.*-specialization controversy which is currently occupying college and university educators. From kindergarten through the Ph.D. degree American education is once again uncertain of its objectives and methods, and as the preceding articles demonstrate, the "great debate" over what kind of "knowledge" leads to what kind of "wisdom" has its forms and varieties within political science, as elsewhere.

The positions taken by Smith and Apter with reference to the nature of our discipline are essentially opposed, although they are not mutually exclusive. Smith's argument is basically a lengthy objection to developments in political science which Apter regards as significant and necessary. Holding that political science is an "idiographic" science, Smith urges that the proper concern of the discipline is "with unique, more or less extended temporal events, seeking to represent them fully and exhaustively rather than abstractly." In this conception, which is by no means isolated or unique in the field, political science deals with concrete and observable phenomena, often lacks sharply defined criteria of confirmation or disconfirmation for its propositions, and proceeds as much by reflection, insight, and intuition, as by empirical investigation. Smith is especially critical of efforts to transform political science into a behavioral science, concerned with general laws and moving in the direction of a generalized theory. The political scientist, he maintains, needs "*less* and not *more* general information . . . A generalized theory . . . would give too distant and too different a view of the reality that the political scientist wants to study and reconstruct."

For Apter, on the other hand, not merely political science but higher education in general, if it "means anything at all, must deal with the manipulation of abstractions and generalizations in relation to problems posed." Although Apter denies that he is pleading for the "integration of concepts into a single 'social science,' " he is clearly much more sympathetic to a "units of analysis" approach that cuts across disciplines than to an institutional approach that draws upon the discrete and specialized knowledge of one discipline. The "first requirement" of current political science, he insists, "is to attempt an overview of some of the different ways those in other specialized fields attempt to categorize action data," both procedurally and theoretically, *i.e.*, to discover what "units of analysis" have been developed in other disciplines. Once this has been accomplished, he implies, we may proceed to develop a "genuine body of research theory" based upon common, or at least complementary, "units of analysis" in the social sciences. Moreover—and this is the point, perhaps, at which Smith and Apter are farthest apart—such a "body of research theory" would be functional for the direction of political science research. Research *not* "theoretically pertinent to a larger body of theory," Apter insists, " . . . remains at the levels of satisfying idle curiosity, or simple acceptance of disciplinary tradition."

Since I am unable to agree totally with Smith or Apter, I shall not participate in this debate as a "seconding" speaker on either side; indeed, I would caution others against taking positions for or against the approaches presented. To begin with, there is a little too much artificial dichotomy, along the lines of either/or, in both articles. It is difficult to know what place, if any, concept formation, model building, language refinement, etc., have in Smith's version of political science, and it is equally difficult to know what place, if any, philosophy, description, reflection, etc., have in Apter's conception of the discipline. In my view, as I shall try to demonstrate, the two approaches are complementary rather than exclusive, and the essential question is not which approach should be emphasized, but to what purposes *both* approaches should be put.

Taking Smith's article first, he is, apparently, more sensitive than Apter to the "knowledge for what?" issue, but he discusses it with reference to research in political theory rather than in the broader context of disciplinary focus. For the most part, although he is critical of the political theorist's "failure to revise the list of topics," his major criticism is reserved for attempts to make scientific, or allegedly scientific what was formerly mere observation, intuition, philosophy and speculation, reflection, guess-work and hunch. He would have us work in the tradition of the great political philosophers (*moral* philosophers, perhaps, would be closer, because Hobbes, after all, was something of a behaviorist), and he is anxious that political science, in its quest for method, shall not become, in the language of Bentham which he quotes, "the art of being methodically ignorant of what everybody knows." I think he intends his remark with reference to political philosophy to have a broader application. "If well done," Smith argues, "a political philosophy has much in common with a thoughtful novel." Smith is basically maintaining that a well developed political *science* "has much in common with a thoughtful novel."

Of course it does! But, well done, it also has much in common with *all* the sciences and arts that attempt to understand and enrich the human experience. Smith proceeds as if the political scientist had to choose *between* science and philosophy, Einstein and Dewey, David Easton and David Hume. It is a little like asking whether, to "get the feel" of infantry combat in World War II, one should read Stouffer's voluminous data study,[1] *or* one of the war novels.[2] To acquire something of the flavor of combat experience, without actually having been in combat, one would be well advised to read both.

I would not deny that there is a good deal of sterility, abstruse irrelevance, and empty parroting of scientific method in many so-called applications of behavioral science to political science. Some of our colleagues appear to be obsessed with analogism and parallelism; they apparently feel that a matching-up of the "laws" of political science with the "laws" of other sciences is a significant end in itself. The theorists in a number of fields, piling induction upon induction, have long since left the raw data behind—or began by neglecting data altogether. In still other fields, the data stand mountain-high, with fresh increments arriving quarterly (when the Journals appear), alongside molehills of generalization and theory. The results of various model-building activities are models that are ever more simplified and elementary, rather than ever more refined and complex, as is the case with model-building efforts in some of the other sciences. Overall, the behavioral and methodological innovations lack integration and correlation: the behavioral approach in one area makes limited contact, or no contact at all, with the behavioral approach in another, and there is not even agreement on what may be termed the methodology of methodological research. Finally, the whole effort toward behaviorism, system-building, codification, conceptual frameworks and methodology, is so cluttered with jargon that relatively few political scientists on the outside know what is going on. Gertrude Stein once observed that "remarks are not literature," and Smith's article serves as a useful reminder that definitions, concepts, formulae and equations are not the *whole* of political science.

But he pushes his argument much too far. His basic assumption is that a scientific approach cannot "help us to decide how we are to live," and this assumption seems to me wrong on a number of grounds. The very examples he cites of "the specific problem and particular institution" which form the "subject matter of politics" are especially susceptible to approaches which he rejects, Would not a general theory of constitutions be of use in framing or evaluating "a constitution for post-war Germany?" Can "the present goals of Soviet foreign policy" be adequately studied without a conceptual framework for the study of foreign policy in general?[3] Is it certain that new methodological approaches cannot be fruitfully applied to investigation of "the legislative process in Congress?"[4] Do not proposals for "reform of a city or state government" base themselves upon normative and descriptive democratic theories, and do they not also call for some precision in defining terms like "power," "corruption," "efficiency," and "representation?" Surely the analysis of such problems and institutions requires guidance from both political *theory* and political *science*.[5]

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[1] Samuel A. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier: Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (Princeton, 1949–50).

[2] Say, Norman Mailer, *The Naked and the Dead* (New York, 1948).

I would also argue that Smith confuses the meaning of "reflection" and "investigation"—or perhaps the major difficulty is that he does not choose his qualifiers carefully enough. He tells us, for example, (my italics throughout) that "the idiographic sciences *often* lack sharply defined criteria of confirmation . . . must *necessarily* emphasize the particular qualitative shadings. . . . In *many* instances, 'proof' can be little more than an effort to establish a close or high degree of 'fit'. . . . *Any reflective* study of the legislative process would afford a good illustration of this thesis." In this comment we go back and forth between various degrees of generality, from "necessarily" to "often" to "many" and, finally, to "any." But at the end it is "*any reflective* study," so that, in effect, Smith's preceding remarks are made to relate not to political science as, allegedly, an idiographic science, but to "reflective" studies. Hardly anyone would question his thesis that "reflective" studies, *by definition*, "often lack sharply defined criteria of confirmation. . . . "

But *empirically oriented* studies are a different matter. Such studies, *by definition*, seek and attempt to utilize "sharply defined criteria of confirmation. . . . " If competently done their initial hypotheses are carefully constructed, their methods available for inspection, and their conclusions stated in such a form as to generate propositions that can be tested in further research. Empirically oriented investigation, in a word, makes an effort to *prove* something, not by introspection or incantation, but by the comprehensive analysis of relevant data.

The whole of Smith's argument turns on his assumption, which I do not share, that political science is and must inevitably be an idiographic science, concerned with unique phenomena that obey no exact regularities. He does not produce concrete evidence for this view, but proceeds mainly through assertions which are little supported by past and current political science research. His references to substantive studies, on those rare occasions when he mentions them, seem to me to be inadequate and misleading. For instance, I do not find "a statement such as 'The national parties are collections of state and local machines,' " to be "a homely example" of "discovery by reflection . . . not 'in the facts', but . . . the result of perspective, insight, and grasp." The "discovery" referred to has emerged from painstaking examination of the national parties, on the one hand, and the state and local parties, on the other.[6] To be sure, reflection, perspective and the rest have played a role in the major studies of political parties, but that does not mean that our knowledge of parties is analogous to "the kind of discoveries reported in the literature of psychoanalysis, in the novel, or in the imaginative treatment of social themes." Indeed, if we are to gain more accurate knowledge about political parties, we must proceed further not toward fiction, but toward factual research.

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[3] An attempt to develop such a framework for study of the whole area of international politics is contained in Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Foreign Policy Analysis Project, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., 1954). See also Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1954).

[4] For example, the measurement of influence in James G. March, Robert A. Dahl, and David Nasatir, "Influence Ranking in the United States Senate," paper read at the American Political Science Association Meeting in Washington, D. C., September 6–8, 1956; game theory in R. Duncan Luce and Arnold A. Rogow, "A Game Theoretic Analysis of Congressional Power Distributions for a Stable Two-Party System," *Behavioral Science*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (April, 1956).

[5] This appears to be the point of view expressed in Stephen K. Bailey *et al.*, *Research Frontiers in Politics and Government* (Brookings Lectures, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1955).

But I hasten to add, in shifting to Apter's article, *not only* research that relates to a body of theory. I am totally unable to agree with Apter's flat statement, which I find extraordinary, that research unrelated to theory constitutes merely "idle curiosity, or simple acceptance of disciplinary tradition." Hardly anyone would deny that theory-related research is of first importance in a number of areas, especially those which have well developed theoretical structures, but the theory-research relationship is not, and cannot be, the sole test of research significance or relevance. There are many fields, obviously, where the major concern of research is to discover 'who gets what, when, how?', or to frame policy recommendations, or to promote popular enlightenment, and these types of research are no less significant than those which relate to theory construction. It is also worth commenting that while existing theory can serve to illuminate one's intellectual efforts, it can also serve to confine one's research interests. The history of physics, in particular, is full of examples of important discoveries that disregarded, or proceeded in ignorance of, accepted theories, and even "laws." Indeed, Apter's stigmatization of non-theory-related research as "idle curiosity" is rather ironic, to choose the kindest term, considering the role of "idle curiosity" in the development of physical science from Newton to the present.[7]

[6] A recent example of such work is V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York, 1956). See also David B. Truman, "The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, Vol. 50, (December, 1956), pp. 1023–1045.

[7] It is equally curious to read, with reference to the allegedly undeveloped theoretical state of the discipline, that college students are " 'voting with their feet.' The best students in the social sciences today tend not to go into political science, but into those disciplines where a genuine body of research theory is emerging." If this statement is intended to imply that the "best students" (by what standard or measurement?) go into other disciplines *because* political science lacks a genuine body of research theory, I know of no evidence to support it.

I must also take issue with Apter's attempt to compare studies of "the political system" with studies of "the political process," to the detriment of the latter. As he defines the approach of anthropologists and social psychologists to "the political system," I am unable to see that it differs much from current political science approaches to "the political process." That is, "the political process" may also be "regarded as the most crucial set of institutional structures for the performance of control functions . . . expression of generalized wants . . . ," and "the political system," like "the political process," often "defies careful pinning down . . . (and bases itself) on synthetic rather than analytical terms." To say that "If one is going to study process he must study system" is not to say very much, unless one is prepared to specify the system variables to be studied. It is in this area, of course, that the anthropological "political system" studies have an enormous advantage, because, for the most part, the societies studied are far less complex than our own. The Bantu and Fort Jameson Ngoni peoples, to whom Apter refers, may have developed "political systems," but it would be fatuous to insist that the variables involved are at the same level of complexity as the variables present in Western "political systems." Indeed, too much emphasis on "the search for, and the exposition of, typical and recurring elements *within the unique course of the world*" can lead to neglect of the atypical and non-recurring elements that often comprise the crucial differences between systems.

Similarly, too much insistence on a "units of analysis" approach can lead us not to greater analytical skill, but to greater analytical obfuscation. The key question, of course, is the kind and variety of "units of analysis" to be employed in a given study, but as Apter demonstrates, it is possible to substitute for a clumsy meat-ax approach knives so sophisticated as to lack both handles and cutting edges. Concepts of "class" and "ideology," he argues, " . . . while very productive in general sociological work, have had to be sharpened by categories having more immediate operational value, *e.g.* status, role, factors of perception, normative structures in typologies of systems, etc." Since this point follows hard on his discussion of some typical analytical approaches to the Spanish Falangist movement, I presume he believes that *only* a status, role, etc. analysis can be usefully applied to that movement. If so, he is wrong, in my view, not merely in terms of Spanish history, but in terms of the origin and development of Fascism. It is doubtful, in fact, whether any important political system can be understood without reference to its class structure and ideology, which is, after all, the major reason why such terms have been "operational" in political analysis for more than 2,000 years. Moreover, if class and ideology are *real*, in the sense that they mean *real* things to *real* men, they are "operational" by definition, however difficult it may be to define them, measure them, locate their indicators, or specify their components.

The complexity of the *real* world, in other words, should not lead us to avoid it, or to follow the road of theoretical precision or methodological refinement to a palpable, if fortuitous, avoidance. Apter's and Smith's concern with the interior state of the discipline, with special reference to political theory, is legitimate, but neither of them, it seems to me, is sufficiently concerned with the major issue facing political science: its relationship to the world at large. The crucial question, confronting the discipline, I would argue, is not whether to be Apterian or Smithian, behavioral or institutional, methodological or philosophical, but whether to be relevant or irrelevant to the problems confronting America and the world. The issue in its broadest terms is the issue of what is to be done with *all* of the approaches which presently constitute the scope of the discipline.

I do not mean that political scientists totally lack interest in the problems which other people find crucial, decisive, and controversial, but that such interests, like interests in the world of literature, drama, and the arts, are of the nature of after-five-o'clock interests. They appear to have little to do with shaping the central concerns of the profession, and they intrude less and less on professional work. Reflections on the state of the world or nation, the analysis of broad political, economic, and social developments, the drafting of policy alternatives and recommendations—these concerns seem to have given way to an unrelated emphasis on historicism, scholasticism, and methodology.

The shift of professional focus in recent years is not peculiar to political science, but the literature of the profession as compared with the literature of the other social sciences supports the impression that the shift in political science is more sharply marked than elsewhere. For example, the most comprehensive studies of voting behavior, including the implications of such behavior for democratic theory, have been the work not of political scientists but of sociologists;[8] indeed, analyses of national and community power structures,[9] trade union behavior,[10] and the relationship between class and politics,[11] have been contributed almost exclusively by sociologists and social psychologists. The "organizational revolution,"[12] the nature and consequences of suburbanization,[13] and public opinion,[14] have largely been studied, in recent years, by economists, psychologists, sociologists—and journalists. The world of science and technology has been generally neglected by political scientists; the *political and* social implications of science research have been discussed almost entirely by the scientists themselves.[15] In this context, it seems to me suggestive that the two most acclaimed books written by political scientists during the past year were biographies.

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[8] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944); Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago, 1954); Seymour Martin Lipset, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Allen H. Barton, and Juan Linz, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1954).

[9] Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers* (Chapel Hill, 1953); C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, 1956).

[10] Arthur Kornhauser, Harold L. Sheppard, and Albert J. Mayer, *When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers* (New York, 1956); Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, *Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956).

[11] Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton, 1949); C. Wright Mills, *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (New York, 1951).

[12] Kenneth Boulding, *The Organizational Revolution* (New York, 1953); William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York, 1956).

[13] John R. Seeley, R. Alexander Sim, and Elizabeth W. Loosley, *Crestwood Heights: A Study of the Culture of Suburban Life* (New York, 1956); A. C. Spectorsky, *The Exurbanites* (Philadelphia and New York, 1955).

[14] As Bernard Berelson has pointed out, public opinion research was once a major interest in political science. He observes in a recent paper: "The Advisory Committee for the 1935 bibliography in this field (public opinion) was composed mainly of political

The current interests and role of the professional journals is best illustrated, perhaps, by recounting a discussion that took place recently among a group of political scientists. Those present agreed that the *most* interesting and suggestive articles on the American and world scenes were appearing in the following journals: *Commentary, The New Leader, Dissent, The New Statesman & Nation, The Economist, Partisan Review, Monthly Review, Encounter, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, and *The Nation*. I may have omitted the names of a few additional journals, but I am quite certain that no one mentioned the names of any of the professional journals in political science.

I have made no attempt to explore systematically all of the political science journals published during 1956, but a cursory examination of the leading journals is, perhaps, revealing. Very few published articles were concerned with current aspects and problems of international politics, the American economy and business enterprise, the mass media and communications, social structure, or the impact of science. Although it was an election year, there were relatively few articles on voting behavior or political parties as such. American foreign policy was discussed only on rare occasions. There were a number of articles on communism, on foreign governments and constitutions, and on state and local government. Political thought articles focused mainly on the history of political thought; there was little attention paid to contemporary developments. The centennial anniversary of Wilson's birth was duly commemorated, but not the centennial anniversary of Freud. The remaining articles were largely devoted to descriptions of the structure and function of various governmental institutions.

Let me add that I am not criticising either the editors of the journals or the authors of the articles referred to. I have no doubt that the editors make the

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scientists; the Advisory Committee for the 1953 *Reader* consisted mainly of sociologists. The earlier academic contributions came from political scientists like Gosnell, Lasswell, Odegard, Herring; the later contributions were more likely to come from psychologists like Newcomb, Cantril, and Hovland; or from sociologists like Lazarsfeld and Stouffer; or, an academic generation later from a combined psychologist-sociologist like Hyman." The principal reason for this shift, he suggests, (Professor Smith take note) is "the dominance of method. Political scientists were not trained in the techniques of social research, and, when the techniques became so important, the proprietors of the method took over intellectual ownership of the subject matter, too. And in some important respects, they changed it." Bernard Berelson, "The Study of Public Opinion," in Leonard D. White, ed., *The State of the Social Sciences: Papers presented at the 25th Anniversary of the Social Science Research Building, The University of Chicago, November 10–12, 1955* (Chicago, 1956).

[15] Harrison Brown, *The Challenge of Man's Future* (New York, 1954); Roderick Seidenberg, *Posthistoric Man* (Chapel Hill, 1950); Heinz Gartmann, *Man Unlimited: Technology's Challenge to Human Endurance* (New York, 1957).

best selection possible of submitted manuscripts, and that many of the articles published were important and useful. My intention is to suggest that *certain* vital research areas and topical questions are being neglected by the profession. And to avoid any imputation of "holier than thou," I want to make it clear that I, too, am guilty of this sort of neglect. Much of my own work has been historical, descriptive, technical, and formal.

The increasing tendency of the profession to engage in major research on minor or peripheral problems clearly stems from a variety of causes. The collapse in our time of radical and liberal solutions to social problems has left its mark on the profession no less than on the world. Scratch a sociologist, it has been said, and you are apt to find a socialist; scratch a political scientist, it was said some years ago, and you are apt to find a reformer—but that was some years ago. I put down my impression, for what it is worth, that the profession contains a very large number of disillusioned reformers, and that some of them are too disillusioned to elaborate anything but forms, structures, and methods, and that others are too disillusioned to elaborate anything in particular.

It is also true that the current political and social atmosphere does not encourage the forthright exploration of certain problems. I do not refer only, or even mainly, to McCarthyism and the loyalty investigations, but to the general climate of conservatism, opportunism, careerism, and "togetherness." The McCarthys are much less representative of our time than the Herman Wouks, the Norman Vincent Peales, and the man in the gray flannel suit. Like everyone else in the middle class, the political scientist is togethering it around the barbecue pit, and the barbecue pit is not the best vantage point from which to examine the major national problems and issues. The most tough-minded research seems to focus almost exclusively on the problems of other nations, and especially the USSR. We have had any number of studies asking the right questions about Russia and Communism: studies of the Politbureau, school system, culture and religion, secret police, class structure, propaganda, Communist Party strategy and tactics, etc. By contrast, we know little or nothing about our own power elite, class structure, and propaganda. Who in political science is currently doing tough-minded research on the National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, Committee for Economic Development, the new middle class, or the mass media?

A further factor of importance, reflected in Apter's article, is the feeling of many in the profession that political science is a discipline only by the grace of God, the indifference of the other sciences, and the tolerance of the humanities. The older established social sciences, not to mention the physical and biological sciences, could certainly disavow it as "science," if they elected to do so (and privately they often elect to do so),[16] and on the other hand the humanities could easily absorb several political science fields, at least in their present state.

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[16] And sometimes not so privately. Thus, in editing *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1957), Professor Mirra Komarovsky did not include any papers written by political scientists. The social sciences, as she defines them, consist of history, economics, and sociology.

It has already been intimated that sociology, or that branch of it known as political sociology, has made important inroads on all aspects of political behavior. Hence the emphasis on science and the development of a scientific method. Prestige if not survival itself, some argue, depends on our becoming less literary, less impressionistic, less political, and more scientific.

Unlike Smith, I have no quarrel with the emphasis on science; indeed, I believe that political science is on the verge of a revolution as significant as any in the whole history of the intellectual world. The awakening interest in mathematics and statistics, the beginning applications to political science fields of scale construction and analysis, the attempts to utilize the methodology of qualitative and quantitative measurement, the efforts to exploit the 'depth' interviewing techniques of psychology and psychoanalysis, the increasing impact of the behavioral sciences in general—these developments mark the long-delayed emergence of political science as science. And I am one of those who welcome these developments.

What I question are attempts to oppose "political" and "science," or tendencies to assume, implicitly or explicitly, that the *more* science, the *less* politics. If the profession is to make its greatest contribution, it cannot choose to say less about the world now in order to say more about it thirty years hence. It is a fair question whether the world has not been more decisively changed in the last thirty years than in the entire preceeding two thousand, and it is an equally fair question whether the next thirty years will not see changes as important, or even more important, than those of the last three decades. But the most important question concerns the nature of that world thirty years hence. If certain issues now facing us are resolved in one fashion, there is every likelihood that 1987 will not be much different from 1984. It is also possible that 1987 will anticipate Edward Bellamy's utopian world of the year 2,000. There is an outside chance—and I know some political scientists who would bet even money on this—that there will be no world at all in 1987, or at any rate none worth living in. But whether there is or is not a world thirty years away, it is far from clear, unless certain issues are faced *now*, that it will be a world hospitable to either politics or science.

The identification of such issues, to be sure, cannot lay claim to a *total* objectivity. One's view of the world will necessarily reflect one's position as a conservative or liberal Republican, a Marxian or democratic socialist, or whatever, and it is only fair to point out that my own specification of the "great issues" reflects a sensitivity to the social theories of—to mention the dead only—Marx, Freud, Mannheim, Max Weber, Veblen, Laski, and Schumpeter. But I would also deny that the identification of issues is a function of *total* subjectivity, on the ground that there is wide agreement on the nature of the values that democracy is designed to support. These values, as I view them, relate to the preservation and promotion of human dignity in a world setting, and the "great issues" are, accordingly, those issues which affect the values associated with human dignity.

Assuming, for example, that human dignity is more sustained by peace (cooperation and compromise) than by war (conflict and violence), there are "great issues" in practically every area of foreign policy, and especially the area from Suez to the China Sea; on a vertical plane, as Lasswell has recently demonstrated, there are "great issues" in the area that begins ten miles up and extends out into space. Not long ago it was reported in *The New York Times* that the population of China aged thirteen and below is already larger than the entire U. S. population. The implications of this for present and future foreign policy are of utmost importance, as are the policy implications of space travel. But the implications do not emerge automatically. In a real sense they have to be discovered, and the discovery must be incorporated in the framing of policies. Political science as a policy science should have something to contribute here, aside from investigating *how* the Chinese teenage population got that large, or *how* the guided missiles and earth satellites are dispatched into outer space from an administrative, decision-making point of view.

Some of our colleagues notwithstanding,[17] there are still a number of "great issues" with reference to the choice of values and goals, for the economic system. To begin with, the present capitalist system has not abolished poverty and want. There are still between twenty and thirty million people in the United States, according to government figures, who live on incomes at or near the bare subsistence level. The recent prosperity has had little effect on their lives, and *if* our goal is to help these people achieve a decent living standard, major economic changes and reforms, and not merely techniques, may be necessary.

There is also the "great issue" of the viability of the economic system, whether or not the Cold War continues. It is useful to recall that the New Deal did not terminate the depression: there were never fewer than seven million persons unemployed at any time during the 1930's. The War and Cold War spending have played a large part in the recent prosperity, although how large a part no one can say, because neither economists nor political scientists have done much research on the question. What are the implications of a sharp decrease in defense spending from the present level of around forty billion dollars per year? Again, they have to be discovered, and until they are we cannot frame effective policies for handling such a contingency.

But even at current levels of spending there are signs of trouble. The business journals report that 1957 may not be as good a year as 1956, and lately the trade journals have been discussing something they euphemistically call "planned obsolescence." "Planned obsolescence" is nothing more nor less than a deliberate effort to shorten the life expectancy of consumer durable goods, by lowering the quality of the materials used, or by accelerating the pace of fashion changes. In short, the aim is to increase the turnover and replacement of automobiles, appliances, TV sets, clothing, even housing. The results are already apparent in the clothing field. Fashions in men's clothing are changing faster than ever before, and I am advised by female informants that the average life of the nylon stocking is getting shorter, while the average life of the leg that wears it is getting longer. At least one of the "great issues" here, I would argue, is the morality of "planned obsolescence" in a world of scarcity and want. As Harrison Brown—a geochemist by profession—has recently demonstrated, the shortage of raw materials is already critical, and in the end may prove fatal for the maintenance of civilized standards of life. Does the economic system, even with defense support, need "planned obsolescence," and if so what are the implications of this for the economic system itself?

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[17] *E.g.* Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York, 1953), 3. "In economic organization and reform, the 'great issues' are no longer the great issues, if ever they were."

Some of the "great issues" arise in the general area of American culture and social life. The emergence of what David Riesman calls "other-direction," and its implication for traditional values;[18] the transition from the Protestant Ethic to the social or organizational ethic, as elaborated by Kenneth Boulding and William H. Whyte, Jr.;[19] the profound alienation of the commuter and suburbanite (to the status and role of which most Americans aspire), as chronicled by John R. Seeley *et al.*, A. C. Spectorsky, and others;[20] the probable impact on education of the enrolment expansion (should we build more universities or enlarge existing ones?);[21] the simple statistic that only one out of six college graduates reads a serious book after he graduates, and only one-fifth of the population read any books at all[22]—in all these developments, or analyses of developments, there are posed a large number of crucial issues. In my view, political scientists are thoroughly qualified to examine them, suggest alternatives, and prescribe policy treatment.

All of these developments raise value questions in the broadest sense, and from this point of view many of the "great issues" are value issues. The values associated with human dignity may be compatible with most present trends, but again they may not. I am not concerned here with taking a position on this question, only with raising it. It may well be that such trends are supportive of the values connected with human dignity, or that they can be adjusted to be supportive without major social surgery. On the other hand, it is possible that minor adjustments alone will not suffice, and that substantial ideological and institutional changes are required.

These questions cannot be adequately answered until we know more about the relationships between institutions, behavior, and values, and such knowledge will require a broadening and deepening of our traditional approach to the study of politics. If, as Smith argues, political science as now constituted is an idiographic science, it either must cease to be one, or merge, once and for all, with the humanities. But in that event we should concede immediately that we have nothing to "prove" or "demonstrate," that we have only something to "discuss" or "reflect" upon. Alternatively, we can seek to become a discipline that makes use of the methodology and techniques of science not for the sake of science, as Apter, apparently, would have it, but for the sake of understanding and solving the significant problems of our age. It is time, and past time, that the largely sterile dispute between institutionalists and behaviorists, philosophers and methodologists, be ended. What is needed, above all, is a concerted effort to frame the larger objectives and goals of our many-sided discipline, in a world setting of crisis.

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[18] David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven, 1950).

[19] See above, note 12.

[20] See above, note 13.

[21] Political science as such has yet to make *any* contribution to discussion of the educational environment in which, as a teaching profession, it flourishes (or does not flourish).

[22] This statement begs the question, of course, whether political scientists read "serious" books after receipt of the Ph.D., and if so, what kinds of "serious" books they read. How many of us, for example, keep abreast of the literature in our particular fields of interest, let alone of the literature in related fields?

Given the prevailing mood, it is not always easy, or "safe," to confront "great issues." For various reasons, those who hold power in the nation and the world are not eager to be identified, or subjected to critical scrutiny. No serious researcher need be told that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain information about certain organizations and activities, as a consequence of the wall of silence, secrecy, and security that has been created. Such research, moreover, often lacks pay-off value with respect to career interests—a consideration that younger, less secure members of the profession, especially, are inclined to take into account. I have seen more than one letter circulated in which acceptance of, or at least a record of silence about, the *status quo* appears to be a condition for academic employment.

The climate, in a word, is not promising for a consideration of "great issues," but it is not hopeless. The national and regional organizations of the profession could do much, through journals and meetings, to promote an atmosphere congenial to the discussion of basic problems. Better yet, the various organizations could create study groups or commissions to identify problem areas and to frame policies for recommendation to the profession as a whole. The professional organizations of the mathematicians, the physicists, the psychologists, and the lawyers, on occasion, deal with, and develop policies for, "great issues." Is it asking too much that the organized political science profession, on occasion, concern itself with such issues? Surely we know as much, and should have as much to say, as the other learned fraternities. The normative and descriptive interests of the discipline promote configurative analysis and prescription, and political science, therefore, is or should be "the policy science, *par excellence*."[23]

My further point is that political science should seek to become a comprehensive science of social analysis in the broadest sense. I have tried to suggest that a number of the "great issues" cut across the boundaries of the disciplines, and that they also cut across the line that some have tried to establish between "politics" and "science." As social analysts we should have something to say about state legislatures *and* the modern corporation, trends in voting behavior *and* literary taste, the Constitutional Convention *and* the A.A.A.S. convention, and we should be able to say it with precision. Above all, we need to frame great policies for "great issues," if we are not to be judged, in the future, as mere historians of an epoch that culminated in 1984.

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[23] Harold D. Lasswell, "The Political Science of Science," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (December, 1956), p. 979.

COMMUNICATIONS

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: NO LOST WORLD

TO THE EDITOR:

In the June number you publish two somewhat related articles, one by Lawrence J. R. Herson entitled "The Lost World of Municipal Government," and the other a bibliographical article by R. T. Daland on "Political Science and the Study of Urbanism." Having read these two offerings with considerable interest, this old-timer in the field of local government feels called upon to make a few comments and a rejoinder, at least in part, on the subject of "The Lost World."

The bibliographical article has very considerable merit and is likely to be widely useful. While its title suggests that national and state as well as local political problems and publications arising out of urbanism will be brought together, the author in fact mainly emphasizes studies on "urban government," which comes close to being the same as Herson's "municipal government." Thus the two articles supplement each other.

In view of the fact that Dr. Daland went as far back as to James Bryce, Frank Goodnow, and Leo Rowe, I regret that he did not list the important publications of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in the days of F. A. Cleveland and his co-workers, some of the excellent legislative committee studies in Massachusetts, New York, and California, and the doctoral theses in problems of urbanism and local government that came out of Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and other universities, beginning well before 1900. Some of the best works of American students of local government have appeared in such publications, and in periodicals.

One can agree or disagree with Dr. Daland's appraisal of the value of what has been published, and concur or not in his judgments as to the gaps in the literature that need to be filled. No one would seriously deny that there are and always have been gaps, or that there are defects in the available materials. Dr. Daland's criticisms of the deficiencies are directed not so much at the scholars who have made efforts to contribute to knowledge in this field as at political scientists in general for their neglect of the problems of urban government in an age of rapidly advancing urbanism. He tends to be objective, fair, and not harsh in his judgments upon earlier and recent contributors to the field; and he reaches rather optimistic conclusions about the possibilities for the advancement of political science and political theory through future studies in urban politics and government. To him, as to me, municipal government does not seem to be a lost world, but an underdeveloped area in which there are many research opportunities, and many challenges to the research-minded.

Dr. Herson's article is of another order. It comes from a man who has not, as far as I can ascertain, published any work in municipal government. It is directed not against political scientists in general for having neglected the field of municipal government, but specifically against those who have worked in the field, and especially at the textbooks some of them have written.

The shortcomings or failings of "the literature of municipal government" are "simply summarized" by the author "by noting that in conceptual construction and in execution, most of the research in this field falls short of the minimal requirements for a systematic political science: for the literature of municipal government is studded with an array of facts that have been gathered with little regard for the construction of general theories; and, at the same time, it is beset with theories that have been advanced without ever being checked against available empirical data" (p. 330).

This is a sweeping indictment, and one is inclined to ask for a bill of particulars and the supporting evidence. Nothing of either kind is forthcoming. Instead the reader is offered two things: a footnote reference to a seven-page "partial evaluation" of "Local Government Research" by Allen Richards in the *Public Administration Review* (Autumn, 1954); and a footnote on method by the author which is certainly a novelty if not a prodigy in the field of scientific method. I quote (pp. 330–331):

> 3. A note on method: The concern of this essay is with the "modal characteristics" of a body of literature, not with its specific contributors. Consequently, none of the generalizations affirmed here applies with equal force to any specific text [sic]; moreover, the multiplicity of texts within this field should make it apparent that texts vary in the degree to which they are vulnerable to the criticisms here advanced. Thus, a book such as Charles R. Adrian, *Governing Urban America* (New York, 1955) is highly conscious of the problems raised here and meets many of them with marked success. Again, a book such as Harold Zink, *Government of Cities in the United States* (New York, 1948) especially in its treatment of politics makes a significant departure from the general mode. In similar fashion, other books differ in one or more respects, both in the treatment given specific problems, and in the level of sophistication that attends this treatment. In general, however, the similarities of the texts are great enough to warrant a summary presentation that seeks (only) for central characteristics.
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> Given the concern of this essay for a *body* of literature, no attempt will be made to deal with the problem of "mean deviation," that is, the degree to which any single text approaches, or diverges from, the characterization made here. And, because this essay seeks only for modal characteristics, it is unnecessary to inject an *ad hominem* element into the discussion by identifying the sources of specific textbook quotations: Such quotations are offered only to illustrate; certainly not to indict.

In this note and in other parts of his article the author in effect announces that he is going to pass judgment on "a body of literature," without giving the names of the authors, or the titles of the books, or the time period in which they were written; and indeed without even identifying the sources of the passages that he quotes. The reader is evidently expected to accept on faith the author's impressions as to the contents, ideas, and "level of sophistication" of the unnamed books; to accept his competence, carefulness, and fairness in selecting the quoted passages that show the "modal characteristics" of the books; and to agree that he has correctly determined the "modal characteristics" of whatever books he has in mind—and all this in the name of advancing political science!

What the author does is to set up a non-existent something that he calls "the text" or "the city government text," which is based presumably upon the "modal characteristics" of the actual books that lie in the background. Ignoring other parts of the books (and they are substantial), he selects for his mythical text, on some unexplained basis, the "administrative theory," the attitude toward "efficiency," and the position taken on urban politics, as principal determinants of the "modal characteristics" of the books. These determinants appear to be simply the subjects in which he is interested.

Although in this footnote Dr. Herson says he is not making an indictment, the text of his article does just that. Time and again he refers not to his mythical "the text" but to the actual "texts" or "books," although he doesn't name them; and because books don't write themselves, when he refers to their "elitist" tendencies, their "insularity," their ignorance of standards of proof, and so on, he is really referring to the authors. Of course, Dr. Herson assures us, no municipal government text writer in particular is guilty of any specific thing, but every one of them is somehow guilty of a number of things in his list of general charges, in his opinion; and these delicts add up to something very unscientific and very bad. All this without naming any of the disapproved writers, or what they wrote or when they wrote it.

Proceeding by the unscientific method of concealing whatever data he has, and not letting his readers in on the "minimal requirements for a systematic political science" that he is going to apply as standards of judgment, Dr. Herson succeeds not in avoiding the making of an indictment against the textwriters, but in opening himself to the very charges of unscientific procedures and attitudes with which he charges them.

If I were just essay-writing and not in earnest about my criticism of his article, it would be easy enough to use figurative language of the kind Dr. Herson employs and say something on such themes as the beam and the mote, the pot and the kettle, straw men, and people who live in glass houses. I would prefer, however, to have the readers of the Review judge his performance on the basis of his article as a whole, including especially the footnote on method quoted above, the first two paragraphs in part III (pp. 337–38), and perhaps the two top lines on page 341: "the bareness of the evidentiary cupboard stands revealed." In the face of his own serious violation of the principles of scholarship and scientific proof, I do not understand how he can justify his attacks upon the textwriters for what he claims are their errors in scientific method.

One of his charges (p. 338) against the textwriters is that of "one-dimensional analysis" (in italics) and "showing concern for only a single factor in a multifactoral situation." Let us see how this applies to his own essay. He starts off (p. 331) by calling the textbooks the "wellsprings" of "any stream of political science" and proceeds to argue that "it may be that the textbooks of municipal government constitute not so much wellsprings as barriers to the production of systematic research. . . . " I resist comment on this metaphoric transformation. In any case, from here on it is the textbooks and the textbooks alone that are the cause of the alleged failure to develop any contributions to "a systematic political science" out of the study of municipal government. Could there be a clearer case of seizing upon a single factor or "variable" as the basis for explaining something in the social sciences that may be and probably is a result (if it is true at all) of the operation of many factors?

To me this looks like just another example of something that has happened frequently in the social sciences, of finding a single direct cause and effect relationship between two phenomena because they happen to occur at the same time and in the same place. The two things brought together by Dr. Herson are (a) the textbooks (unnamed) in municipal government, and (b) the failure (alleged but not proved) of research and writing in municipal government to contribute to the development of "a systematic political science" (undefined). As I see it, to establish that (a) is the cause of (b) would require proof not only (1) that Dr. Herson is right about (a)—that the books are all bad, that they deter students from going ahead with research, put them on the wrong track, etc.—but also (2) that he is reasonably correct about (b), which he does not prove, and (3) that there are no other probable causes except (a) to explain (b) if (b) is true. That he persists nevertheless in his emphasis upon the textbooks is evidenced by the fact that near the end he outlines the contents of an ideal textbook that would presumably save the world of municipal government from being permanently lost.

As to the alleged failure of men working in the field of municipal government to contribute significantly to a systematic political science, should it not have occurred to him that this failure, and the alleged defects in the textbooks these men wrote, probably stemmed from the same combination of causes? Or, in short, that the defects in the texts were primarily evidences of some more deep-seated difficulties? To raise the textbooks up into prime causes seems to me to be dubious, indeed, and to make them sole causes quite indefensible. There have probably been defective textbooks in every field of knowledge, but research has gone on just the same.

If time and space permitted I could write something about the difficulties of getting research done in the local government field during the past thirty or forty years. Dr. Herson speaks of the opportunities for comparative government research among 16,000 municipal governments, and Dr. Daland (p. 509) speaks with some enthusiasm of "a vast untapped reservoir for the study of political theory" in the "hundred thousand experiments in the design and operation of political institutions . . . currently in progress . . . " in cities, towns, districts, and authorities. This is fine. But every place is a different one, every experiment different, and one man is only one man in one place at one time. Even today it is impossible even to scratch the surface, or to get support for much serious and comprehensive work, because real research in local politics and government is almost prohibitively expensive and time consuming.

And how much greater the obstacles were not more than a few decades ago! A very small number of teachers, loaded with other duties, who specialized to some extent in urban government, mostly in the big city universities, called upon time and again for practical service and advice by local authorities, without adequate research funds, time, or staff, with only the meagerest of statistical and other information available, with very little support or stimulation from contemporary scholars in economics, sociology, psychology, and history, with those fields little more advanced in ideas than political science—I will not go on! These are some of the factors Dr. Herson might have thought about as causative factors for what he thinks is wrong instead of concentrating on the textbooks. He might even have found something to praise.

There are so many things in his article with which I cannot agree that I simply must not go on to try to discuss them all. My present copy of the REVIEW is so marked up with questions that I must order a fresh copy. But a few of his criticisms of the textbooks cannot go unnoted. One of his charges is that "the urban political process being described in today's city government text is a picture seen through the eyes of Graham Wallas, Lincoln Steffens and James Bryce, rather than a view that might come from contemporaries such as Lubell, Riesman, Hunter, Key or Truman." Since he does not give us the citations of the "today's" texts he is attacking, I turn to Dr. Daland's article for a fairly good list (p. 494). Skipping the very early ones of Goodnow, Fairlie, Rowe, and Zueblin, we have the following texts with dates for various editions:

Charles Beard, 1912
William B. Munro, various texts, 1912, 1915, 1916, 1923, 1926, 1929, 1934
Chester C. Maxey, 1924, 1929
William Anderson, 1925; revised with Edward W. Weidner, 1950
Thomas H. Reed, 1926, 1934
Chester A. Hanford, 1926
Austin F. Macdonald, 1929, 1936, 1940, 1946, 1951, 1955
Charles M. Kneier, 1934, 1947
Harold Zink, 1939, 1948
Stuart MacCorkle, 1942
Ernest B. Schulz, 1949
Arthur Bromage, 1950
Fisher and Bishop, 1950
Charles R. Adrian, 1955

In this list only one new book and one new edition of an older book have been published since 1951.

These texts are, I presume, the ones whose writers should have paid attention to Lubell, Riesman, et al. The books by these men (and here our author does give us names and dates, note 6, p. 332) were published as follows:

Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, 1952
Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd*, 1950
Hunter, *Community Power Structure*, 1953
Truman, *The Governmental Process*, 1951
Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 2d ed. 1947
Key, *American State Politics*, 1956

A little better sense of timing would have been helpful at this point. Can Dr. Herson inform us how the writers or revisers of the Municipal Government texts published in 1950, or even 1951, and earlier years back to 1912, could possibly have used the books of Lubell, Riesman, Hunter or Truman, or the last one by Key, all published in 1950 or later?

Even if he were not completely wrong in suggesting that the textwriters should have included something in their texts from books not yet published, doesn't he in effect imply that every time a new book on politics appears in print, the writers of texts should immediately accept it as established in truth and in science, and make use of its findings, instead of using their independent judgment in the matter? I understand that there is considerable disagreement about the scientific value of at least one of the books he lists, and the pertinence or value of any one of them for a municipal government course is surely debatable.

The treatment he gives to the textbook discussions of "efficiency" also calls for brief comment. I find him to be very confusing on this point. He talks about a "value-free administrative process" and "the idea of a value-free efficiency" (p. 334) as if they are concepts common to and fully accepted by the writers on municipal government. I must confess that some of these writers have not been sufficiently clear and specific in stating the "values" that they hold and for which they work. Anyone who knows them, however, and who knows the ideals generally held by American political scientists should have no reason to be in doubt. I am sure that to the writers the values were not "half-hidden" (p. 335). Most of them (and I think all) hold the general view that government is an instrument or device of the people for promoting their own security and the moral and material welfare of mankind. When the writers speak of "efficiency" in government they have in mind the principle of stewardship, that a public office *is* a public trust, however old-fashioned that may sound, and that the resources made available to the public authorities by the people should be so used as to obtain the maximum benefit for the people, in moral, intellectual, material, and every other way. Efficiency in this sense never was and never can be value-free. It is never divorced from choices as to policy, either; but the fact that "efficiency" in a quite different sense could be claimed by Nazi and Fascist regimes should not mislead us. It is efficiency in the American sense and for American democratic ends that is being discussed. In this American sense efficiency as a practical aim is a noble concept of all the different ways of achieving intelligence, honesty and effectiveness in promoting the general welfare, without undue waste of the mental and physical labors of men and women, or of the natural and other resources. To say that the "efficiency" test is purely financial is inaccurate, but even if it rose no higher than that it could be defended as a value.

"B.L.T." (Bert Leston Taylor), the widely read quipster-columnist of "the world's greatest newspaper" a generation ago, once printed a classification of college studies made up by college students on a highbrow-lowbrow basis. There were "high" highbrow subjects like aesthetics and the poetry of Swinburne, "low" highbrow subjects, "high" lowbrow subjects and "low" lowbrow subjects. As I recall it, the best municipal government could do was to gain a "high" lowbrow rating. I am certain the teachers of municipal government in the country at that time (and there were not very many of them) accepted the classification in good spirit and went on about their work.

The basis of the classification was, as far as I could ascertain, the practical usefulness of each subject. The more practical, the more lowbrow. It is my belief, based upon a fairly wide acquaintance with the men in the field, that the teachers of municipal government in general have always taken a deeply practical interest in the subject. Living in communities that were confronted with many problems of government, planning, financing and administration, and confronted by a continuous inflow of students wanting to know about what could be done to improve government locally and in the state, and by citizen leaders who asked for help on urgent state and community problems, they in general willingly combined their teaching, research, and citizenly duties in the local field. They studied and wrote about local problems, and spoke to local groups, worked on local committees, and brought all this experience and more to their students in the classroom. I doubt that many of them ever thought of these activities as contributing much to "a systematic political science," but I know that their work did a great deal to bring a sense of realism and practicality into the classroom and to bring intelligence into the discussion of local problems. They helped also to improve the relations of the colleges with their communities and to show the practical usefulness in at least one direction of the study of political science. And while these teachers devoted time to such activities, others in their departments could devote their efforts to the more "highbrow" and less utilitarian courses.

These teachers of municipal government were not remiss, either, in their attempts to increase and improve knowledge in their fields. They were mostly industrious, intelligent, and realistic, but they were relatively few. What their younger critics of today need to realize more fully than some seem to, is the set of conditions under which men of a generation or more ago, or even more recently, had to work in developing the fields of local and even state government at all. But I have already said something on that subject.

There are grounds for fair criticism of the work being done in any and every field of learning and science. There is need for such criticism, continuous criticism, if knowledge is to be improved and advanced. Even more, there is need for men to undertake substantive research of their own, because it is the substantive contributions that really add to the body of knowledge. Mere criticism of what others are doing is not enough.

The field of municipal government, or urban government, is one in which there is, in my opinion, urgent need for more workers than there ever have been before. Urban concentration of population is advancing rapidly. It is changing the nature of politics not only in the urban places but throughout the states, the nation and the world. Studies in the urban field need to be made with all the energy, all the wisdom, all the scientific sophistication, and all the regard for human well-being that we can muster, so that political science as a whole can be advanced for the benefit of mankind. And there is evidence that increasingly large resources are being made available for such studies. The field is open to all, but the work will not be easy.

In my judgment, the study of municipal government is not a lost world, even though it is overshadowed to some extent by current interests in other fields. As to Dr. Herson's essay I would say:

Method unsatisfactory.
Charges not proved.
Municipal government no lost world.

WILLIAM ANDERSON
University of Minnesota

A REPLY TO WILLIAM ANDERSON

TO THE EDITOR:

So far as I can see, Professor Anderson's objections turn on the following points:

1. That I have not previously published any work in municipal government. This is true; but I trust that the merits of argument may rest on other grounds.
2. That I have failed to specify the textbooks I treat and that I have been selective in my concerns. Again, true; but I wrote an essay (as the footnote which Professor Anderson was kind enough to quote makes clear) concerned not with any single book, but only with deficiencies common to nearly all of them. Within the compass of any essay, sharp selectivity is inescapable; but my focus upon topics I deemed most important (*e.g.*, administrative theory) ought to be construed not as a lack of concern for other things. Rather, it was a necessary surrender to the demands of orderly presentation.
3. That *mere* or *negative* criticism is not enough. True again; but is there to be no room in our literature for a "first examination"? And is there to be no room in our scholarly journals for a "loyal opposition"?
4. That I impute to the textbooks on municipal government sole responsibility for inadequate research in that field. This, I think, is a misunderstanding. I wrote in my essay that I offer "one explanation" for the state of this research, and further, that the textbooks "orient and guide" research in this field. To speak of an orienting force is not the same as referring to a sole determining force. To speak of offering one explanation presumably implies that others are to be found and that they might be fruitfully explored. But my language there is perhaps not as clear as I should have liked it to be; and if my words be read as Professor Anderson chooses to read them, I will not cavil at his criticism.
5. That I curiously expect authors to incorporate into their textbooks, the findings of later books. My point here is twofold. First, these later books were cited "to suggest" alternative approaches to the study of city government. These books had precursors (presumably known to the textbook writers) that might equally be cited. But since the purpose of an example is to evoke the richest response within the shortest compass, I chose to cite the later, and presumably more widely known, studies. Second, and more important, the content of these later books (as of their precursors) was based on facts already

there when the textbooks on city government were written. That the writers of the textbooks did not perceive or create from these facts the constructs I referred to, but that writers from outside the field of city government did, is in itself a striking commentary upon the textbooks.

6. That I do not appreciate the empirical contributions of the textbook writers, their sacrifices, or the *personal* meaning they attached to efficiency. My appreciation, I should like to think, is not ungenerous. But to the extent that it *may* be somewhat limited, it is because I join with Professor Anderson in seeking "all the scientific sophistication . . . that we can muster." Such sophistication, it seems to me, requires the construction of theories that transcend and make meaningful any collection of data, no matter how laboriously or patiently assembled. It was to search the textbooks for such theories that I began my examination.

With the possible exception of his comment on "efficiency," Professor Anderson has not dealt with the substance of the argument in my essay. For that, the essay, the critical standards upon which it proceeds, and the textbooks themselves, are all open to public inspection.

Lawrence J. R. Herson

Ohio State University

HUNTINGTON ON CONSERVATISM: A COMMENT

After cogently demonstrating that conservatism can only be a purely *situational* rather than ideational ideology—a defense of any existing institutions against fundamental challenge—Professor Huntington ends his article by calling on liberalism to liquidate itself "for the duration."[1] Defining the challenge to American institutions as communism, Huntington urges American liberals to "lay aside their liberal ideology" and adopt conservatism as their defense until the communist threat is ended. Yet, on his own evidence, the precedents for this advice are dismal indeed. For every one of the four great manifestations of conservatism he lists (the defense of the estates against the rise of absolute monarchy; the defense against Puritan dissent; the defense against the French Revolution; and the defense of the South against abolition) failed signally in its object. Since all these conservative upsurges lost to the forces of radical change, and since defense of the old order was their only purpose, Huntington's willingness to rely on this weapon now is puzzling indeed.

But this is not all. If conservatism is hopeless as a weapon to defend the institutional *status quo*, then, on Huntington's own terms, it is also a pointless and absurd ideology, since it has no inherent ideational validity. Perhaps the consistent failure of conservatism in its previous struggles with one radical ideology after another can be explained more fully. As Huntington points out, so long as existing institutions are universally accepted, there is no need for a conservative ideology of defense. Conservatism arises in reaction to the attractions of a new ideational philosophy, one necessarily radical and at variance with current institutions. But, on Huntington's own account, conservatism is not a *rational* defense of these institutions, but rather the contrary: a blindly tropistic hostility to change, whatever it may be. Pitting a coherent ideology against a tropism will tend to provoke an unequal contest, with the ideational philosophy the victor. For men, even those who care little about constructing a philosophic system, must have *some* set of ideational principles with which to view social institutions. The deeply interested parties search for a set of principles, and the less interested are generally content to accept their principles from socially-appointed leaders whom they respect. But some set of principles must be chosen. The necessity for this choice is indicated by Huntington's admission that the reason the society was not previously in turmoil was that everyone had adopted the same ideational system, and only quarreled over interpretations *within* that system. It was precisely the flowering of a contrasting set of principles that constituted the challenge to existing institutions. But if society must choose some ideational viewpoint, and if conservatism is not ideational at all, then conservatism will necessarily fail in the struggle. For a radical ideational ideology tries to convince people by the use of reason, while the conservative ideology, relying on blind instinct, can only scorn reason. Now, conceding to the enemy the monopoly of reason is fatal, for any ideology whatever can appeal to emotions alone. The set of ideas which seems to have reason on its side possesses the great advantage of the force of conviction that, in the long run, is likely to overcome mere resistance to the new and unfamiliar. For the once new, as Huntington himself points out, soon becomes the familiar and old; and this applies to ideologies as well as institutions. By Huntington's own (and accurate) definition, communism itself is rapidly becoming "conservative."

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[1] Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism As An Ideology," this Review, Vol. 51 (June, 1957), pp. 454–473.

The proper answer to the radical challenge of a new ideology is to adopt not conservatism but a contrasting radicalism, to oppose reason with reason. If this means changing existing institutions, then so much the better. Since Huntington is professedly a "liberal" (however the term be defined), the rational approach for him to adopt toward American institutions is to transform them to accord more nearly with the liberal ideal. This should be the "answer" to communism, an answer in rational, ideational terms. Since it is not arguable, blind adherence to the *status quo* is no "answer" at all.

Why indeed does Huntington support the existing institutions? His article gives only brief hints, but enough to demonstrate a striking and inherent inconsistency of conservatism: while basically situational, it is still, almost shamefacedly, ideational in part. Thus, Huntington argues for conservatism as follows: "conservatism is the intellectual rationale of the permanent institutional prerequisites of human existence. It has a high and necessary function. It is the rational defense of being against mind, of order against chaos, . . . of the institutional prerequisites of social order" (pp. 460, 473). If conservatism has indeed so exalted a role, then it is not, as Huntington asserts, a purely positional ideology; it is ideational as well. For what can be more systematic and ideational—more rational—than an assertion of the necessities of existence? Clearly Huntington has overdrawn his case; conservatism is ideational as well as situational.

Let us examine Huntington's six-point list of the generally agreed-upon conservative creed. Points (2) and (6) are clearly and solely situational; the appeal to "prescription" and the presumption for settled government are purely tropistic appeals to the *status quo* whatever it may be. These bear out Huntington's thesis. But the other points have different implications. Point (1), that man is a religious animal, can be positional, in lending divine sanction to the *status quo*. It can also cut the other way, however, by providing a buttress for the self-same universal principles of natural law that Huntington recognizes as the age-old enemy of conservatism. Point (4), that the community is superior to the individual and that human nature is the source of evil, is irrelevant to situational concerns. It is, on the contrary, an ideational statement. In an existent *laissez-faire*, individualist society, for example, such a position would imply radical, and therefore ideational, changes from current institutions. The same is true of point (5), that men are unequal and that hierarchy is inevitable. For example, if a few members of an Israeli *kibbutz* were to put forth this doctrine it would be radical indeed. Of the six cardinal features of the conservative creed, therefore, two are situational, two are ideational, and one can be used in either way.

I have purposely held to the last his point (3), that reason should be eschewed in favor of habit and emotion—that logic should be abandoned for concrete experience—because, while situational, this doctrine holds special interest. For it is not only situational; it is an implicit confession that the *ideational strands* in the defenses of existing institutions are so weak that they fail to stand up under analysis. In short, the conservative, after putting forth ideational doctrines, refuses to defend them by the use of reason. Apparently believing them too weak for defense, he retreats to take his stand finally upon habit and emotion and to leave reason to his enemies. This is the ultimate and really distinguishing feature of the conservative philosophy.

Conservatism should either be defined as a situational or as an ideational ideology; otherwise, hopeless confusion of meanings will continue indefinitely. If conservatism is best defined positionally, and I agree with Huntington that this is the best definition, then points (4) and (5), and probably (1), should be dropped from the catalog of conservative views. The ideational strands should be separated out, and used to form a frankly ideational and radical system.

Huntington's necessary "prerequisites" are, then, ideational, and not conservative at all. The footnote in which he denies the possibility of a "conservative defense of sheer chaos" and his designation of Nazi Germany as "chaos," is an attempt to escape his dilemma (p. 459n). For if conservatism is situational *and* necessary, then *all* existing institutions must and should be defended, including Nazi institutions when they were in existence. Hence Huntington's attempt to banish totalitarian societies from the rubric of "existing institutions." But he cannot have it both ways. If conservatism is good, then this situational defense of the *status quo* is good always and everywhere, whatever institutions exist: whether they be liberal, communist, Nazi, slave, or cannibalistic. On the other hand, if he would balk at defense of any one set of institutions, then he has already abandoned conservatism for good and all: he has transcended the immanent and adopted the ideational. The question, in short, is not whether he approves of Americans defending their existing institutions against challenge. The critical question is: does he equally approve of such defense by Soviet Russia, South Africa, and Yemen?

Huntington is very severe with the New Conservatives. He calls them vague as to the institutions they would defend and the enemies they would counteract. He sees communism as the only plausible threat to America. But the New Conservatives do not agree. It seems to me that most of them are quite clear on the nature of the enemy: it is democratic socialism. The New Conservatives therefore oppose: (1) the economic and political system of socialism, *i.e.*, the complete control by the state of the economic and political order; and (2) the social and cultural implications of democracy, *i.e.*, egalitarianism, mass culture, the divine right of the majority, the worship of the "common man," etc. And hence, the New Conservatives oppose, not only the totalitarian systems abroad, but also the New-Fair Deals at home, as part and parcel of the modern wave of social democracy. (Liberal democrats may wonder at this classification of totalitarianism under forms of Social Democracy. But the New Conservatives hold that modern totalitarian movements depend peculiarly on collective support.)

Much more just is Huntington's charge that the New Conservatives are vague about what they positively wish to defend. The reason for this vagueness is clear, however; it stems from the utter lack of agreement among the New Conservatives, and among the contemporary Right generally, on the nature of the world they would like to see brought into being. And, of course, Huntington is absolutely correct on one point: the New Conservatives are not really conservative at all. They are not really *defending* any more, if they ever did; they are fighting against trends which have already and increasingly prevailed. They are therefore ardent radicals, in the root sense. But they and their critics have not realized this, or have not conceded it, partly because of the lack of agreement within their ranks. Since the New Conservatives can unite only in opposition to the enemy, and never on the positive advancement of a consistent creed, their public stance tends always to seem purely "negative" and situational. But the positive ideational creeds are there: some New Conservatives are *laissez faire* individualists, some Tory feudalists, some ardent decentralists, some monarchists, etc. Strategically, these differences tend to be buried, in order to create a Popular Front of opposition. But the "conservative" label is a most misleading term to apply to this congeries of opposition. The true conservatives in America today are the defenders of the current *status quo*. The fact that so many former liberals have shifted to the "conservative" mantle is highly significant, for it seems to mean that liberals have begun to lose faith in the liberal ideology, and must therefore turn to tropistic conservatism as a final defense of what is. But if historical precedents are prophetic, this means that liberalism is doomed and that either communism or one of the ideational creeds of the Right opposition bids fair to become the "wave of the future."

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New York City

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES[*]

COMPILED BY WILLIAM C. SEYLER[†]

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I. DISSERTATIONS IN PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1956 LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Additions

Ernest E. Acheson, The Political Principles of Albert Gallatin. *New School.*

Daniel M. Berman, The Political Philosophy of Hugo L. Black. *Rutgers.*

Martin Birnbach, Neo-Freudian Materials for a Political Philosophy. *Rutgers.*

Nadim Bittar, The Political Philosophy of Charles Maurras. *Michigan.*

Clark W. Bouton, Jean Bodin: The Theory of Sovereignty. *Chicago.*

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[*] Similar lists have been printed in the Review annually since 1911, except for 1915–19, 1921 and 1923–24; full citations are given in the 1955 list, XLIX, 792.

Items which appeared in the September, 1956, list and which are still in preparation *without change* are *not* repeated in this listing. The present listing contains only additions, changes and deletions. Additions are those items which were reported in preparation for the first time; changes are those items which have had a change in title or have been completed since the 1956 listing—in which case, the item is followed by the notation "(Completed)" and can also be found in the "Dissertations Completed Since the Last Listing" section; deletions are those items which are no longer in preparation.

In cases where classification of an item has been suggested by the institution concerned, the suggestion has been followed. Each item is listed under one classification only with the exception of those items listed under "Changes" and marked "(Completed)" which are also listed in Part II of the present listing.

The lists printed in the Review are based on information from departments giving graduate instruction in political science. Often dissertations are in progress in departments of economics, history, sociology, etc., which overlap or supplement dissertations in preparation in political science. Attention is called especially to the following lists: "Current Research Projects in Public Administration" (reported to Public Administration Service), the most recent edition of which appeared in 1951; "Doctoral Dissertations in Political Economy in Progress in American Colleges and Universities," in the *American Economic Review;* "List of Doctoral Dissertations in History Now in Progress," published annually by the Division of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution through 1938, and since then by the American Historical Association, as supplements to the *American Historical Review* (1940 and 1941), as Vol. III of its Annual Report (1941), and as separate publications (1947, 1949 and 1952); and "Doctoral Dissertations in Sociology," in the *American Journal of Sociology*. Consult also the "External Research List," published by the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State. These are in addition to the "List of American Doctoral Dissertations Printed in 1938," the most recent of an annual series published by the Library of Congress; and Arnold H. Trotier and Marian Harman, "Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by American Universities, 1952–53," the twentieth of a series beginning in 1933–34, compiled for the Association of Research Libraries. Consult, for other lists, T. R. Palfrey and H. E. Coleman, Jr., "Guide to Bibliographies of Theses, United States and Canada" (Chicago, American Library Association, 2nd ed., 1940).

Abstracts of some of the theses listed as completed may be found in "Dissertation Abstracts," published bi-monthly by University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[†] On leave of absence from the University of Pittsburgh.

Morris Davis, Behavior and Change of Behavior in Classical Political Theory. *Princeton.*

William Eaton, The Politics of George Bernard Shaw. *California* (Berkeley).

James C. Finlay, S.J., The Political Theory of Charles, Comte de Montalembert. *Duke.*

James R. Flynn, A Critical Exposition of the Theory of Authority of Yves Simon. *Chicago.*

Gerald Fryling, Theories of Party in American Political Thought. *Minnesota.*

Norman H. Greene, Jean-Paul Sartre as a Critic of Contemporary Political Philosophy. *Michigan.*

George C. Keller, The Social Ideas and Politics of Reinhold Niebuhr. *Columbia.*

Irving J. Levine, Political Thought of Disraeli. *New School.*

Richard Lindblad, The Political Theory and Methodology of Charles E. Merriam. *Minnesota.*

William T. McClure, Jr., The Demagogue. *Illinois.*

Joffre C. McLaurin, The Political Theory of Mohandas K. Gandhi. *Southern California.*

Stefan C. Maczynski, The Communist Concept of Industrialization and Levels of Living. *Notre Dame.*

Ralph J. Mehr, H. J. Laski as a Marxist. *New School.*

William E. Oden, Critique of Selected Theories of Functional Representation. *Indiana.*

Hanna Pitkin, The Theory of Representation. *California* (Berkeley).

Herman J. Ruether, Concepts of Leadership in Indian Political Thought. *Claremont.*

Thomas W. Ryley, The Political Theory of the Social Gospel. *Rutgers.*

Sami Saliba, Freedom of Movement. *Kansas.*

George Schwab, The Political Theories of Carl Schmitt. *Columbia.*

Jacob Vroom, Techniques of Evacuation—in Propaganda. *New School.*

Charles B. Weasmer, The Political Theory of the Great Disruption. *Virginia.*

Leonard Wigon, Some Political Implications of Existentialism. *Illinois.*

Changes

Gilbert Abcarian, Political Romanticism: Coleridge and Tolstoi. *California* (Berkeley). (Completed)

Minoo Adenwalla, Political Philosophy of the Indian National Movement. *Northwestern.* (Completed)

Albert Alexander, Impact of U. S. on Revolutionary Ideas in Europe, 1830–1848. *New School.* (Completed)

Laurence Berns, The Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon with Special Attention to the Principles of Foreign Policy. *Chicago.* (Completed)

William T. Bluhm, The Theory and Practice of Social Catholicism. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Francis P. Canavan, S.J., The Role of Reason in Politics: Burke and 18th Century Rationalism. *Duke.* (Completed)

Yung Ping Chen, Chinese Political Thought: Mao Tse-Tung and Liu Shao-Chi. *Maryland.*

Margaret W. Dower, The International Thinking of George Bernard Shaw. *Boston University.* (Completed)

Theodore B. Fleming, Jr., John Stuart Mill's Essay on Liberty: A Critical Analysis. *Yale.*

Julian Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Idea of Sovereignty. *Columbia.*

Richard B. Gray, A Study of the Politics and Political Ideology of Jose J. Marti, the National Hero of the Cuban Republic. *Wisconsin.* (Completed)

Richard P. Kosaki, Majority Rule in the Theory of Democracy: A Critical Analysis. *Minnesota.* (Completed)

Guenter Lewy, The Political Philosophy of Juan de Mariana. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Cesar A. Majul, The Political Philosophy of the Philippine Revolution, 1896–1899. *Cornell.* (Completed)

Serif A. Martin, The Young Ottoman Movement: A Study in the Evolution of Turkish Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century. *Stanford.*

David Rapoport, Praetorianism: Government without Consensus. *California* (Berkeley).

William O. Reichert, The Mind of William H. Mallock: A Study in Conservative Political Thought. *Minnesota.* (Completed)

James E. Titus, Left of Center: A Study of American Liberalism in the 1930's. *Wisconsin.* (Completed)

Vincent C. Watson, The Indian Constitution and the Hindu Tradition: Compatibility and Conflict of Basic Political Ideas. *Northwestern.* (Completed)

Deletions

Paul M. Downing, Corporation or Solidarism in Catholic Social Philosophy. *Columbia.*

Allen McConnell, Alexander Herzen and the Revolutions of 1848. *Brown.*

Esther Edelman Rowland, Political Theory of Ernest Jones. *Columbia.*

Gene W. Setzer, Contemporary American Ideas of Human Equality. *Columbia.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Additions

Chadwick F. Alger, The Role of the Private Expert in the Formulation of American Foreign Policy. *Princeton.*

Bruce Andrews, Block Voting by Roman Catholics. *Syracuse.*

Robert H. Bailie, The UNESCO Relations Staff of the Department of State: A Study of Agency Response to Public and Private Pressures. *Pittsburgh.*

Elizabeth Bernsten, The Formulation and Implementation of Fair Employment Practice Policy by the Federal Government and by New York State. *Fordham.*

Elbert M. Byrd, Jr., Treaties and Executive Agreements: Their Separate Roles and Limitations. *American.*

Billy G. Crane, Intergovernmental Relations in Disaster Relief in Texas. *Texas.*

Patricia E. Cunnes, Water Resources Policy Formation in the Appropriations Process: Congress and the Bureau of Reclamation. *Chicago.*

Winston M. Fick, Private Anti-Trust Actions. *Claremont.*

Walter A. Hahn, Jr., Industry-Government Relations. *Syracuse.*

Robert S. Hirschfield, Crisis Government in America. *New York University.*

John L. Houk, Aspects of Congressional Policy on Psychological Warfare, 1947 to 1957: A Study of Relationship between the Congress and the United States Information Agency in the Formulation of Public Policy on Psychological Warfare. *Southern California.*

Howard K. Hyde, Business Management in Defense: The Industrial Fund Program. *Chicago.*

Allen B. Lee, The Kinzua Dam Project: A Case Study of the Politics of Flood Control. *Pittsburgh.*

Edward M. Levine, The Natural Gas Act: Group Politics and Public Opinion. *Chicago.*

Naphtaly Levy, Eisenhower, and the Concept of the Presidency. *New School.*

Joyce C. McLeod, The Availability of Government Information. *California* (Berkeley).

Elizabeth Marvick, Empirical Studies of Voting Behavior in Relation to the Theory of Political Democracy. *Columbia.*

Joseph K. Roberts, Jr., Industry in the Politics of Emergency: A Case Study of the Middle East Emergency Committee. *Columbia.*

James A. Robinson, Decision-Making in the House Rules Committee. *Northwestern.*

Eleanor A. Schwab, Public Access to Information in the Federal Government. *New York University.*

Murray Silberman, The American Labor Party. *Columbia.*

Donald E. Stokes, Partisan Attitudes and Voting Choice. *Yale.*

Luther W. Stringham, The Formation of United States Military Policy. *American.*

Arthur B. Thompson, Jr., The American Presidency under Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur. *Virginia.*

William J. Webb II, Political Party National Committee Utilization of Television in the 1956 U. S. Presidential Campaign. *American.*

Stephen Worth, Congressional Investigating Committees as Instruments of Subversive Control. *Washington* (Seattle).

Changes

David Booth, Constitutional and Political Aspects of the Jay Treaty. *Virginia.* (Completed)

Edmund B. Brownell, A Study of the Interaction between the Department of the Treasury and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. *Michigan.* (Completed)

Rudolph S. Comstock, The St. Lawrence Seaway Project. Ohio State. (Completed)

Melvin Crain, Some Aspects of Representation in Alaska, 1912–1952. *Southern California.* (Completed)

Dorothy H. Cronheim, The Relation between the Communication Practices of the Members of Congress and the Status of Party Politics in Selected States. *Ohio State.* (Completed)

James J. Flannery, Water Pollution Control: Development of Public Policy and Federal-State Relations. *Wisconsin.* (Completed)

Roy E. Fossett, Impact of the New Deal on Georgia Politics, 1933–1941. *Florida.*

Paul C. Fowler, The Formulation of Public Policy for Commercial Broadcasting by the Federal Communications Commission. *Indiana.* (Completed)

William C. Gibbons, Congress and the International Information Program, 1945–1952. *Princeton.*

Thomas V. Gilpatrick, The Midwest Farm

Vote and Farm Price Support Theory. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Don F. Hadwiger, Farm Groups and United States Foreign Economic Policy, 1946–1955. *Iowa.* (Completed)

Harry Hall, Congressmen and Scientists. *Chicago.*

Samuel Halperin, American Zionism: The Building of an Interest Group. *Washington* (St. Louis). (Completed)

David W. Hazel, The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Legislative Process, 1940–1954. *Michigan.* (Completed)

Richard B. Henderson, Political Philosophy of Maury Maverick. *Maryland.*

Victor K. Heyman, The National Farmers Union and Its Political World. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Walter Hohenstein, Federal Control over Local and State Personnel. *Minnesota.* (Completed)

Robert J. Huckshorn, Congressional Reactions to the Second Hoover Commission. *Iowa.* (Completed)

Leigh Hunt, View of the Proposed Constitution of Political Leaders Who Did Not Attend the Convention. *Minnesota.*

Alan E. Kent, Wisconsin and Foreign Policy: Wisconsin's Senators and Representatives since World War I. *Wisconsin.* (Completed)

Kenneth T. Kofmehl, Congressional Staffing with Emphasis on the Professional Staff. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Milton Levine, Reorganization Plans Submitted by the President to the 83rd Congress. *American.* (Completed)

Lewis Mainzer, Research Policy Formation under the Research and Marketing Act of 1946. *Chicago.* (Completed)

John R. Probert, Staff Arrangements in the Organization for National Security. *Pennsylvania.* (Completed)

Seymour Scher, The National Labor Relations Board and Congress: Study of Legislative Control of Regulatory Activity. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Vytas S. Vardys, Select Committees of Congress in Foreign Relations: A Case Study in Legislative Process. *Wisconsin.*

Deletions

William D. Hatley, The Dixiecrat Movement. *Missouri.*

Don Muchmore, Political Use of the Presidential Appointive Powers, 1900–1950. *California* (Los Angeles).

Quentin H. Whybark, Political Aspects of the Public Power Issue in the Pacific Northwest. *Stanford.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

William H. Brown, Judicial Review of Congressional Investigative Powers with Special Reference to the Period 1945–1957. *American.*

Henry M. Holland, Jr., Justice Cardozo: A Study in Mediation. *Washington* (Seattle).

David R. Manwaring, The Flag Salute Cases: A Study of a Reversal. *Wisconsin.*

Walter Murphy, A Generation of Litigation: A Study of State Reactions to the School Segregation Decision. *Chicago.*

H. Shirley Thomas, The Judicial Philosophy of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. *Johns Hopkins.*

Changes

Karl Andresen, The Theory of State Interposition to Control Federal Action. *Minnesota.*

Louis A. Antrobus, The Federal Exclusionary Rule in Relation to the Fourth Amendment as Applied and Interpreted by the U. S. Supreme Court. *Missouri.* (Completed)

Gordon B. Cleveland, The Role of the Rule of Law in the Administrative State; with Special Emphasis on Civil Liberties. *North Carolina.* (Completed)

Rondal G. Downing, The Federal Courts and Labor Relations, 1935–1955: A Study in Judicial Decision-Making. *Illinois.* (Completed)

Robert J. Frye, Deportation of Aliens: A Study in Civil Liberties. *Florida.*

Spencer Gervin, The Development of Executive Rule in the United States. *Duke.* (Completed)

Royal C. Gilkey, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties. *Minnesota.* (Completed)

Luther Hagard, The Equality of the States in the United States: Theory, Constitutional Law and Practice. *Minnesota.* (Completed)

Charles A. Hollister, A Judicial Analysis of the Right to Acquire, Possess, and Protect Property in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.* (Completed)

Eleanor T. Linenthal, Free Speech and the Power of the Courts and Congress to Punish for Contempt. *Cornell.* (Completed)

Gordon Patric, The Impact of the McCullom Decision in the State of Illinois. *Illinois.* (Completed)

Yosal Rogat, Political Theory and Judicial Review: A Study of the Thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. *California* (Berkeley). (Completed)

Robert Scigliano, The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury: A Study of Courts and the Political Process. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Harold F. Way, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures. *Cornell.*

Peter Woll, The Informal Administrative Process: An Analysis of the Growth of Informal Methods of Adjudication and Rule-Making, and the Significance of this Development in Terms of Administrative Responsibility. *Cornell.*

Deletions

John T. Kitos, Coordination of Public Health and Hospital Administration in New York State. *Syracuse.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

David Bernstein, Budget and Management in New York City. *New York University.*

John C. Brashear, The Impact of Industrialization upon the Political Institutions of Jefferson County, Tennessee. *North Carolina.*

Philip H. Burch, Jr., Governmental Policy and Practice in Highway Construction and Maintenance. *Rutgers.*

David Carley, The Wisconsin Governor's Legislative Leadership. *Wisconsin.*

Alfred E. Diamond, Planning a State Civil Defense Organization: A Problem in Cooperative Federalism. *Ohio State.*

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Arnold S. Trebach, Defendants and Defense Counsel in the New Jersey Criminal Courts. *Princeton.*

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Changes

Eva Aronfreed, Public Relations as a Function of City Government: A Study of Municipal Public Relations in the City of Philadelphia. *Pennsylvania.*

John T. Ballard, The Impact of State Controls upon Financial Procedure: Johnson County, Iowa. *Iowa.* (Completed)

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Lloyd Woodruff, County Boards in Wisconsin. *Minnesota.* (Completed)

Deletions

Lemuel F. Blitz, The Involvement of Local Governments in Metropolitan Problems in the Norfolk, Virginia Area. *North Carolina*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

Lillian M. Banahan, The Enforcement of Price Controls: 1942–1953. *Georgetown.*

Robert J. Batson, Measuring the Effectiveness of Personnel Management in State and Local Government. *Chicago.*

Daniel W. Burch, The Concept of Public Expenditures as a Tool of the Fiscal Policy of the U. S. Federal Government. *American.*

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Robert I. Golembiewski, Small Group Analysis Applied to the Study of Organization in Public Administration. *Yale.*

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Donald B. Hayman, Personnel Management in North Carolina. *North Carolina.*

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Joseph A. James, The Administration of the Earned Income Tax in the Township of Mt. Lebanon: A Case Study. *Pittsburgh.*

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Changes

John G. Barmby, Utilization of Funds and Personnel for Naval Research. *American.* (Completed)

David A. Bingham, Iowa Agricultural Inspectional Activities: An Organizational Analysis. *Iowa.*

Robert J. Courtney, The Manager Plan in Pennsylvania Local Government. *Pennsylvania.* (Completed)

Donald E. Habbe, Pearl Harbor: A Case Study in Administration. *Wisconsin.* (Completed)

Mordecai Hacohen, The Administrative Aspects of the Jordan Valley Administration. *New School.* (Completed)

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Walbert W. Kaempfer, West Virginia's Board of Public Works: A Study of the Utility of the Plural Executive at the Highest State Level. *Alabama.* (Completed)

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Gordon McLean, Relative Power of the United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve System in Monetary Management and some Controversial Proposals for Changes. *New York University.* (Completed)

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William B. Monat, A Critical Analysis of the Merit System in Minnesota. *Minnesota.* (Completed)

Chester Morrill, Jr., Mission and Organization of the Army National Guard of the United States, with Emphasis on the Period since 1952. *American.*

Robert M. Northrop, Administrative Doctrine and Administrative Behavior: The AEC Experience. *Michigan.* (Completed)

Herbert Rosenberg, Office of Defense Mobilization: A Study of Civil Military Relations during the Korean Mobilization. *Chicago.* (Completed)

William B. Shore, Doctrine of Governmental Liability and Its Impact upon Public Administration. *Syracuse.* (Completed)

A. Donald Urquhart, The Conduct of Administrative Hearings in Metropolitan Los Angeles. *California* (Los Angeles). (Completed)

John L. Withers, The Administrative Theory and Practice of William Howard Taft. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Deil S. Wright, The Prestige of Public Employment in a Metropolitan Community. *Michigan.* (Completed)

Deletions

Frederick O. Bundy, The Administration of Rule Making and Licensing Processes under Selected Statutes of the Department of Agriculture. *Syracuse.*

Victor C. Hobday, Tennessee Municipalities and TVA Electric Power. *Syracuse.*

James E. Nix, The Admission of Negroes to

State Universities in the South. *Syracuse.*

Liberate B. Ruscigno, Organization for Personnel Management in California. *Stanford.*

Martin K. Tytell, Determining the Make, Model and Approximate Age of a Typewritten Document from Its Write. *New York University.*

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Henry Albinski, The Labour Party in South Africa Society. *Minnesota.*

J. Bruce Amstutz, The Indonesian Youth Movement, 1908–1955. *Fletcher School.*

William G. Andrews, Pierre Mendès France: A Study of French Parties and Politics. *Cornell.*

William T. Anene, Local Government and Administration in Nigeria. *New York University.*

E. Ramon Arango, The Social Thought of Belgian Catholics. *Florida.*

Satish K. Arora, The Formulation of American Foreign Policy and Attitudes toward India, 1946–1956. *Cornell.*

Douglas E. Ashford, The Istiglal Party in Transition. *Princeton.*

Shirley B. Cupery, British Regulation of Monopolies and Restrictive Practices. *Illinois.*

Bohdan R. Dociurkiw, Soviet Church Policy in the Ukraine. *Chicago.*

Tarig El-Mutwalli, The Tax System in Iraq: A Study of Taxation in a Developing Country. *American.*

Ivo K. Feierabend, Czechoslovakia 1938–39 and 1945–48: The Pattern of Two Satellite States. *Yale.*

Irving Goldner, Comparative Public Economic Enterprises. *New York University.*

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Vance M. Holland, Comparative National Politics in Regard to European Unity. *Washington* (Seattle).

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William H. N. Hull, A Comparative Study of the Role of the Cabinet Minister in the Nationalized Industries of Canada and Australia. *Duke.*

Adnan G. Iskander, Government and Administration in Lebanon since 1943. *American.*

Raymond H. Kaaret, The Government of Finland since 1947. *American.*

Robert K. Nelson, The Function of the Private Member of the New Zealand Parliament, 1946–1955. *Duke.*

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Pak Kun, Postwar Japanese Political Parties. *Pennsylvania.*

John C. Lane, The Constitutional Court of the Federal German Republic. *Columbia.*

George Lenches, Central Banks and Governments: The Institutional Framework of Monetary Policy Formation in the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. *Georgetown.*

Harold Lerner, The Role of Poles in Latin American Civilization. *New York University.*

Daniel S. Lev, Indonesia and the Afro-Asian Bloc. *Cornell.*

Adnan Mardini, Monetary Policy for Economic Development: A Case Study of Syria during the Last Decade. *American.*

Benjamin M. May, Jr., The Official Soviet Image of the Red Army, 1941–1945. *Yale.*

Mohammad T. Mehdi, Constitutionalism, Western and Middle Eastern. *California* (Berkeley).

Peter Merkl, The Emerging Federal System of Western Germany. *California* (Berkeley).

Khosrow Mostofi, A Comparative Study of Nationalism in Four Asian Countries: China, India, Iran, and Turkey. *Utah.*

Charles R. Naef, The Executive in the German Republic. *Rutgers.*

I. G. Nagy, The Intellectual Background of Popular Revolt in Hungary: (Portrait of a Generation in an Era of Political Ferment). *Columbia.*

Ngo Ton Dat, Post-Geneva Viet-Nam. *Cornell.*

Yasuo Okamura, Genro Politics in Japan. *Minnesota.*

Sunok Pai, Social Reform in Korea since 1945. *Rutgers.*

Jurji Popiw, Three Basic Elements in Soviet Religious Policy. *Notre Dame.*

Raymond G. Rocca, Italian Foreign Policy and the Mediterranean Problem, 1913–1939. *California* (Berkeley).

Peter H. Rohn, European Integration: A Comparison of Institutions. *Washington* (Seattle).

John Rue, The Uses of Nationalist Ideology in the Politics of the Chinese Communist Regime. *Minnesota.*

Michel Rywkin, The Soviet Nationalities Policy and the Communist Party Structure in

Uzbekistan: A Study of the Methods of Soviet Russian Control (1941–46). *Columbia.*

Rudolph Salaveria, The Office of the Mayor of Manila. *New York University.*

Thomas M. Sanford, The Social Credit Party in British Columbia. *California* (Berkeley).

Theodore F. Schaerf, Theories of Selected Leaders in the German Social-Democratic Party during the Weimar Period. *New York University.*

Ronald Schneider, Communism in Guatemala. *Princeton.*

Ernest H. Scrotskin, The Conduct of Foreign Policy under the Bonn Republic. *Stanford.*

Peter A. Toma, An Inquiry into the Political Process in the Soviet Union: The Reputation of Lysenkoism after Stalin's Death. *Southern California.*

Warren H. Tsuneishi, The Japanese Emperor under the Constitution of 1946. *Yale.*

Mattackal T. Varughese, Training Programs for India's *Gram Sewak. Claremont.*

Walter E. Volkomer, The Post-War Structure and Policies of the German Christian Democratic Party. *Rutgers.*

Elias K. Zighaib, Economic Development in Syria. *Syracuse.*

Changes

Eduardo D. C. Austin, The First Democratic Revolution in the Far East: Philippines, 1895–1905. *Georgetown.* (Completed)

Hans H. Baerwald, Problems of Developing Democratic Leadership in Japan. *California* (Berkeley). (Completed)

Samuel Barnes, The Political Role and Ideology of Organized Labor in Canada. *Duke.* (Completed)

P. V. Bhambal, Social Security in India and the United States. *Syracuse.* (Completed)

Robert C. Bone, Jr., The Origin and Development of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem, 1946–1956. *Cornell.*

Sudershan Chawla, India and the Communist Bloc. *Ohio State.*

C. W. Choudhury, The First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1947–1954): A Study in the Failure of its Mission. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Alfred Diamant, The Course of Political Catholicism in Austria. *Yale.* (Completed)

Rudolph Eilers, Foreign Policy Problems of the West German Government, 1942–1952. *American.* (Completed)

John G. Eriksen, Church and State Relations in Germany, 1930–1933. *Minnesota.*

J. Richard Gaechter, Government Liability in Tort: A Comparative Study of the French and Anglo-American Systems. *Cornell.* (Completed)

Khalil A. Ghalayini, Organization and Administration of the Arab States: Selected Problems and the Problem of Arab Unity. *American.* (Completed)

John G. Grumm, Electoral Systems and Voting Behavior in Western Europe: A Quantitative Approach. *California* (Berkeley). (Completed)

Earl Huyck, Population Growth in South Asia: A Study in Differential Fertility in India and Ceylon. *American.* (Completed)

Conrad Joyner, The Referenda Campaigns over Extension of Australian Commonwealth Powers; 1911–1919. *Florida.* (Completed)

Mehdi Kianfar, Greater Syria. *American.* (Completed)

Roy D. Laird, The Evolution of Soviet Agrarian Policy in Theory and Practice. *Washington* (Seattle). (Completed)

Thomas J. Leonard, Some Administrative Relations of the Indian Union and States, 1950 to 1956. *Southern California.*

Charlie Lyons, Jr., The Political Impact of American Assistance in India. *Ohio State.* (Completed)

David K. Marvin, Development of Conceptual Analysis for Study of African Political Systems in Transition. *Northwestern.* (Completed)

P. N. Narayanan Nair, The Office of the District Collector in the Government of India. *Cornell.* (Completed)

V. K. S. Navar, An Analysis of the Major Influences in the Drafting of the Constitution of India. *Yale.* (Completed)

Amos Perlmutter, A Study of the Socialist Zionist Parties in Israel, 1897–1955. *California* (Berkeley). (Completed)

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Salim A. Salim, The Political Significance of Labor Conditions in Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. *Southern California.*

Josef Silverstein, Federalism in Burma. *Cornell.*

James R. Soukup, A Study of the Political Activities of Selected Japanese Labor Unions. *Michigan.* (Completed)

Isidore Starr, Proposals for the Reform of the American Anti-Trust Laws. *New School.* (Completed)

Richard G. Staveley, Commerce Clause: Australia. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Herbert Storing, The British Ministry of Agriculture: A Study of Public Administration and Private Interests. *Chicago.* (Completed)

George Vlasak, The Czech Political Tradition: A Study in the Formative Period. *New York University.* (Completed)

Harold Webb, The Liberal Party in England: Theory and Practice. *Brown.* (Completed)

Ernest Wohlgemuth, The Politics of Labor in West Germany. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Deletions

Romeo A. Cherot, Kazakh Customary Law under the Russian Empire, 1824–1917. *Columbia.*

William Fleming, Judicial Review of Chancellor von Papen's Coup d'Etat in 1932. *Columbia.*

Jack Gourman, Germany: The Hitler State, 1933–1945. *California* (Los Angeles).

John F. Hostie, The Rise and Fall of the Rally of the French People. *Stanford.*

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Leslie G. Rofe, The French Economic Council. *Columbia.*

William L. Rofes, A Study of the Prime Minister in Great Britain. *Columbia.*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, POLITICS AND LAW

Additions

George K. Alapatt, The Problem of Forceable Repatriation of Prisoners of War. *St. Louis.*

Abid A. Al-marayati, Iraq's Role in the United Nations. *New York University.*

Tiburcio Baja, The United States Aid Program for the Republic of the Philippines: An Analysis and Evaluation. *Southern California.*

Joseph Barrat, The Relationship of the North Atlantic Treaty to the Charter of the United Nations. *New York University.*

Arthur B. Boenau, Civilian Control over the Military as It Was Conceived and Implemented by the West German Government from 1949 to 1956. *Columbia.*

Gertrude C. Boland, India in the General Assembly: Representation, Role and Voting. *Claremont.*

George H. Cohen, International Human Rights and the Constitutional Treaty Power in the United States. *New School.*

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Genevieve V. DeChellis, The Soviet Citizen's Picture of International Affairs—1955: A Study of the Official Soviet View of International Affairs as Presented to the Soviet Citizen by the Soviet Press. *Georgetown.*

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Kalesh Dudharkar, Factors Affecting Indian Attitudes toward Foreign Policy. *Minnesota.*

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Margaret Hamilton, French Socialists and Morocco. *Columbia.*

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Radovan Korach, Trieste and the United Nations. *Minnesota.*

Agnes Yao Kwan, Comparison of Mandates and Trusteeship. *Chicago.*

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Raymond A. Moore, Jr., The Foreign Policy Image of the British Labour Left. *Columbia.*

Jorge Morales-Yordan, The United States and Non-Self Governing Areas: A Study of the Relationships of the U. S. and the United Nations under Chapter XI of the Charter. *American.*

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Nicholas Nyary, Austro-British Subsidy Alliances in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. *Columbia.*

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Paul F. Power, International Thought of M. K. Gandhi. *New York University.*

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Chester F. Roberts, Malaya: The Development of International Relations and Policies. *Chicago.*

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John F. Rys, An Analysis of the Factors Influencing the Formulation of U. S. Foreign Policy toward the Inter-American System during the Period of the Cold War, 1945–1955. *American.*

Morton Schwartz, Soviet Policy in the World Federation of Trade Unions, 1945–1949. *Columbia.*

Ali Sheikholislam, Secret Diplomacy versus Registration of Treaties. *New York University.*

Maung Hla Shwe, The Foreign Policy of the United States towards Nazi Germany, 1933–1938. *American.*

Robert D. Tomasek, International Aspects of the Problem of Mexican Contract Labor in the United States. *Michigan.*

Eugene R. Vikingson, Sources of Authority in International Air Transport. *Minnesota.*

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Carl M. Wheeless, The Place of Minorities in Turkey, 1924–1951: A Study in Authority and Responsibility. *Georgetown.*

William W. Whitson, Army War College Preparation for National Security Policy Formulation. *Fletcher School.*

Young K. Yoon, United Nations Participation in the Korean Affair, 1945–1954. *American.*

Isidoro Zanotti, Judicial Settlement of Inter-American Disputes. *American.*

Changes

Rajai Abou-Khadra, UNESCO and the Arab Community. *Indiana.* (Completed)

Kenneth P. Adler, Can Adult Education Affect Foreign Policy? *Chicago.* (Completed)

Costas Alexandrides, United Nations Collective Economic Action in the Republic of Korea. *New York University.*

Iwuoha E. Aligwekwe, The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problems and the United Nations. *Ohio State.*

Victor Basiuk, Steel and the Changing Strengths of the Great Powers. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Anne B. Beeler, The International Labour Organization: Important Developments in its

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Stanislaw K. Bilinski, The Pattern of Soviet Russian Maritime Expansion after the Second World War: European "Satellite" Shipping (1945–1955). *Georgetown.* (Completed)

Jan J. Brazda, The Korean Armistice: A Case Study in American Chinese Communist Negotiations. *Florida.* (Completed)

Webster C. Cash, A Comparison of the Effects of Government Policies on Industrial Recoveries in East and West Germany, 1945–1955. *Chicago.*

Alphonso Castagno, Regional Influences in Italian Foreign Policy. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Tao Cheng, The Evolution of Treaty Provisions Concerning the Protection of Persons and Property: The British Practice. *Columbia.*

Ralph E. Cook, The Effect of the Armenian Question on Turkish-American Relations, 1894–1924. *Fletcher School.*

Anton DePorte, The European Policy of France, 1944–1947. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Edward Drake, The Soviet Alliance System. *New York University.* (Completed)

William B. Dunn, American Policy toward Vietnam since 1950. *Chicago.*

Morris O. Edwards, An Administrative Evaluation of Military Government in Germany during and after World War II. *Georgetown.* (Completed)

Harold E. Engle, The Place of International Administration in the Structure of International Politics: A Critical Study of "Functionalism." *Columbia.* (Completed)

Eliezer Ereli, Truce Supervision by the United Nations. *Fletcher School.* (Completed)

Richard F. Gardner, The Relations of the United States and Spain from 1898 to 1948. *Fletcher School.* (Completed)

Eggert W. Giere, The Interrelationship of Certain Forces in the Making of Foreign Policy: A Case Study—The Policy toward Postwar Germany from 1942–1945. *Washington* (Seattle).

Joan Gillespie, The North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1956: A Case Study in International Law and Diplomacy. *Fletcher School.*

Meredith Gilpatrick, Strategy of the Western Front, 1871–1914. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Elliot R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a World State. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Angelina Grammatico, The United Nations and the Development of Human Rights. *New York University.* (Completed)

Robert W. Gregg, International Narcotics Control under the Aegis of the United Nations. *Cornell.* (Completed)

Jane W. Harbaugh, The Origins of the Balfour Declaration: A Study of the Movement for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, 1914–1919. *Fletcher School.*

Takeshi Haruki, Japanese Foreign Policy under Matsuoka. *Southern California.* (Completed)

Charles H. Heimsath, India's Participation in the Korean War and Its Settlement. *Yale.* (Completed)

Stephen T. Hosmer, The 1955 General Elections in Java. *Yale.*

Richard Jaffe, Japanese Aggression in Southeast Asia, 1930–1950. *Chicago.*

Abdulfattah Jandali, U. N. Efforts to Set Standards for National Independence. *Wisconsin.* (Completed)

Catherine S. Kadragic, Role of the League of Nations in the Pacific Settlement of Political Disputes in the Balkans. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Subbiah Kannappan, The Indian Trade Union Movement: An Account and An Analysis. *Fletcher School.* (Completed)

Pierre Keller, American Defense Policy in Europe, 1947–1951: Official Views and Congressional Attitudes. *Yale.* (Completed)

Nancy Jane Kenney, The Economic Ideas of Gandhi and Indian Economic Planning. *Fletcher School.* (Completed)

Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby and the Formulation of American Foreign Policy, 1945–1952. *Florida.*

Max Landau, Political and Legal Aspects of Certain Discriminations against Direct Private U. S. A. Investments in Mexico. *New York University.*

Jonathan Levin, A Theory of Export Economics: Case Studies of Peruvian Guano and Burmese Rice. *Fletcher School.* (Completed)

Stephen Low, Population Redistribution under Colonial Government: American Experience in the Philippine Islands. *Fletcher School.* (Completed)

Stuart H. McIntyre, Legal Effect of War on Treaties. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Joseph C. McKenna, S.J., Diplomatic Protest as an Instrument of United States Foreign Policy. *Yale.* (Completed)

Robert L. McNeill, United States Policy toward Self-Government for Puerto Rico, 1898–1952. *Fletcher School.* (Completed)

Alfredo Manat, The Policy of the Philippines in the United Nations with Special Reference to the Position of the United States. *Chicago.*

Leo J. Moser, The Human Rights Program of the United Nations, 1945–1955. *Southern California.* (Completed)

Carl C. Moses, Judicial Control of the Constitutionality of the Laws in Cuba: A Study of Development in Theory and Practice. *North Carolina.* (Completed)

Irwin Oder, The United States and the Palestine Mandates, 1920–1948. *Columbia.* (Completed)

DeVere E. Pentony, The Marshall Plan: Declared Objectives and Apparent Results. *Iowa.* (Completed)

John W. Price, Anglo-French Attitudes in the Council of Europe. *Michigan.* (Completed)

Fahim I. Qubain, The Impact of the Petroleum Industry in Iraq, Bahrain, and Kuwait: A Case Study. *Wisconsin.* (Completed)

Dorothy Roberts, The Role of Partisanship in the Conduct of the Foreign Relations of the United States. *Chicago.* (Completed)

Theresa Schmatz, The Status of Dependent Areas in International Organizations in the Field of Communications. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Donald H. Scott, The Cultural Institute in Mexico City. *Southern California.*

Otis Shao, American China Policy in 1937. *Brown.* (Completed)

Glenn Snyder, Civil Military Perspectives on Raw Materials Security Policy. *Columbia.* (Completed)

James L. Snyder, The Post-War Economic Foreign Policy of Japan. *Yale.*

George S. Sugden, Influence of the Submarine on United States Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School.* (Completed)

Leif Tobiasson, The Right of Access to the United Nations Headquarters. *New York University.*

Donald R. Toussaint, The French Contribution to the Political Unification of Europe, 1944–1953. *Stanford.* (Completed)

Haydn Williams, A Study in British-American International Civil Aviation Relations: The Opening of the Atlantic and Pacific Airways *Fletcher School.*

Kurt Wimer, United States Executive-Legislative Tensions in Relation to the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter. *New York University.* (Completed)

Claude Woltz, Bloc Action in the United Nations. *New York University.* (Completed)

Philip M. Woo, Korea: An Analysis of Foreign Policy in Relation to Economic Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, 1945–1955. *New York University.*

Herbert H. Wood, Jr., International Supervision of Colonial Administrative Unions. *Columbia.* (Completed)

Theodore P. Wright, Jr., American Support of Free Elections Abroad. *Yale.* (Completed)

David Wurfel, The Bell Report and After: A Study of the Political Problems of Social Reform Stimulated by Foreign Aid. *Cornell.* (Completed)

Bahman Zand, The British and Russian Policies in Persia between 1907 and 1927. *Fordham.* (Completed)

Deletions

Abdul-Malik S. Al-Zaibag, Iraq Oil Politics in the Inter-War Period. *Columbia.*

Edward Barber, The Evaluation of National Power. *Georgetown.*

Marie P. Eaves, Prelude to War in Eastern Europe: Romania and the Powers, 1931–1941. *Columbia.*

Marina S. Finkelstein, The Soviet Challenge in the Balkans. *Columbia.*

Marjorie H. Gordon, Development of American Policy for the Occupation of Japan, 1941–1945. *Indiana.*

Budda V. Govindaraj, The Role of India in the Settlement of Disputes within the United Nations. *Michigan.*

Bruce B. Harlow, Determinants in International Relations: An Inquiry into Fundamentals. *Columbia.*

Wilhelm G. Hertz, The Swiss Conception of International Law. *Columbia.*

Conrad P. Homberger, A Theory of International Relations. *Columbia.*

Thomas Hovet, Jr., The General Assembly of the United Nations: An Analysis of the Establishment and Development of Its Organization and Procedures. *New York University.*

Louis G. James, Relations of the North American Railroads: A Study in International Cooperation of the Railroads of Canada, Mexico and the United States. *Columbia.*

Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy towards the Chinese Communists, 1935–1949. *Columbia.*

Charles H. McLaughlin, Principles of Treaty Interpretation. *Columbia.*

Daniel P. Moynihan, United States and the International Labor Organization. *Fletcher School.*

Frank Parrella, European Recovery Program vs. Communism in Italy, 1948–1950. *Georgetown.*

George H. Ried, Administration of an International Police Force. *Syracuse.*

Alfred S. Rigsbee, A Study of Functional International Organization in its Administrative Aspect. *Indiana.*

H. S. Royce, Jr., The British Withdrawal from Malaya. *Columbia.*

Charles E. Savigs, A Study into the Obligatory Character of Resolutions Passed by the Principal Organs of the League of Nations and the United Nations. *Florida.*

Jonathan D. Stoddart, The Influence of Immigrant Groups on United States Foreign Policy. *Fletcher School.*

G. Hans Voelkel, Discrimination Against Aliens in International Law. *Columbia.*

Juliane von K. Valentin, German-Japanese Relations in the Period between the Two World Wars. *Pennsylvania.*

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Gilbert Abcarian; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Political Romanticism: Coleridge and Tolstoi. *California* (Berkeley).

Minoo Adenwalla; A.B., Bombay University, 1948; A.M., Northwestern, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Political Philosophy of the Indian National Movement. *Northwestern.*

Albert Alexander; B.S.S., City College of New York, 1935; M.S. in Ed., *ibid.*, 1938; Ph.D., New School, 1957. American Influence on the Growth of Democracy in France. *New School.*

Lawrence Berns; A.B., Chicago, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. The Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon with Special Attention to the Principles of Foreign Policy. *Chicago.*

William T. Bluhm; B.A., Brown, 1948; M.A., Fletcher School, 1949; Ph.D., Chicago, 1957. The Austrian Idea: A Study of the Ideology of the Christian Corporative State of Austria, 1934–1938. *Chicago.*

Francis P. Canavan, S.J.; B.S., Fordham, 1939; A.M., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Duke, 1957. The Role of Reason in Politics According to Edmund Burke. *Duke.*

Margaret W. Dower; B.A., New Hampshire, 1943; M.A., Boston University, 1945; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. The Political and Social Thinking of George Bernard Shaw. *Boston University.*

Richard B. Gray; B.A., Wisconsin, 1947; M.A., Fletcher School, 1949; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1957. Jose Marti: His Life, Ideas, Apotheosis, and Significance as a Symbol in Cuban Politics and Selected Social Organizations. *Wisconsin.*

Dollena J. Humes; A.B., University of California, 1950; M.A., Nebraska, 1951; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1956. Oswald Garrison Villard: A Study in American Liberalism. *Syracuse.*

Richard P. Kosaki; B.A., University of Hawaii, 1949; M.A., Minnesota, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Majority Rule in the Theory of Democracy: A Critical Analysis. *Minnesota.*

Guenter Lewy; B.S.S., C.C.N.Y., 1951; M.A., Columbia, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Constitutionalism and Statecraft during the Golden Age of Spain: A Study of the Political Philosophy of Juan de Mariana, S.J. *Columbia.*

Cesar A. Majul; Ph.B., University of the Philippines, 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., Cornell, 1957. The Political Philosophy of the Philippine Revolution, 1896–1899. *Cornell.*

William O. Reichert; B.A., Transylvania (Lexington, Ky.), 1949; M.A., Kentucky, 1950; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1956. The Conservative Mind of William Harrell Mallock. *Minnesota.*

James E. Titus; B.A., Oklahoma, 1943; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1957. Studies in American Liberalism of the 1930's: John Dewey, Benjamin Cardozo and Thurman Arnold. *Wisconsin.*

Vincent C. Watson; A.B., University of Georgia, 1949; A.M., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1957. The Indian Constitution and the Hindu Tradition: Compatibility and Conflict of Basic Political Ideas. *Northwestern.*

Robert Yee; B.A., Washington (Seattle), 1947; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Harold J. Laski, from Pluralism to Marxism. *Washington* (Seattle).

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

David Booth; B.Sc., (Econ.), London School of Economics and Political Science, 1952; M.A., Virginia, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Constitutional and Political Aspects of the Jay Treaty, 1794–1796. *Virginia.*

Edmund B. Brownell; A.B., Michigan, 1949;

M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. A Study of the Interaction between the Department of the Treasury and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. *Michigan.*

John P. Carney; A.B., Wittenberg College, 1951; A.M., Southern California, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Major Problems Connected with United States Control of Postwar Mexican Immigration, 1945–1955. *Southern California.*

Rudolph S. Comstock; A.B., Kent State University, 1951; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1956. The St. Lawrence Seaway Project. *Ohio State.*

Melvin Crain; A.B., University of Redlands, 1946; A.M., Southern California, 1947; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Governance for Alaska: Some Aspects of Representation. *Southern California.*

Dorothy M. Cronheim; A.B., Rutgers, 1949; M.A., Ohio State, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Congressmen and Their Communication Practices. *Ohio State.*

James J. Flannery; B.A., Syracuse, 1948; M.S. Wisconsin, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Water Pollution Control: Development of State and National Policy. *Wisconsin.*

Paul C. Fowler; B.A., Nebraska State Teachers College, 1943; M.A., University of Colorado, 1947; Ph.D., Indiana, 1956. The Formulation of Public Policy for Commercial Broadcasting by the Federal Communications Commission. *Indiana.*

Thomas V. Gilpatrick; B.S., Illinois, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., Chicago, 1956. The Midwest Farm Vote and Farm Price Support Theory. *Chicago.*

Don F. Hadwiger; B.A., Oklahoma, 1953; M.A., Nebraska, 1954; Ph.D., Iowa, 1956. Farm Organization and United States Foreign Trade Policy, 1946–1955. *Iowa.*

Samuel Halperin; B.A., Washington (St. Louis), 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956.
American Zionism: The Building of a Political Interest Group. *Washington* (St. Louis).

David W. Hazel; A.B., Tufts, 1943; M.Ed., Boston, 1946; Ph.D., Michigan, 1957. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Legislative Process, 1940–1954. *Michigan.*

Walter Hohenstein; B.A., Winona State Teachers College, 1950; M.A., Minnesota, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. National Influence Over State and Local Personnel Practices in the United States. *Minnesota.*

Robert J. Huckshorn; B.S., Southwest Missouri, 1950; M.A., Iowa, 1955; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Congressional Reactions to the Second Hoover Commission. *Iowa.*

Alan E. Kent; B.S., Wisconsin, 1948; M.S., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Portrait in Isolationism: The LaFollettes and Foreign Policy. *Wisconsin.*

Kenneth T. Kofmehl; A.B., Idaho, 1941; A.M., Columbia, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Congressional Staffing, with Emphasis on the Professional Staff. *Columbia.*

Milton Levine; B.S., C.C.N.Y., 1942; M.A., Columbia, 1943; Ph.D., American, 1956. Reorganization Plans Submitted by the President to the 83rd Congress. *American.*

Lewis Mainzer; B.A., New York University, 1948; M.A., Chicago, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Research Policy Formation under the Research and Marketing Act of 1946. *Chicago.*

John R. Probert; B.A., Lafayette, 1937; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Staff Arrangements in the Organization for National Security. *Pennsylvania.*

Seymour Scher; B.S., Teachers College of Connecticut, 1950; M.A., Chicago, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Bifurcation of the National Labor Relations Board. *Chicago.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Louis A. Antrobus; A.B., Westminster College, 1928; M.A., University of Missouri, 1940; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Federal Exclusionary Rule in Relation to the Fourth Amendment as Applied and Interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. *Missouri.*

Gordon B. Cleveland; B.S., Davidson, 1938; M.S., Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 1947; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1957. A Theoretical Analysis of Administrative Policy Making. *North Carolina.*

Rondal G. Downing; A.B., Southwest Missouri State, 1952; A.M., Illinois, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Federal Courts and Labor Relations, 1935–1955: A Study in Judicial Decision Making. *Illinois.*

Spencer Gervin; B.S., East Tennessee State, 1936; A.M., Duke, 1941; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Rule by Decree under Statutory Delegations. *Duke.*

Royal C. Gilkey; B.A., Cornell, 1941; M.A., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1957. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Civil Liberties as Manifested in, and Suggested by, the Compulsory Flag Salute: A Study of Fifteen

Years of Supreme Court Opinions, 1939–1953. *Minnesota.*

Luther Hagard; B.A., Southern Methodist, 1943; M.A., *ibid.*, 1947; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1957. The Quest for Constitutional Equality among the States in the United States. *Minnesota.*

Charles A. Hollister; B.A., Nebraska State Teachers College, 1940; M.A., Arizona, 1946; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1957. A Judicial Analysis of the Right to Acquire, Possess, and Protect Property in Pennsylvania. *Pennsylvania.*

Eleanor T. Linenthal; B.A., Radcliffe, 1943; Ph.D., Cornell, 1956. Freedom of Speech and the Power of Courts and Congress to Punish for Contempt. *Cornell.*

Gordon Patric; B.S., Bradley, 1950; A.M., Illinois, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. The Impact of the McCollum Decision Particularly in Illinois. *Illinois.*

Yosal Rogat; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1947; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1956. Political Theory and Judicial Review: A Study of the Thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert G. Scigliano; B.A., California (Los Angeles), 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Chicago, 1957. Politics and the Judicial Process. *Chicago.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

John T. Ballard; B.A., Colorado, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., Iowa, 1956. The Impact of State Controls upon Financial Procedure: Johnson County, Iowa. *Iowa.*

Joseph Bernd; A.B., Mercer, 1945; A.M., Boston University, 1953; Ph.D., Duke, 1957. A Study of Primary Elections in Georgia, 1946–1954. *Duke.*

William J. Block; A.B., Eastern Illinois State College, 1948; A.M., Illinois, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Separation of the Farm Bureau and the Extension Service: A Study of Group Activities. *Illinois.*

Donald E. Boles; B.S., Wisconsin, 1950; M.S., *ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Administrative Rule Making in Wisconsin Conservation. *Wisconsin.*

John Bond; B.S., Trinity (Hartford), 1942; M.A., Chicago, 1948; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1956. Legislative Reapportionment in Minnesota. *Minnesota.*

Howard D. Criswell; B.A., George Washington, 1953; M.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., American, 1956. Urban County Government: A Survey of the Arlington County, Virginia, Government. *American.*

John M. DeGrove; A.B., Rollins College, 1953; M.A., Emory, 1954; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1957. Water Control in Central and Southern Florida: A Study of Public Administration and Intergovernmental Relations. *North Carolina.*

Brock Dixon; A.B., Pacific College, 1939; A.M., University of Oregon, 1949; PhD., Southern California, 1957. Governing the Suburban Fringe of Portland, Oregon. *Southern California.*

Floyd O. Flom; B.A., Hamline, 1942; M.A., Minnesota, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. The Minnesota Youth Conservation Act: A Case Study in the Legislative Process. *Minnesota.*

Richard T. Frost; B.A., Wesleyan, 1949; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1956. Standards for Zoning Agencies with Particular Reference to Use Variances and Conversions in Syracuse, N. Y. *Syracuse.*

Herbert Garfinkel; M.A., Chicago, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Black March on the White House: The Negro March on Washington Movement in the Organizational Politics for FEPC. *Chicago.*

Israel Glasser; B.A., Brooklyn, 1943; M.P.A., New York University, 1946; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. An Analysis of Voting Participation in the 1953 Democratic Mayoralty Primary Election in New York City. *New York University.*

Maurice G. Guysenir; B.E., Chicago Teachers College, 1947; A.M., Northwestern, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Jewish Voting Behavior in Chicago's 50th Ward. *Northwestern.*

Louise Harned; A.B., Bryn Mawr, 1950; M.A., Yale, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Participation in Political Parties: A Study of Party Committeemen. *Yale.*

Frederick H. Harris, Jr., A.B., Randolph-Macon, 1934; A.M., North Carolina, 1943; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. A Study of Political Activity in Two North Carolina Counties. *North Carolina.*

Evan A. Iverson; B.S., Utah State Agricultural College, 1943; M.A., California (Berkeley) 1945; Ph.D., University of Utah, 1956. Organization and Administration of Law Enforcement in the United States. *Utah.*

James A. Jarvis; A.B., Union College (Ky.), 1942; A.M., Kentucky, 1949; Ph.D., Illinois, 1957. Intergovernmental Relations in Public Housing with Special Reference to Louisville, Kentucky. *Illinois.*

John A. Larson; M.B.A., Northwestern, 1948;

Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1955. Community Participation in Tennessee's Postwar Industrial Development. *Northwestern.*

Ellis E. McCune; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Jury Selection in California: A Study in Judicial Administration. *California* (Los Angeles).

Thomas R. Masterson. Ph.B., Chicago, 1946; M.B.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Milwaukee Board of Harbor Commissioners: A Study in Public Port Administration. *Chicago.*

Warner Mills, Jr.; B.A., Dartmouth, 1943; M.A., Yale, 1948; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1956. Ross Sterling, Governor of Texas. *Johns Hopkins.*

Benjamin S. Nispel; B.S., Shippensburg State Teachers, 1942; M.A., Duke, 1949; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1957. The Office of Lieutenant Governor. *Pennsylvania.*

Edgar L. Owens; A.B., Dickinson College, 1948; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1956. Party Campaign Funds in Connecticut, 1950–54. *Syracuse.*

Dorothy S. Pealy; A.B., Michigan, 1947; M.P.A., *ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Charter Commissioners at Work: Ann Arbor, 1953–1955. *Michigan.*

James M. Roherty; B.A., Washington, 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1957. The Legislative Council as Legislative Institution: A Study of the Wisconsin Joint Legislative Council. *Wisconsin.*

Leonard C. Rowe; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1951; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Political Campaign Funds in California. *California* (Berkeley).

Joseph A. Schlesinger; A.B., Chicago, 1942; M.A., Harvard, 1947; Ph.D., Yale, 1955. The Emergence of Political Leadership: A Case Study of American Governors. *Yale.*

Edgar L. Sherbenou; A.B., Kansas, 1948; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Structure and Method of Political Power in a Small Town. *Kansas.*

William C. Wimberly; B.S., Southern Illinois, 1948; A.M., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., Illinois, 1957. The Illinois Primary. *Illinois.*

John W. Wood; A.B., Southwest Missouri, 1950; M.A., Iowa, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. A Study of the Iowa Judiciary. *Iowa.*

Lloyd Woodruff; B.A., South Dakota, 1943; M.S., Denver, 1947; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1957. The Wisconsin County Boards of Supervisors: A Study of Their Organizational and Operational Characteristics. *Minnesota.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

John G. Barmby; B.A., Middlebury, 1942; B.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1944; M.A., George Washington, 1951; Ph.D., American, 1957. Utilization of Funds and Personnel for Naval Research. *American.*

Robert J. Courtney; B.A., LaSalle, 1941; M.A., Niagara, 1946; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1957. The Manager Plan in Pennsylvania Local Government. *Pennsylvania.*

Benjamin Goldberg; B.S., St. John's University, 1934; M.A., New York, 1938; Ph.D., American, 1957. A Case Study in Price Control During the Korean Emergency: The Petroleum Industry in the United States. *American.*

Donald E. Habbe; B.A. Denison, 1952; M.S., Wisconsin, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Pearl Harbor: A Case Study in Administration. *Wisconsin.*

Paul H. Heppe; B.A., Wisconsin, 1939; M.A., *ibid.*, 1948; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. The Liberal Party of Canada. *Wisconsin.*

Walbert W. Kaempfer; B.P.A., Mississippi, 1953; M.A., Alabama, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. West Virginia's Board of Public Works: A Study of the Utility of the Plural Executive at the Highest State Level. *Alabama.*

Eugene Lee; A.B., California (Los Angeles), 1946; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Non-Partisan Local Government in California. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert S. Lorch; B.A., Iowa State, 1949; M.A., Nebraska, 1950; Ph.D., Wisconsin, 1957. Career Development in the Air Force. *Wisconsin.*

Gordon McLean; B.A., Arizona, 1935; M.A., *ibid.*, 1936; Ph.D., New York University, 1957. Relative Power of the United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve System in Monetary Management and Some Controversial Proposals for Changes. *New York University.*

Donald R. MacQuivey; B.A., Stanford, 1935; M.B.A., *ibid.*, 1942; Ph.D., American, 1956. Frequency Assignment Administrative Control. *American.*

William B. Monat; A.B., Minnesota, 1949; M.A., Wayne, 1950; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1956. A Critical Analysis of the Merit System in Minnesota. *Minnesota.*

Robert M. Northrop, A.B., Yale, 1949; M.A., Columbia, 1955; Ph.D., Michigan, 1957. Administrative Doctrine and Administrative Behavior: The AEC Experience. *Michigan.*

Robert A. Richards; B.Sc., B.A., Melbourne University, 1947; M.A., Manchester University, 1949; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1957. Decentralization in Public Utility Administration under Public and Private Ownership: A Study of Postal and Telephone Administration. *Ohio State.*

Herbert Rosenberg; B.A., Syracuse, 1939; M.A., Chicago, 1949; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. Office of Defense Mobilization: A Study of Civil-Military Relations during the Korean Mobilization. *Chicago.*

William B. Shore; B.A., Minnesota, 1948; M.A., University of Manchester (England), 1952; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1956. Doctrine of Governmental Liability and Its Impact upon Public Administration. *Syracuse.*

A. Donald Urquhart; A.B., Washington (Seattle), 1943; M.A., *ibid.*, 1949; Ph.D., California (Los Angeles), 1957. Adjudication and Rule Making in Los Angeles Municipal Administration. *California* (Los Angeles).

John L. Withers; S.B., Agricultural and Technical College of North Carolina, 1936; Ph.M., Wisconsin, 1941; M.A., Chicago, 1951; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. The Administrative Theory and Practice of William Howard Taft. *Chicago.*

C. Packard Wolle; B.A., Morningside, 1940; M.A., American, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. A Program of Plural Management for the Federal Government. *American.*

Deil S. Wright; A.B., Michigan, 1952; M.P.A., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1957. The Prestige of Public Service in a Metropolitan Community. *Michigan.*

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Eduardo D. C. Austin; B.A., California (Berkeley), 1949; M.A., *ibid.*, 1951; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1957. The First Democratic Revolution in the Far East: Philippines, 1895–1905. *Georgetown.*

Helmut Bader; Doc. of Law, University of Graz, 1937; Abs. Rer. Pol., *ibid.*, 1938; Ph.D., Southern California, 1957. The Impact of the American Doctrine of Judicial Review upon Austrian and German Constitutional Law. *Southern California.*

Hans H. Baerwald; A.B., California (Berkeley), 1950; M.A., *ibid.*, 1952; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1956. Problems of Developing Democratic Leadership in Japan. *California* (Berkeley).

Samuel H. Barnes; A.B., Tulane, 1952; A.M., *ibid.*, 1954; Ph.D., Duke, 1957. The Ideologies and Policies of Canadian Labor Organizations. *Duke.*

P. V. Bhambal; LL.B., Nagpur University, 1936; M.A., Syracuse, 1951; D.P.A., *ibid.*, 1957. Social Security in India and the United States. *Syracuse.*

Bourhan Chatti; L. en Droit, Syrian University, 1946; Ph.D., American, 1957. The Fiscal System in Syria with Emphasis on its Role in the Economic Development of the Country. *American.*

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

THE STUDY OF POLITICS IN FRANCE SINCE THE LIBERATION: A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY[1]

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In France, as Thibaudet has noted, political action takes place in the name of ideas. Ideological patterns and attitudes, some of which antedate the French Revolution, still underlie political activity so that the study of politics as a distinct branch of social theory and science has hardly developed. This continues to be the case today despite the fact that World War II, with the Vichy Regime, the German occupation, and ultimately the Liberation, revived many old problems and created new ones that called for careful scrutiny and reconsideration. To point to the lack of "political science" in France, therefore, is also to underline some peculiar characteristics of political thought in that country. Political philosophy and political speculation, ever since the time of the Encyclopedists, have been intimately associated with action. The inquiry into the nature of the good society leads often to a passionate call for action. In the best tradition of the eighteenth century, the medium of philosophic expression on political issues remains the pamphlet, the novel, and the periodical. The writings of Camus, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Mauriac, Simone de Beauvoir constitute today the most original political speculation in France, if not in Europe.

Political speculation in France has been primarily a confrontation of ideologies, often mutually incompatible and divisive of the body politic. The Republic itself has been for a long time and continues to be a bone of contention; parliamentary democracy and the institutions developed under the Constitution of 25 October 1946 continue to divide the French into many "schools of thought," and the reform of institutions is today a problem as old as the Republic itself: the scars of the Revolution have not been healed. Despite the *ralliement*, Catholics still seek a *modus vivendi* in the Republic; the issues raised by the conflict between the proponents of the *école laique* and the *école libre* trace their venerable past to arguments concerning the *répartition proportionelle scolaire* of the twenties, which in turn go back to the years before and after the turn of the century and to the Revolution. A number of political groups capitalize on a state of perennial discontent against the lack of positive achievement on the part of the Republic and constitute a growing body of disaffected, one might say alienated, citizens. Their protest finds expression in an anti-republican campaign. Today this is noticeable not only on the extreme left, but also among conservative and extreme right-wing groups.

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Cutting across these ideological divisions, there are some persistent ideological currents that unite and at the same time divide public opinion. The distinction between Left and Right, despite the changing content of the terms, continues to delineate two poles of attraction. Communism, Socialism, Radicalism, Christian Democracy continue to be the most important political labels of the "Left," while the disunited Right is splintered into tendencies that range from orthodox economic liberalism to Gaullism, various forms of integral nationalism and anti-republicanism, to fascism.

French theorists are thus caught up in an intense political, social, and ideological struggle. A great deal of effort is devoted to polemical discussion of current issues. The natural dialog that ought to take place within a democratic community is distorted by the continuous necessity for liberals, conservatives, and socialists to collaborate in order to stave off the collapse of French democracy itsef. The great debate in France is not between liberals and conservatives, or liberals and socialists, but between those who accept democratic values and those who subordinate these values to some "higher" goal. The challenge of totalitarianism, of course, has led to a general re-examination of concepts of freedom and constitutionalism in the West. But in France, the *internal* menace of fascism and communism has stimulated a literature of soul-searching rather than of re-examination. The power of the extreme Left and the occasional virulence of the Right seem to have exercised a kind of fascination on French theorists. Writings on democracy frequently reflect a pervasive lack of confidence in the capacity of a people to utilize parliamentary institutions in dealing with their most urgent problems.

In giving a bibliographic account which covers approximately a decade, we shall have to deal to a considerable degree with a type of literature that *reflects* rather than analyzes ideological positions and attitudes. We shall have to deal often with pamphlets, magazine articles, and other such publications that constitute a call to action rather than an incitement to reflection and speculation. Through our various citations we shall try to provide the reader with a tool by means of which he can examine for himself the contemporary French political scene. We shall also try to convey a sense of the drama that is going on today in a society striving constantly for the discovery of fundamentals on which the community can agree—but whose internal ideological divisions have been sharpened to such an extent that compromise and common action have been rendered arduous if not impossible.

I. GENERAL THEORY OF THE STATE

The books that attempt a general systematic analysis of the nature of the state, the source of political obligation, the changing character of individual rights, the relationships between freedom and the growing collectivism of the modern democratic systems, and the basic characteristics of constitutionalism are very few. Perhaps the only work that continues the tradition set by Duguit and Hauriou is Georges Burdeau's six-volume *Traité de science politique* (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1949–). The first volume, *Le pouvoir politique* (1949), is a general analysis of the origins of political society, the sources of law and the function of political power; the second, *L'État* (1949), is a systematic treatment of the theory of the state, its origins, and the nature of political obligation; the third, *Le statut du pouvoir dans l'État* (1950), deals with the mechanisms of constitutional government and the nature of constitutionalism; the fourth, *Les régimes politiques* (1952), deals with the various forms of government and more particularly with the representative and authoritarian regimes; the fifth and sixth, *L'état liberal et les techniques politiques de la démocratie gouvernée* (1953) and *La démocratie gouvernante: son assise sociale et sa philosophie politique* (1956), deal respectively with the general theory and practice of liberal democracy, and with the decline of liberalism, Marxism, and the development of the welfare state. Despite the great effort that has gone into this comprehensive treatise, there are few if any original insights. The little volume by Donnedieu de Vabres, *L'État* (Que-Sais-je, 1956), is a concise but rather elementary presentation of the democratic theory of the state and of the functioning of democratic institutions. The first chapters are of particular interest because the author's able analysis of legitimacy highlights the lack of consensus that characterizes the Fourth Republic. Maurice Duverger, *Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques* (Presses Universitaires, 1957) is valuable in that the author adds to the traditional analysis of the norms and institutions of the French constitution a good comparative section on other political systems. Marcel Prélot's *Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel* (Précis Dalloz, 1957), presented along the same lines as Duverger's study, is useful and comprehensive, but explains primarily legal forms rather than institutions and processes. The works of Bertrand de Jouvenel are in a somewhat different vein: *Du pouvoir* (Geneva, Editions du Cheval Ailé, 1945) and *La souveraineté* (Librairie de Médicis, 1955). Another work that merits consideration is Eric Weil, *Philosophie politique* (J. Vrin, 1956): Weil defines politics as "la science philosophique de l'action raisonnable" and proceeds to derive reasonable human action from moral postulates. The works of Jacques Maritain are sufficiently known not to require specific citations.

Despite the tradition of legal philosophy in France, there has been hardly any new work worth citing in the last ten years. The notable exceptions are Georges Scelle, *Le droit publique et la théorie de l'État* (Rousseau, 1951) and Henri Lévy-Bruhl, *Aspects sociologiques du droit* (Editions Rivière, 1955), both reflecting pre-war philosophic trends founded by the authors themselves.

II. THE FOURTH REPUBLIC AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

As may well be expected, the debate over the formulation of a new constitution preoccupied French political thinking from the time of the formation of the first Resistance groups and reached a high level of intensity in the years following the Liberation. Even after the Constitution of the Fourth Republic had been adopted, the debate continued. Inevitably, the Third Republic which had been laid to rest was resurrected and its merits and demerits carefully examined, while dissatisfaction with the institutions of the Fourth Republic kept alive the spirit of reform. It is not our purpose to cite any literature on the Third Republic except when it has a bearing upon the present movement for reform. In this connection, some of the autobiographies of prominent political leaders and thinkers, many of whom are still active, are of particular interest. General de Gaulle's *Mémoires de guerre* (Plon, 1954 and 1956), especially the first part of the first volume, gives a critical picture of the apathy and inertia of the fateful years preceding the declaration of World War II. *L'étrange défaite* (Société des Éditions Franc-Tireur, 1946), by the late Marc Bloch, one of the foremost historians of France, is a penetrating account of the inefficiency and demoralization of the army personnel—a demoralization that reflected accurately the state of mind of the civilian population. Edouard Herriot, *Jadis* (Flammarion, 1948–52), particularly the second volume, *D'une guerre à l'autre* (1948), and Vincent Auriol, *Hier-demain* (Charlot, 1945) are worth consulting. Léon Blum, *A l'échelle humaine* (Gallimard, 1945), on the other hand, is a more detached scrutiny of past errors, especially of the attitudes and policies of the working classes and the working class parties, and a call for reform. *Réflexions politiques, 1932–52* (Editions du Seuil, 1951), by Hubert Beuve-Méry, one of the most eminent representatives of the French press, spans the period of the two Republics. Of particular interest are the passages dealing with foreign policy and French neutralism, of which Beuve-Méry was an articulate exponent.

The debates on the new constitution and the literature they evoked have been well reported in Gordon Wright, *The Reshaping of French Democracy* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948). Necessary background material may be found in *Les idées politiques de la résistance, documents clandestins*, by Henri Michel and Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch (Presses Universitaires, 1954), and Robert Aron, *Histoire de Vichy* (A. Fayard, 1954). On the constitution of the Fourth Republic itself, there have been numerous first-rate studies. The most important are: Georges Burdeau, Maurice Byé, J. J. Chevalier, and André Hauriou, "La constitution de la IV^e République, commentaires," in *Études juridiques* (Nos. 3–4, March-August 1954); Malézieux and Rousseau, *La constitution de la IV^e République: commentaire et texte de la loi constitutionelle du 27 octobre 1946, modifiée par celle du 7 décembre 1954* (Cujas, 1955); Jean Lassaigne, *Constitution de la République française, 27 octobre 1946, et lois organiques: Textes complets et commentaires* (Recueil Sirey, 1947), which includes detailed reference to the debates in the Constituent Assembly for each article. For the best commentary on the recent reform of the Constitution, see Claude Poutier, *La réforme de la constitution (loi constitutionelle du 7 décembre 1954), texte et commentaire* (Recueil Sirey, 1955). A good analysis of the social and economic provisions of the Constitution is J. Rivero and Georges Vedel, *Les problèmes* *économiques et sociaux de la constitution du 27 octobre 1946* (Librairie Sociale et Economique, 1947).

The elaboration of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic hardly satisfied any political group or student of French politics. Thus the debate on the institutions of the Republic was resumed at the very moment when the new constitution came into effect. Criticism came originally from the right-wing groups and particularly the Gaullists. The most important publications, in addition, of course, to General de Gaulle's speeches, are Rémy Roure, *La IV^e République: naissance ou avortement d'un régime* (Le Monde, 1949) and Michel Debré's more comprehensive criticisms in *La mort de l'État républicain* (Gallimard, 1947) and *La république et ses problèmes* (Nagel, 1952). Debré is perhaps the most eloquent critic of the Fourth Republic. The excessive administrative centralization, the instability of the cabinet, the apathy of public opinion and the gap that separates it from Parliament and Cabinet, the lack of political leadership that should produce a greater involvement and participation of the average French citizen in politics, and finally the sectarian attitude of parties and groups are provocatively treated in these two books. Maurice Lauré, *Révolution: dernière chance de la France* (Presses Universitaires, 1954) and Léon Noël, *Notre dernière chance* (Librairie Gedalge, 1956) are both written in the same vein. Lauré notes that the revolutionary ideologies of nationalism and freedom need to be complemented with an attachment to the ideas of "community" and "solidarity," while Noël, an avowed Gaullist, demands extensive constitutional modifications to give more power to the government in order to curtail the power of the pressure groups and the civil service, which in essence, he contends, governs France.

As time went on, however, the demand for reform became more persistent and a number of writers of unimpeachable republican respectability joined the growing movement of protest. Curiously enough, extreme demands for reform, involving the scrapping of parliamentary institutions in favor of a presidential regime, came from two professors of law who are generally associated with the Left, Georges Vedel and Maurice Duverger: from the former, in his "L'instabilité gouvernementale," *Revue banque et bourse* (May 1956), and from the latter, in the series of articles that appeared in *Le Monde* in April, May, and June of 1956. A good summary of their arguments will be found in François Goguel, "Vers une nouvelle orientation de la révision constitutionnelle," *Revue française de science politique*, Vol. VI, No. 3 (July–September 1956). Vedel and Duverger advocate the presidential system in order to produce an executive independent of the welter of parties and interests that dominate the cabinet today, while at the same time both authors, but more particularly Duverger, argue for some form of "automatic dissolution" and re-election of the representative assembly *and* the president in case of conflict between the two! Indeed, the literature on constitutional reform reveals a curious inability on the part of the French to understand the simple mechanism of cabinet government in England and the significance of the two-party system in the development of the American presidential system. Though recognizing many of the institutional weaknesses of the Fourth Republic, both Charles Morazé in *Les Français et la république* (A. Colin, 1956) and André Siegfried in *De la troisième à la quatrième république* (B. Grasset, 1956) tend to view the present institutions with relatively less pessimism. Finally, Jacques Théry, *Le gouvernement de la quatrième république* (Librairie Générale de Jurisprudence, 1949), though outdated, is a useful examination of the constitutional basis and the functioning of the institutions of the Republic, while François Goguel, *Le régime politique français* (Editions du Seuil, 1955) is a succinct exposition of the workings of the French contemporary political system. There is no French work comparable to Philip Williams, *Post-War Politics in France* (London: Longmans, 1954).

The institutions of the French Union and the provisions embodied in Section VIII of the Constitution have come under intensive study and criticism. There is adequate background material in the *Encyclopédie politique de la France et du monde*, Vol. I, and in Pierre Lampué, *L'union française d'après la constitution* (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1947), the latter dealing exclusively with legal structure. Bernard Lavergne in *Une révolution de la politique coloniale de la France* (Librairie Mercure, 1948) admits that the traditional policy of assimilation has failed in Algeria but asserts that "assimilation est en fait de la colonisation le norme caractéristique du génie français" (p. 53). Hubert Deschamps, *L'Union française* (Berger Levrault, 1952) is a balanced account of the history, economy, and social evolution of the Union. Contemporary problems facing the French Union are dealt with in a collection of essays published in *La nef* (June 1955) under the title "Où va l'Union française? Du colonialisme à l'association."

The arguments in favor of federation, presented in a number of publications, run counter to the long-established tradition of a unitary state. Resistance to new ideas is illustrated not only by the lack of institutional reform, but also by the poverty of theoretical works on the subject of federalism, which still remains anathema to Jacobin republicanism. Alexandre Marc, *Civilisation en sursis* (La Colombe, 1955) is a rather ambitious work, trying to show that the future of democracy and liberty is inextricably associated with the development of European and world federalism. René Capitant's short essay, *Pour une constitution fédérale* (Renaissances, 1946) is a succinct juristic formulation of the principles of federalism; Charles Durand, *Confédération d'états et état fédéral* (Rivière et Cie, 1955) is a juristic discussion of the differences between a federal system and a confederation.

III. IDEOLOGIES AND PARTIES

Political Parties and Public Opinion: The early work of André Siegfried, in particular his *Tableau politique de la France de l'ouest sous la III^e République* (A. Colin, 1913), stimulated an intense interest among French political scientists in electoral sociology and geography. The theoretical assumptions underlying much of the post-war literature in this field are stated in François Goguel, *La politique des partis sous la III^e République* (Editions duSeuil, 1946). Goguel interprets the history of the Third Republic in terms of a persistent conflict between two opposed political temperaments and forces: the party of Movement and the party of Order. The thesis is further developed in his *Géographie des élections françaises de 1870 à 1951* (A. Colin, 1951), which contains a series of valuable electoral charts pointing up the historical evolution of the Left and Right in France. Goguel has analyzed each of the post-Liberation elections in *Esprit* (December 1945, July 1946, and September 1951) and in the *Revue française de science politique* (January–March 1956).

A number of monographs have been published on research methods and problems in electoral sociology. One of the first post-war efforts was an omnibus volume by Charles Morazé, R. B. MacCallum, Gabriel Le Bras, and Pierre George, *Etudes de sociologie électorale* (A. Colin, 1947). François Goguel and Georges Dupeux, *Sociologie électorale* (A. Colin, 1951) contains a summary of research undertaken in the field, and a useful guide to research materials. Electoral systems are examined in Maurice Duverger (ed.), *L'influence des systèmes électoraux sur la vie politique* (A. Colin, 1950); the essays by Duverger on electoral systems in general and by Goguel on the French experience are useful. François Goguel (ed.), *Nouvelles études de sociologie électorale* (A. Colin, 1954) is an omnibus volume in which ten contributors analyze election results in France and abroad. The role of women in French politics is discussed in Mattéi Dogan and Jacques Narbonne, *Les Françaises face à la politique* (A. Colin, 1955). Under the direction of Maurice Duverger, François Goguel, and Jean Touchard, the general elections of 1956 were subjected to an intensive examination. The result, *Les élections du 2 janvier 1956* (A. Colin, 1957), is an indispensable work on the French party and electoral system. A number of studies have been published by the Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques on specific departments and cities. One of the best in the series is Pierre Clément and Nelly Xydias, *Vienne sur le Rhône* (A. Colin, 1955). The authors provide an analysis in depth of the social, economic, and political structure of the area.

The methods, assumptions, and conclusions of most of the above-cited works in electoral sociology have been subjected to a vigorous critique by Raymond Aron in "Réflexions sur la politique et la science politique françaises," *Revue française de science politique* (January–March 1955), and "Electeurs, partis et élus," *ibid.* (April–June 1955). Aron challenges Goguel's thesis concerning the historical constancy of the Left and the Right as political forces and questions the utility of intensive analyses of French departments in attempting to explain the lack of discipline and unity in the governing process. "La recherche microscopique, dans le cadre de la circonscription, risque d'accumuler des renseignements intéressants ou curieux, sans aboutir à aucune conclusion" (p. 241)—a remark not without relevance to American literature in the field.

The leading theoretical work on political parties is Maurice Duverger's well-known *Les partis politiques* (A. Colin, 1951), a comparative analysis of the ideology, social and class basis, and structure of parties. An indispensable supplement to Duverger is G. E. Lavau, *Partis politiques et réalités sociales* (A. Colin, 1953), in effect a global critique of Duverger's hypotheses, especially his assumptions concerning the importance of electoral systems. The relationship between social and party organization is explored in Maurice Duverger (ed.), *Partis politiques et classes sociales en France* (A. Colin, 1955); thirteen contributors analyze the political activities of the chief social classes in France, as well as the social structure of the major political parties.

The changes that have taken place in the French party system since the Liberation, which have conditioned speculation on party structure, are described in several handbooks. The best short treatments are François Goguel, *Les partis politiques en France* (Editions de l'Encyclopédie Coloniale et Maritime, 1950), which originally appeared as a contribution to the *Encyclopédie politique de la France et du monde*, and Jacques Fauvet, *Les forces politiques en France* (Editions Le Monde, 1951). The political analyst of *Le Monde* examines the psychology, structure, geography, and programs of the parties that dominated the first legislature and also comments on the problem of electoral reform. Less satisfactory but useful surveys include Paul Marabuto, *Les partis politiques et les mouvements sociaux sous la IVᵉ république* (Recueil Sirey, 1948) and Jacques Malterre and Paul Benoist, *Les partis politiques français* (Bibliothèque de l'Homme d'Action, 1956).

The development of *tripartisme* stimulated a literature of protest by Gaullist intellectuals against the "party-state." For Marcel Waline in *Les partis contre la république* (Editions Rousseau, 1948), the regime of the parties is the very negation of parliamentary government. Louis Vallon, *Le dilemme français* (Les Editions Denoël, 1951) is a condemnation of the divisive tendencies of party politics. For an early polemical attack on the "regime of the parties," see Roger A. Priouret, *La république des partis* (Editions de l'Elan, 1947).

The standard French work on public opinion remains Jean Stoetzel, *Théorie des opinions* (Presses Universitaires, 1943), solid and scholarly. Alfred Sauvy, *L'opinion publique* (Presses Universitaires, 1956) is a brief summary, interesting chiefly for its material on the alcohol and trucking lobbies. There has been in recent years considerable interest among French political scientists in pressure groups. Some valuable essays may be found in the special issue of *Esprit* for June 1953, "Pouvoir politique et pouvoir économique." See also G. E. Lavau, "Note sur un 'pressure-group' français," *Revue française de science politique* (April–June 1955), and Jean Meynaud, "L'intervention des groupes d'intérêts dans la vie politique," *Revue économique et sociale* (October 1956).

Right and Left: The traditional categories of Right and Left continue to be used, for example in Goguel's work cited elsewhere. Jean Labasse in *Hommes de droite, hommes de gauche* (Economie et Humanisme, 1947) associates the "men of the Left" with a continuing belief in the principles of '89—liberty, equality, rationalism, and humanism; the "men of the Right" are those who have never fully accepted these principles and remain attached to the values of hierarchy, order, tradition, and, often, revealed truth. An interesting special issue of *Les temps modernes* (Nos. 112–113, 1955), entitled "La Gauche," analyzes the various ideological positions of the Left; the general conclusion reached by the reader is that Radicalism and Socialism have abandoned their pre-war positions to move considerably to the Right, while the Communist party no longer represents a genuine ideology of the Left. René Rémond comments on this symposium in "A propos de la gauche," *Revue française de science politique* (October–December 1955). Raymond Aron in his *L'opium des intellectuels* (Calmann-Lévy, 1955) and *Le grand schisme* (Gallimard, 1948) portrays the growing dogmatism and alienation of the intellectuals of the Left and the disruption of the Left by the withdrawal of the Communists from the body politic. The distinction has come under sharp criticism, notably in the first chapter of René Rémond's excellent volume, *La droite en France de 1815 à nos jours* (Aubier, 1954), and in Raymond Aron, "La politique et la science politique françaises," *Revue française de science politique* (January–March 1955). Both contend that differences within the Left and the Right are as important as differences between them.

Ideological Conflict: The existence of a powerful Communist movement in France has provoked an enormous literature of exposition and protest. For the history and organization of the Communist party, see Gérard Walter, *Histoire du parti communiste français* (Librarie Somogy, 1948), especially good on the bolshevization of the party and the evolution of the united front tactic. The author tends to be uncritical, even of the role played by the party after the Nazi-Soviet pact. Alain Brayance, *Anatomie du parti communiste français* (Dencel, 1952) is a pedestrian account of the party's structure. Maurice Thorez, *Fils du peuple* (Editions Sociales, 1949) is a basic source. For the reaction of the leadership to the de-stalinization campaign, *Le xiv^e congrès du parti communiste français, Le Havre, 18–21 Juillet 1956* (Cahiers du Communisme, 1956) is indispensable.

Communist party intellectuals have turned out a spate of unoriginal books on various theoretical topics. Aragon in his *L'homme communiste* (Gallimard, 1946–53) gives a long and unduly tedious account of the virtues of the Communist militant and, ultimately, citizen. Roger Garaudy, *Le communisme et la morale* (Editions Sociales, 1945) is an analysis of bourgeois "individualism," fascist "totalitarianism," and Christian "personalism" from the viewpoint of Marxist "humanism." Garaudy, *La théorie matérialiste de la connaissance* (Presses Universitaires, 1953) is the basic party work on dialectical materialism and psychology. The theme of Garaudy, *La liberté* (Editions Sociales, 1955) is that "liberty" (i.e., elimination of the class struggle) can be achieved only through the dictatorship of the proletariat. *La liberté* was accepted as a doctoral thesis at the University of Moscow and is, not unnaturally, ultra-Stalinist. A more interesting defense of historical materialism may be found in Jean T. Desanti, *Introduction à l'histoire de la philosophie* (Editions de la Nouvelle Critique, 1956).

Other standard Communist theoretical works include Henri Lefèbvre, *Le matérialisme dialectique* (Presses Universitaires, 1947), *Le marxisme* (Presses Universitaires, 1948), and *Contribution à l'esthétique* (Editions Sociales, 1953)—all orthodox statements. Jean Baby, *Principes fondamentaux d'économie politique* (Editions Sociales, 1951) is a dreary exercise. Victor Leduc makes a polemical attack on social democracy in general and on Léon Blum in particular in *Le marxisme, est-il dépassé?* (Editions Raison d'Etre, 1946). Maurice Thorez, *Pour la grandeur de la France* (Editions Sociales, 1946), Georges Cogniot, *Réalité de la nation* (Editions Sociales, 1950), and Victor Leduc, *Communisme et nation* (Editions Sociales, 1954) patiently explain how French workers become true patriots by supporting the Soviet Union rather than the French bourgeois state. An official statement on relations between the party and intellectuals may be found in Laurent Casanova, *Le parti communiste, les intellectuels et la nation* (Editions Sociales, 1951).

Angelo Rossi, an important figure in the international communist movement for ten years following World War I, has written a series of critical studies on French communism. *La physiologie du parti communiste français* (Editions Self, 1948) covers the period from June 1940 to the end of 1941 in detail. Although Rossi considers the French Communist Party a "foreign nationalist party," he recognizes that its roots strike deep into French society. The dependence of French Communist policy and tactics upon the foreign policy needs of the Soviet Union is the recurrent theme of *Les cahiers du bolchévisme pendant la campagne 1939–40* (Dominique Walter, 1950), *Les communistes français pendant la drôle de guerre* (Les Iles d'Or, 1951), and *La guerre des papillons* (Les Iles d'Or, 1954).

Among the most worthwhile critical studies of Marxism and communism are Alfred Camus, *L'homme révolté* (Gallimard, 1951) and the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: *Humanisme et terreur* (Gallimard, 1947), *Sens et non-sens* (Nagel, 1948), and *Les aventures de la dialectique* (Gallimard, 1955). Merleau-Ponty's "neo-liberalism" (neither pro-capitalist nor pro-Stalinist) has led him into the Mendèsiste camp. The numerous replies to Merleau-Ponty include an official Communist riposte, *Mésaventures de l'anti-marxisme* (Editions Sociales, 1956), ed. Roger Garaudy. Merleau-Ponty is castigated, ridiculed, and then arraigned on the heinous charge of "pragmatism" (the doctrine that truth is whatever is useful to the bourgeoisie!). Raymond Aron is perhaps the best known French critic of Marxism. *L'opium des intellectuels* (Calmann-Lévy, 1955) pitilessly examines the French intelligentsia's pusillanimous relations with Communism; the author's comments on the "myths" of the Left, Revolution, and the Proletariat are stimulating. Aron's *Polémiques* (Gallimard, 1955) is a collection of articles that appeared over the post-war years, with Sartre and assorted Communists as the principal targets.

Michel Collinet, *La tragédie du marxisme* (Calmann-Lévy, 1948) is a biting criticism of Leninism and Stalinism. Communism is viewed as a secular religion by Jules Monnerot in *Sociologie du communisme* (Gallimard, 1949). Thierry Maulnier discusses terror as an instrument of communist policy in *La face de méduse du communisme* (Gallimard, 1951). Jean Marchal in *Deux essais sur le marxisme* (Librairie de Médicis, 1955) rejects Marxist metaphysics and sociology but attempts to utilize Marxist economics as an instrument of analysis—with particular reference to the distribution of national revenue. Jean Hyppolite, *Etudes sur Marx et Hegel* (M. Rivière, 1955) is a good analysis of the

Hegelian foundations of Marxism. Pierre Naville outraged orthodox Marxists by trying to provide, in *Psychologie, marxisme, matérialisme* (M. Rivière, 1946), a psychological theory for Marxism drawn from Watson's behaviorism.

Catholic intellectuals have undertaken a systematic and in many cases provocative review of Marxist theory. Jean Lacroix in *Marxisme, existentialisme, personnalisme* (Presses Universitaires, 1950) argues that both Marxism and existentialism fail to recognize all that is implied in the human condition, especially the role of belief. He affirms the personalist principle that Man, caught between time and eternity, is a pilgrim of the Absolute. The three-volume series of "carnets de route" by the late editor of *Esprit*, Emmanuel Mounier—*Feu la Chrétienté* (Seuil, 1950), *Les certitudes difficiles* (Seuil, 1951), and *L'espoir des désespérés* (Seuil, 1953)—are a rich source for an understanding of Christian socialism and in large part constitute a critique of Marxism and the Communist movement. Mounier denounces both American "expansionism" and Soviet Communism as alien to "Christianism." Actually, he considers capitalism altogether incompatible with Christian principles—no link can be discerned, he says, between the Sermon on the Mount and American capitalism—while Communism at least shares with Christianity certain revolutionary aspirations and strivings. In spite of his sincere desire to collaborate with the Communists, circumstances forced Mounier into a series of bitter polemical exchanges with Thorez, Kanapa, and Garaudy. See also the volume of collected correspondence and essays, *Mounier et sa génération* (Seuil, 1956).

Other critical works on Marxism from the Christian viewpoint include Pierre Bigo, *Marxisme et humanisme* (Presses Universitaires, 1953), Henri Bartoli, *La doctrine économique et sociale de Karl Marx* (Seuil, 1950), Henri Chambre, *Le marxisme en Union Soviétique* (Seuil, 1955), and Emile Baas, *Introduction critique au marxisme* (Editions Alsatia, 1953). The Catholic critics generally view Communism as an *incomplete* humanism. Henri Bartoli, for example, argues that Marx, by refusing to accept man as a mere commodity, thereby restored his dignity as a person—though Bartoli hastens to conclude that no solution to the problems raised by Marx is possible outside Christ. Pierre Bigo similarly lauds Marx's refusal to accept as definitive the status of the proletariat and the domination of money over man and then deplores Marx's failure to recognize the true dimensions of man. Henri Chambre's work is a detailed study of the transformation of Marxist theory into a collection of utilitarian techniques for the execution of the policies of the Soviet state and the Communist party. Marxism in the Soviet Union, he contends, has thus become the utter negation of Christian values and principles. Finally, Jean Yves Calvez, *La pensée de Karl Marx* (Seuil, 1956) is an unusually comprehensive and relatively objective treatment of the subject from the Catholic standpoint.

The French Communist party suffered a severe leadership crisis after the failure of the anti-Ridgway riots in 1952. The repressive action taken against the party led Jean-Paul Sartre to an ultra-Leninist view of the role played by the Communist party, best expressed in his articles, "Les communistes et la paix," in *Les temps modernes* (July 1952, October–November 1952, April 1954).

Of considerable interest are Sartre's vitriolic exchanges with Albert Camus and Claude Lefort in *Les Temps modernes* (August 1952, April 1953). At any rate, the subsequent humiliation and expulsion of André Marty, André Lecoeur, and Pierre Hervé resulted in a number of literary productions that have provided precious background on the internal processes of the French party, as well as some work of theoretical interest.[2]

André Marty told his story in *L'affaire Marty* (Deux Rives, 1955), a rambling but important source of information on the organization and leadership of the party. The real cause of his expulsion, he claims, was his statement in 1952 before the Central Committee that the leadership was sacrificing the interests of the proletariat by its policy of class collaboration. Auguste Lecoeur in *L'autocritique attendue* (Editions Girault, 1955) also denounces Thorez's opportunistic emphasis in creating a mass party. He gives an interesting account of the pettiness and vindictiveness of Thorez, Duclos, and above all of Jeannet the Vermeersch but refrains from criticizing Communism or the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Pierre Hervé, *La Révolution et les fétiches* (La Table Ronde, 1956) contains no direct references at all to the party leadership. He rather undertakes a highly abstract criticism of "fetichism," relying for "proof" on carefully selected quotations from the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin!

Hervé's book was attacked in *L'humanité, France nouvelle, Cahiers du communisme*, and the *Nouvelle critique*. The most noteworthy criticism was in Jean-Paul Sartre's articles, "Le réformisme et les fétiches," *Les temps modernes* (February 1956) and "Réponse à Pierre Naville," *ibid.* (March–April 1956). Sartre declared that Hervé was wrong but that the party should not have expelled him merely for expressing an opinion. In this context Sartre made the celebrated comment: "Porté par l'histoire [le parti communiste] manifeste une extraordinaire intelligence objective; il est rare qu'il se trompe" (p. 1158). This moved Hervé to publish a second book, *Lettre à Sartre et à quelques autres par la même occasion* (La Table Ronde, 1956), which contains much "inside" information on the French party and the unyielding dogmatism of its leaders. Hervé calls virtually for a program of social democracy: a return to constitutionalism and support for sweeping economic and social reforms. He also claims, with some justification, that his doctrine of "several roads to socialism" was vindicated by Krushchev and Mikoyan at the Twentieth Party Congress. Hervé deals with the implications of the de-stalinization campaign in his hastily written *Dieu et César, sont-ils communistes?* (La Table Ronde, 1956).

The intervention of Soviet troops in Budapest had a profound impact upon left-wing intellectuals. In a special issue of *Les Temps modernes* (January 1957), Sartre developed his theory of the "double refus" (even-handed condemnation of Suez and Budapest) and denounced the French Communist party for its complicity in the massacre and for its blind subservience to Russia.

The French Socialist party, torn between Marxist aspirations and reformist policies, has been unable to develop a new, creative doctrine that might capture the imagination of the masses as well as provide a realistic guide to political action. The predicament of Socialist theory is brought out in "Le socialisme français, victime du marxisme?" *La Nef* (June–July 1950), and "Le socialisme," *Esprit* (May 1956). In fact, there are few Socialist works that deal with such problems as freedom in a planned society, the internal organization of nationalized services and their relations with the public, the reform of political institutions, and international cooperation. Marcel Prélot, *L'évolution politique du socialisme français* (Spes, 1939) is an historical treatment of French Socialism that serves mainly to point up its doctrinal dilemmas. The traditional Jaurès position was restated during the war by André Hauriou in *Le socialisme humaniste* (Alger: Fontaine, 1944), without adding much light on the real problems of post-war French Socialism. Georges Izard, *L'homme est révolutionnaire* (Bernard Grasset, 1945) was a promising effort to free the Socialist party of certain Marxist dogmas—but was not followed up. There are, of course, a number of books that set forth the traditional social democratic (anti-capitalist, anti-Stalinist) point of view: for example, Georges Bourgin and Pierre Rimbert, *Le socialisme* (Presses Universitaires, 1950) and Georges Lasserre, *Socialiser dans la liberté* (A. Michel, 1949). Bourgin and Rimbert's work is an introductory essay, while Lasserre's proposals for a "third road" between capitalism and state socialism are unrealistic. F. Koechlin in *Capitalisme et socialisme* (Librairie de Medicis, 1953) recommends a plan for profit-sharing and workers' participation in management which resembles the Gaullist scheme of capital-labor "associations." The analysis, however, is elementary. The cooperative movement is examined by Bernard Lavergne in *Le socialisme coopératif* (Presses Universitaires, 1949).

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[2] For a full bibliographical note, see Jean Touchard, "De l'affaire Lecoeur à l'affaire Hervé," *Revue française de science politique* (April–June 1956), 389–398.

The only exceptional work on Socialist theory is the recent study of *La démocratie industrielle* (Presses Universitaires, 1955), by a leading Socialist intellectual and former deputy, André Philip. Refusing to become entangled in Marxist schemas, Philip rejects direct workers' control of production as a socialist goal: what is required is to restore to the worker his self-respect by the participation of his union in the institutions that make important decisions concerning the distribution of national income. Trade unions can rally democratic elements of the population, Philip points out, when the workers' claims are presented as one aspect of a general struggle for human liberty, not as a narrow professional interest.

Jules Moch, *Confrontations* (Gallimard, 1952) reviews Marxist doctrine in the light of twentieth century technological developments and the experience of Britain, France, the United States, Russia, and Yugoslavia. He concludes that Marx's analysis is no longer valid, though the capitalist regime is still involved in material and moral contradictions. Although Moch holds out a hope for the realization of socialism, his attempt to develop a new theory is disappointing.

The activity of Catholic groups during the Resistance and thereafter has inspired an impressive political literature. Indispensable for gaining a perspective on the position of Catholicism in France is Adrien Dansette's three-volume study, *Histoire religieuse de la France contemporaine* (Flammarion, 1948–57). The third volume, *Destin du catholicisme français* (1957), deals intelligently with the chief issues confronting contemporary French Catholicism. The special number of *La Nef* (January 1954) on "Problèmes du catholicisme français" is a good introduction to the problems of dechristianization, Catholic social policy, and state aid to private schools. *Les forces religieuses et la vie politique* (A. Colin, 1951), by André Latreille and André Siegfried, is a more objective examination of Catholicism and Protestantism, particularly in France.

A path-breaking work by H. Godin and Y. Daniel, *La France, pays de mission?* (Editions du Cerf, 1943), brought into light the trend toward dechristianization and pointed out that the Church was losing not simply many workers, but the working class. F. Boulard, *Problèmes missionnaires de la France rurale* (2 vols.; Lille: Facultés Catholiques, 1952) should also be mentioned. Gabriel Le Bras, *Etudes de sociologie religieuse* (Presses Universitaires, 1955) provides solid background on the problem.

The movement of the "prêtres-ouvriers" was an effort to establish contact between the Church and the working class. In practice, the young missionaries tended themselves to become proletarianized; two worker-priests were among those arrested during the Communist-inspired manifestations in May 1952. *Les prêtres-ouvriers, documents* (Editions de Minuit, 1954) justifies the sympathy of certain worker-priests for the Communist "guides of the proletariat." For a balanced view of the experiment, see Pierre Andreu, *Grandeurs et erreurs des prêtres-ouvriers* (Amiot-Dumont, 1955).

The progressive aspect of post-war Catholic political thought, heir to the tradition of Lamennais and the Sillon group, is brought out in a number of publications. Two historical studies, J. B. Duroselle, *Les débuts du catholicisme social en France* (Presses Universitaires, 1951) and Henri Rollet, *Sur le chantier social* (Lyon: Chronique Sociale de France, 1955) survey the development of Christian socialism from 1822 through the Third Republic. A. Dauphin-Meunier in *La doctrine économique de l'Église* (Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1950) and *L'Église en face du capitalisme* (Librarie Arthème Fayard, 1955) restates the Catholic critique of both capitalism and communism. Fairly authoritative statements on the social doctrine of the Church appear in Albert Goux, *Vers un ordre social humain* (Témoignage Chrétien, 1949), Jean Villain, *L'enseignement social de l'Église* (3 vols.; Spes, 1953), and Chanoine P. Tiberghien, *Sens chrétien et vie sociale* (Editions Ouvrières, 1954).

The debate between liberals and conservatives, so important in Britain and the United States, hardly exists in France. The best statement of Radical theory is still to be found in the works of Alain, a selection of whose writings appears in *Propos* (Gallimard, 1956). Pierre Mendès-France has attempted to infuse traditional Radicalism with a large dose of Keynesian economics and New Deal reformism. His speeches before the Assembly outlining a program of modernization for France are reprinted in *Gouverner c'est choisir* (Editions René Julliard, 1953) and *Sept mois et dix-sept jours* (Editions René Julliard, 1955). On the economic doctrine of radicalism, Pierre Mendès-France and Gabriel Ardant, *La science économique et l'action* (Unesco-Julliard, 1954) is interesting. However, the middle-class elements who have always provided the main support of the party are generally unwilling to follow Mendès-France, and the Radical party is now consequently split into several warring fractions. In any case, the Mendèsiste slogan, "we are in 1788," can hardly be considered a political theory. Albert Milhaud, *Histoire du radicalisme* (Editions Françaises et Internationales, 1951) is a short historical study, with a sketchy treatment of Radical doctrine. The only plea for laissez-faire that might be cited is Jacques Rueff, *L'ordre social* (2 vols.; Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1945): a blanket condemnation of deficit financing, state investments, and all the other forms of state planning.

Some of the most interesting theoretical works to come out of the party struggle since the Liberation have been written by Gaullists. The underlying theme is the need to invigorate the government, reform political institutions, and unify the nation by creating a system of "associations." A convenient summary of the Gaullist program with respect to the constitution, economic and social renovation, the French Union, and foreign policy, may be found in *La France sera la France, ce que veut Charles de Gaulle* (Rassemblement du Peuple Français, 1951). The Gaullist movement for political reform is expressed in the works of Defré, Noël, and others, cited elsewhere.

The Poujadist movement has failed to attract the support of intellectuals, for reasons made obvious in Pierre Poujade, *J'ai choisi le combat* (Saint Céré, 1955). Stanley Hoffman, *Le mouvement Poujade* (A. Colin, 1956) is a fine, objective, and detailed analysis of the history and mythology of Poujadism.

The survey we have undertaken points to some of the most significant gaps in the existing literature. The "great debate" in American political science over methodology and goals has no equivalent in France. General theoretical studies in the tradition of Laski, Barker, Lindsay, and G. D. H. Cole are few. There are a number of works on intellectual history and on the history of political thought, including some good monographic studies on specific periods or individual theorists; but a detailed account of these is beyond the scope of our survey. Even more noteworthy is the lack of systematic works on international relations and foreign policy. With the exception of two collected volumes published by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques—*La politique étrangère et ses fondements* (A. Colin, 1954), ed. Jean B. Duroselle and *Les relations internationales de l'Allemagne occidentale* (A. Colin, 1954), ed. Alfred Grosser—and several books by Raymond Aron—*Le grand schisme* (Gallimard, 1948), *L'âge des empires et l'avenir de la France* (Editions Défense de la France, 1945), and *Les guerres en chaîne* (Gallimard, 1951)—there are few serious works on the subject. There are no studies of French foreign policy that depart from the strict historical approach, exemplified by the works of Renouvin. The same generally applies, as we have noted, to the study of federalism. Even more interesting is the lack of studies on the French bureaucracy, though every informed Frenchman is inclined to believe that the civil service and the great bureaucratic formations, such as the *Inspecteurs des Finances*, govern France. Apart from the traditional juridical treaties that deal with questions of administrative law and the post-war reform of the civil service, there is no study of the bureaucracy as a functioning entity within the French political system, with the exception of Roger Grégoire, *La fonction publique* (A. Colin, 1954).

We have attempted to give one explanation for the lack of systematic political theory and science in France. The divisions of the body politic, we have pointed out, are being expounded rather than analyzed, thus creating a climate in which argument rather than detached examination is the rule. But even so, polemic has often been a source of political analysis and constructive speculation in other countries. Perhaps the explanation lies in more mundane factors: the tight control exercised upon young intellectuals by the Universities, in which the *Grandes Facultés* of Law, History, and Philosophy continue to constitute the main channels for academic careers. The *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques* is the only serious center of political study today; it is beginning to train students and produce a literature, some of which, as we have noted, is of high quality. But it may be some time before the resistance of academic tradition and interest are overcome.

BOOK REVIEWS

Latin America in the United Nations. By John A. Houston. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1956. Pp. 345. $2.75.)

Denmark and the United Nations. By Max Sorenson and Niels J. Haagerup. (Prepared for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company. 1956. Pp. xi, 154. $3.00.)

Sweden and the United Nations. Report by a Special Study Group of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company. 1956. Pp. x, 315. $3.00.)

La Suisse et les Nations Unies. By Jacqueline Belin. (Prepared for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company. 1956. Pp. 139. $3.00.)

These four volumes are all basically concerned with the evolving attitudinal interactions of national states with the United Nations during the first ten years of its checkered life. Houston's study of the Latin American bloc constitutes the eighth in a succession of special monographs on the United Nations inaugurated by the Carnegie Endowment in 1947; the other three, on Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, represent the first published results of the Endowment's current series of "National Studies on International Organization," covering more than twenty countries. (At the time this review was prepared two additional volumes, dealing with Israel and Canada, respectively, had appeared.) In sponsoring this ambitious undertaking, the Endowment, to quote its President, "hoped to provide a forum for an exchange of unofficial views on international organization, thereby fostering increased understanding of significant differences of national outlook and of areas of agreement, and to stimulate examination of the potentialities and possibilities of the United Nations in terms of national interests."

A general comparison of the volumes under review is not easy, since they differ in organization, focus, and level of analysis. If there is a unifying thread, it lies in the attempt to interpret the impact of intergovernmental institutions on the foreign policies of various middle and lesser powers of the free world. Except for Switzerland, this entire group of states joined the UN at its birth and, despite their obvious disappointment over its inability to function as an effective collective security instrument, they still find it sufficiently useful to continue participating actively in its operations. The central value of the four studies is their illumination, with varying degrees of clarity, of this differential image of the United Nations.

Latin America in the United Nations, written by an American scholar, analyzes Latin American reactions to four sets of UN problems: peace and security, dependent peoples, higher living standards, and human rights, with a view to indicating the degree of consensus or divergence on particular issues. This analysis, admirably done on the whole, reveals that the Latin American republics tended until quite recently to form a fairly solid bloc in the General Assembly, for three main reasons: leadership and pressure by the United States, their strong and persistent anti-communism, and their growing interest in the financing of economic development through the UN. In this connection, the appendix to the study presents a number of useful graphs and tables showing the extent of group solidarity on important roll-call votes during the first ten sessions of the Assembly. From this record Argentina emerges as the chief dissenter, while "Brazil's practically unfailing allegiance to the cause supported by the United States" represents the opposite end of the spectrum.

Since Korea, however, deviations from a solid Latin American alignment have become increasingly frequent. Many of the nations below the Rio Grande have not hesitated to express open disagreement with their North American neighbor concerning the primacy of regional arrangements in enforcement matters, the anti-colonial issue, and, most sharply of all, SUNFED. In his concluding chapter, the author refers briefly to current signs of a realignment of blocs in the UN Assembly which has brought the Latin Americans and the Arab-Asians together at times, with Soviet bloc support as well on a number of colonial questions. While the full implications of this new situation are not explored, Professor Houston does observe that "if authoritarian and totalitarian political movements should achieve momentous proportions [in Latin America] . . . a much greater propensity might develop to blackmail this country [the United States] for economic concessions in return for political support in the Assembly."

In contrast to such a highly interest-motivated, cohesive region as Latin America, neutrality-oriented Scandinavia tends to view the United Nations, not as a channel for the promotion of specific national or regional political and economic objectives, but rather as a "mediating force" between the two rival great power coalitions. Sweden, for example, when it joined the UN, appears to have attached special importance to the veto if only because it might serve as a safeguard against the organization's becoming a vehicle of conflict between the Soviets and the West. Even in Denmark certain groups attacked the decision to enter NATO on the ground that it might weaken the UN as an agency of conciliation. For most Danes, however, the Atlantic alliance is considered necessary for the protection of Danish security by reason of the UN's impotence. Paradoxically enough, contend Sorensen and Haagerup, "the more dependent Denmark has become on the United States, the more strongly has [it] endeavored to emphasize its independence and individual judgment"—even though it usually ends up by voting with this country on vital UN issues.

Sweden's "freedom from alliances" policy, which kept her out of NATO, is still supported by a strong majority in all the major political groups of the country. From the Swedish standpoint it is imperative that the "universal" character of the UN be preserved. Ideally, Sweden would also like to see the legal obligations of its members broadened, including compulsory jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice; yet it is realistically recognized that Charter revision would at this juncture be a meaningless if not dangerous move, which risks splitting the organization wide open. Meanwhile, as the Swedes view it, the UN can serve as a useful instrument of world-community building and as a dispenser of advice and services to the less advanced countries. In this context, the Swedish people take pardonable pride in the notable contribution made by their compatriots to the UN's role in Palestine, Jerusalem, and the Korean armistice, not to mention the Secretary-Generalship.

Prepared by groups of scholars in the two countries, the Scandinavian studies have the special merit of providing insights into the process by which national opinion and policy relating to the UN are formed. Account is taken of party pronouncements, newspaper editorials, important speeches by civic leaders, and public opinion polls, as well as parliamentary debates: all of which make for somewhat greater depth of evaluation than appears in Houston's volume on Latin America, based primarily on official documentation.

Jacqueline Belin's essay on *La Suisse et les Nations Unies* proceeds from a decidedly different approach. Her principal purpose apparently is to explain, as much in legalistic as in political terms, how Switzerland's traditional neutrality policy has developed from medieval times to the present, over half of the study being devoted to this task. From her account the reader begins to realize why the Swiss people, following their disillusioning experience with the League of Nations, should have decided not to try it again—why they concluded in 1945 that the collective security concept was fundamentally incompatible with the preservation of neutrality, pure and unadulterated. One senses in the Swiss mentality a wistful longing for the removal of all international problems from the turbulent political arena to the calmer environment of humanitarianism, reason, and law. It is thus not surprising that Switzerland should have joined the International Court, almost all of the UN functional agencies, and the OEEC, or that she consented to participate in the uninviting task of supervising the post-armistice and prisoner-of-war agreements in Korea.

All in all, the four volumes under review constitute significant contributions to a more realistic understanding of the political conditions of UN development in terms of middle and small power behavior. From the evidence contained therein, however, it is difficult to assess with any precision the UN impact on the course of their foreign policies. It seems clear that in no case has the UN become the pivot around which key policies have centered. On the other hand, acceptance of the principles and purposes of the Charter has no doubt had an intangible, symbolic influence on national policy makers. Notwithstanding the failure of the world organization to live up to original expectations, all of the governments with which the four studies are concerned, not even excluding that of Switzerland, continue to profess faith in its ultimate potentialities—provided the great powers somehow manage to avoid catastrophic war. None of this sample of states, all belonging to the free world, has considered withdrawing from the organization.

What it is important to emphasize is that each set of national (or regional) fears, needs, interests, and goals is in some respects unique. Consequently, their susceptibility of treatment by a global political organization varies from nation to nation and from region to region. It is this differential pattern of national-international action that the remaining volumes in the Carnegie series should help to clarify still further. Students and practitioners alike will look forward to their appearance with a sense of real expectancy.

WALTER R. SHARP.

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The Unadjusted Man: A New Hero for Americans. BY PETER VIERECK. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1956. Pp. ix, 339. $5.00.)

Beyond the Dreams of Avarice. BY RUSSELL KIRK. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1956. Pp. x, 339. $4.50.)

Three cheers and a tiger for Mr. Russell Kirk. We are all in his debt. For in his latest collection of essays Mr. Kirk has at long last revealed for the laity the ultimate passion of the "new conservatism." The cat is out of the bag, and it turns out to be a hippopotamus. The new conservatism is nothing more than a conspiracy to impose upon all us political agnostics ponderosity as a synomym for profundity. Unfortunately, an intolerance of triviality is no sure safeguard against thinking—or writing down—trivial thoughts. Serious and seriouser, to be sure; but profound and profounder? alas, no.

Life to Mr. Kirk is a deadly serious business, and playing games is not only wasteful but sinful. Neither political activity nor creative scholarship is characterized for Kirk by a spirit of playful inventiveness. The first he illustrates by the solemnity of his dogmas, the second by the unrelieved grimness of his style. It is in this manner that Kirk has performed the valuable service of delineating the current fashion in conservatism. Advocacy of conservative doctrine, that is, solemn preaching, is taken for sound scholarship. As one might expect the combination is deadly. No wonder life appears so bleak. In this respect at least Kirk is a committed equalitarian: he wishes to diffuse a sense of melancholy throughout the entire society.

It was not always thus. Late eighteenth and early nineteenth century conservatism in America possessed a certain urbanity and sophistication and, if not an unbridled joy of living, at least a healthy respect for empirical reality. It was not especially reverent, nor was it romantic. It contained something of the cantankerous spirit of Viereck's "mad squire." Words like "tragic" and "melancholy" did not clutter the pages of the advocates of conservatism, nor had they cast themselves in the role of holy crusaders against the triviality and superficiality of existence. All of this they accepted as *part* of existence. Yet today the American Alexandria stands besieged by the Kirks for precisely the reason ancient Alexandria stood besieged by the zealots of all faiths: by its very existence, it constitutes a threat to a deeply religious view of life. It deprives men of the right, according to Kirk, "to struggle against evil for the sake of good." It stands in the way of salvation not because it is evil, but because it is superficial. To deny the right of men to struggle against the profoundly sinful is akin to denying to the infant the excruciating joy of pressing his swollen gums against dry biscuit.

Life is tragic. Yet, ironically enough, instead of tragedy Kirk has produced still another example of the typical art form of a trivial American culture, the horse-opera—peopled by sly liberals (the big men from the East) and virtuous but beleaguered conservatives (the simple forthright cowboy heroes). Unlike the usual product, in this case there is no assurance—on the contrary a good deal of pessimism—that in the end the good guy will get the girl. This makes Mr. Kirk very angry. For he is convinced that *the* evil of our time is avarice: too many motor cars, shiny appliances, wonder drugs, etc. Even bolsheviks, far from being religious, solemn men like himself, are materialists, and Marxism is "only the logical culmination of the materialism of the doctrinaire liberal." The communists are simply super-American merchandisers. Selfishness, not self-contempt, is the source of all evil. The "Age of Gluttony" is upon us, and to resist is only the "manly" thing to do. (If Kirk is for anything he is for manliness.) We must renounce the liberal "brummagem utopia of creature-comforts" and "humbly" dedicate ourselves to a meaningful reconstruction of social purpose. (Kirk is also for humility.) We simply must get conservative religion.

Mr. Viereck's text is more faithful to traditional conservative scripture. He confirms Kirk's thesis by an adept reverse English. He can write. His style is felicitous, his arguments are delightfully disorganized and often original, and his mood is playful. His playfulness alone is sufficient to distinguish him from the new conservatives. By this volume Viereck has earned a place among the cynical realist commentators of the past two centuries. He finds himself in opposition to much of what Kirk tries so desperately to stand for. This could scarcely be otherwise, since Viereck's sights are lowered at the twin targets of mediocrity and conformity. True, he shares with Kirk a distaste for those who "commit television" or "go lusting after supermarkets" and is squarely against the "plutocratic hucksterism of government by automobile dealers." But Viereck's guiding spirit is less that of Augustine and John Cotton than that of Nietzsche, an exponent of that "joyful kind of seriousness, the wisdom full of pranks that constitutes the best condition of man's soul."

Conformity is the enemy—whether it is the conformity of liberalism, of conservatism (Kirk he regards as a "high-minded but romanticizing" right-wing Republican), or of nonconformism. The worship of Mammon is to be deplored, but then so is the uncritical conservatism of the religious romantic. "If overzealous new converts to conservatism try to discard the whole liberal heritage indiscriminately, and this in America of all countries, then they will find themselves with surprisingly little left to conserve." Viereck lavishes most of his affection upon the random, upon the occasional atom which struts onto the stage in baggy pants and putty nose to perform a hilarious but disquieting pratfall. Like Kirk, Viereck is a deeply religious man, but there is a profound difference. Viereck's religion is the religion of creativeness. Kirk could no more appreciate Viereck's plea in behalf of the "playfully private, the unapologetic exhilaration of play" than he might a plea in behalf of sexual promiscuity as an expression of individual creativeness. Russell Kirk has a remarkable social conscience, approximately twice the size of Texas. But Viereck retains one crucial advantage—he can still laugh at himself.

NORMAN JACOBSON.

University of California (Berkeley).

Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States. BY JAMES WILLARD HURST. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1956. Pp. ix, 139. $2.50.)

Sober casting-up of accounts, a sort of national stock-taking induced by conscious responsibility, is conspicuous in the reflective writing of our generation. It appears in many forms—in lament for waste of natural assets, in concern over compound increase of population, in sorrowful comment on our political traits. It can appear in legal thought.

Professor Willard Hurst of the University of Wisconsin Law School, for the theme of the three lectures, delivered at Northwestern University under the Julius Rosenthal Foundation, which constitute the volume here reviewed, chose the legal phenomena which interacted with American social and economic changes between 1776 and the end of the first decade of our century.

His first lecture has as its significant title "The Release of Energy." In the pioneer United States, as soon as community action had achieved the simple means of survival, our "unclaimed natural abundance together with the promise of a new technical command of nature" came to "dictate that men should realize their creative energy and exercise their liberty peculiarly in the realm of the economy to the enhancement of other human values" (p. 6). We err, Mr. Hurst tells us, if we picture nineteenth century legal policy as simple laissez-faire. "The record is different. Not the jealous limitation of the power of the state, but the release of individual creative energy was the dominant value" (p. 7).

Thus, by about 1800, when our political forms were settled, the law was turned to facilitation of consensual economic arrangements—unimpairable contracts, land freely alienable, formal business associations. Most development of the continent proceeded under non-governmental organizations, for which legal institutions furnished the essential sanctions.

Mr. Hurst's second lecture, "The Control of Environment," further develops his theme that from 1800 to 1870 our legal history demonstrates "preoccupation with the economic challenge of physical and social circumstance"—mainly by nongovernmental organs. He suggests, quite properly, that the "release of energy" was not simple. President Jackson recognized in the thirties that private government might become tyrannical, that in the general interest public government must dominate it. His campaign against the Bank, hasty and inefficient as it was, foreshadowed the Granger movement, the Sherman Act, and the Interstate Commerce Act.

"The Balance of Power," Mr. Hurst's third lecture, treats of the emergence after 1870 of a new order of society in the United States. With bigness, with welcome increase in material comfort, went an uneasy consciousness that now events were apt to push most individuals around. While "release of energy" by private organization continued, a heavier counter-balance appeared in the forces of public government. Reliance on competitive "release of energy" began to yield to the Granger legislation of the seventies, to *Munn v. Illinois*, to the "hard-paced, rough-and-tumble, trial-and-error development of the law of public utility regulation between 1870 and 1908" which was "our first and principal effort of the time to redress the domestic balance of power" (p. 88).

Mr. Hurst has produced a thoughtful analysis of the interaction of government and law with private economic groups. His subject is boundless; constraint within three lectures has made his treatment unavoidably elliptic. He has the matter to give us a much more comprehensive book. It would be welcome.

ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND.

Harvard Law School.

The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis: A Study in the Influence of Ideas. BY SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. ix, 316. $6.00.)

Mr. Justice. EDITED BY ALLISON DUNHAM AND PHILIP B. KURLAND. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1956. Pp. xi, 241. $3.75.)

If history, as Collingwood seems to insist, is no more than an idea in the mind of the historian, then law, the *legal realist* might equally argue, is no more than an extension of the judge's mind. Certainly, in the chemistry of the common law, by which argument at bar is transformed into law of the land, it is the judge's mind that constitutes both catalyst and crucible; and it is to explain the workings of that mind that the judicial biography is dedicated.

Underlying this dedication, there exists a two-fold premise that the judicial mind is consistent and that the basis for both consistency and the final legal product is the value-structure of the individual judge. Hence, a search for a hierarchy of values (within a Weberian frame of choice and rationality) is the element common to all judicial biographies; and, if the judicial biography thus faces into the social sciences it is also at one with the humanities, for nearly every judicial biography seeks to establish its link with that intriguing and essentially humane question: What makes the Great Man great?

But the best of the judicial biographies seeks more than value structure and cautionary knowledge. In skillful hands, the judicial biography becomes a cutting edge of legal analysis that can lay bare what Morris R. Cohen once called the *analogical* foundations of the common law system. Beyond this, the judicial biography can explore (within the frame of sociological jurisprudence) the growth of legal doctrine from community pressure to judicial utterance. In the context of a collegial court, the judicial biography can also analyze the impact of that utterance upon the collective court. And finally, the judicial biography can comment upon the nature of evolving doctrine, so that ultimately the comment can remake the doctrine, by being fed back into the law through the particularly symbiotic relationship that unites juridical commentator and common law judge.

These accomplishments constitute the potential of the judicial biography, and the measure of Konefsky's success is that he has realized this potential while reconstructing the judicial world of not one, but two, of the Supreme Court's most famous jurists. What Konefsky has done, in fact, is to seek this reconstruction upon three major levels of analysis: the impact (or influence) of Holmes and Brandeis, each upon the other; their impact, singly and in concert, upon their contemporaries on the High Court; and their impact, singly, and again in concert, upon a subsequent generation of Supreme Court justices. By doubling the judicial biography, Konefsky was forced to compound the paths of analytic pursuit; and to keep the enterprise within manageable confines, he fixed his attention upon a problem central to both Holmes and Brandeis and central to the democratic process: that of finding an accommodation between majority demands and minority rights.

This problem of accommodation, of course, has special characteristics in our governmental system; for here, the courts become the interpreters of a document designed to impose permanent limitations upon majority action. Thus, the problem facing both Holmes and Brandeis, in common with their judicial brethren, was to find ways of permitting (and even encouraging, in the instance of Brandeis) certain majority demands, while at the same time holding back those demands whenever they were thought to be inimical to the essences of a democratic system.

More specifically, the problem confronting these justices was that of finding formulae that would permit (or in Holmes's case, tolerate) majority action against the minority of property, while at the same time restraining a legislative majority directed at the rights of a political minority. Basically, then, the threads of Konefsky's analysis connect with a problem very much with the courts today.

In its severest form, the problem catches up such questions as the preferred position of First Amendment liberties, the absoluteness of free speech, and the right to political organization. And in the formulary of Holmes and Brandeis the most celebrated equation for dealing with these problems is the Clear and Present Danger doctrine. Konefsky's analysis of the doctrine is judicial biography at its best. He traces the doctrine's origins and growth, and thus, when he comes to analyze its present-day applicability, he is able to demonstrate that its current ordeal is in part traceable to the mind of the justice who first gave it formulation.

In contrast to Konefsky's analysis in depth, the volume presented by Dunham and Kurland is a treatment in breadth, a series of nine biographical sketches. The purpose of the book is to "rescue the [Supreme] Court from the limbo of impersonality"; and to this end, each of nine writers has attempted to catch the essence of a single judicial personality: Holmes, Marshall, Stone, Bradley, Brandeis, Sutherland, Hughes, Rutledge, Taney. What is presented in the protraits of these nine men is not an "ideal" court; but, in the fashion of

Konefsky's book, an attempt at comparative biography. Each of the chosen justices is representative of an era and a mode of judicial thought. And, given the limitations of space, each portrait is framed within the confines of the basic biographic method. Accordingly, the result is a highly readable exploration of the value structure of the inner man and the personality and humaneness of the outer.

LAWRENCE J. R. HERSON.

The Ohio State University.

Political Theory. BY G. C. FIELD. (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc. 1957. Pp. xvii, 297. $3.50.)

This volume consists of the material the late Professor Field of the University of Bristol used in his lectures on political theory. These lectures are much like a quiet conversation of a past time, and few books published recently are so congenial with the manner of speech of the nineteenth century. Modern history seems remote from this volume, as remote as it might be at times from the English classrooms in which Professor Field delivered his lectures. Still, the method of the last century in discussing systematic politics is important, because it analyzed the problems of successful and relatively peaceful societies. There is more of the atmosphere of Green, Dicey, Seeley, Sidgwick, and others, than of the storm and stress of totalitarian movements and the newer attempts to formulate alternative theories of politics.

The author begins with a discussion of the history of political ideas and some inquiry into the leading modern schools of political thought, primarily considering Rousseau and the Utilitarians. Following this, state and sovereignty, the law and legal sovereignty, and forms of government are considered. However, chief attention is given to the classical arguments for and against democracy, including an extended analysis of the machinery of democracy, as in representative government. Other modern issues, such as the political party, the state and other societies, the question of pluralism, the state and the individual, and the relations between states, are considered.

At the conclusion of the volume, Professor Field inquires into the problem of ethical judgment and the social values of a political society. His ethical system seems to be Kantian, affirming the social creation of the ethical judgment. "It does, however, seem that one element in the 'good life' emerges as implied in the very conception of it. That is the attitude of mutual consideration and recognition of the needs and claims of other people besides ourselves. In Kant's famous phrase, every human being is to be thought of as an end and never merely as a means" (p. 273). Accepted ideas and standards are properly spoken of as moral ideas, and the author says that he cannot in this volume give indications of the positive content of the idea of the good life (pp. 232, 272).

Perhaps the most invigorating section of this book is the reprint of the author's article from the *Cambridge Journal*, November, 1949, on "Democracy, Ancient and Modern." Here we have an inquiry into whether there is anything in common between the democracy of Athens and that of the modern state.

Contrary to generally accepted critical ideas, Field concludes that an Athenian democrat might understand and sympathize with a goodly amount of the political practice of the modern state. There is, indeed, a striking number of essays on this problem in recent years, such as those of Lord Lindsay, Ernest Barker, Harold Nicolson, and E. H. Carr, which either indicate the lack of community between ancient and modern democracy or which compare Greek democracy with Communist democracy. The contemporary study of Greek democracy suggests the force of a contention that has long been made, that the proper starting point for the analysis of modern problems is often to be found in Greece and Rome.

FRANCIS G. WILSON.

University of Illinois.

Les élections du 2 janvier 1956. EDITED BY MAURICE DUVERGER, FRANÇOIS GOGUEL, AND JEAN TOUCHARD. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1957. Pp. xvi, 504.)

The Fondation des Sciences Politiques must be congratulated for having carried through, despite adverse circumstances, the first study of this type ever undertaken in France. In the foreword the editors confess that the dissolution of the National Assembly in December 1955 "pregnant with consequences on the political plane was not without incidence on the plane of political science": three weeks before the election the Foundation had neither the funds nor the men to carry out the project it had planned to accomplish under more leisurely circumstances.

Despite this handicap the present study is amply rewarding. It offers a rich source of valuable information, including an abundance of maps and charts, and an impressive sampling of various methods of investigation, including analysis of documents, direct observations of the campaign, local and regional studies, each using a different method of approach, and a post-electoral poll. Introductory chapters by Maurice Duverger, Jacques Fauvet, and Georges Dupeux give the political background and the programs of the parties, and concluding ones by François Goguel and Mattei Dogan offer an analysis of the results concerning the geographical distribution of the votes and the characteristics of the candidates and of the new deputies.

This study must be placed in the context of recent publications by the Foundation, particularly "Le mouvement Poujade," by Stanley Hoffmann, "Partis politiques et classes sociales," under the direction of Maurice Duverger, and the forthcoming "Les moyens d'expression et la représentation politique du monde paysan," under the direction of Jacques Fauvet and Henri Mendras. It augurs well for the vitality of French political science.

Two remarks come to the mind of this reviewer. While the character of French politics may well impose a certain experimentation with various approaches to the study of elections, it remains true that a more uniform methodology is probably necessary for meaningful comparisons both in time and in space. The present study will undoubtedly permit a selection of the more valid types of approach. Secondly, electoral geography, whether at the national or regional level, has a limited usefulness for an understanding of political behavior: it throws little light on the problem of how particular groups vote and why they do so. An interesting attempt is made here by Joseph Klatzmann to answer the question of the distribution of the votes among various occupational groups in Paris and suburbs. Another, somewhat unconvincing, attempt is made by a post-electoral poll of some five hundred Parisian electors, the drawbacks of which are rightly stressed by François Goguel. This reviewer for one would welcome another type of approach. An analysis in depth of such microcosms as villages or "quartiers" would give an insight into problems of motivation that no analysis in width can furnish, since it would place votes into a total context. In this connection the recent "Village in the Vaucluse" by Laurence Wylie demonstrates the value of anthropological methods in giving a realistic and human picture that avoids misleading generalizations. Sufficiently representative testing grounds could be found that would permit a useful carry-through from one election to the next. Frenchmen are not necessarily unapproachable and unwilling to tolerate interference with their cherished privacy. This at least was the experience of this reviewer, who found the Grenoble metal workers shortly after the elections of 1956 quite willing to give a piece of their mind.

CHARLES A. MICAUD.

University of Virginia.

The Fate of East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy. EDITED BY STEPHEN D. KERTESZ. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 463, $6.25.)

In the rapidly mushrooming literature on Eastern European governments and politics, this impressive volume is destined to occupy a distinguished and permanent place. Professor Stephen D. Kertesz of the University of Notre Dame ought to be congratulated for a thoughtful and significant editorial performance, which has borne fruit in this comprehensive study. Having experimented with *The Fate of East Central Europe* in an advanced course on Eastern European politics, this reviewer is pleased to report both pedagogic success and academic satisfaction.

The overriding theme of the volume consists of a many-sided and truly microscopic analysis of the Soviet Union's *Gleichschaltung* or "take-over" techniques and strategies in selected Danubian and south-eastern European countries. Thus the many co-authors of the book have the distinct advantage of dealing with a tangible, historically determined, and now closed period—primarily the years 1945–1953—which spells its own characteristic stories of Communist suppression, violence and systematic duplicity. In surveying this "take-over" process of engineered disruption, three essays are of outstanding value: Mosely's account of American policy toward East-Central Europe in the years 1941–1947; Dr. Ivo Duchacek's brilliant summary of the Communist enslavement of Czechoslovakia, and Kertesz's own detailed study of Hungary's total *Gleichschaltung*. Since the authors have here focussed their attention on a manageable and finite sector of recent European history, their conclusions and even their short-term predictions stand up surprisingly well against the unexpected and shattering impact of Poland's bloodless and relatively successful revolt and Hungary's violent, and truly catastrophic, popular rebellion. By the end of 1957 Western scholars and observers alike are bound to agree with the prophetic remark of Professor Mosely (who first applied it to the period ending in 1946): "Against unyielding Soviet insistence on transforming East Central Europe into a closed preserve, the American Government had a heap of broken Soviet promises to point to as a reminder that *hope, divorced from power, is not a policy*" (p. 74; italics mine).

It would be both professionally and personally pleasant to report that all five major parts of the volume and all the sixteen contributors had achieved the high standards characteristic of the three essays mentioned above. Unhappily, this is distinctly not the case. The discussions of the Baltic States and Eastern Germany are completely unsatisfactory journalistic fragments. Surprising also in its pedestrian approach and superficial reliance on second- and third-rate sources is Robert Byrnes's review of "American Policy Toward East Central Europe, 1947–1955." The "economic framework" of Part Four is both too sketchy and too technical to provide the reader with useful and relevant information.

On the whole, one might criticize the editor for over-drawing and somewhat exaggerating the geopolitical scope of this volume. To analyze and review the fate of Eastern Europe proper is a gigantic task in itself. Why broaden the coverage to the point where beyond Yugoslavia (very ably covered by Professor Alex N. Dragnich), even Austria, Finland, the Baltic States, and East Germany have to be given space and a hearing? A study of fewer countries would have provided richer rewards, and a less ambitious *horizontal* approach would have offered more exciting *vertical* findings in the form of such thoughtful "depth analyses" as are glimpsed in the Duchacek and Mosely essays.

It is obvious that a few inevitable shortcomings cannot detract from the superb intrinsic values of this book. The editor's hope that at this "apocalyptic juncture of history the volume will contribute toward an understanding of facts and ideas in their relation to the United States and East Central Europe" has been given added emphasis and timeliness by the Soviet suppression of Hungary, this dreadful anti-climax to a heroic uprising against Communist tyranny.

ANDREW GYORGY.

Boston University.

Japanese Politics: An Introductory Survey. BY NOBUTAKA IKE. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1957. Pp. xiv, 300. $4.00 text; $5.50 trade.)

Japanese Society and Politics: The Impact of Social Stratification and Mobility on Politics. BY ALLAN B. COLE. (Boston: Boston University Bookstore. 1956. Pp. 158. $1.50.)

More than a decade has elapsed since Japan's surrender, and scholars are now attempting to view in perspective the impact of the conqueror's reforms upon indigenous institutions. These two studies, although unavoidably sketchy in those areas that cry for more field research, are valuable additions to the library of Far Eastern scholarship and shed important empirical light on political behavior in Japan.

Drawing upon a variety of Japanese sources as well as Western writings, Dr. Ike surveys Japan's political forces in their social milieu—a setting in which the old is struggling to assimilate the new. He emphasizes the family as the underpinning of the social structure and contends that familial behavior patterns are projected into other sectors of life, especially the economic and political. It is the author's thesis that the individual becomes enmeshed in the personal relationships of his primary group and is unable to transfer his loyalty to larger, impersonal associations, which tend as a result to become factionalized. In sketching the hierarchical arrangements in urban and rural Japan, Ike calls particular attention to the political role of the middle strata—small entrepreneurs, landowners, factory foremen, teachers, etc.—who serve as local leaders for small groups of obedient followers.

Although the author does not clearly distinguish between forces and process, he outlines the political role of such groups as business, labor, agriculture, the bureaucracy, and the intellectuals—their development and growth, their mutual relationships, the bases of cleavage and stratification, and their channels of influence. The parties are evaluated in terms of their leadership, their role in the legislative process, and their interest-group appeals. Although there is evidence of changing voting patterns among urban residents and younger age groups, such traditional influences as personality still weigh more heavily upon the Japanese voter than party affiliation. Irrationality in politics is not, of course, a Japanese monopoly; indeed, some analysts will question the image of the American "independent" voter as a rational, issue-weighing citizen. This study also considers dominant political doctrines, the influence of mass media on public opinion, and the role of violence in politics. It uses the surrender policy and Yoshida's resignation as illustrations of the decision-making process.

In a thoughtful monograph, Professor Cole has assembled empirical data from Western and native scholarship on the changing and persisting patterns of social stratification and the political tendencies of Japanese elites and interest groups. In analyzing the social structure he identifies the nobility, bureaucracy, military, trade-union labor, the "urban middle strata," and the gentry, small proprietors, and tenants of the countryside. The author recognizes that within each functional category there is stratification that reflects the socio-economic divisions of Japanese society itself. A summary of the prewar political role of each elite serves as useful background for the examination of postwar patterns, which are the main focus of the study.

Occupation reforms and policy reversals generated modifications in the social hierarchy and changes in the power relations among strategic social groups. Replacing the downwardly mobile nobility and military is a stratum of business executives who have also "largely superseded the older *zaibatsu* families" (p. 86). This managerial elite combines with the bureaucracy, which as SCAP's administrative arm was able to survive the tempest of reform, to support the right-wing parties and to lead the new drive toward conservatism. A rejuvenated labor movement still suffers from parochial organization, political inexperience, and irresponsible leadership, and the internecine strife is reflected in the proletarian parties. Intellectuals and labor leaders have used the trade unions as a springboard to political office. Under the spell of rural traditionalism, Japanese workers readily adjust to patriarchal authority and give considerable electoral support to the conservative parties. The author underscores the differences between urban and rural middle-class structure; he includes a table on the occupational distribution of Representatives from 1949 to 1955 and an occupational breakdown of conservative and reformist party support according to a voting sample from Japan's largest cities (pp. 62, 65).

Both authors recognize that relaxed social controls in postwar years have exacerbated social tensions and distorted the image of internal harmony. Despite its recent growth, the middle class remains traditionally organized and vulnerable to economic pressures. The citizen still takes refuge in small groups and "informal government," resulting in a fragmented polity and a blurring of the "public interest." While it is hoped that Japan's representative institutions will be able to strike deep roots, there is fear that severe crisis may turn the nation to extreme statist forms.

These studies are useful to the political scientist both for the data they present and for the areas of needed research they indirectly suggest.

JOHN E. TURNER.

University of Minnesota.

Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains. BY HOWARD L. BOORMAN, ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN, PHILIP E. MOSELY, AND BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ. (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1957. Pp. xii, 227. $2.75.)

China and Soviet Russia. BY HENRY WEI. (Princeton, Toronto, New York, London: D. Van Nostrand and Company, Inc. 1956. Pp. xvi, 379. $7.75.)

Moscow-Peking Axis offers a brilliant and penetrating analysis of the ties that bind the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union. It is based on careful study of many facts in the realm of public knowledge, not widely known or understood in the West and quite obviously not employed as a basis for American policy toward Communist China. The work evaluates the elaborate pattern of Sino-Soviet relationships established between 1949 and 1957. In the main it is tightly and cogently written, with speculation and extrapolation contained within identifiable limits. For the first time Sino-Soviet relations are comprehensively covered from the points of view of Chinese and Soviet national interests, aspirations, intentions, capabilities, and inner tensions—these being examined politically, economically, ideologically, strategically, and geographically, as they might be seen by the partners themselves. Sino-Soviet relations are not made to correspond to external notions of what they are or might become; and a volume such as this, refreshingly at variance with prevalent official and unofficial impressions of its subject, should be widely welcomed and carefully considered.

Messrs. Boorman, Eckstein, Schwartz, and Mosely were members of a Study Group of the Council on Foreign Relations formed in 1955–1956 to inquire into the problems faced by the United States in its relations with the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Mr. Boorman makes the most extensive contribution, with two chapters on "The Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Political Impact" (pp. 1–53) and "The Borderlands and the Sino-Soviet Alliance" (pp. 142–197). He sees "the general combination of ideological, military, political, and economic factors which shape the Sino-Soviet alliance" as providing "a foundation of common interests and reciprocal benefits"; consequently, the partners "find the present relationship not only expedient but necessary" (p. 49). Mr. Boorman believes that "the West would be foolhardy to ignore the fact that Communist China is now, and will continue to be, an increasingly important force in the Communist world, or to overlook the probability that the general community of belief and purpose underlying the alliance gives prospect of a reasonably durable union" (p. 52). Mr. Boorman's conclusions are supported by his analysis of the Chinese Communist position *vis-à-vis* Japan, Korea, Indochina, and Southeast Asia, and by his review of Sino-Soviet understandings in the peripheral regions of China—in Manchuria, Inner and Outer Mongolia, and in Sinkiang. The general withdrawal of the Soviet Union from direct intercession in the affairs of the Chinese outer provinces leads him to conclude that "the Soviet leaders appear to have taken particular care to avoid direct conflict or unnecessary competition with the Chinese Communists in the borderlands and have gradually retracted their own sphere of activity in them" (p. 194); and he believes that "Peking and Moscow will continue to devise solutions to local problems of the borderlands in cooperation and without subjecting the Sino-Soviet alliance to any unmanageable strain" (p. 197).

Mr. Eckstein deals with "Moscow-Peking Alliance: The Economic Pattern" (pp. 54–111), with particular attention to the effect of American embargos. He makes the best of the fragmentary data now at hand and concludes that "trade controls, embargos and similar economic measures represent rather ineffective and insensitive instruments . . . . In and of themselves, these measures can hardly be expected either to induce a collapse of the Chinese Communist regime, to impose critical strains upon Soviet industry and the Soviet economy, or to result in a rupture of the Sino-Soviet alliance" (p. 104). Speaking strictly in economic terms, Mr. Eckstein believes that "a high level of trade between China and the Soviet Union is disadvantageous for both trading partners" but is "more artificial from a Soviet than from a Chinese point of view" (p. 83). In any case, he believes that "the divergence of their economic interests may pale into insignificance" beside the community of political, ideological, and other non-economic considerations.

Professor Schwartz tackles the difficult problems involved in "Ideology and the Sino-Soviet Alliance" (pp. 112–141). He suggests that while "the general tendency has been toward the disintegration of Marxist-Leninist ideology [as a unifying force] . . . ideology has continued to be of basic importance even in its process of disintegration" (p. 115). At a time when Soviet spokesmen were endorsing apparent Chinese Communist deviations from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, the Chinese Communists attempted to restore a minimal ideological harmony by identifying their "people's democratic dictatorship" as the true "dictatorship of the proletariat" (*Jen-min jih-pao,* Peking, April 5, 1956). Professor Schwartz believes that "the drastic disintegration of the ideology . . . has greatly weakened ideology as a binding fabric" (p. 141), without necessarily weakening the will of the partners to act in political unison.

Moscow-Peking Axis is China- and Asia-centered. It points up the objective elements in Sino-Soviet relations that have permitted Communist China to thrive and grow in stature in the Communist world. It might better have been called *Peking-Moscow Axis.*

Mr. Wei's *China and Soviet Russia* is a larger and heavier treatise, which pays more attention to historical events leading to the Communist victory in China than to present relations between China and the Soviet Union. His belief that "the Soviet Union is the cock of the walk in China" (p. ix) pays lip-service to an opinion widely held in this country, but stands in sharp contrast to the better-informed judgment of the authors of *Moscow-Peking Axis.* From Mr. Wei's heavily-weighted treatment of American-Soviet diplomacy in the period preceding the Communist victory in China, the reader is somehow left to conclude that that catastrophe was ascribable to Soviet machinations and American stupidity rather than to the internal disintegration and collapse of the Nationalist Government on the mainland.

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Special District Governments in the United States. BY JOHN C. BOLLENS. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1957. Pp. xiv, 280. $4.50.)

Most students of American government will be familiar in a general way with the special district; a number of other types of technicians have discovered the device; so far the general public would appear to be relatively uninformed. Professor Bollens has written an exceedingly readable and comprehensive account of these districts, his point of attack being primarily their structure and powers, plus some analysis of their performance. Because of the comprehensive sweep of his study, Dr. Bollens has not had an opportunity to provide lengthy case studies of specific districts, although some of the more important metropolitan districts have been examined at some length. This book's value lies in the breadth of the coverage, as well as in the sober care taken with the subject.

The relative abandon with which special districts have been formed makes classification difficult. Dr. Bollens chooses to distinguish metropolitan districts, urban fringe districts, coterminous, rural, school, and dependent districts. This is a useful scheme and brings some sense of order to a rather chaotic collection.

I see no quarrel with this book's analysis of the causes for these districts. Those causes have been comprehensively and dispassionately laid out and I think no essential point has been missed. The author notes that we have crippled our cities as to their powers and fiscal resources, so that the special district has become necessary. Many cities, too, have been lethargic about their fringe and metropolitan problems; the special district has filled the vacuum. I think the author might have emphasized a little more the role of "unadorned self interest" in the creation of districts. They not only furnish ways of marketing such solid articles as concrete and pipe, as he notes; they are also money-makers for the lawyer, the engineer, and the banker. So is any government, of course, but the special district has attractions all its own, which the specialist in district-building has discovered and exploited. The cost to the tax- or rate-payer is rather high and the results not too good as the author points out, particularly in his chapter on urban fringe districts.

A thorough examination of the school district shows it to be firmly rooted in the American scheme and highly resistant to any reorganization as part of multiple-purpose governmental operations. Even though the school district be accepted as a separate unit, it is clear that extensive reorganization and consolidation have not produced a completely rational system. A few states have reluctantly come to the view that this kind of rationality can be obtained only through firm action at the state level.

Professor Bollens' report is carefully thought out and I do not see how partisans of the special district can regard his work as otherwise than objective. His final judgment on special districts is not friendly. "Not all their deviations," he notes (p. 251), "from widely known governmental molds and practices are beneficial, and in total their characteristics are a mixed blessing." Their existence measures to a large degree the partial breakdown of local government in this country. They reveal the unresponsiveness, and the weaknesses, of local government. They disclose the fact that governments and private organizations are taking an increasingly specialized approach to public problems. In this approach, federal agencies have played an important role. Finally, they reveal a desire for home rule, but whether this is a cloak for special privilege or a genuine desire for local democracy and face-to-face dealing with local problems is certainly open to question. On the whole, this book lends little support to the idea that the special district is a satisfactory means of providing public service.

LEE S. GREENE.

The University of Tennessee.

Civil Service or Bureaucracy? BY E. N. GLADDEN. (New York: John de Graff, Inc. 1957. Pp. xiii, 224. $4.00.)

This is a curious, and in many respects a disappointing, book. Indeed, a reviewer cannot help wondering why the author thought it necessary to write it. Mr. Gladden had already produced two books about the British civil service and a couple of general works on public administration. The principal objection to this latest volume is that it has so little to say that is new.

In his own words, his aim is "(i) to provide an up-to-date description of the British Civil Service as a developing institution, with special reference to its problems as a working body, and (ii) to examine critically the present situation and suggest lines for future development" (p. vii). The book divides into two parts: the first part, three-quarters of the whole, consists largely of description, much of it historically organized, of the principal aspects of the Treasury classes of the Civil Service, while the last quarter is a discussion of needs and problems under modern conditions. In the descriptive part, almost everything is a *résumé* of familiar material, repeating the oft-told story of the growth and organization of the Civil Service since the 1850's. Most of this section consists of narration, and some of it is very dull reading. The only new data are those that cover very recent events, including a chapter entitled "Postscript" added at the end to summarize the findings of the Priestley Commission, which sat from 1953 to 1955.

The book begins to come to life only in the closing quarter, when the author plunges into discussion and starts raising some argumentative questions. But again, although the reader's interest is enlivened at this point, he soon finds once again that in the discussion, as in the narration earlier, the ideas contain little that is original. Surely it is not news to anyone to have a contrast made between the concept of civil service and the practice of bureaucracy, to be told that the Administrative Class has constituted a powerful and socially homogeneous oligarchy, to listen to a plea for more imagination and initiative in large-scale organization, and to be informed of the dangers to the Service of criticism that is too corrosive and unsympathetic, from the public and the press.

Mr. Gladden is correct in pointing out that some of the features that once marked out the British Civil Service for a career and an employment are no longer as advantageous as they used to be. Salaries compare less and less favorably with many that can be earned in private business; and the bigger corporations, by introducing pension schemes, have robbed the Crown of one of its recruiting baits. The truth is that in the Britain of to-day the dividing line between business and government is much less sharp than was once the case. Managerialism has had its effect on industry, while the State has, of course, entered business as a result of the extensive programmes of nationalization. Mr. Gladden is aware of these changes and of the challenge to public employment which they constitute. Hence, it is a pity, and all the more surprising, that his own treatment covers so limited a scope and confines itself to the traditional aspect of Britain's Civil Service. The fact is that there are now a great many separate personnel systems in Britain, all of whose employees are remunerated from public funds. To understand the role of the State as an employer, from this time on it would be better to deal not only with the Treasury Classes, but also with the Foreign, Colonial, and Commonwealth Services, and above all with the large and important staffs of the public corporations in the nationalized undertakings. The new thinking about the Civil Service, which Mr. Gladden rightly invites, should begin with a comprehensive account that does not ignore the newest functions and personnel of the mid-twentieth-century State.

LESLIE LIPSON.

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Studies of Overseas Supply. History of the Second World War (Civil Series). BY H. DUNCAN HALL AND C. C. WRIGLEY. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery

Office and Longmans, Green and Company; New York: British Information Services. 1956. Pp. xi, 537. $6.75.)

The Combined Food Board: A Study in Wartime International Planning. By Eric Roll. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1956. Pp. xiii, 385. $7.50.)

In the last world war the battles for supply and production, no less than crucial military exploits, were determinants of victory. The new technology of that war did place a premium upon the procurement and delivery of guns, tanks, and planes. Ships and food were no less important to our allies, who depended upon imports for their supplies. It is in such a context that both of these volumes constitute significant contributions to the history of the Second World War. They illuminate the experience of the war and fill in a number of gaps hitherto not adequately recorded by historians.

The book by H. Duncan Hall and C. C. Wrigley, *Studies of Overseas Supply*, is a part of the United Kingdom Civil Series, which has dealt most comprehensively with the history of World War II. In passing, one cannot help paying tribute to the excellence of this series, most volumes of which have already been published. A somewhat similar series on the history of wartime administration was undertaken by the United States Government with far less success, the work of the War Production Board (WPB) being one of the exceptions as far as the civilian wartime agencies were concerned.

The volume by Hall and Wrigley is somewhat diffuse, and deliberately so. It is composed of a series of chapters, each dealing with different aspects of overseas supply. These include such matters as munitions supply from North America, procurement and lend-lease, British supply organization in various countries, and the Combined Boards. Other sections deal with scientific collaboration primarily between the United Kingdom and the United States on radar, the jet engine, and the atomic bomb. A final chapter records the contribution of the Eastern Hemisphere to war supply, a record of achievement which has not been fully appreciated. While the "arsenal of democracy" no doubt was to be found in the Western Hemisphere, South Africa, India, Australia, New Zealand, and the British dependencies pulled their weight very effectively.

Though this volume appears to be somewhat segmented, there is a thread of continuity which runs throughout the whole. The evolution from Britain's first important efforts in the war procurement field to the highly developed machinery of the British Supply Council is a history of growth and adjustment, which eventually culminated in intensive cooperation between the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. How action was organized to carry out broad policies of supply reveals the close interplay of policy formulation and policy execution in the British mode. Despite difficulties which at times appeared insurmountable, the British team were well trained and disciplined. Unlike many of their opposite numbers in the United States they were not beset with numerous cross-pulls and jurisdictional problems stemming from the plethora of wartime agencies.

This volume, as well as the one by Mr. Roll, gives rise to various reflections, particularly in the field of comparative administration. To deal adequately with such reflections would require a treatise on the respective cultures of the United States and Britain. In fact, the whole mode and method of British administration are quite different from the American, despite a similar Anglo-Saxon heritage and devotion to the common law. With the British, as a rule, administrative mechanisms—techniques and procedures—grow largely out of evolving relations. They are not a substitute for such relations. The British live within a society whose roots are old and well established and whose social controls are well settled by custom and usage. Their culture represents an orderly framework within which adjustments take place. The British know much better than the Americans what actions and reactions they may expect from each other, and hence compromise and accommodation are more readily understood and more effectively managed. Thus the British approach to the art of government and administration, though largely by indirection, is nicely portrayed throughout these volumes on the history of wartime effort.

The book by Eric Roll, *The Combined Food Board*, concentrates upon one of the instrumentalities established to assist in combining the wartime supply efforts of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. This was one of the non-military boards, which also included the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, and the Combined Production and Resources Board. This work is the first extensive history to appear on any one of the boards. The origin, growth, and eventual dissolution of the Combined Food Board are traced by a man who had a great deal to do with the functioning of the Board. Thus the author had the advantage of being a first-hand participant from the British side in a unique experiment in international cooperation.

The book itself takes the reader through the early stages of food procurement by the British Food Mission in Washington, the beginning of combined planning through the creation of the Combined Food Board, the development of the Board, and its final dissolution. Unlike the other combined boards, the Combined Food Board weathered its early difficulties and expanded in scope and importance as the war drew to a close. Its work, in fact, became the basis for continuing international attention to food problems with the emergence of the present day Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

Mr. Roll's conclusions are particularly of interest as they relate to the contemporary international scene. He recognizes the importance of the diplomatic pattern, as well as the United Nations, in the building of order and security in the world. But perhaps equally important may be the emergence of intergovernmental organizations, the "international conferences in permanent session." These he considers the true inheritors of the Combined Boards and particularly of the Combined Food Board. These organizations, of which NATO and the OEEC have been examples, have grown in scope and importance. While they have developed their own secretariats and staffs, they serve to bring together in permanent session national administrators who remain responsible to their own governments. This is the essence of the combined process. It is a middle type of organized effort, between the diplomatic pattern on the one hand and the rather elaborate international agencies of a United Nations' system on the other, which can also play an important role in the building of peace.

Some of the implications which might be drawn from such a viewpoint should not be lost upon the reader. The strategy so essential to the building of world order requires a multiple approach. The problems of the postwar world are in many respects no different from those of the war. These problems are comparable in scale and call for the same bold treatment. They call for leadership, as well as for the effective execution of large programs hitherto identified only with wartime administration. And one might well add that in the battle for peace there is an urgency no less compelling than in the prosecution of war.

Both of these volumes add to our perspective not only with respect to wartime organization and management but also with regard to the needs and requirements of the postwar world.

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International Cooperation Administration,
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The Administration of War Production. History of the Second World War (Civil Series). By J. D. Scott and Richard Hughes. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans, Green and Company; New York: British Information Services. 1956. Pp. xii, 544. $6.75.)

This ably done volume is one of seven composing the War Production Series· Attention is fixed on the years of the build-up of war production. "It was in this great effort of expansion, beginning with rearmament and going on, in the field of administration, until some indeterminate date in the latter part of the war, that the great achievement of planning, of ingenuity and of effort took place." With scope so restricted, the treatment of the Combined Boards and the problem of civilian requirements is deliberately limited. The administration of war production is told as the detailed history of the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Air Ministry; the Ministries of Supply and of Aircraft Production; the Ministry of Production; and a complex of central authorities.

Part I is devoted to the pre-war period and bares the essential patterns of complicated workings that had their effect on postwar administrative developments. Why Admiralty organization is "almost completely impervious, as a system, to all attempts at radical alteration imposed from above" is explained. The tortuous struggle of the War Office to reconceptualize its production responsibilities *vis-à-vis* industry contrasts with the sensible *ad hoc* adaptation of administration within the Air Ministry to rapid changes in aircraft design and armament and to advances in the technique of air warfare. By May 1940, when the Ministry of Aircraft Production was established, a successful system for dealing with problems of capital expansion had been worked out, and a true "production directorate" had been developed under pressure of air-force expansion programs.

For a number of reasons, notable among which was the relaxation of Treasury control, innovation and departures from the orthodox characterized M.A.P. administration. Organization for research, design, and development had long been "strong and coherent." The primary problem was "the need for a different approach to the planning of aircraft output." The estimates of the producing firms always remained the basis of production programming, but processes were worked out for correcting such initial estimates in relation to the goal of a realistic minimum program.

The Admiralty never yielded to a comprehensive and radical reorganization. The "four chief principles" that pervaded Admiralty institutions were maintained throughout the war years, although "special circumstances on occasion led to departures from each of them." The cardinal principle was "the doctrine of 'user-control'." The Admiralty portion of the volume was done by Richard Hughes. Administrative history, as Mr. Hughes writes it, makes extraordinarily good reading.

The story of the Ministry of Supply is divided into organization, central control, and research and development. The Ministry was organized on the durable principle of self-contained production divisions. The development of the Secretariat is traced, and recognition is given to the able way in which the administrative civil servants exercised their extensive authority. The methods of central control were priorities, the allocation of materials, capacity, and labor, the location of new capacity, and the control of construction. Production programs were at the heart of the entire machinery of central control. The threshold difficulty lay in obtaining a clear statement of requirements from which to start. Beyond this lay the problems of working out effective machinery for program review and program forecasting. As for research and development, "All the problems were connected with the one big problem of the 'civilianization' of research and development."

The Ministry of Supply concentrated on central control of operational production programs. Questions of total production planning were the concern of the War Cabinet Defence Committee (Supply) and the Ministry of Production. The former was "the personal instrument of the Prime Minister." It is characterized as "the fountainhead of authority in production matters" and "the nerve center of production planning." The latter was the result of the entry of the United States into the war. "It was the Prime Minister's view that one individual representative of His Majesty's Government ought to be in a position to treat with Mr. Nelson on equal terms, as bearing responsibility for the whole of British production." The status and role of the Production Ministry was far clearer with reference to the integration of British and American programs and the global planning of production in relation to resources than with reference to the work of the other supply departments, the ministers of which were not subordinate to the Minister of Production. The regional organization was the instrument through which was finally solved the "intractable problem" of the extent of the Production Ministry's direct authority in industrial matters. The Ministry of Production is evaluated as an " 'historical, not rational' " solution to the general problem of war production coordination; "a successful improvisation" rather than "a model or archetype."

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American Defense and National Security. BY TIMOTHY W. STANLEY, WITH A FOREWORD BY ROBERT CUTLER. (Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1956. Pp. 202. $3.25.)

Timothy W. Stanley's *American Defense and National Security* is the only effort to date to describe the history and organization of the government for this nation's military security. That this should be so is curious if one considers how frequently this organization is made the butt of criticism. Such knowledgeable experts as Lt. Gen. Leslie B. Groves, Vannevar Bush, Ralph J. Cordiner, and Nelson A. Rockefeller all had an adverse word to say in a single week in May. In view of the lack of balance between public and academic concern, therefore, any student of government should be appreciative that a first-rate text is presently available.

Mr. Stanley's is a descriptive analysis. It is written in three parts, the first of which deals with the coordination of military policy within the Executive Branch, with the functioning and origins of the National Security Council, and with State-Defense coordination through the Office of International Security Affairs. The second describes the changing patterns of organization (changes, by the way, have occurred with such frequency that the book is already slightly behind the times) from World War II through the Korean War to the date of publication. The sub-section on "Unification in a Nutshell" (pp. 68 f.) is a classic of succinctness, with the harried and awkward relationships between the services as a whole and the Office of the Secretary of Defense neatly summarized. Comprised in the third section are four appendices, a selective bibliography, and a series of organization charts. The first appendix is a note on British defense organization by L. W. Levine, who, like Mr. Stanley, was a teaching fellow of the Harvard Defense Studies Program. The others are reproductions of the texts of the National Security Act of 1947, Reorganization Plan No. 6 (the sweeping reorganization effected by the Eisenhower administration), and the 1953 revision, by Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, of the much debated Key West Agreements, on the roles and missions of the several military services. Running throughout are exceptionally interesting footnotes.

American Defense and National Security is primarily an elementary guide to a Pentagon problem area. It was specifically designed as such, and as such it is remarkably successful. The section on "A Hypothetical Example of an Administrative Policy Decision" (pp. 122 ff.) is not so helpful on reflection as it perhaps first seems, and the duties of the multiple Assistant Secretaries of Defense, as outlined on pp. 112 ff., could have been more detailed. But—and this is the point—the book does well what it sets out to do. It pioneers in a neglected area.

What are needed now are inquiries into the organization philosophy of DOD on the one hand and its political behavior on the other. Although by no means clear, the implicit theoretical concept of DOD would seem to be that OSD is merely an office of management review in the narrowest sense. When there is an operational crisis, in the field of guided and ballistic missiles for example, an outsider apparently has to be called in to work on the problem. This in turn suggests that the organizational concepts of DOD are deserving of scholarly review.

What most notably falls outside the approach employed by Mr. Stanley is any critical consideration of the pattern of the day-to-day relationships of the segments of DOD to one another, their political behavior. Between that curious semi-autonomous corporate body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, and the Secretary of Defense, there are delicate problems of authority which are insistent and bitter. Add to this the relationships between the members of the J.C.S. as Chiefs of the services, their service secretaries, and the OSD, and there is need for a great deal more work.

In future research, however, Mr. Stanley's book will remain a gratefully remembered blaze on the trail. In the meantime it serves as an indispensable introduction to the study of national defense.

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The Council of Europe: Its Structure, Functions, and Achievements. By A. H. Robertson. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1957. Pp. xiii, 252. $7.75.)

All serious students of international organization will want to read this succinct, definitive work on the Council of Europe. There have been a number of good articles on the Strasbourg organization created in 1949 by European states "for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideas and principles which are their common heritage," but no one has hitherto drawn together the threads of seven years' experience. This A. H. Robertson, Counsellor in the office of Clerk of the Assembly, has skillfully done, suggesting also the future design.

The book discusses in turn the origins, purposes, structure, and work of the Council of Europe, in their political, economic, social, and legal ramifications; a final organic chapter treats its relations with other private and public international agencies. The appendix includes a welcome guide to the Strasbourg publications and a complete chart of treaties ratified under the aegis of the Council. In the effort to be comprehensive within 221 (excellently footnoted) pages of text, the author has crowded together virtually all the facts; written with legalistic detachment, his balanced paragraphs do not always make lively reading. Nevertheless, his survey over the years—from Churchill's ebullient vision, at Zurich in 1946, of European integration, to the failure of the Council of Europe, by 1952, to become a political authority—is frank and discerning, as is his examination of its tentative role, from 1952 to 1954, as mediator between "Little Europe" (Benelux, France, Germany, Italy) and the rest of western Europe. He weighs its success in blessing the Coal and Steel Community against its chagrin at the abandonment of the Defense Community. The Council of Europe, as he pithily describes it, is "an essentially political organization with no clearly defined political role."

Such transformation as Europe has experienced in the past decade, from a shared Western tradition to an integrated community in the federalist sense, seems mainly confined now to the six members of Little Europe. Further confirmation of this trend appeared in the momentous signature of the Common Market and Euratom Treaties last March, an event too recent for Mr. Robertson's volume, but fully in line with his analysis. If the Council of Europe has not become a political authority, even with limited functions, or even a supervisory agency for the several functional "communities," can it at least serve as a general framework for European policy? The answer is equivocal. Certainly, as far as concerns policy coordination of any of the existing or contemplated functional organizations, the Council of Europe lacks authority. Yet the joint-study reports from the OEEC, the ECSC, and other intergovernmental agencies have led to animated discussions of economic policies affecting all Europe and have drawn public attention to the issues. Moreover, the Consultative Assembly of the Council, composed of parliamentary members acting as individuals or party members rather than as national delegates, has turned up provocative ideas in every field of economic and social action, prodding the Committee of Ministers to rational decisions, whether positive or negative, that admit a "European" point of view. The achievements of the Council of Europe in fostering conventions to regulate international legal matters, human rights, cultural exchange, and social welfare have been considerable. As of April 1956, sixteen conventions, agreements, and protocols in these areas were in affect. In drawing attention to the pressing needs of Europe, without the obfuscating arguments inherent in national paraliaments, the Strasbourg Assembly has acted vigorously. More than once, the Council of Ministers, naturally restrained by their responsibilities as political incumbents, have accepted the thoughts of the Consultative Assembly and refurbished them for translation into deeds.

In his slim but perceptive conclusion, Mr. Robertson justly sees that the organization has been much like a standing conference, that the Assembly could be reproached for wanting to do too much too inconsiderately, and the Committee of Ministers for its penchant for finding difficulties rather than exploring solutions. Nevertheless, there exists an organization that will not let a proposed convention founder on the inertia of national government departments. The Consultative Assembly can not only remind and persuade through a whetted public opinion, but also directly help in the treaty ratification process by virtue of its ambivalent membership.

The claims for the Council of Europe are modest; Mr. Robertson writes modestly, but with a firm conviction, supported by scholarly analysis, that this international organization merits respect for its patient plodding through the labyrinth of European integration.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Second Consul: The Vice Presidency: Our Greatest Political Problem. By Edward Wiggins Waugh. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1956. Pp. 224. $3.75.)

Alben Barkley, whose reputation as a storyteller needs no defense, was fond of telling the following story about the Vice Presidency: "Once upon a time there was a farmer who had two sons. One of them ran off to sea. The other was elected Vice President of the United States. Nothing was ever heard of either of them again." In contrast to stories like this one, which are legion, is the urgent appraisal of the nation's second executive office made by President Eisenhower in his press conference of February 6, 1957: "I believe," declared the President, "that it is almost showing indifference to the welfare of the American people, unless you keep the Vice President aware of everything that is going on. . . . I would . . . have him in every important conference of government. . . ."

Edward W. Waugh, in this latest book on the Vice Presidency, finds much to justify both the Barkley and the Eisenhower pronouncements. In a careful review of the history of the Vice Presidency, the author is impressed that the office, after long decades of desuetude in the nineteenth century, has achieved a recurrent high significance in the twentieth. The contrast is owing in considerable part to the increasing tendency of modern Vice Presidents to succeed to the highest office: witness Roosevelt I, Coolidge, and Truman. A related and equally determining factor is the difficult transition from one Presidency to the next in the rigorous world political environment of today: witness Mr. Truman's rough passage into the highest office and the earnest preparations being given Mr. Nixon.

The author describes fully the significant current developments concerning the Vice Presidency, particularly Nixon's roles in foreign affairs, in executive policy-making and administration, and in party and legislative affairs. Also given are useful accounts of the treatment accorded the Vice Presidency by the national party conventions in 1956. In making evaluations, the author is chary about concluding that any of these happenings is apt to produce lasting changes in the office.

The book gives much attention to proposals which have been made to alter, and presumably to strengthen, the Vice Presidency. There is comprehensive treatment of the many viewpoints and suggestions collected in the hearings conducted by Senator John F. Kennedy, as well as of other studies and sources of recommendations. Here are to be found former President Hoover's proposal for an Administrative Vice President, legislation introduced to increase the Vice President's staff, constitutional amendments to abolish the Vice President's legislative functions, and all sorts of measures for drawing the Vice President more intimately into executive affairs. In sizing up this array of ideas, several of which at first glance have strong appeal, Mr. Waugh is steadily wise and sane. In general, he abhors Constitutional amendments and most often prefers the *status quo* to the hazards and imponderables of change.

The book is designed primarily for the general reader. Much of its information, accordingly, is known to the professional, although he stands to benefit from the inclusive, well-ordered presentation. The style is readable, making good use of anecdote and the striking phrase. One feature all readers will find useful is an Appendix with thumbnail sketches of all the Vice Presidents. The details are discriminatingly selected and the comment apt. Mr. Waugh has given us a competent book, which provides a good basis upon which further studies of the Vice Presidency may be made.—Louis W. Koenig, *New York University.*

The Agricultural Commodity Programs: Two Decades of Experience. By Murray R. Benedict and Oscar C. Stine. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. 1956. Pp. xliii, 510. $5.00.)

The Agricultural Commodity Programs is the last of three related volumes of the Twentieth Century Fund directed by Murray R. Benedict. The first, *Farm Policies of the United States: 1790–1950*, was an historical account; the second, *Can We Solve the Farm Problem*, examined contemporary programs in terms of "the principles involved, the general effects of the programs, and the public and private costs resulting from them."

While the material in the second volume was organized around the major clusters of farm programs such as credit, price supports, conservation, and surplus disposal, the third volume is an extensive examination of farm programs—especially of the period 1933–1955—in relation to the commodities for which the programs were developed. Much of the complexity of the "farm problem" is, thereby, revealed. Differences in production techniques, technological and research influences, stability of consumer preference, foreign markets, and adaptability to new uses combine to produce special problems and unique characteristics for each commodity. The farm program is a composite of many segments, each a specific response to a specific problem.

The commodity analysis reveals other complexities which relevant programs have not met. The absence of program differentiation of regional and varietal differences within single commodities is one example. The over-produced hard winter wheat of the Pacific northwest and the spring wheat in which over-production is not a problem should not be subject to the same regulations.

This study provides very useful material for political scientists. It is a case study of public policy formulation in response to immediate demands, but inextricably related to historic forces of many decades, to the impact of other—industrial, financial—segments of the national economy; to regional variations, interest groups, checks and balances, and federalism.

The "farm problem" is largely the result of forces over which the farmer has had little influence. The agricultural commodity programs and the farm program generally reflect a conviction that the farmer on the "family sized farm" is the true free citizen and basic unit of democracy. Thus there is justification for the effort to preserve agrarianism in spite of the fact that agrarianism is incompatible with technological facts. For an evaluation of the older attitudes in the face of new forces we must look elsewhere; but the need to re-examine assumptions that lie behind public policy in agriculture and, indeed, in other areas, is clear.—LEON O. WOLCOTT, *University of New Mexico.*

Who's Behind Our Farm Policy? BY WESLEY MCCUNE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1957. Pp. vi, 374. $3.50 cloth, $1.50 paper.)

Students of government know that more than the legislative branch is involved in the making of national policy. Policy is "made" in the administrative and regulatory agencies and in the courts, as well as in Congress. In addition, there are at least two other factors, the pressure groups and the propaganda and public opinion which they consciously generate.

The farm policy pressure groups, both rural and non-rural, are portrayed in this book. In writing it Wesley McCune has put in his debt all those political scientists and other students of policy-making who are dissatisfied with description of appearances and who seek the real makers of policy. While he disclaims any intention of interpretation and is content with reporting the facts, it is obvious from his exposition of the "Wall Street hayseeds" and of people intent on "farming the farmers" where his sympathies lie. There is no law against industrialists denouncing farm price supports, businessmen promoting competition in agriculture while resisting it in industry and distribution, or associations of bankers and insurance companies getting into the hard *versus* the soft money and credit controversy. McCune does not argue that there should be. All he does is to lay on the line for all to see "the many changes in the composition, tactics, techniques and arguments of the pressure groups" since the basic laws of agricultural policies were enacted in the 1930's (p. v). But this is plenty. The book should be required reading for Congressmen (who are barely mentioned in it), for college undergraduates, for newspaper editors and radio commentators, and for those urban dwellers who wonder why prices at the grocery story rise while the farmer's share of the food dollar goes down. Rural dwellers, too, would benefit from reading this book, although, on the whole, they are probably somewhat better informed about "who's behind our farm policy" than urban dwellers are. In any event, this book is a welcome addition to the political literature on that hardy perennial of American politics, the farm probem.—DONALD C. BLAISDELL, *The City College of New York.*

The Liberties of an American: The Supreme Court Speaks. BY LEO PFEFFER. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1956. Pp. xi, 309. $5.00.)

Convinced that the "instinct for liberty is not enough," and that it must be reinforced by an "understanding as widespread as the instinct," the author undertakes to set forth in his expository account of the leading decisions of the Supreme Court the ingredients necessary for an informed appraisal of the complex problems of civil liberties.

Mr. Pfeffer makes no claim to originality or profundity in this volume, but he has written an admirably clear and concise book for the general reader, which accomplishes his purpose of shedding "some light on what the liberties of an American are and what they mean." Sample chapter headings include "Liberty of Belief and Disbelief," "Liberty of Speech and Silence," and "Liberty of Entry, Sojourn and Exit." In a final chapter entitled "Today and Tomorrow" he evaluates the judicial trends in each of the fields and reaches the conclusions that the Supreme Court "by and large has fulfilled the responsibility committed to it to guard the Bill of Rights and protect the liberties of Americans."

Tulane Studies in Political Science, Volume II. The New Orleans Voter: A Handbook of Political Description. By Leonard Reissman, K. H. Silvert and Cliff W. Wing, Jr. *Republicanism in New Orleans.* By Kenneth N. Vines. (New Orleans: Tulane University. 1955. Pp. 134. $2.00.)

Two short studies, primarily descriptive and statistical in nature, of the political affiliations and voting behavior of citizens in a major Southern city. The first piece consists of an ecological analysis of voter characteristics; the second portrays the nature of minor party political support. Special attention is paid to the racial, ethnic, and religious factors that make New Orleans politics somewhat different from the typical pattern of Southern cities. Each study is supported by elaborate tables and maps.

The Negro and Southern Politics: A Chapter of Florida History. By Hugh D. Price. (New York: New York University Press. 1957. Pp. xviii, 133. $5.00.)

In Florida in 1944, about 5.5 per cent of the Negro population were registered to vote. In 1956, 37.5 per cent were registered, but this was by no means uniform over the whole state. There were two counties where no Negroes were registered, and twelve where 60 per cent or more were registered. The author analyzes the reasons for these variations. He also describes the role of Negroes in Florida campaigns with special reference to the state's "unique" Negro voting leagues. A somewhat limited attempt is made to analyze Negro voting behavior. The author concludes that "the state's Negro voters have been joining with South Florida to support moderate gubernatorial candidates in the primaries, but with North Florida to vote for Democratic presidential nominees." The 1956 election is not included in this analysis. An interesting study dealing with significant questions in a careful manner.

Union Democracy: The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union. By Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press. 1956. Pp. xxviii, 455. $7.50.)

Rather than constituting a thorough refutation of Michel's "iron law," this study concentrates on delineating the factors that make for and sustain democracy in a major American trade union, the International Typographical Union. In many respects the ITU is not a typical union—for instance, it is one of the few that has a functioning internal two-party system. Nevertheless, this work goes far toward answering the question why a kind of democracy can exist among printers and not prevail in other private government settings. The methodology of this volume, which combines social, psychological, and historical approaches, will be of interest to students of the politics of voluntary associations.

Checklist of hearings before Congressional committees through the Sixty-Seventh Congress. Part IV: House Committee on the District of Columbia through House Committee on Industrial Arts and Expositions. Compiled by Harold O. Thomen. (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. 1957. Pp. vii, 122. $1.)

Prior to 1924 in the 68th Congress, the hearings of Congressional committees were distributed only by the committees themselves. Frequently the hearings escaped notice in the *Monthly catalog of United States government publications* and in the former biennial *Document catalog.* As the hearings have become more esteemed as sources, not only in Washington but elsewhere, the need has been more and more felt for a systematic and complete inventory of all hearings up to the time that the current record in the *Monthly catalog* became substantially complete. On his own initiative, a member of the staff of the Library of Congress has been attempting for some years to work towards filling this need. The first part was issued in a small edition in 1942, the second in 1949, and the third in 1951.—J.B.C.

Check-list of departmental publications of the State of Rhode Island, 1935–1955. (Providence: Rhode Island State Library. [1956.] Pp. 33.)

The "Check-list," prepared by Alice E. Caldwell, is arranged in the order of the departments as given in the *State manual,* is as complete a listing as possible of all state publications issued during the twenty year period so far as deposited in the State Library, and has an index only by agency. About seventy-five special commission and committee reports made to the General Assembly are recorded on pages 25–27.—J.B.C.

A List of Tennessee State Publications, No. 3. By the State Library Division (Nashville: Tennessee State Library and Archives. 1956. Fol. 52.)

The annual publication now attempts to include for the first time all Tennessee state publications received by the State Library during the previous year. Nos. 1 and 2 issued in 1954 and 1955 might be described as guides to the publications of the principal agencies of the state government, giving note of the latest editions and not including the state universities and colleges. The State Library also seems to be giving some consideration to a much-needed retrospective listing of state documents; it issued in 1954 a *Preliminary check-list of Tennessee legislative documents.*—J.B.C.

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AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

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University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

China: New Age and New Outlook. By Ping-chia Kuo. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1956. Pp. xi, 231, viii. $3.75.)

Dr. Kuo's compact and very readable book evaluates the "irrepressible" Chinese Revolution in terms of Kuomintang failures and Chinese Communist successes. Because the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek failed to exert the revolutionary leadership demanded by the masses, it lost, in the end, even the support of "the village gentry and city merchants . . . its habitual sources of support" (pp. 79–80). For their part, the Chinese Communists are seen as successfully synchronizing "reform and revolution," as satisfying popular aspirations for "peace and unification," and thus gaining some immunity for their dictatorial methods and pseudo-democratic manipulations. Since Dr. Kuo sees no rival regime "capable of effectively challenging the power of Peking," he believes it "a purely academic pursuit" to condemn the regime on grounds of ideology or legitimacy (p. 204). He thus comes to advocacy of "open recognition" of the new international status of Communist China, holding that this would "substantially help the cause of peace" and "further the success of the anti-aggression stand of the West" (p. 219). Dr. Kuo has written an essay in interpretaion, judgment, and opinion, rather than a scholarly treatise in the formal sense. Yet what he has to say gains importance from the fact that Dr. Kuo (Ph.D. in History at Harvard) has taken up residence in the United States as a private citizen after successive years of service under the Nationalist Government as professor at the National Wuhan University, wartime official of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and Director in the Department of Security Council Affairs of the UN Secretariat. He writes courageously and imaginatively of the future development of Sino-Soviet relations, confident that the Chinese Communists will serve the national interests of the Chinese people rather than the interests of the Kremlin.—H. Arthur Steiner, *University of California (Los Angeles).*

The Political History of China, 1840–1928. By Li Chien-Nung. Translated and Edited by Ssu-Yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls. (Princeton, Toronto, London, New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1956. Pp. xii, 545. $7.50.)

This volume makes available in English translation a text which has had wide use in pre-Communist China. The first quarter of the volume treats of the years 1840–1895 (Chs. 1–3); the second, of the early reform and revolutionary movements (Chs. 4–9). In the last half of the volume the author gives approximately equal space to the Yuan Shih-kai period (1912–16), to the war lord period (1917–1923), and to the reorganization of the Kuomintang. Throughout the author emphasizes the operation of domestic rather than external forces in shaping the course of China's political development. This, as well as a distinctly Chinese point of view, distinguishes this volume from most other English language treatments of the period, and makes this translation an addition to the English literature on the subject. The value of the book is enhanced by the inclusion of a selected but extensive bibliography and an index.

Japanese People and Politics. By Chitoshi Yanaga. (New York: John Wiley and Sons; London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd. 1956. Pp. ix, 408. $7.50.)

The comparative behavioral approach is here used to draw aside the exotic veil from the Japanese political process while historical flashbacks help explain what is unique about that process. The sure touch of focus, highlights, and underlying analysis show this as the fruit of Professor Yanaga's pedagogical experience at Yale and the thorough digestion of his historical research: *e.g., Japan Since Perry.*

The text opens with a four-chapter background on the historically conditioned modes of thought and behavior of the Japanese people and on their social structure. The first of the institutionally oriented chapters examines the significance of the new constitution. There follows a unique if somewhat sanguine chapter on the Emperor as the cynosure of the nation, giving pause for reflection on the function of monarchy in the modern world. The next three chapters on cabinet leadership and the operations of the Diet delineate in terms of what has become customary, rather than in terms of rules, how legislation is made—with such sidelights as why Diet committee members tend to pad rather than hatchet the budget. This makes way for three succeeding chapters on the nature, function, and support of political parties, detecting the allurement of ministerial office and the predominance of personality over political program. The giant bureaucracy is the subject of an excellent chapter, but the final three chapters on welfare, law, and foreign affairs are somewhat anti-climactic and if intended to round out a picture of the political process might have included local administration. Nevertheless, studded with references to familiar American and European experience, this first-rate study undermines any excuse for not including Japan in comparative government courses.—GEORGE O. TOTTEN, *The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.*

The Labour Government and British Industry, 1945–51. BY A. A. ROGOW. WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF PETER SHORE. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1955. Pp. xii, 196. 18s.)

The publishers state that "this is a fresh and original study of the most critical domestic problem of a Socialist Government: namely, its relationship with private industry." The publishers are right, and they might have gone on to say with complete accuracy that the study is carefully thought out and organized, informative, penetrating, and provocative. In short, this is a first-rate little book.

Successive chapters deal with "Planning Under the Labour Government"; "Controlling Industry"; "Organisation of Private Industry"; "Industry and Labour"; "Industry and Taxation"; "Public Relations of Government and Business"; "The Impact of Nationalisation"; and "The Politics of Stalemate." The author is concerned with the effects upon private industry of the measures and devices instituted by the Labour Government, and with the consequent attitudes, policies, and practices of private industry. Industry, it appears, was quite prepared to go along with the Welfare State on issues of property rights, but it balked effectively and brought the welfare movement to a halt when the issue became one of control and power. In this connection, industry entered the political arena and performed more skilfully than the Labour Government and with more telling results. Incidentally, both those on the Right and those on the Left would do well to take note that to the extent that Socialism in Britain was successful in pointing up and bringing about changes in the general area of welfare, it progressively lessened its chances to achieve any more radical reorganization of society. Hence the dilemma which faces the British Labour Party today. As the author puts it: "It is possible to suggest, therefore, that the Labour Party is in urgent need of a theoretical critique which can serve to generate a new dynamic sufficient to carry its members to the outskirts of the Socialist Commonwealth. No longer can it gain victory by taking a stand against the evils and iniquities of *laisser-faire* capitalism, for they have been largely abolished by the Welfare State. . . . The main political challenge to the status quo derives from the rank and file members of the Labour Party, to whom the Welfare State brought material but not spiritual satisfactions. Here it is not difficult to discern a quest for the substance of the vision that has inspired, but has always eluded, the Socialist movement everywhere."

To repeat, this is a first-rate little book.—BEN W. LEWIS, *Oberlin College.*

Delegation in Local Government: County to District Councils. BY PETER G. RICHARDS. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. 184. $4.50.)

This book arises out of the continuing movement to reorganize the structure and functions of local government units in England and Wales, a movement that seems likely to produce some major changes within the next few years. The volume is not a general survey of local government but a specialized study of a problem or system of immediate practical importance. The author has sought to examine the working of the schemes by which county councils delegate authority and functions to the subsidiary units within their jurisdictions: non-county boroughs, urban and rural districts. The practice of such delegation, while not heretofore unknown, has been much extended by three great statutes dating from the period of 1944–1948. This development offers a partial solution at least to the competing claims of the various local councils for funds and jurisdiction; thus the examination of delegation as a means of rationalizing the relationship among local authorities is a necessary preliminary to any further reform, especially in view of its expansion since the war. While not everyone will agree with his views or accept his recommendations, all concerned will join in acknowledging the value of Mr. Richards' study. He says what he believes and says it well; his book is careful, comprehensive, and competent.

New Sources of Local Revenue. Report of a Study Group of the Royal Institute of Public Administration. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1956. Pp. 260. 25s.)

This study was prompted by the belief that local authorities in Britain are becoming too dependent upon central government grants and that the needs of a vigorous and healthy local government system demand that a greater share of local revenues be under the direct control of local authorities. The study group has examined local tax schemes in several other countries, especially in Sweden, and their report provides a comparative view of these as well as an examination of the British problem itself. Their recommendations, while obviously controversial, are cautiously and competently argued: they include the transfer of certain revenue sources from the central to the local governments and the authorization of local councils to impose a modest tax on personal incomes.

The British Press under Government Economic Controls. By J. Edward Gerald. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1956. Pp. xiv, 235. $4.50.)

As part of its planning for the safety and security of the nation in World War II, the British government brought the press and publishing industries under strict control and made virtually all the basic decisions about trade and production. Many of the controls described in this book have continued into 1957 and constitute, the author believes, a disturbing break with the tradition of a free press. Not only are the bases and form of governmental regulation made plain here, but information on its effect on the press is evaluated and its rationale subjected to patient criticism. In the light of contemporary fears about governmental and technological threats to freedom of the press in the United States (such as those voiced recently by J. Russell Wiggins), the British experience is instructive.

The Official History of the British Legion. By Graham Wooton. (London: Macdonald and Evans, Ltd. 1956. Pp. xviii, 348. 25s.)

This is an official history in the sense that it was written at the bidding of the Annual Conference of the British Legion. Although the author was somewhat restrained by the need to satisfy officially-appointed scrutinizers—"at some points in this book," he confesses, "the shadow of reticence has fallen over the harsh glare of 'absolute truth' "—he has produced a highly informative, well-organized, lucid, and generally balanced account of the only really important veterans' organization in Britain. Students of pressure politics will be fascinated by the descriptions of the political aims and methods of the British Legion, especially since they by no means parallel those of veterans' groups in this country. As a case study in politics, the book gives special insight into the complicated network of power and influence in British national life without claiming a greater impact on government policy than the facts warrant. Among the more interesting revelations are those of the degree of comity existing between the Legion and the ministries of state, the efforts of the Legion to improve international relations with a resurgent Germany, and the movement to send a contingent of Legionnaires to supervise a plebiscite in Czechoslovakia.

The Ministry of Works. By Sir Harold Emmerson. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. 171. $2.40.)

A summary, by a former Permanent Secretary, of the history, functions, and organization of this general-service ministry. The book is valuable chiefly for its showing of the great variety of tasks for which the ministry is responsible.

De Valera and the March of a Nation. By Mary C. Bromage. (New York: The Noonday Press. 1956. Pp. 328. $4.95.)

This well-written book, by the wife of a noted political scientist, offers an American version of the life of the controversial Irish statesman who, never *hors de combat,* has once again rotated back into the premiership. Mrs. Bromage has spun the facts of the enigmatic Dev's career into a fascinating narrative and has delineated the structure of an almost wholly political personality (whom Yeats called "a living argument rather than a living man"). Critics of De Valera's politics and the quality of contemporary Irish life will not find this book to their taste, for it is adulatory and partisan and hardly comes to grips with the larger questions raised by *émigrés* such as Joyce and O'Faolain.

Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism. By Wilbur D. Jones. (Athens: The University of Georgia Press. 1956. Pp. xi, 367. $5.00.)

Writing "a short political biography" of Edward Stanley, fourteenth Earl of Derby and thrice prime minister, without access to the Derby papers is writing under a handicap. Moreover, Mr. Jones has not attempted to organize political data topically (cf. N. Gash, *Politics in the Age of Peel*); he offers little to the student of constituencies, national party organization, or elections. His use of his principal manuscript source, the Disraeli papers, baffles the reader. What, for example (p. 308), did Derby report to Disraeli of Baxter's guess respecting "beer-barrel influence"? Treatment of Stanley's Colonial Office experience is too brief to be clear, and J. S. Marais is his authority for New Zealand. While stressing House of Lords proxies, he overlooks Tory use of them in 1864 and is unaware of the Standing Order abolishing them in 1868. His style is awkward: *e.g.*, "increasingly less strong supporters" (p. 108), and his tone uniformly uncritical.

The Growth and Culture of Latin America. By Donald E. Worcester and Wendell G. Schaeffer. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. xvii, 963. $6.00.)

As the title indicates, this volume is more than just a history of the tangled web of Latin American political development. The authors have managed to cover all phases of Latin American historical evolution and at the same time do justice to the broad basic cultural forces and institutions. Besides its other merits, the book adds much to our understanding of the often neglected seventeenth century. The authors are to be commended, too, on their insistence that for the Latin American nations the wars for independence did not mean a complete break with their Iberian background. The book is a sympathetic, intelligent, and readable interpretation of the internal problems and forces that have conditioned the growth and culture of Latin America. As such it will be welcomed by teachers and scholars alike.

Assemblée Nationale. Recueil des textes authentiques des programmes et engagements électoraux des députés proclamés élus à la suite des élections générales du 2 janvier 1956. Dressé par les soins du Secrétaire Générale de l'Assemblée Nationale. (Paris: Imprimerie de l'Assemblée Nationale. 1956. 2v. Pp. 1875.)

The two volumes of political platforms of the deputies elected to French National Assembly in 1956 are arranged alphabetically by the departments of France proper, followed by the overseas departments, and then by the overseas territories. The report, often refered to as Barodet, was printed for the Chamber of Deputies for each legislature from 1881 to 1936, and for the National Assembly of 1952.—J. B. C.

Les élections en Moselle. By Eugene L. Baudon. (Metz. 1956. Pp. 96. Fr. 500.)

The compilation shows the results of the various elections of the former "Reichsland" in Germany after its incorporation into France in 1918, and has a brief preface by Raymond Mondon, deputy in the National Assembly and mayor of Metz.—J. B. C.

Les publications périodiques éditées par les services centraux des ministères. By M. Gh. Keppenne. (Bruxelles: Commission Belge de Bibliographie. 1957. Pp. 64.)

Stimulated by the work of Everett S. Brown, Jacques de Dampierre, and others on government publishing and publications, the author has prepared a catalog of almost three hundred titles issued currently in periodical or other serial form in 1954 by the ministries proper of Belgium. The main arrangement is in the alphabetical order of the ministries. For the first time it is possible to secure an overall picture of current periodical publications of the Belgian government, noting also bilingual editions as well as separate editions in Dutch and French. Since there is no central control over the printing and publishing of the Belgian government, assembling the information has raised questions as to what are to be considered central services of the ministries and what are to be considered official publications.—J. B. C.

25 anos de administração pública: Ministério das corporações e previdência social. By the Presidencia do Conselho. (Lisbon: Imprensa nacional. 1955. Pp. 174.)

The Ministry of Corporations and Social Welfare represents a special feature of the economic organization of the Portuguese State under the present Constitution. Although the Ministry as such was not organized until 1950, there had been a Subsecretariat of State of the same name since 1933. The volume gives a statement of the organization and development of the various services, as well as a report on activities, for the entire period. Beginning with 1953, similar volumes have been prepared by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers covering the *Ministério de Comunicações*, the *Ministério de Exército*, the *Ministério das Finanças*, the *Ministério do Interior*, and the *Ministério das Obras Públicas*.—J. B. C.

Gedanken zur staatsbürgerlichen Erziehung. BY EDUARD SPRANGER. *Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst. Heft 26*. (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst. 1957. Pp. 51.)

Spranger's philosophic thoughts on civic instruction are issued by an official agency of the German Federal Republic for the strengthening of democratic ideas and institutions. The agency functions only within the Federal Republic, and the various numbers of the "*Schriftenreihe*" are not handled in the book trade, and are not ordinarily available for, or intended for, other than domestic distribution. The comment of Spranger on page 49 that "*Der eigentlich freie demokratische Geist hat in Deutschland noch keine tiefwurzelnde Tradition*" may help explain the need for the *Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst* and the active role it plays with the cooperation of similar *Länder* agencies.—J. B. C.

Aufgabe und Leistung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie in Ländern und Gemeinden. HRSG. VON ARNO SCHOLZ UND WALTER OSCHILOWSKI. (Berlin-Grünewald, Arani-verlag, 1956. Pp. 240. Wille und Tat: Bücher der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, IV. DM 6.00.)

The *Festschrift* prepared for the Convention of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands at Munich, July 10–14, 1956, contains illustrated reports on the issues and actions of the Party in the *Länder* and cities and is interesting as a document of present-day political party action in West Germany.—J. B. C.

Wirkungskreis der Behörden in Baden-Württemberg. Frühjahr 1956. BY THE INNENMINISTERIUM OF BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG. (Stuttgart: Beilage zum Gemeinsamen Amtsblatt. 1956. Pp. 117. Map.)

The manual describes the field of action and competence of the various ministries and other agencies of the State of Baden-Wurttemberg and includes similar information about the federal authorities functioning in the State and the ecclesiatical authorities in the State; it is intended for the use not only of offices and officials, but of those who have dealings with offices and officials, and even for the training of recruits to the public administration. It is edited by Oberregierungsrat a. D. Kätzler, and is a continuation of a publication edited from time to time previous to World War II by the *Innenministerium* of the State of Württemberg under the title *Aufbau und Wirkungskreis der staatlichen Behörden in Württemberg*, last appearing in 1938.—J. B. C

SBZ von A bis Z. Ein Taschen- und Nachschlagebuch über die Sowjetische Besatzungszone Deutschlands. Dritte, überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. BY THE BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR GESAMTDEUTSCHE FRAGEN. (Bonn: Deutscher Bundes-Verlag, 1956. Pp. 319.)

The standard alphabetical reference work on Eastern Germany from the point of view of Western Germany, which was first published in 1953, includes not only official agencies and institutions but biographies of leading personalities and cities of more than 25,000 population and has about a thousand more entries than the previous edition. It was edited by Eugen Stamm with the assistance of Günther Fischbach. At the end is a bibliography of 436 items, including all the titles in the two unnumbered series of the Federal Ministry for All-German Questions: *Bonner-Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschland*, and *Materialien zur Wirtschaftslage in der sowjetischen Zone*.—J. B. C.

SBZ von 1945 bis 1954. Die Sowjetische Besatzungszone Deutschlands in den Jahren 1945–1954. BY THE BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR GESAMTDEUTSCHE FRAGEN. (Bonn: Deutscher Bundes-Verlag. 1956. Pp. 361. 10 charts.)

The day-by-day record of political pressures in Eastern Germany from May 8, 1945, to December 31, 1954, was assembled from the law gazettes, official publications, newspapers and magazines, and edited by Fritz Kapp and Günther Fischbach, as a help in evaluating the reasons for the constant flight into Western Germany from Eastern Germany. There is also a "*Taschenausgabe*," 1956, of 307 pages. There are indexes by persons and topics, with an alphabetical key to abbreviations. A provisional edition, limited to political events in a rather narrow sense, was published in 1953 under the title: *Die sowjetische Besatzungszone Deutschlands in den Jahren 1945–1953. Eine chronologische Übersicht*.—J. B. C.

All India election guide. CHIEF EDITOR: R. V. KRISHNA AYYAR. (Mylapore, Madras: Oriental Publishers. 1956. Pp. 320, 97. Rs. 10.)

The guide for the second general elections in India contains a very useful statement on the states under the recent States Reorganization Act, summaries about the various national parties, comment on the first general elections, an article on election laws and procedure, another on the planning of a political campaign, and various brief sections on parties, programs, and policies. At the end is included the text of the Representation of the People Act 1951.—J. B. C.

Political Resolutions adopted at the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of India. (Delhi: D. P. Sinha. 1956. Pp. 46.)

The text of the resolution indicates the method of the Party in endeavoring to bring its force to bear on Indian problems, spelled out in "The immediate programme" appended to the Resolution on pages 40–46.—J. B. C.

Know your administration series. Nos. 1–20. BY THE BOMBAY LEGISLATURE CONGRESS PARTY. (Bombay. 1955–56. 20 nos., Rs. 8/-.)

The series deals with the operation of the various departments of the government of the State of Bombay, one of the largest states in India, prior to the recent States Reorganization Act, and thus presents an unusually helpful description of Indian government at the state level.—J. B. C.

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HIRAM M. STOUT

Washington, D. C.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

Technical Co-operation in Latin American Agriculture. By Arthur T. Mosher. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1957. Pp. xiv, 449. $6.00.)

This book is the second in a series of research reports being produced by a committee of the National Planning Association which, financed by a $440,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, investigated the role played by technical co-operation in Latin America. Dr. Mosher's contribution is a study of technical co-operation in agriculture. He has assembled a great deal of information, not readily available, about the activities of various programs of technical co-operation and presented it in a well-organized form. About half the book consists of eight case studies: rather detailed descriptions of programs now functioning in Latin America. The second half of the book consists of Dr. Mosher's discussion of how agricultural development comes about, what technical co-operation has contributed toward that end, and what can be done to improve technical co-operation.

Dr. Mosher defines technical co-operation in agriculture as "all those activities (other than importation of capital) that aim primarily at developing a more productive agriculture in a country and in which a non-profit agency external to the country is a co-operating partner." In the programs studied by him the external co-operating agencies were the Rockefeller Foundation, the American International Foundation, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the U. N., the Organization of American States, and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, an agency set up by the United States Government to handle bi-lateral technical co-operation programs in Latin America.

Dr. Mosher discovered that technical cooperation in agriculture in Latin America is an activity of considerable size. The programs varied in their accomplishments, but he thinks that as a whole they justified the investment represented and, therefore, technical co-operation in agriculture should be continued. He is of the opinion that through the years the programs have increased their efficiency and can accomplish much more in the future than they have until now. He believes that Foundations are especially effective in setting up successful programs.

The most interesting section of the book to this reader was Dr. Mosher's discussion of how agricultural development comes about and the need of creating self-generating resources among people. He discovered that agricultural progress was being made in Mexico as a result of its Revolution and in Bolivia because of the MNR movement. He concludes that agriculture develops most rapidly where people become interested in improvement since "agricultural development does not depend on farmers alone but is a product of the whole way of living, the whole culture, of a nation or of a region." Most political scientists would agree with this and point out that not only agriculture, but all aspects of economic life in Latin America, would improve rapidly if so much effort and resources were not used to preserve an outmoded *status quo.*

Footnotes, an index, and a large number of charts, graphs, and statistical tables increase the value of this book. It is recommended as a thought-provoking study which contains a great deal of information about the history, achievements, shortcomings, and problems facing technical co-operation in agriculture in Latin America.—Harry Kantor, *University of Florida.*

European Refugees, 1939–52: A Study in Forced Population Movement. By Malcolm J. Proudfoot. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1957. Pp. 542. $6.50.)

The last two years have seen the publication of a series of books which deal with the refugee problem during and after the Second World War from an organizational, legal, and humanitarian angle. Mr. Proudfoot provides an important addition to this material through his careful and detailed consideration of the part played by the armed forces in dealing with forced population movements in the European theater of war during and immediately after the war.

Mr. Proudfoot's book has a broader scope than suggested above. It encompasses in chronological order the three phases of the refugee problem of World War II; the military, the UNRRA, and the IRO periods. In addition he deals with three special problems; the peoples in the Nazi concentration camps, the Jewish refugees, and the German refugee movements from Eastern Europe, Poland, and Soviet Russia.

The author is particularly well qualified to shed light on the hitherto uncovered years of military control, when the refugee and displaced persons movements were at their peak. Mr. Proudfoot served during the war in the Displaced Persons Branch of SHAEF which from March to September 1945 repatriated to their home countries more than ten million people and cared for those who would not return. He concluded his military service in the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department, which was again concerned with refugee matters.

Although the work of UNRRA and IRO has been more exhaustively handled by specialized studies, the value of including them in this study is that it shows how much the later efforts grew out of the work which had been done by the military. In handling with such insight and clarity the work of the army in this field, Mr. Proudfoot has added a new dimension to our understanding both of the breadth of military accomplishments and of the degree to which they underpinned the program of the later agencies that dealt with refugees and displaced persons.—Louise W. Holborn, *Connecticut College.*

Swords Into Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. By Inis L. Claude, Jr. (New York: Random House. 1956. Pp. xii, 497.)

Teachers in the field of international organization will find this stimulating and analytical work a most useful companion for texts dealing primarily with structural and functional details of international organization. It can, of course, be used by itself. The emphasis is, in the words of the author, upon the "theoretical bases, evolutionary trends, constitutional problems and major operational problems . . ." in international organization. Such problems are properly and consistently set within the context of world politics and tensions. Mr. Claude competently examines the historical background and developments of international organization and then goes on to discuss in some detail the constitutional problems of international organization in general and of the United Nations in particular. For example, he sees a clear strain of antijudicialism in the UN which he traces in part to the failure of the San Francisco conference to create a judicial body with jurisdiction to settle the thorny problems encountered in interpreting the Charter. In a third section he deals with the approaches to peace through international instrumentalities such as collective security, disarmament, trusteeship, and the specialized agencies. A final section sets forth some realistic and convincing appraisals of the present and future of international organization and world government. An appendix contains the pertinent documents.

The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches. By Edward Duff, S.J. (New York: Association Press. 1956. Pp. xii, 339. $7.50.)

This book is an admirable study of the origins, the structure, the philosophy and policy discussions of the World Council of Churches. Although the account is primarily descriptive, the social scientist will find it a rich source of information on the ways in which religious institutions affect and are affected by the social situations of which they are a part.

The student of political science will perhaps be most interested in two aspects of Father Duff's study. First is the account of the discussions in the meetings of the World Council of Churches and of the various positions taken, on a number of political questions. The desirability of religiously unified political parties, the relations of church and state, the growth of international organization are among the issues explored. Indirectly, but perhaps more importantly, the book discloses the strangely parallel problems of politics and diplomacy faced by the World Council of Churches and by secular agencies. These are seen most readily in a comparison with the United Nations. How to attain some unity while preserving individual sovereignty (among churches the word is autonomy); how to disprove the charge of being a debating society only; how to state and work for common goals when important differences separate the members—these are problems common to the United Nations and to the World Council of Churches.

British Reconstruction and American Policy, 1945–1955. By William C. Mallalieu. (New York: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. 1956. Pp. vi, 232. $5.00.)

This is an interesting attempt to examine the postwar economic situation in Britain as a problem of both British and American policy. The inquiry extends over a variety of questions not always treated in relation to one another: the British economic planning system, the nature of economic controls, the U.S. foreign aid programs, especially the Marshall Plan, the working of the nationalized industries, the management of sterling, and the whole array of Anglo-American economic and monetary relations. Careful scholarship and readable exposition are marred by flecks of editorial inadequacy.

The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy since 1950. By Norman A. Graebner. (New York: The Roland Press. 1956. Pp. viii, 289. $4.00.)

This study investigates the relationship between party politics and foreign policy since the outbreak of the Korean War. Its thesis is that deeply rooted American isolationist attitudes, stirred up by the right wing of the Republican Party in order to discredit the Democratic Administration, not only succeeded in slowing down the Truman-Acheson foreign policy before 1952, but eventually also involved Eisenhower and Dulles in the dilemma of incompatible challenges presented by the international situation and the necessity of keeping harmony within the Party. The author, who is an admirer of Professor Hans Morgenthau, blames Eisenhower and Dulles for their partial adoption of isolationist attitudes: by representing power in moral terms, by aiming at utopian goals, and by maintaining rigid and unilateral policies towards Russia and China. The lively and lucid, though occasionally oversimplified, analysis follows traditional methods.

The Economics of European Air Transport. By Stephen Wheatcroft. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1956. Pp. xxii, 358. $6.00.)

This is the first large-scale, non-official work on the subject in over fifteen years. The author thoroughly dissects the economic difficulties of the vast, disorderly, inefficient European airline industry and evaluates the prospects for remedying them. The problems sketched out here are in many ways redolent of the larger political obstacles to multinational progress in Western Europe. Among the solutions proposed are the establishment of common machinery to facilitate international planning and to provide, rather along the lines of the CAB, for a more rational allocation of routes. No observer can fail to detect the political dimension of these economic dilemmas. The non-specialist will find this treatise rather heavy going, not only because of its technicalities but also because it is not enlivened by the felicity of style often associated with British academic prose.

L'Assemblée Consultative du Conseil de L'Europe: essai de définition de sa nature juridique. By Georges Rencki. (Paris: Union Federaliste Inter-Universitaire. 1956. Pp. 124.)

A short but well documented survey of the structure and powers of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on the basis of the Council's record from its inception to the end of 1952. The writer is an official of the European Movement.

Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe. By W. N. Medlicott. (London: The Athlone Press; New York: John de Graff, Inc. 1956. Pp. xiv, 353. $7.00.)

A detailed account of what the author regards as "one of the major turning-points in the history of European diplomacy": namely, the period between 1879 and 1882. It is his thesis that while Bismarck was giving security to Germany by imposing a deadlock on Europe, Gladstone's search for a revived Concert of Europe was the last attempt before 1914 to achieve a permanent relaxation of tensions. The writer is an accomplished diplomatic historian, Professor of Diplomatic History at the London School of Economics. The present work is a continuation of an earlier study, *The Congress of Berlin and After* (1938). It appears in the University of London Historical Studies series.

Captive Rumania: A Decade of Soviet Rule. Edited by Alexandre Cretzianu. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. 1956. Pp. xvi, 424. $6.00.)

A symposium on the impact of Soviet domination on Rumanian government, economics, education, and culture, by a panel of exiled writers of whom G. Ionesqu is the best known. Most of the contributors work for *La nation roumaine* (Paris); the introduction is by the former Foreign Minister Constantin Visoianu, now President of the Rumanian National Committee. The approach is, on the whole, scholarly and the individual chapters are factual and rich in data. The book contains a fairly comprehensive bibliography, but there are no footnotes and sources remain occasionally unidentified.

Population Growth and Levels of Consumption: With Special Reference to Countries in Asia. By Horace Belshaw. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. 1956. Pp. xxix, 223. $4.50.)

An interesting and worthwhile, at times quite technical, study by a New Zealand economist, who has spent ten years investigating and planning development programs for the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and for the F.A.O. His conclusions call for a pluralistic approach to ward off the Malthusian specter from Asian countries.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH, AND METHODOLOGY

Ausnahmezustand und Norm—Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre von Carl Schmitt. By Peter Schneider. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. 1957. Pp. 296. DM 12.)

The German tragedy from World War I through World War II unfolded to the incidental music furnished by one who was perhaps the most influential, if not the greatest, theoretical annotator of political systems and events the Germans have had: Carl Schmitt. Despite his silence in recent years, the wealth and power of his concepts and formulations, taken up by a host of disciples, still, or again, influences thought on state and politics in Germany, which may bode ill for the chances there of moderation, limited government: in short, liberal democracy. For this profound analyst of concepts and institutions, like Hobbes (a thinker to whom he feels closest and whom he extols) a product of actual or latent civil war, has been a searching critic, too, but one with a blind spot. Perhaps it took a non-German close to German intellectual tradition, a Swiss like the author, to undertake the first comprehensive *immanent* criticism of Schmitt's work. The greatest merit of Peter Schneider's excellent study is in showing the intrinsic contradictions into which his peculiar type of thought has led Carl Schmitt, contradictions which so far had been concealed by the brilliance of his literary output.

Over against "abstract-individualist" liberal thinking, with its emphasis upon general norms and situations, compromise solutions, and limited power, Schmitt set thinking adapted to "the concrete situation": the "measure" necessitated by the situation, the act of decision, crises and the exceptional emergency condition, "existential" enmities (the "friend-foe" relationship), these were the factors that really determined the life of societies and nations. While this approach yielded deep insight into forms and problems of concentrated power (especially dictatorship) and related phenomena frequently overlooked or played down by liberals, it involved not only neglect of the opposite problems, but also a host of inherent inconsistencies or ambiguities. Does "decision" create the "concrete order," or does preexisting order determine "decisions"? What values or criteria are to determine decisions anyway? Is the relation of nations characterized by "total enmity," or does a common *jus publicum* unite them (or some) in a sort of ordered community? Is "liberalism" the "existential" form in which certain nations (the British, for instance) live, or is it the expression of "formal," reality-alien but also order-destroying "nihilism"? These and other basic questions, Schmitt, as Schneider shows, has never resolved. Also, character has not measured up to scholarship. It made Schmitt servant of a regime which gave the *coup de grace* to that *jus publicum Europaeum* whose downfall he bemoans in his last major work (*Der Nomos der Erde*). How entering the service of a political regime debases can be seen from the debasement of Schmitt's scholarship in the Nazi era, with his embrace of vague, sloganized concepts, while he was allowed to be free, fertile, and to soar to the height of his genius under the abhorred and maligned *Rechtsstaat.* With Schelling he would say "Je méprise Locke," yet it was some of the "banal" Lockean liberties that enabled him to live spiritually.

But Schneider is far from neglecting the valuable aspects of Schmittism. In a veritable *tour de force* he has undertaken to discuss Schmitt's main themes in conjunction with the chief stages of European history, travelling with Schmitt through modern history from the Discoveries to the League and totalitarianism. That this can be done attests to the extraordinary range as well as the wealth of ideas in Schmitt's work. In Schneider, Schmitt has thus found not only a searching critic but also a lucid interpreter.—John H. Herz, *The City College, New York.*

Alexander Hamilton in the American Tradition. By Louis M. Hacker. (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1957. Pp. xi, 273. $4.75.)

This essay is a forceful defense of Hamiltonian conservatism against an odd assortment of critics. Hacker argues for Hamilton's farsighted leadership in pushing for a new constitution which did, indeed, rescue the infant republic from the clutches of an inadequate Confederation. Hamilton clearly saw America's true interest in stability, strength, and justice. And, consequently, he forged those mighty links between private interest and public policy which brought to the nation's support those who enhanced the nation's honor, confidence, wealth, and welfare as they benefited from investment in the nation's economy. Hamilton was not a foe of popular, republican government. He was neither hostile to the states nor prepared to see them swallowed up in a strong, central government. Hamilton, Hacker argues, was a true conservative. He loved country, justice, and integrity. He respected property, stability, and sound progress. Hamilton called for reliable credit, industrialization, and vigorous nationalism only because these were indispensable for true National greatness.

Hacker's argument is a reasonable and persuasive plea for a key figure in the American tradition. As in much good pleading, however, the argument accentuates the positive, eliminates the negative, and doesn't "mess with Mr. In Between." Few would deny Hamilton's masterful contributions to basic policies in all three branches of our government. But what of the absence, in Hamilton's thought, of a republican theory for a large federal state, of Hamilton's lack of faith in the constitution for which he worked so tirelessly and brilliantly, of his lack of the art of republican politics, or of his dubious position on the Sedition Act. On the latter point, Hacker seemingly suggests that Hamilton was sane and liberal on the Sedition Act. This is *not* the conclusion that James Morton Smith reaches in his well-documented study, *Freedom's Fetters* (pp. 109, 153–155). In all fairness to Mr. Hacker, however, one should note that he doesn't absolve Hamilton from all errors of judgment: for example, Hamilton's army quarrel with Washington or his politically inept knifing of John Adams.

But Hacker certainly doesn't "mess with Mr. In Between." He bases a significant part of his analysis on the over-worn Jefferson-Hamilton dichotomy. And the Mr. In Betweens: the James Madisons, John Adamses, Abraham Lincolns? After all, Madison, who shared Hamilton's concern for a more perfect union, did articulate a political philosophy for federal America in his theory of the extensive republic. Similarly, Madison could share Hamilton's belief in the importance of fiscal responsibility without holding that the fate of the entire republic hinged upon safeguarding investments! And Madison could oppose faction without identifying good government so fully with the rich and the well-born. It is here that one begins to entertain the unholy thought that sometimes this book seems to be less a scholarly, critical analysis and more a well-written free-enterprise brochure for McGraw-Hill.—NEAL RIEMER, *The Pennsylvania State University*.

The Organization Man. BY WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR. (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1956. Pp. 429. $5.00.)

Students of political theory are henceforward going to have to reckon with Mr. Whyte's organization man. Unlike the independent and autonomous creature for whom the credo of individualism was so laboriously created, Mr. Whyte's new man seems bent on breaking all the prescriptions and descriptions which have been set down for him.

It is unnecessary to characterize this person for teachers of undergraduates. For we see, each year, thousands of students depart for the life of the organization. Interviewed, briefed, and contracted, they leave the campus for a setting not far different from the fraternity house, the student union, and the committees of the extracurricular activities network. Today's organizations—be they industrial, governmental, scientific, military, or even academic—concern themselves with providing for the group needs and social satisfactions of their members. The trainees and middle-management men with whom Mr. Whyte is concerned are tested so that a spot congenial to their aptitudes may be found; they are surrounded by like-minded spirits so that in the group can be found psychic strength; they are cushioned by elaborate fringe benefits and expense accounts; and they will never have to fear that individual accountability will be thrust upon them. In this process, both the organization and the organization man have foresworn the individualistic Protestant Ethic—presumably the polestar of their fathers—for a Social Ethic. And Mr. Whyte views this transformation with an alarm tempered only by his readable style and high good humor.

In an indictment of such a significant development as this, it is imperative that responsibility be fixed as specifically as possible. But Mr. Whyte is never clear if he is more disturbed by the organization or by the organization man. "Organization has been made by man; it can be changed by man. It has not been the immutable course of history that has produced such constrictions on the individual as personality tests. It is organization man who has brought them to pass and it is he who can stop them." Does an editor of *Fortune* really believe this? The task of a company such as IBM is to make and market business machines. If "constrictions" like personality tests produce more effective manufacturing and sales personnel, then the very rationale of an industrial organization will call these devices into being. The single tenable argument against them—and one that Mr. Whyte only half-heartedly makes—is that they do not actually help long-run production or sales requirements. The organization, in fact, has promoted the group way of life without worrying about ethical implications inherent in this policy. Can even Professor A. A. Berle's "conscience of the corporation" be extended to demand that a company sacrifice its own goals for the sake of an irrelevant ideology?

What is there in the character of today's emerging Americans that they so long for security and social solidarity? At one point Mr. Whyte acknowledges that "we talk much about the alienation of the worker." But he rejects Elton Mayo, skirts over Erich Fromm, and does not seem to want to explore this line of analysis. Nor does he examine the awful possibility that the character of his organization man is, essentially, soft. The scales are weighted against any expression of individualism; and, well-fed, well-trained, and well-organized, we have a person who is unprepared to stand on his own. The hard truth is that the organization man is the final fruit of Twentieth Century democracy. That these new men command our attention is the inevitable price of our success. And nothing in our nation's book of rules calls for the transmission of yesterday's ethic into today's organizational structure. Nor less should it be expected that our coming generations possess the rudimentary capacity of living up to the difficult catechism of individualism.

At this writing, Mr. Whyte's book has been on *The New York Times* non-fiction bestseller list for fifteen weeks. It is clear that organization men have been buying and reading *The Organization Man*. But imbibing exhortations to be an individual can only upset the equanimity of their lives. And it is not self-evident that this is a good thing. The organization man has no choice but to play the game according to the rules which the organization sets down. If he follows Mr. Whyte's suggestion and tries to cheat on the personality tests, the consequences will be of neurotic proportions. Indeed, we seem to have come to the point where to follow individualist prescriptions can only result in a severe breakdown of the personality structure. Our traditional ideal of the citizen marched boldly into the wilderness; tomorrow's man will be content to ride on someone else's back. Just how academic political theorists are going to deal with this new American is one of the most profound challenges which faces our profession.—ANDREW HACKER, *Cornell University*.

Work and Authority in Industry: Ideologies of Management in the Course of Industrialization. BY REINHARD BENDIX. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.; London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd. 1956. Pp. xxv, 466. $7.50.)

This imaginative study by a perceptive political sociologist deals with the ideas that have been developed to justify the exercise of authority by employers over workers. Entrepreneurial and managerial ideologies (which are differentiated) are examined in two types of periods—the early phase of industrialization and the fully developed stage—in four case studies: England during the industrial revolution, Tsarist Russia until 1905, twentieth century United States, and recent East Germany. The selections make possible an interpretation of differences in fact and ideology between a totalitarian and non-totalitarian form of subordination in economic enterprises. The case studies are supplemented by two interesting essays: one on the problem of bureaucratization, the other on the East-West alternatives in their relationship to the economically underdeveloped nations.

Entrepreneurial ideology originally had the task of justifying industrialization itself, the destruction of the old order, and was directed mainly against existing aristocracy. At a later stage, managerial ideology justifies mainly freedom for itself and obedience from workers and is aimed primarily at workers. The essential ideological appeals in the West are largely personal: individual incentive for improvement. In the East they are mainly social: obligation to society. Adjustments in both are being undertaken in the competition for the minds and hearts of uncommitted new nations. The author's approach has been prompted by the desire to gain a better understanding of the interrelation of ideas and action.

This is a fascinating and significant work of scholarship which should be of particular interest to students of administration and political theory.—HERMAN M. SOMERS, *University of California (Berkeley)*.

Theodore Dwight Woolsey. BY GEORGE A. KING, S.J. (Chicago: Loyola University Press. 1956. Pp. xiii, 305. $4.00.)

Theodore Dwight Woolsey has long been overshadowed by his distinguished contemporary in the field of academic political science, Francis Lieber. Both Lieber and Woolsey began to teach political science in the middle third of the nineteenth century, both were profoundly affected by German philosophers, wrote systematic treatises on politics, and made contributions to the study of international law. They embraced the historical school's condemnation of the excesses of the French Revolution, without giving themselves wholly over to the kind of anti-State doctrine later embodied in the writings of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner. As Frank Freidel points out in his prefatory note to Father King's volume, Lieber and Woolsey "spoke energetically for the Christian gentlemen and the merchant aristocrats of the middle of the century, but these were soon outshadowed or crushed by the new builders of industrial empires." Woolsey's ponderous volumes on *Political Science, or the State Theoretically and Practically Considered* are much duller than Lieber's corresponding studies of civil liberty, self-government, and political ethics. On the other hand, Woolsey, as president of Yale and leader in the liberal wing of the Republican party, probably wielded more influence than did the German-born professor at Columbia.

Father King's intense concern with natural law doctrine leads him to consider Woolsey's writings almost exclusively from the Thomist viewpoint. He contends that Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Bentham, Hume, Adam Smith, John Austin, and Karl Marx "broke away from the christianized idea of natural law and set up their own subjective, confusing, conflicting, dogmatic, pseudo versions. At present the world is painfully sick of the disastrous consequences of their doctrines and yearns for a return to the only natural law that is based on reason, security and justice." For Father King, the only solution is scholasticism in the true Christian tradition, to which Woolsey "substantially adhered." But Woolsey's key doctrine, that a state of society is in fact a state of nature, was in vogue among German liberals and popularized in the United States by Lieber. It would appear excessive zeal on the part of the author to consider Woolsey primarily an advocate of the traditional Christian concept of natural law. In general, Father King overestimates the importance of Woolsey as a theorist and also tends to oversimplify and ridicule, rather than criticize, non-Thomist trends in political philosophy. However, he has performed a useful service in synthesizing Woolsey's writings, and particularly in presenting material on Woolsey's influence at Yale and in Republican politics.—BERNARD E. BROWN, *Michigan State University.*

James Madison: The President, 1809–1812. BY IRVING BRANT. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1956. Pp. 540. $6.50.)

This fifth volume of a projected six-volume biography is an exhaustive and sometimes exhausting study of Madison's first term and the events leading to the War of 1812. Basing his account on new sources, the author demonstrates that Madison was not the feeble President some historians have claimed but the active guide of the nation's foreign policy. The War of 1812 was in truth Mr. Madison's war and not the result of a political bargain forced by Congress on a pliant Executive. The author proves that there was collaboration between President and Congress and that Secretary of State Monroe prepared statements which, until the publication of this volume, had been attributed to the War Hawks. All of which suggests that Madison was a stronger President than legend would allow but was short-sighted in leading the country into a war which it could not wage effectively or win decisively.

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NEWS AND NOTES

Foreign subscriptions to the REVIEW from most countries may now be paid for in the currencies of those countries. See the revised statement on the inside front cover.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The fifteenth annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists was held May 2–4 in Springfield, Illinois, with the Illinois Legislative Council and the University of Illinois as co-hosts. The attendance was 290. Featured speakers were Quincy Wright of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace whose topic was "The Place of International Law in the Contemporary Study and Practice of International Relations" and E. E. Schattschneider, president of the American Political Science Association who spoke on "The New Politics." John Corcoran of the Public Administration Service addressed a breakfast meeting sponsored by the Springfield APSA chapter.

Topics for round table discussion included the following: "Interest Groups in India," "The 1956 Elections," "The Political Theorist and the Problem of Political Morale," "Military Power in International Relations," "Suburbia—the Parties' New Battleground," "The French Radical Party and the Creation of the Republican Front," "Predictability in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion," "The Theory of Constitutional Government and Its Relation to the Loyalty and Liberties of Citizens," "Soviet Policy and Communist Strategy in India," and "Scientific Theory as a Goal of Graduate Training." Ralph Straetz of Miami University was the chairman of the program committee.

The new officers of the Conference for 1957–1958 are: Clarence A. Berdahl, University of Illinois, president; William O. Farber, University of South Dakota, vice-president; Raymond English, Kenyon College, and Frank Grace, University of Michigan, members of the executive council for three-year terms. Clark F. Norton of DePauw University is chairman of the program committee for the 1958 meeting which will be held at the University of Michigan on April 24–26.

The 1956–57 annual meeting of the New England Political Science Association was held on April 25 and 26 at Dartmouth College. Two panel discussions were held. Andrew Gyorgy of Boston University was chairman of the panel on "Regional Security Arrangements and American Foreign Policy." Participants were Walter Filley of Wesleyan, John S. Gibson of Boston University, George Little of Vermont and Lucian W. Pye of M.I.T.

James W. Fesler of Yale chaired the panel on "Metropolitan Politics" in which Lawrence H. Fuchs of Brandeis, Herbert Kaufman of Yale and Allan P. Sindler of Yale participated. The meeting also heard an address by Dr. Joost A. Meerloo entitled "The Psychology of the East-West Controversy."

At the business meeting the following officers were elected for the coming year: Guy H. Dodge, Brown, president; James W. Fesler, Yale, vice-president; George Goodwin, Jr., University of Massachusetts, secretary-treasurer. Elected to the executive committee were: G. Lowell Field, University of Connecticut; John W. Masland, Dartmouth; Lucian W. Pye, M.I.T.

H. Arthur Steiner of U.C.L.A. served as director of a Western Regional Conference on "The United States and The Far East" at the University of California's Lake Arrowhead Center, June 13–16, 1957, sponsored jointly by the University of California at Los Angeles and the American Assembly of Columbia University. Political scientists present included William B. Ballis of the University of Washington, G. Homer Durham of the University of Utah (who served as chairman of Round Table I), Eric C. Bellquist of the University of California (Berkeley), (chairman of Round Table II) and Josiah W. Bennett, Political Officer, Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State. Also present were some fifty representatives of business, industry, government, and the press.

The Tenth Annual Conference of the Northern California Political Science Association was held at San Jose State College on April 27, 1957. The program consisted of two general sessions, in the morning on a constitutional amendment of the State of California which was defeated in the last election, and in the afternoon on the reaction of the United Nations to recent revolutions. The luncheon speaker was Professor William A. Robson, Professor of Public Administration, London School of Economics and Political Science, visiting at the University of California, Berkeley.

The newly elected slate of officers is as follows: president, James T. Watkins IV, Stanford University; vice president, Carl Buckman, Fresno State College; secretary-treasurer, Norman Jacobson, University of California, Berkeley; counselors, Roy Archibald, College of San Mateo; Robert C. Johnston, Mills College, Oakland; Earl C. Segrest, Sacramento State College; Frank Mesple, San Francisco State College; Burton Brazil, San Jose State College; Alma Patterson, Jr., City College, San Francisco.

At the tenth annual meeting of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association the following officers were elected: Paul Beckett, Washington State College, president; Charles Schlicher, University of Oregon, vice-president; Robert Hosack, University of Idaho, and Howard Dean, University of Oregon, two-year term on the executive committee; Ruth Widmayer, Portland State College, one-year term on the executive committee. The 1958 meeting will be held at Montana State University, Missoula, Montana.

The Thirteenth Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities, held at The Hague, June 12–18, 1957, attracted nearly 900 registered participants from 35 countries and 20 international organizations. Two main themes were discussed: "Problems of Expanding Towns" and "Traffic Congestion in the City Center."

R. J. Oud, retired burgomaster of Rotterdam, was reelected president. New members of the executive committee are: Orin Nolting, International City Managers Association: C. A. Anderson, chairman, city council, Stockholm; G. Agron, mayor of Jerusalem; Mohammed Abdel Halim, chairman, municipal council, Khartoum; and a member from Asia to be designated. The next Congress is to be held in West Berlin in 1959.

An Institute on Governmental Problems of Metropolitan Cincinnati was held by the department of political science of the University of Cincinnati June 10–21. It was under the direction of George L. Willis, who also served as moderator at each session. Problems of finance, transportation, public health, police and community planning and zoning, as well as the general problem of organization of the metropolitan area were discussed by panels made up of local government officials and officers of private organizations concerned with metropolitan area problems.

At the University of California, Berkeley, a faculty seminar on the metropolitan community was held during the spring semester under the chairmanship of Coleman Woodbury, visiting professor of political science, city and regional planning and public health. The seminar was attended by 25 members of faculties and institutes representing 12 social science and allied disciplines. The following political scientists, in addition to Coleman Woodbury, participated in the seminar: professors George Belknap, Victor Jones, and Eugene Lee; visiting professor William A. Robson of the London School of Economics; and George Duggar and Stanley Scott of the bureau of public administration.

The seventh annual meeting of the Iowa Conference of Political Scientists was held March 23 on the campus of St. Ambrose College. The morning meeting was devoted to a panel discussion on legislative reapportionment. At the noon meeting, John J. Rensenbrink of Coe College discussed the topic "The United States and United Nations Diplomacy." LeRoy Bennett of Drake University was elected president and George B. Telford of Drake was reelected secretary.

The department of political science at Marshall College sponsored a workshop on American-Soviet relations June 3–21 under the direction of Conley H. Dillon. W. C. B. Lambert of Omaha University was guest lecturer and T. B. Larson, deputy chief of research for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Department of State, advised.

A small conference of young political theorists, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council, was held at Swarthmore College under the chairmanship of professor J. Roland Pennock, June 12–14, 1957. In addition to the regular members of the conference, Kenneth

Thompson of the Rockefeller Foundation, David Easton of the University of Chicago and Bryce Wood of the Social Science Research Council were present and participated in the conference for part of the time. Discussion, based upon papers circulated in advance, ranged widely within the general framework of the subject of the conference: "Political Theory and the Organization and Processes of Modern Democracy." Special consideration was given to the opportunities for empirical and other research to contribute to the solution, clarification or validation of the theoretical problems discussed.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The American Political Science Association has announced a new award program, the J. Kimbrough Owen Memorial Award, for the most significant doctoral dissertation within the general field of state and local government. A lifetime membership in the Association, the cash value of which is $250, will be awarded the author of the winning dissertation.

The John Hay Whitney Foundation, 630 Fifth Ave., New York 20, N. Y., announces the ninth year of its Opportunity Fellowships for 1958–59. The closing date for applications, to be presented on forms provided by the Foundation on request, is November 30. The competition is open to any citizen of the United States or territorial resident who has given positive evidence of special ability and superior promise and who has not had full opportunity to develop his talents because of arbitrary barriers, such as racial or cultural background or region of residence. Awards have been made in the past to Negroes, Spanish-Americans, Chinese- and Japanese-Americans, American Indians, residents of the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, Alaska, Samoa and the Appalachian Mountain area. Candidates are in general expected to be between the ages of 22 and 35, and to have completed their undergraduate college education. Awards are for a full year of serious work in any field and normally range from $1000 to $3000. Results of the competition will be announced in the latter part of April, 1958.

The University of Chicago and the University of Virginia are sponsoring the publication of a new and complete edition of the papers of James Madison. The editors will appreciate information about the location of letters by or to James Madison or his wife, especially letters in private possession or among uncalendared manuscripts in the collection of public or private institutions. Please address The Papers of James Madison, 1126 East 59th St., Chicago 37, Illinois.

The Committee for Economic Development is conducting a competition of ideas on the question "What is the most important economic problem which the United States must face in the next twenty years?" Papers to be submitted are to be not more than two thousand words in length. The competition is open to anyone in the Free World except trustees, employees and their families, consultants and advisors to the committees or subcommittees of the Committee for Economic Development. The deadline for the papers is October 31, 1957. Entries should be addressed to "Problems of United States Economic Development" Committee for Economic Development, 444 Madison Ave., New York 22, N. Y.

Section K—Social and Economic Sciences—of the American Association for the Advancement of Science will hold a session for contributed papers at the annual meeting of the AAAS in Indianapolis, December 26–31, 1957. Association members interested in presenting a paper at this session should forward titles and abstracts not later than October 15 to the secretary of section K, Donald P. Ray, George Washington University, Washington 6, D. C. The American Political Science Association is an affiliate member of the section on Social and Economic Sciences of the AAAS.

Plans for a new School of International Service under the auspices of The American University in Washington have been announced by president Hurst R. Anderson. The school is not to be a foreign service school exclusively or even primarily. It is to be a school for the preparation of selected young men and women in several varieties of international service. Extensive use will be made of area studies dealing with all parts of the world. Professor Pittman B. Potter has been working on the problems concerning the school program and student and staff personnel. The staff will consist of members of the University faculty and numerous experts from government departments and international agencies. Ernest S. Griffith, director of the legislative reference service of the Library of Congress, has been designated as dean of the new school.

Effective September 1, 1957, the department of social science of Wake Forest College was divided into two departments, a department of history and a department of political science. The staff of the department of political science consists of Claud H. Richards, Jr. (promoted to full professor) chairman, and Roy Jumper, assistant professor of political science.

Thirty-five leading scholars and specialists on African affairs named Melville J. Herskovits, director of the Northwestern University program of African studies, president of the newly created African Studies Association. This new formal organization will service the needs and interests of individual scholars, university African programs, and organizations concerned with Africa. Gwendolen M. Carter, Smith College, is serving as vice-president. A board of trustees empowered to draft a constitution and administer association affairs until the convening of the first annual meeting was also set up.

Effective July 1, 1957, The Roper Public Opinion Research Center was established at Williams College. The main function of the Center is to make the Roper survey materials available to American educators and their students for teaching and research purposes. Philip K. Hastings, associate professor of psychology and political science has been appointed director. The Center contains the raw materials of more than 600,000 interviews, dating from 1938, conducted by the Roper organization for *Fortune* magazine and various American industries. Through periodic gifts from Mr. Roper the collection is growing at the rate of about 12 studies each year.

The department of political science at the University of North Carolina has received a three-year grant from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation to institute a program of field work and participation in politics as primary elements of the learning experience in its courses on the political process. The program, inaugurated this fall, is under the direction of Donald Matthews, formerly of Smith College, who will serve as Falk lecturer in political science.

The political science department of Rutgers University and the Eagleton Foundation have begun a cooperative program in practical politics leading to the master's degree. The core of the program is centered around a seminar in practical politics taught by Neil A. McDonald and Donald G. Herzberg, executive secretary of the Eagleton Foundation. The new program is designed for students who wish to enter government service through political rather than civil service channels.

A California state legislative internship program has been established, starting this fall, under the sponsorship and joint participation of five universities in the state offering graduate work, in cooperation with the Rules Committee of the State Assembly. Under the program which is patterned after the congressional internship plan of the American Political Science Association, up to fifteen interns will be appointed annually for a period of ten months service with the Assembly and its staff agencies. Interns, who will receive a stipend of $400 monthly, will devote full time to the program, and will reside in Sacramento or wherever their duties require. They will normally be enrolled as graduate students in one of the participating universities, and may receive credit for the internship, which includes participation in a weekly seminar on the legislative process. The participating universities include the University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, Stanford University, University of Southern California and the Claremont Graduate Schools. An unusual feature of the program is the joint sponsorship by the departments of political science, journalism and the school of law at these institutions and the availability of the program to graduate students of other social science departments. The program is financed jointly by the State Assembly and the participating universities. The Ford Foundation has made a five year grant to cover half of the annual stipends of the interns. Eugene Lee of the department of political science of the University of California, Berkeley, has been appointed faculty supervisor of the program.

The University of Pittsburgh has established an administrative science center on its campus. James D. Thompson, associate professor of administration at Cornell University and editor of *Administrative Science Quarterly* has been appointed head of the center. Experimental in nature, the new center is founded on the thesis that administration as a process in the operation of an organization has progressed beyond the stage of being an art and may now be properly considered a science.

A new quarterly journal of world affairs, *Orbis*, is being published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by the University of Pennsylvania Press. The new periodical will solicit articles and reviews from contributors in the United States and other countries. It hopes to make available to the American public writings from abroad which are not easily accessible even to American specialists in foreign affairs.

Arnaud B. Leavelle, Stanford University political scientist, who died last October, has been honored by the Stanford class of '58 with a gift of $1000 to establish the Leavelle Memorial Fund. Interest from the fund will provide an annual prize for the outstanding student in political science 150, the course in political theory which was Dr. Leavelle's favorite.

An educational, non-profit institution, The Academy of Organizational Science, has been founded in San Antonio by Colonel Leland B. Kuhre, to deal with the problems of participation in and management of the organization for human enterprise. Further information about the organization and its publication *Atorgenics Aspects* can be obtained by writing to The Academy of Organizational Science, 203 Greenlawn Dr., San Antonio 1, Texas.

William Anderson retired from the department of political science at the University of Minnesota at the close of the year 1956–57. To honor him for his contributions to the profession and to the political life of the Twin Cities, the state, and the nation, the department held a three day conference, "Political Science: Today and Tomorrow" on May 9, 10 and 11. The participants in the conference were either former Minnesota colleagues of Professor Anderson or students who had received their doctors' degrees under his direction. Papers were presented by Robert Cushman (Cornell), John Gaus (Harvard), J. Edward Gerald (Minnesota), Harold Quigley (Minnesota), Francis Rourke (Johns Hopkins), Edwin Stene (Kansas), Edward Weidner (Michigan State), and Quincy Wright (Chicago). The final paper, "The Future of Political Science in the United States" was presented by Professor Anderson. At a testimonial dinner for Professor and Mrs. Anderson on May 10th, Professor Anderson was presented with a bound volume of letters from colleagues, former students and persons in public life.

Charles S. Ascher and Erwin Bard of Brooklyn College attended the Round Table of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences at Opatija, Yugoslavia, in June, 1957. Professors Ascher and Albert Gorvine of Brooklyn College attended the Congress of the International Union of Local Authorities in The Hague in June, 1957. In addition Professor Ascher attended a meeting of the Council of the International Federation for Housing and Town Planning in West Berlin during August.

Stephen K. Bailey will be on leave from Princeton for the academic year 1957–58 on a Fulbright lectureship at Oxford University.

Gordon E. Baker, assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara College, has been awarded a grant in state politics by the Social Science Research Council for the summer of 1957.

Paul C. Bartholomew of Notre Dame taught at the summer session of Northwestern University.

Kenneth E. Beasley has been granted a leave of absence from his duties as assistant director of the governmental research center, University of Kansas, to serve as executive director of the legislative committee on efficiency and economy in government for the state of Kansas.

Anthony T. Bouscaren, associate professor of political science at Marquette University, has been granted a leave of absence during 1957–1958 to join the staff of The National War College in Washington, D. C.

Phillips Bradley, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, will spend the academic year 1957–58 at the University of New Delhi. While there, Professor Bradley will be assisting in the development of an American Studies program at the graduate level.

Henry L. Bretton has returned to his duties as assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan after spending a year at the University of Innsbruck, Austria.

Denis W. Brogan, professor of political science at Cambridge University, has been appointed visiting professor of political science at Yale University for the fall term, 1957–58. Professor Brogan taught at the summer session of the University of California, Berkeley.

Edward H. Buehrig of the department of government at Indiana University will spend the academic year as visiting professor at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon under a Smith-Mundt grant.

Ronald F. Bunn, instructor in government at the University of Texas spent the summer doing research at the Chicago offices of the Inland Steel Corporation under a fellowship granted by the Foundation for Economic Education.

Eugene Burdick, University of California, Berkeley, has received a grant from the Fund for the Republic to undertake a study in the field of civil liberties.

Robert K. Carr of Dartmouth College has been granted a leave of absence to serve as general secretary of the American Association of University professors. He assumed his duties on September 1, 1957. In his absence Robert A. Horn of Stanford will serve as visiting professor.

Byrum E. Carter, associate professor of government at Indiana University received the Frederick Bachman Lieber award for distinguished teaching at the Founders Day ceremonies, May 1. The award is made annually to the teacher selected by an all-University committee of 10 faculty members and administrators.

John Chapman of Smith College was a member of the staff of the 1957 University of California summer session.

James C. Charlesworth, professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania, recently concluded his services as executive director of the Pennsylvania State Reorganization Commission. The Commission submitted a series of seven reports to the General Assembly.

Hugh Clokie, lecturer in political science, University of California, Berkeley, who spent the 1956–57 year in teaching at Vanderbilt University and in travel in the Caribbean and Africa, resumed teaching at Berkeley this fall.

George A. Codding, Jr., assistant professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania, has been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship for 1957–58.

Thomas I. Cook served as lecturer in political theory at the several terms of the mid-career training course which is offered by the Department of State for the benefit of its Foreign Service personnel.

Joseph Costanzo, S.J., of Fordham University, delivered four lectures at the Spring Hill College Forum last April on "Religious Liberty and the First Amendment."

Cecil V. Crabb, assistant professor of political science at Vassar College, has been awarded a Vassar College Faculty Fellowship for 1957–58.

Robert T. Daland, assistant professor at the University of Connecticut spent the summer on research for a nation-wide research project on urban renewal politics sponsored by the Bureau of Public Administration of the University of California and the Housing and Home Finance Agency.

John Dorsey of Michigan State University will begin a two year assignment in Vietnam in June in connection with the MSU technical assistance program there.

Cecil H. Driver, chairman of the department of political science at Yale University suffered a heart attack in December, 1956. Pending his full recovery, James W. Fesler served as acting chairman from January to June, 1957, and Robert A. Dahl is serving as acting chairman from June, 1957 to June, 1958. Professor Driver resumed his teaching activities in September, 1957.

Arthur B. Dugan, chairman of the department of political science at the University of the South, will serve as acting dean of administration for the academic year 1957–58.

Joseph Dunner, chairman of the political science department at Grinnell College, lectured at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfort, West Germany in July and at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in August. He has been granted a sabbatical leave for the second semester of 1957–58 which he will spend in India and Japan.

Martin L. Faust, of the University of Missouri, taught at the University of Illinois summer session.

Robert Y. Fluno, of Whitman College, will be on leave of absence for the academic year 1957–58 while engaged as Fulbright lecturer at Rajashahi University of East Pakistan.

C. Nolan Fortenberry served as visiting professor of political science at the University of Alabama during the summer of 1957.

Ludwig Freund of Roosevelt University will spend the first semester of the 1957–58 academic year lecturing at German universities under the auspices of the "Gesellschaft zur wissenschaftlichen Foerderung Politischer Literatur."

Alex T. Edelmann will be visiting professor of political science at the University of Nebraska during 1957–58.

Keener Chapman Frazer returned to the University of North Carolina in September, 1957, after two years leave of absence during which he served as Chester W. Nimitz professor of social and political science at the Naval War College in Newport, R. I.

Louis L. Gerson of the University of Connecticut will be directing a full-time research project, financed by congressional funds, on the impact of ethnic groups on American foreign policy, during the academic year 1957–58.

Federico G. Gil returned to the University of North Carolina in September, 1957 after a year's leave of absence spent in Chile on a Rockefeller Foundation grant-in-aid.

Wesley L. Gould of Purdue University has received a leave of absence for the fall semester 1957–58 for the purpose of accepting a National Science Research Council fellowship and a Purdue University XL summer grant for study at the Hague.

Frank Grace of the University of Michigan taught at the University of Illinois summer session.

Leo Gross, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, taught at the summer session of the University of California.

Ernst Haas is on partial leave of absence from the University of California, Berkeley, for the 1957 calendar year.

Louis J. Halle of the University of Virginia will remain on leave in Geneva during the 1957–58 academic year on the faculty of the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales.

William H. Harbold of the University of Washington was engaged in the summer of 1957 as research specialist on the Library Government Project sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the Pacific Northwest Library Association.

Joseph Harris has returned to full-time teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, following a half-year of service at the University of Bologna graduate school of administrative sciences and after a year of sabbatical leave as Fulbright Scholar (England) and Guggenheim Fellow. He was also the recipient of a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

Robert J. Harris of Vanderbilt University is serving as visiting professor of American Government at Columbia University during 1957–1958.

Carroll Hawkins of Michigan State University will be on leave at the University of the Andes in Bogota, Colombia for a year.

Alexander Heard is on leave from the University of North Carolina from February 1, 1957 to January 31, 1958, as Ford Research professor of government at Harvard University.

Richard H. Heindel, vice-chancellor and professor of history and government, University of Buffalo was the recipient of an honorary degree at Wagner College.

Dell G. Hitchner, who is on a year's leave from the University of Washington to serve as head of the American Section of the Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government (London), delivered a series of lectures on the background of American politics at the Congress of European American Associations' Seminar on American Life at Salzburg, May 26–June 8, 1957.

Lynwood M. Holland has an Emory University research grant to study metropolitan planning in the South.

John Perry Horlacher, professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania, has been named chairman of a tripartite minimum wage board set up under the Act of 1937 for the purpose of establishing minimum wage rates for retail trade throughout the State of Pennsylvania.

David Horton of Westminster College taught at the University of Missouri during the summer session.

Charles D. Hounshell of Emory University was a Commonwealth Summer Research Scholar at the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center.

Edwin C. Hoyt, of Columbia University, has been appointed visiting assistant professor of government at Hamilton College for the year 1957–58.

Ronald F. Howell of Emory University was visiting professor at the Johns Hopkins University for the summer quarter.

Nobutake Ike, of the Hoover Institute, Stanford University will spend 1957–58 as visiting associate professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.

Jack Isakoff, director of research of the Illinois Legislative Council is a visiting professor of political science at the University of Illinois during the first semester of this academic year.

Louis G. Kahle, associate professor of political science at the University of Missouri will be on sabbatical leave of absence during the second semester of the 1957–58 academic year, having been granted a research fellowship by the University of Missouri.

Gladys M. Kammerer of the University of Kentucky was elected Distinguished Professor of the year by her colleagues of the Arts and Science faculty. Under terms of the election she was granted relief from academic duties during the first semester and gave a public university lecture in April.

Hans Kelsen, professor emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, is spending the summer as visiting lecturer at the University of Athens and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

Norman Kogan of the University of Connecticut will be on sabbatical leave during the academic year 1957–58. He will be in Italy doing work on foreign policy formation.

Samuel J. Konefsky of Brooklyn College will be a member of the School of Historical Studies of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, for the academic year 1957–58.

Richard J. Kozicki of the University of Pennsylvania has received a Ford Fellowship for research in India and Burma.

George A. Lanyi, of Oberlin College, will be an academic consultant in international relations and social science at the Naval War College in Newport, R. I., from July to December. In the second half of 1957–58 he will be on sabbatical leave, which he plans to spend in research in England.

William F. Larsen, on leave from his duties at the Graduate School of Public Administration and Social Service at New York University, has joined the NYU group at the University of Athens. En route to Turkey, Professor Larsen was a member of the US delegations to the meetings of the IULA at the Hague and the IIAS at Opatija, Yugoslavia.

Carl Leiden of Marshall College was a member of the 1957 summer session at the University of California.

Albert Lepawsky, University of California, Berkeley, was on leave of absence for the spring and summer terms, 1957, to undertake research in Europe.

Charles O. Lerche was director of the seminar in international relations sponsored by the Ford Foundation at Emory University during the past summer.

John D. Lewis, of Oberlin College, taught in the first summer session of the University of California (Berkeley).

Leslie Lipson, who is on leave of absence from the University of California, Berkeley, for the fall of 1957, spent the summer in Europe doing study and research.

Gerhard Loewenberg, assistant professor of political science at Mount Holyoke College will be at the University of Bonn from June, 1957 to January, 1958 on a Fulbright grant.

Norton Long of Michigan State University is going to Harvard as visiting professor of government and research associate in the graduate school of public administration. He will be working with Charles Cherington on a study of metropolitan leadership under a grant from the Stern Family Foundation to the G.A.I.

Clarence C. Ludwig, professor of political science and director of the municipal reference bureau of the University of Minnesota, has been appointed by Governor Freeman as one of seven citizen members of the newly established Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Planning Commission.

Joseph Maloney of Fordham University is a visiting professor of political science at Hunter College during 1957–58.

Gerard J. Mangone of the Maxwell School, Syracuse University, was appointed special lecturer on American foreign policy for the Council on Student Travel of New York during the summer. Professor Mangone visited Yugoslavia as part of an overseas interviewing project on Americans At Work Abroad which the Maxwell School, supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, is conducting.

Roscoe Martin, Jesse V. Burkhead, and Guthrie S. Birkhead, Maxwell School, Syracuse University have been awarded a joint grant by the Ford Foundation for a study of water resources policy administration.

Dwaine Marvick and Charles Nixon, University of Califronia at Los Angeles, have received a joint grant from the Committee on Political Behavior, Social Science Research Council, for a study dealing with active campaign workers.

Alpheus T. Mason, McCormick professor of jurisprudence at Princeton, gave the Edward Douglass White Lectures at Louisiana State University on March 27, 28 and 29. His book *Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law*, was awarded the American Library Association Liberty and Justice Prize of $5,000 in History and Biography.

Edwin B. McPheron has been granted sabbatical leave for the first semester of 1957–58 to carry on research projects in England and Sweden.

Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., University of California at Los Angeles, has been awarded a grant by the Comparative Politics Committee of the Social Science Research Council for a field survey in Japan which he will conduct from June, 1957 until early 1958. He has been granted a sabbatical leave for the second half of 1957–58.

Eugene Miller was on the staff of the summer session at the University of Hawaii.

Malcolm Moos and Francis E. Rourke are director and assistant director respectively for the Committee on Government and Higher Education to conduct a study under the financial auspices of the Fund for the Advancement of Education from February 1957 through the succeeding academic year. They are on half-time leave from The Johns Hopkins University for the completion of the study.

Robert J. Morgan, University of Nebraska, will be on leave of absence at the University of Virginia for the academic year 1957–58.

Herbert J. Muller of Indiana University spent the summer in Cambridge, England on a grant from the Fund for the Republic, doing research on the unpublished papers of Lord Acton.

James N. Murray, Jr. of the State University of Iowa has been awarded a grant by the Ford Foundation to study at Columbia University in the field of sociology and anthropology.

Lloyd D. Musolf and Nelson Taylor of Vassar College have undertaken a study for the Temporary State Commission on a Constitution Convention of the State of New York.

Sigmund Neumann of Wesleyan University taught at the summer session of the University of Michigan.

Peter Odegard has resumed full-time teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, following a year's leave of absence.

Richard Park, of the Modern India Project under the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, will be on leave during the spring term, 1958 to carry on research in the South Asia field.

Robert J. Pitchell has received a two-year leave of absence at Purdue University to accept an appointment as resident director, Indiana Commission on State Tax and Financing Policy.

James K. Pollock, Murfin professor of political science and chairman of the department of political science at the University of Michigan was awarded an honorary doctor of laws degree by the University of Pittsburgh in May.

Ralph E. Purcell of the University of Virginia has been awarded a grant by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council.

Emmette S. Redford, professor of government at the University of Texas spent the summer at Columbia University where he served as visiting professor in the department of public law and government.

John S. Reshetar of Yale University has been appointed as acting associate professor at the University of Washington.

Donald Rhodes, administrative consultant, governmental research center, University of Kansas, has been given a leave of absence to serve on the staff of the legislative committee on efficiency and economy in government for the State of Kansas.

Channing B. Richardson has received a Ford Fellowship for study and travel in Africa. He will also lecture at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland at Salisbury in Central Africa.

Arnold A. Rogow of the State University of Iowa has been awarded a research professorship for the first semester of 1957–58.

Joseph S. Roucek, chairman of the department of political science and sociology at the University of Bridgeport has been appointed American editor of *Il Politico*, a quarterly published by the University of Pavia (Italy) under the editor-in-chief, Bruno Leoni.

Walter E. Sandelius, professor of political science at the University of Kansas, has been named chairman of Governor George Docking's Commission on Constitution Revision.

Robert Scalapino is on sabbatical leave from the University of California, Berkeley, to spend 15 months in Japan and the Far East under a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

Elmer E. Schattschneider directed a program of thirteen television interviews under the direction of NBC in cooperation with the Educational Television and Radio Center under the title of "The American Government and the Pursuit of Happiness."

Robert Scigliano, assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University, will begin a two year assignment in Vietnam in June in connection with the MSU technical assistance program there.

George Sherrill, head of the department of political science at the University of South Carolina will retire at the close of the summer session of 1957. He will be succeeded by Henry B. Mayo of the University of Alberta, Canada.

Mulford Q. Sibley of Minnesota has accepted an appointment as visiting professor at Stanford University for 1957–58.

William J. Siffin of the department of government at Indiana University has joined the staff of the Institute of public administration at the University of Thammasat in Bangkok, Thailand as visiting professor.

R. G. Steinmeyer, who taught in the University of Maryland overseas program in the Far East during the spring semester, has returned to teaching on the campus at College Park.

Edwin O. Stene, professor of political science, University of Kansas, has been granted a leave of absence to accept an appointment as professor of political science, University of the Philippines for the academic year 1957–58.

Albert L. Sturm, professor of political science at West Virginia University has been granted a leave of absence for two years. He will join the New York University group at the University of Ankara, in October, as professor of public administration.

Carl B. Swisher lectured at the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies during the March–April term. In May he was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws by West Virginia Wesleyan College.

Eduard Taborsky of the University of Texas spent the summer at the University of Tennessee.

Jan Triska, of the Hoover Institute, Stanford, has been appointed visiting lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley.

Julian Towster, University of California, Berkeley, is spending the summer in travel and study in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Committee on University Travel. He will also be on leave during the spring semester, 1958.

Amry Vandenbosch of the University of Kentucky will serve as a Fulbright lecturer at Leiden University during 1957–58.

Dwight Waldo, University of California, Berkeley, has returned to full-time teaching after a year's service at the University of

Bologna graduate school of administrative sciences.

Schuyler C. Wallace, executive officer of the department of public law and government and director of the school of international Affairs at Columbia University, is returning to the United States after a six-months' trip around the world on work related to the school of international affairs and the Near and Middle East Institute.

E. V. Walter of Ohio Wesleyan University will be on leave for the year 1957–58 doing research under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Herbert Waltzer who has been chief personnel psychologist at the Armed Forces Examining Station in New York City has joined the department of government at Miami University as visiting assistant professor.

Robert E. Ward has returned to his duties as associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan after spending a year in Japan.

Egbert S. Wengert, head of the department of political science at the University of Oregon, has returned to the University of Oregon after spending a year as visiting professor of public administration at the institute of public administration, University of Philippines.

William S. White, of the *New York Times*, has been appointed Regents' professor at the University of California, Berkeley, for 1957–58, to serve as visiting professor of journalism, in cooperation with the political science faculty.

Robert R. Wilson, professor of political science and director of graduate studies in the department of political science at Duke University, was elected president of the American Society of International Law at the last meeting of the Society.

Glenn G. Wiltsey, chairman of the department of government, University of Rochester, has been chosen to fill the R. T. French exchange professorship at the University of Hull, England during the next academic year. During his absence, William E. Diez will serve as acting chairman of the department.

Sheldon Wolin, University of California, Berkeley, has been granted leave of absence for the 1957 calendar year.

Herbert H. Wood, assistant professor at the University of Maine was a member of the summer study group on the teaching of international relations at Emory University.

Lloyd W. Woodruff, formerly of the bureau of government, university extension division, University of Wisconsin, recently accepted a two year appointment from Michigan State University as a public administration specialist with the Vietnam project.

Robert Yee, formerly of the bureau of governmental research, University of Washington, has been appointed instructor at Whitman College.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Henry J. Abraham has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

John A. Anderegg, doctoral candidate at Rutgers University, is currently a foreign service officer in Colombo, Ceylon.

Totton J. Anderson has been promoted to professor of political science at the University of Southern California. He became chairman of the department commencing with the fall semester.

Charles Adrian has been promoted to the rank of associate professor at Michigan State University.

Chester W. Bain has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Virginia. He will continue as assistant director of the bureau of public administration.

Benjamin Baker has been promoted to associate professor at Rutgers University.

William B. Ballis, formerly of the University of Washington, has been appointed professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Willard F. Barber, recently counselor of embassy at Warsaw, has been assigned as director of political affairs, The National War College in Washington.

Samuel H. Barnes, formerly of Duke University, has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Michigan.

Russell H. Barrett has been promoted to associate professor at the University of Mississippi.

George Belknap of Michigan State University, who has been visiting assistant professor at the University of California, Berkeley for 1956–57, has received a regular appointment to the Berkeley staff.

W. E. Benton, assistant professor of political science, University of Houston, has become associate professor of political science at Texas A. & M. College.

William C. Beyer has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

David A. Bingham, formerly of the State University of Iowa, has been appointed as instructor in political science at Arizona State College, Tempe.

William Bluhm, formerly of Brown, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Rochester.

James R. Brown has been appointed associate professor of political science at Marquette University as of September 1957.

William N. Chambers has been promoted to professor of political science at Washington University, St. Louis.

Harold W. Chase of Princeton University has been appointed as associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota.

Inis L. Claude, formerly of the University of Delaware, has been appointed associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Frederic N. Cleaveland has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the University of North Carolina.

Gordon B. Cleveland has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of North Carolina.

Frank Cliffe, currently a Brookings Fellow, has been appointed assistant professor at Michigan State University in the department of political science.

Richard Cox of Harvard University has received appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.

John Crittenden has been appointed an instructor in political science at Wesleyan University.

Robert E. Cushman, Goldwin Smith professor of government at Cornell University has retired after 35 years in this department. He has accepted a one-year visiting professorship at Vanderbilt.

Herbert A. Deane has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at Columbia University.

John M. DeGrove has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of North Carolina.

Elmer A. DeShazo, formerly of Indiana University, has been appointed to the faculty of Southwest Texas State Teachers College at San Marcos, Texas.

Archie T. Dotson has been promoted to an associate professorship of government at Cornell University. He has been serving this year as advisor to the Comptroller of the State of New York. He will be on sabbatical leave next year serving as consultant to the Ministry of Planning of the Government of India.

Don W. Driggs has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of history and political science at the University of Nevada.

Lewis Edinger of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at California, has been appointed assistant professor at Michigan State University.

Charles Edwards of the department of political science and sociology at Westminster College has been advanced to associate professor.

N. Marbury Efimenco, formerly of the University of Michigan, has accepted a position with the USIA in Bombay, India.

Rowland Egger, chairman of the Woodrow Wilson department of foreign affairs at the

University of Virginia has also been appointed chairman of the department of political science.

Mario Einaudi of Cornell University has accepted an appointment as consultant to the Development and Resources Corporation of New York.

Samuel J. Eldersveld has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Lynn W. Eley, research associate in the institute of public administration, University of Michigan, has been appointed supervisor of the Lansing office of the institute.

Arnett A. Elliott, formerly of Barnard College, has joined the staff at Wittenberg College as instructor of political science.

Hugh L. Elsbree assumed the chairmanship of the department of political science of Wayne State University on April 1, 1957, succeeding Carl O. Smith who had been acting chairman.

Richard T. Fenno, formerly of Amherst College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Rochester.

John Fenton of Tulane University has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Wesley Fishel, associate professor of political science at Michigan State University, has been promoted to full professor.

James J. Flannery has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration at The American University as lecturer in city management.

William S. Flash, formerly of Harvard and Bowdoin, has been appointed associate professor of public administration at the American University at Beirut.

Houston I. Flournoy has resigned his position as administrative assistant to Senator H. Alexander Smith to accept an assistant professorship in the department of government at Pomona College.

E. J. Forsythe has been advanced to an assistant professorship at Wayne State University.

Guy Fox, associate professor of political science at Michigan State University has been promoted to full professor and has been appointed on-campus coordinator of the Vietnam project. He has returned to campus after two years in Vietnam.

Richard T. Frost has been appointed an instructor in the department of politics at Princeton University.

John Gange, formerly director, Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, has completed a year as visiting Fulbright professor at the University of Heidelberg. On August 1, 1957 he joined the staff of The Asia Foundation with offices at 105 Market S., San Francisco, California.

Edwin A. Gere, Jr., formerly instructor and acting director of the institute of public service, University of Connecticut, was appointed assistant professor and training officer, Bureau of Government Research, University of Massachusetts, effective May 1, 1957.

Frank K. Gibson has been appointed assistant professor of political science and research associate in the bureau of public administration at the University of Virginia.

William Goodman has been promoted to professor of political science at the University of Tennessee.

William Gore, assistant professor of political science, University of Kansas, has resigned to accept a similar position in the school of business and public administration, Cornell University.

Hilton P. Goss, professor of political science at the Air University since its founding in 1946 and director of the Air War College Studies there since January 1955, has resigned to accept a position with the General Electric Company's Technical Military Planning Operation at Santa Barbara, California where he will direct research in political science.

George L. Grassmuck, formerly of the American University of Beirut, Lebanon, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Alan Grimes has been promoted to full professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Joseph Hajda, formerly of the Indiana University South Bend Center, has been appointed to the faculty of Kansas State College.

Joseph Hamburger has been appointed instructor in political science at Yale University.

Paul Y. Hammond, assistant professor of political science at Columbia University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Yale University.

Joseph B. Hampton, doctoral candidate at Rutgers University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Gettysburg College.

Earl T. Hanson, who has been serving as director of admissions of the graduate school at Duke University, has resigned that position to return to full time duty as assistant professor in the department of political science.

Royce Hanson has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration of The American University as instructor in charge of Unit I of the Washington Semester Program.

M. Judd Harmon of Utah State University has been promoted to associate professor of political science.

Louise Harned, who received her degree from Yale University in 1957, has been appointed instructor of political science at Bryn Mawr College for the year 1957–58.

C. Ferrel Heady has been promoted to the rank of professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Francis H. Heller, professor of political science at the University of Kansas, has been named associate dean of the college of arts and sciences at that institution.

George Hinds has been promoted to an associate professorship at Wayne State University.

Jirina Hrazdilova, a doctoral candidate in the Russian Institute of Columbia University has been appointed instructor in political science at Mount Holyoke College.

Harold K. Jacobson, formerly of the University of Houston, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

Norman Jacobson, assistant professor of political science, University of California, Berkeley, has been promoted to associate professor and has been appointed vice-chairman of the department.

Carey B. Joynt has been promoted to the position of head, department of international relations, Lehigh University. For the academic year 1957–58 he has been given a leave of absence to undertake studies at Harvard University on a Ford Foundation grant. His place will be taken by Tieh-Tseng Li, former Chinese ambassador to Thailand and Iran.

Morton A. Kaplan, assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago, has been appointed acting director, committee on international relations, University of Chicago.

Frederick E. Kidder has resigned as assistant director, school of inter-American studies of the University of Florida, to accept the position of registrar and lecturer in political science at the Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, San Germán, P. R.

Cecelia Kenyon is the new chairman of the department of government at Smith College.

Chonghan Kim has been instructor of political science, Marquette University as of February 1957.

Marshall Knappen has resigned as professor of political science at the University of Michigan in order to devote his full time to the organization of a group (as yet unnamed) which will work for the effective implementation of American foreign policy.

Robert J. Koblitz has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at Bard College.

Kenneth Kofmehl, assistant professor of political science at the University of Kansas, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at Purdue University.

Roy D. Laird, formerly of the University of Washington, has accepted a position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Kansas.

Robert S. Lancaster, dean of men and professor of political science in the University of the South, has been appointed dean of the college.

Leon C. Lantz has recently been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Martin branch of the University of Tennessee.

Ruth C. Lawson has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at Mount Holyoke College.

Eugene Lee, lecturer in political science and assistant to the chancellor, University of California, Berkeley, has received a regular appointment to the faculty as assistant professor.

David D. Levine has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration of The American University as lecturer in management.

Edward M. Levine, presently completing his graduate work at the University of Chicago, has accepted an appointment as instructor of political science at Purdue University.

Gunther Lewy, assistant professor at Columbia University, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Smith College.

Eleanor T. Linenthal, formerly of Cornell University, has been appointed research associate in the institute of public administration, University of Michigan.

Fremont Lyden has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Washington.

Max Mark has been promoted to an associate professorship at Wayne State University.

David Mars has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of government and international relations at the University of Connecticut.

Tom Mason, formerly of Harvard, has been appointed instructor of government at Smith College.

Nick Masters has been promoted to assistant professor at Wayne State University.

Carl A. McCandless has been promoted to the position of professor of political science at Washington University, St. Louis.

Howell McClesky, formerly of Harvard University, has been appointed instructor in government at the University of Texas.

Charles B. McLane, formerly of Swarthmore, has become professor of Russian Studies at Dartmouth College.

Robert J. McNeill, assistant professor of government, Los Angeles State College, has accepted appointment as assistant professor of political science, Purdue University.

Wallace Mendelson, formerly of the University of Tennessee, has accepted appointment as professor of government at the University of Texas.

Alfred Meyer of the Harvard Russian Center and recently of Columbia University has been appointed associate professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Lester Milbrath, who has been a fellow of The Brookings Institution for the past two years, joined the department of political science at Duke University as research associate at the beginning of the academic year.

Edward W. Mill has been appointed assistant to the president of the Rockford Colleges. He will continue to serve concurrently as professor of political science and chairman of the department.

Emmet V. Mittlebeeler of The American University has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the school of government and public administration.

Ralph M. Miwa joined the political science faculty of the University of Missouri as an assistant professor in September.

William Monat has been promoted to assistant professor at Wayne State University.

Allan S. Nanes of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, has been appointed a lecturer in the school of government and public administration, American University.

Earl A. Nehring has been reappointed lecturer in government at Indiana University for the academic year 1957–58.

Richard E. Neustadt has been promoted to associate professor of government in Columbia College.

Nicholas Nyary has been added to the staff at St. Olaf College as instructor in international relations. During the past summer he has been participating in the Columbia University research project in Germany.

Morris Ogul, who recently completed his doctoral work at the University of Michigan, has been appointed instructor in political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Karl O'Lessker, doctoral candidate in the department of government at Indiana University, has been appointed to the faculty of the University's Southwestern Center at Jeffersonville, Indiana.

Gene D. Overstreet, formerly of the Institute of East Asiatic Studies of the University of California, Berkeley, has joined the political science department at Swarthmore.

Caleb Perry Patterson retired in June as professor of government at the University of Texas, having been a member of the faculty since 1919. Professor Patterson has been the recipient of thirteen academic degrees, the author or co-author of sixteen books and more than fifty articles, and the founder of both Pi Sigma Alpha and the Southwestern Social Science Association. Professor Patterson was honored by his colleagues at a testimonial dinner on May 10, 1957.

Anthony Pearce has accepted appointment as instructor in the department of political science at San Jose State College.

Claude S. Phillips, Jr., formerly of the Unisity of Michigan, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Western Michigan University.

Palmer C. Pilcher of Wayne State University has been named administrative assistant and executive officer in the graduate school of that institution.

Charles Press, presently with the Grand Rapids Metropolitan Area Study, accepted a staff appointment with the bureau of government, university extension division, University of Wisconsin.

Eugene Price has accepted appointment as instructor in the department of political science at San Jose State College.

R. K. Ramazani has been appointed assistant professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

Maurice M. Ramsey will return to the department of political science at Wayne State University after a number of years service as assistant dean of the graduate school.

Joseph M. Ray, formerly professor and head of the department of government and politics of the University of Maryland, has resigned as chief of the education and libraries branch of the headquarters, United States Air Force, to become president of Amarillo College, Texas.

Peter Remec of Fordham's International Relations faculty will be visiting lecturer at the New School for Social Research during the academic year 1957–58. He spent the summer as visiting lecturer at the College of the City of New York.

Ross R. Rice has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at Arizona State College, Tempe.

James A. Riedel has accepted a position as associate professor of political science at Union College, Schenectady, New York.

Peter Rodyenko has joined the teaching staff of the social sciences department of Adelphi College.

Yosal Rogat has been appointed an assistant professor on the staff of the political science department, University of California, Berkeley.

James M. Roherty, who recently received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin, has been promoted to assistant professor of political science, Marquette University.

Francis E. Rourke has been promoted to an associate professorship at The Johns Hopkins University.

Leonard Rowe, lecturer in political science, University of California, Berkeley and head, public administration extension, in the University extension has been reappointed for 1957–58.

Bernard Rubin has been promoted to assistant professor of political science at Rutgers University.

Robert Runo, associate professor of political science at Roosevelt University, has become chairman of the department.

Bryan Rust has retired from Wayne State University after 28 years in the department of political science.

Robert H. Salisbury has been promoted to the position of assistant professor of political science at Washington University, St. Louis.

John Schaar, formerly of Mt. Holyoke College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science, University of California, Berkeley.

Seymour Scher has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of Rochester.

Eugene A. Sekulow has been appointed an instructor in political science at The Johns Hopkins University.

Jasper Shannon, formerly of the University of Kentucky, has accepted a professorship in the department of political science at the University of Nebraska.

Wilbur S. Shepperson has been promoted to an associate professorship at the University of Nevada.

Jay J. Sherman of Wayne State University has retired to the rank of professor emeritus after teaching 32 years at Wayne State University, 30 of which were spent as chairman and head of the department.

Thornton Sinclair of the University of Houston has become chairman of the department of political science.

Rhoten A. Smith has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Kansas.

W. J. Stankiewicz, formerly of the department of economics, Government of Ontario, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of British Columbia.

Murray S. Stedman, Jr., has resigned at Swarthmore to become director of information for the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.

Philip B. Taylor, Jr., formerly of the University of Michigan, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Tulane University.

Richard W. Taylor, visiting assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University, has been appointed associate professor of political science at Coe College.

Samuel F. Thomas, professor of government at the City College of New York, has become assistant dean at City College's Baruch school of business and public administration.

Woodworth G. Thrombley, formerly of Indiana University, has been appointed to the staff of the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Texas.

Henry J. Tomasek has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of North Dakota.

Robert D. Tomasek of the University of Michigan has accepted a position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Kansas.

James E. Titus, formerly of the University of Wisconsin, has become a member of the department of political science at the University of Kansas with the rank of assistant professor.

Robert W. Tucker has been promoted to an associate professorship at The Johns Hopkins University.

Thomas D. Ungs has been promoted to assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of North Dakota.

Robert Van de Velde has been appointed assistant to the director of the Woodrow Wilson school at Princeton. He will also be a visiting lecturer at the school.

P. J. Vatikiotis of the department of government at Indiana University has been promoted to assistant professor.

Eric Waldman was appointed acting director of the department of political science, Marquette University.

John F. Wallerstedt has been appointed to the faculty of the school of government and public administration at The American University as lecturer in comparative government.

Kenneth N. Waltz has resigned as assistant professor at Columbia to go to Swarthmore as an associate professor.

George H. Watson has been appointed dean of students of Roosevelt University for the academic year 1957–58.

Alan Westin, senior research fellow at Yale Law School, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Cornell University.

John P. White has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

York Willbern of the University of Alabama has been appointed professor of government and director of the bureau of government research at Indiana University.

Oliver Williams, of Wesleyan University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Paul G. Willis has resigned from Indiana University's department of government to go into business in Texas.

Catherine Williston, formerly of Mt. Holyoke, has been appointed an instructor in the department of government at Smith.

Arnold Wolfers, Sterling professor emeritus of Yale University, has been appointed as director of the newly established Washington center of foreign policy of the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University.

Coleman Woodbury has been appointed professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin and will head the University's new research program on urban development.

Theodore P. Wright, Jr., has been promoted to assistant professor of government at Bates College.

Raphael Zariski of Bennington College has joined the staff of the department of political science at the University of Nebraska as assistant professor.

Stanley Zyzniewski has joined the staff of the Soviet bloc foreign economic relations project at the University of Virginia.

IN MEMORIAM

Arthur F. Bentley, one American who contributed to political theory, died on May 21, 1957, at the age of 86. The range of his scholarly interests extended to the frontiers of the physical and the physiological sciences as well as the behavioral. His career included newspaper editing, welfare work, farming, and political campaigning.

His long and fruitful scholarly life commenced with a model of historical research, *The Condition of the Western Farmer as Illustrated by the Economic History of a Nebraska Township* (1893), and was concluded by the publication in the January (1957) issue of *The Humanist* of an essay "The Word 'Transaction'." His early career is marked by an effort to achieve a framework for coherent social description. His studies at Johns Hopkins, Berlin and Freiburg from 1892 to 1895 gave him a substantial background in the economic, sociological and political researches of European as well as U. S. scholars.

After receiving his Ph.D. in 1895, he taught a seminar on French and German sociologies at the University of Chicago, at which time he came in contact with John Dewey. His professorial role ended, by mutual agreement with his five students, in November, 1896, only to be resumed in 1941–42 when he was invited to a visiting professorship in philosophy at Columbia University and shared responsibility for a seminar on research in language with Professors Randall, Edman and Nagel. He declined an invitation to become chairman of the Department of Political Science of a large eastern college at this time because he was over seventy.

Fundamentally an iconoclast, Arthur Bentley was fortunate that his career was so little bound by academic routine. He left the University of Chicago for newspaper work and became a member of the editorial staff of the Chicago *Times-Herald* and *Record-Herald* until 1911, after which he retired to agricultural pursuits on a farm near Paoli, Indiana, his home for the rest of his life. During the first World War he raised money for the American Red Cross, becoming Chairman of the Indiana State Executive Committee. In 1924 he led the LaFollette-Wheeler campaign for the state of Indiana. Most important, his orchard in Paoli permitted him to read and reflect on the vast changes which came with the scientific developments of the Twentieth Century.

His newspaper work left him time to work on *The Process of Government* (1908) which today has become recognized as an inspiration and important guide to behavioral political research. This political study brought him to see that all thought and description is in language, and that language is social, a finding which was to dominate his subsequent inquiries. A first draft of this volume has the significant inscription: to "John Dewey, Georg Simmel, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Walt Whitman and many other joint makers of this book." The *Finis* reads: "To Any Reader—I am no more the slave of this book than are you."

After retiring from newspaper work, Arthur Bentley applied his linguistic hypothesis experimentally to sociological research, mathematics, psychology and logic in that order. These studies resulted in a large number of technical articles in professional journals from 1926 through 1950. The books he published during this period include *Relativity in Man and Society* (1926), *Linguistic Analysis of Mathematics* (1932), *Behavior, Knowledge, Fact* (1935), (with John Dewey) *Knowing and the Known* (1949), and *Inquiry into Inquiries: Essays in Social Theory* (1954). The product of this effort has been the *transactional* point of view which John Dewey and Arthur Bentley worked out together following the publication of Dewey's *Logic.* Regrettably, Bentley never was able to complete his theory of language.

The American Political Science Association honored him at a testimonial dinner in 1953. In 1954 the American Humanist Association voted Dr. Bentley "Humanist of the Year," and in November, 1956, this same association held a symposium on the importance of the transactional view to history, politics, psychology and education. This year the Antioch Press published *Life, Language, Law: Essays in Honor of Arthur F. Bentley* which included contributions from the fields of biology, economics, history, law, philosophy, physics, political science, psychology and sociology, suggesting some of the frontiers of learning which Arthur Bentley's work has influenced.

RICHARD W. TAYLOR *Coe College,*

1958 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1958 annual meeting of the Association will be held in St. Louis, Mo., September 4–6.

The Program Committee consists of Professors Marver H. Bernstein, Princeton University, chairman; Robert A. Dahl, Yale University, for political theory; Leon Epstein, University of Wisconsin, for comparative government; William Goodman, University of Tennessee, for political parties; Daniel Grant, Vanderbilt University, for local government; Richard Neustadt, Columbia University, for national government; Jack Peltason, University of Illinois, for public law; Richard Snyder, Northwestern University, for political behavior; Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Princeton University, for international relations; and Frederic Cleaveland, University of North Carolina, for public administration.

The committee invites and will welcome suggestions from members of the Association regarding possible topics and participants; these may be addressed to any committee member.

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

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